

SSO Armd

ARMOUR

BULLETIN

DES BLINDES



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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S FOREWORD


This edition of the Armour Bulletin continues the tradition of previous volumes and provides a forum of views and opinions of a professional nature, as well as an update on activities and events in the Corps.

In reviewing previous editions, I noted with interest my predecessor's plea for more articles. The response this year has been good, however, there can never be too many articles. I urge each Commanding Officer to plan now to include an article on his Regiment's activities, or for that matter on any subject, for inclusion in the next Bulletin.


The future of the bulletin remains uncertain. The proposal to produce a combat arms publication this year obviously did not come to fruition. There is still, I believe, a strong desire to realize that goal. We should accept that as the inevitable and make appropriate plans to obtain a suitable sponsor to allow the Armour Bulletin or a similar type publication to continue.

On the good side, our readership has received a considerable boost this year as the journal will be distributed to each paid-up member of the RCAC Association.

I wish to thank those individuals who have contributed articles for this edition and encourage our readers to provide comments on those articles or to provide new articles for the next edition.



I.D. Barnes
Lieutenant-Colonel
Editor-In-Chief



COLONEL COMMANDANT'S FOREWORD

At our Corps Association meeting in Valcartier last September, it was agreed that the Armour Bulletin would be given much wider distribution this time and it would be distributed to all Regular, Militia, Life and Association members. We thank Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Barnes and his School for their work in its production and we hope this extra effort will strengthen our lines of communication within the Corps and spark greater interest in what the Corps is doing and where we want to go. This is the opportunity for all members to air your views and express your feelings and opinions. I urge you therefore to stop talking and start writing and "send a letter to the Editor".

When I retired from the Army in 1974 at Gagetown, most of you will recall, that I was presented with a golden "Sherman Tank", which now sets proudly defending the Madawaska Valley in Hussar's Park, at the farm in Killaloe. Receiving that tank, on that particular day, is something which my feelings find difficult to describe and I shall never forget the love and comradeship which came with it. Since that time the little outdoor museum has grown in leaps and bounds and has now become an "All Arms", complex. The 8th Hussars presented a Ferret Scout Car representing

reconnaissance; 2nd Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Regiment presented a Regimental Survey Control Point, which was named "St Barbara's Lookout"; which now puts the farm on the National grid; 1st Canadian Field Squadron RCE, erected a section of a "Bailey Bridge" representing the Sappers. In September 1983 General Pat Carew, aided by The Ontario Regiment, presented me with a highly polished No. 4 MK 1 "Lee Enfield", rifle to complete The "Combat Arms" representation. The Bailey Bridge has three metal flag masts attached to it, so on fine days, should you pay us a visit, you will see the Canadian standard, the Corps flag and one of a number of your Regimental flags flying proudly over the Park. I can't begin to tell you how grateful and proud I am for all you have done and I still get a lump in my throat every time I pass by "Memory Lane", except now it is on a Tractor and not a Tank!

As you can see, however, from the picture above nice things are continuing to happen. General Bob LaRose, Lieutenant-Colonel Doug Taylor and their Regiment, 12e Regiment Blindé du Canada, kindly placed my name on the Centurion which guards the main gate at Base Valcartier, and unveiled it at our Association Conference. I was excited, speechless and overwhelmed at the ceremony and having raised "A" Squadron of the 8th Hussars there in 1957, this kind gesture makes one think.

Je remercie les officiers, sous-officiers et hommes du Régiment et suis très heureux de constater votre évolution et votre contribution au Corps depuis les premiers jours de la formation du Régiment.

Pendant toute la deuxième Guerre Mondiale, j'ai eu la chance de servir avec le Régiment blindé de Sherbrooke et ce fut une bien triste journée, lorsqu'à notre retour de la guerre le Régiment fut radié de l'ordre de bataille de temps de paix. En 1957, lorsque l'Escadron "A" du 8th Hussars fut créé à Valcartier, je croyais que nous étions à nouveau sur le chemin du progrès et de la réalité. Maintenant, avec votre Régiment au sein du 5ème Groupe-Brigade, le Corps est parvenu à cette représentation blindée souhaitée à Valcartier.

Vous détenez actuellement le trophée "RAM'S HEAD" pur avoir remporté la compétition de tir du Corps. Mais dans quelques mois, tous vous donneront la chasse à la compétition de Wainwright. Continuez à bien tirer et bonne chance.

I have just read the "Armour Guide which our Director, Colonel Bob Billings has produced and distributed. It is a comprehensive and straight talking document emphasizing the state of the union in the Corps. It states that the Corps cannot carry out its National Operational commitments since neither the Regular or Militia Regiments in Canada have any tanks to train with or for operations. The few tanks now at Gagetown are insufficient to expand our training load. The Armour Guide explains our equipment and personnel short-falls very clearly. This situation in the Corps is not new but it is serious

enough that now it must be listened to by our government and corrected. I urge Commanding Officers to ensure that this document gets circulated in their Regiments so that there are no hidden secrets. Life and Association members can also assist tremendously by briefing their members of parliament, as the Corps, I believe, is on the edge of a revival and needs all your support.

Our past Colonel Commandants, Generals Worthy, Swatty Wotherspoon, Bruce Macdonald and Ned Amy all faced the same difficulties and pushed on and the Corps survived. Today, the Corps is not standing still; in fact it is gradually getting stronger and better. As I visit the School and the Regiments across Canada and Europe it is obvious that the comradeship and esprit is first class. All we need are tanks and then we will be ready and willing to cross that start line!

There just could be a bit of a light at the end of the Tunnel, so my words of encouragement are: "Keep your powder dry and Don't Quit".

Sven Rad.

S.V. Radley-Walters

12 Feb 85



DIRECTOR OF ARMOUR'S FOREWORD

My last message to you was to urge you all to work on basic armour warfare. Judging from the conversations I've had in my travels you are aware of the subject. This time around I want to fire a shotgun but not before I urge you all once more to be good at your profession - know your Armour Tactics and DO NOT be bashful about expressing your Armour Warfare views.

I mentioned in the last Bulletin that I was surprised at the volume of traffic flowing into my office and that my staff appeared on paper to be small. In reality it has proven to be adequate for the task. I feel compelled this time around to tell you about some of the traffic and what is being done about that traffic. Not that we are accomplishing much, but I want to assure you that the effort is one hundred per cent. "SITREP AS FOLLOWS" -

- a. Armour Guide. As General Milner said in Volume 16 "It is a living document, continually updated responsive to the needs of today and the requirements of tomorrow, and as such is a working document for all members of the Corps..."

The Armour Guide has been reviewed and amended but not published for a couple of years. It is now ready to go out to you the Corps, from the Director. I ask you to use the Guide as Armour soldiers. If you do not agree with the Guide then for the good of the Corps, tell the Director;

- b. More Tanks. This is a continuing requirement which I trust you all could wax eloquently on at any moment. Each of you must accept the responsibility to express the Corps' requirements and the Army's needs for MBT. The NDHQ staff directly responsible for staffing the requirement for more tanks is active. Small progress is being made. That is better than NO progress;
- c. Competitions and RV. The Cougar Gunnery Competition in Gagetown 84 was FIRST CLASS. It was well organized, excellently supported, well attended, the shooting was good with room for improvement and the competition was very close. Well done 12 RBC. In '85 we have a full plate, i.e., Cougar and Recce Competitions in Wainwright, CAT '85 in Hohne and Leopard Battle Runs in Suffield. All should be very exciting and a great opportunity to hone our Armour skills;
- d. Regimental Rotation. Regimental rotation is still very much a requirement of the Corps. It can be done and it will benefit the Corps, the Army, the Regiments, the soldiers and the families. There are some detractors but it is our task to convince one and all that it can be done and that it is good. The short term task is to rotate the RCD and 8 CH. Then we must examine the rotation of the 12 RBC and LdSH (RC);
- e. Merit Boards. My fall calendar is always full with numerous Merit Boards and the consequent social activities to entertain visiting board members. Being a part of Merit Boards involving members of our Corps is an honour. I urge everyone who has an opportunity to be part of a Board to accept the task in a positive manner. Having read almost every Corps file from Cpl to Capt, I can assure you that we are in good shape. Your performance is good and the supervisors are producing good reports. The reports on Maj's, LCol's and Col's, I am told, are of a very high standard. You are all well thought of but you must remember you did not get that respect easily. It required dedicated professional work. Keep up the good work;
- f. OCDP. This programme has been in existence for about eight years. It had as its roots the aim of keeping the CF young, attracting good talent and providing meaningful careers. It has accomplished some of this but there is another side which has become unpleasant for our Corps. We have reached

the point where certain officers will NOT be offered IPS and therefore will be released at the 20/40 point. I do not like the task of releasing good officers and I am searching for ways to retain these officers. My staff is also analysing OCDP to ensure it is working to the best interest of the Corps as part of the Army and the CF. Be assured your concerns are our concerns;

- g. Officer Career Patterns and Technical Training. In this past year I have been continually reminded of our Corps' need for technically qualified people. We always were technically oriented but now more than ever we need this qualification. The Corps has a part to play in developing Armoured Vehicles, not just for ourselves but the whole Army. I feel we must re-assess our traditional career patterns to better accommodate the technical requirements. My staff is studying the problem with a view to making recommendations on training and employment. I urge you to think about it and put pen to paper either in the Bulletin or direct to me;
- h. Militia. In our Regular Force careers we tend to move in and out of assignments which may or may not involve the Militia. I had been separated from the Reserves for about four years and I was pleasantly surprised at the level of expertise we have achieved. I have visited all Regiments at Milcons - except Jeff and the PEIR - and observed some very good training. I also saw some questionable training - but not much. I was impressed with the quality of the troopers and their enthusiasm, the young officers and their dedication, the "old salts" and their energy. Some of our programmes may not be meeting your needs but based on what I observed we can't be doing everything wrong. If I could give you more equipment, more money and more people, I would. In the meantime keep up the good work;
- j. Dress. No sitrep would be complete without a word on dress. NDHQ has approved a new amendment to dress regulations which will state "... the black beret is compulsory for wear with all orders of dress by all Armoured Branch personnel no matter where they are serving". In addition, NDHQ has approved a new pattern of Mess Dress for Armoured Officers and CWOs. At this time the four regular force regiments and the Armour School have the pattern for the Mess Kit.

SITREP ENDS

Message draws to a close. It has been another busy year. I

have enjoyed working for you and with you all. Keep your spirits high and your professional armoured knowledge keen.

R.S. Billings

R.S. Billings
Colonel
Director of Armour



CORPS UPDATE

CORPS UPDATE

EDITOR'S NOTE:

What follows is a series of brief updates from several of the Reserve and Regular Force Armour units. It is our attempt towards a "central publication" which satisfies the needs of all the Corps. As the Colonel Commandant and others have recently pointed out, it is a solution to the problem of increasing communication within the Corps.

It is realized that some of the information presented is dated, however, it is hoped that succeeding issues of the Bulletin will continue to "inform us all".

8TH CANADIAN HUSSARS (PRINCESS LOUISE'S) (MILITIA)

The calendar year of 1984 was a very active one in the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) (Militia).

In January, all Squadrons as well as RHQ personnel undertook winter refresher training. In February the Cougar Troop was fired up and started theory and IMR training carrying on into March when they went to Gagetown for nine days field training winding up with a two day live range practice. At the same time a Recce Squadron (-) was formed in Sussex with remaining available militia soldiers carrying out TQ 1 level training winding up with a two day exercise.

The Regiment was very successful in District Small Arms Competition. The Cougar Troop carried out its operational tasking with 12 RBC in May and participated in Ramshead Competition where we didn't come first but then again we didn't come last.

The Regiment conducted an Escape and Evasion Exercise in June which with support provided by Intelligence and Service Support Personnel was of great benefit to morale within the Regiment.

The summer period was filled with a General Military Training Course conducted in Moncton for forty-two recruits. Courses on Cougar Gunnery, Cougar D&M and Recce Crew Commanding were conducted in Blue Mountain during the month of July. The Flyover Troop spent three weeks in Petawawa in July preparing for Germany and then subsequent training with RCD in Germany during August and September. The Armoured MILCON was conducted in Gagetown training area and was very successful with personnel from Engineers, 403 Helicopter Sqn and Service Support adding a great deal to the exercise. The exercise concentrated on the ability to set up a screen, and withdraw through a reserve demolition.

The fall period was taken up with troop level exercises and a miscellaneous weapons weekend. During Christmas school break the Regiment completed a TQ1 Course and conducted a Cougar D&M Conversion and Cougar Gunnery Conversion Course.

EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE



Freedom of Hampton

On the 27th of October 1984 the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) Regiment was given the Freedom of the Village of Hampton. Both Regular and Militia soldiers formed the parade, which was well attended by past serving Hussar and veterans of World War II. After the ceremony the Regiment marched through the Village with bayonets fixed, drums beating and Guidon flying.



Fox Hill Cairn unveiled and dedicated 9 June 84

Unveiling of Fox Hill Cairn

On 09 June 1984, the Association of 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) unveiled a Cairn. The ceremony was carried out by LGov George L.G. Stanley, O.C. Representatives of the Regular and Militia Regiments were in attendance as well an excellent turn-out by past service serving Hussars.

Regi Patriaeque Fidelis

GUIDON PRESENTATION PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND REGIMENT

The Prince Edward Island Regiment with squadrons located in Charlottetown and Summerside was honoured with due pomp and ceremony during a parade on the 23rd of June 1984 when it was presented with its Regimental Guidon by Lieutenant-Governor J. Aubin Doiron.

The Guidon was hand made in Pakistan for the occasion and features the PEI Regiment's official badge on a red silk background crafted in gold thread, two white horses to signify the regiment's historical association with cavalry units, and its five battle honours.

The last time an Island regiment was presented with official colors was in 1908 when the 92nd Abegweit Light Infantry, first formed in 1875, received its regimental and Queen's Colors at a ceremony in Victoria Park July 4. Those colors now flank the chancel at the Kirk of St James, where they were placed in 1922 for safe keeping.

The Prince Edward Island Regiment, now commanded by LCol G.F. Erving, was formed shortly after World War II by amalgamating the PEI Light Horse and the PEI Highlanders.

The PEI Light Horse reached a strength of 21 officers, 200 other ranks, and 154 horses by 1939, the officers and men from the unit quickly signed up for service.

Commanding Officers of the PEI Light Horse, reorganized in 1921, included Col G.E. Full, Col F.I. Andrew, and LCol L.T. Lowther.

The PEI Highlanders, also re-organized in 1921, had the following Commanding Officers: LCol R.H. Campbell, LCol C.J.C. Stewart, LCol A. MacLeod, LCol U.G. Dawson, LCol E.H. Strong, LCol C.C. Thompson and LCol W.J. MacDonald.

The first Commanding Officer commanding the PEI Regiment in the late 1940's was BGEN W.W. Reid, followed by Brig A.W. Rogers, LCol A.H. Peake, LCol E.K. Kennedy, LCol John A. MacDonald, Col D.J. MacCormack, LCol E.G. MacLeod, LCol W.S. Veale, LCol J.E. Ready, LCol J.B. Connolly, LCol A.R. Driscoll and LCol G.F. Erving.

On Friday, the 22nd of June 1984, the Regiment hosted a lavish Officers' Mess Dinner at the Armoury for the PEI Regiment Officers, out-of-province dignitaries and the Lieutenant-Governor A. Doiron, Premier James Lee, MP's and civic officials. The ladies were hosted at the première performance of "Anne of Green Gables". The Regimental Sergeant Major, CWO James Crombie, hosted a Lobster Dinner for the Senior NCO's and RSM's of Atlantic Militia Area.

There was a public reception following the parade on 23rd June and all were invited to attend. That evening the Lieutenant-Governor and Mrs Doiron hosted a Military Ball for the Regiment at Fanningbank, the official residence of the Lieutenant-Governor, while the men of the Regiment had a dance at the armoury.

Some of the visiting military dignitaries who were in attendance that weekend were Canada's Senior Army Officer, LGEN Charles Belzile, Commander Mobile Command, St Hubert, Quebec; BGEN S.V. Radley-Walters, Colonel Commandant Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, Ottawa; BGEN F.W. Fear, Commander Atlantic Militia Area, Halifax; BGEN George Kells, Ottawa; Col J.D. Murray, Commander CFB Moncton, New Brunswick; Col C.H. Parent, Commander CFB Summerside and LCol R. Hoodspith, SSO Armour. BGEN S.V. Radley-Walters was the Guest Speaker at the Friday evening Mess Dinner.

The Prince Edward Island Regiment perpetuates the history of several Island military units that have played significant roles in the Island history and have made important contributions to the South African War and both World Wars.

Its predecessors included the 82nd Abegweit Light Infantry, formed in 1875, the famed 105th Infantry Battalion of World War I, the 2nd and 8th Siege Batteries, the Prince Edward Island Regiment in 1921, the PEI Light Horse and the 17th Recce Regiment.

Many former officers and men from the old PEI units were on hand for the weekend celebration. Planning for the Guidon weekend has been handled by the Regimental Advisory Committee under the chairman and Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, BGEN W.W. Reid.



THE PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND REGIMENT RECEIVES REGIMENTAL GUIDON

LCol G.F. Erving, right, passes the Regimental Guidon to MWO J.B. Francis, the Guidon Bearer, who is flanked by Sgt B. DeCoste and Sgt T. Hunert, all of The Prince Edward Island Regiment.

A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH ALBERTA LIGHT HORSE

Divide and conquer is the formula for success of all great military establishments and strategists, but in the case of the South Alberta Light Horse, it is a sign of growth and strength. RHQ and A Squadron are established in Medicine Hat, Alberta while B Squadron is located 600 kilometers to the north in Edmonton. Assigned to Northern Alberta Militia District in 1979, the creation of B Squadron is evidence of the development and strength of the unit.

Military service from Southern Alberta traces its history back to 1885 when a cavalry unit was raised to protect settlers in what is now Southeast Alberta. The Rocky Mountain Rangers were formed in April 1885 in response to the Northwest Rebellion. Disbanded four months later and praised as a success in their role as peacekeepers, they have been and continue to be an excellent example for all those who have heard the call of duty throughout the years in the Southern Alberta area.

South Alberta Light Horse history is a story of changes, amalgamations and redesignations of over 40 different units encompassing infantry, machine gun, artillery, cavalry and armoured disciplines.

The official birthday is July 3, 1905 when the 15th Light Horse was created. South Alberta Light Horse perpetuates the Rocky Mountain Rangers as well as 22nd Battery Canadian Field Artillery, 12th and 13th Regiments Canadian Mounted Rifles and the 31st, 113th, 175th and 187th Battalions, Canadian Expeditionary Forces, 1914-1919. Battle Honours stretch from Northwest Canada 1885 to Vimy and Ypres in 1917 and to Northwest Europe in 1944-1945.

While the South Alberta Light Horse has always been served by dedicated men, one man in particular, Major D.V. Currie, served with particular distinction. Major Currie, commanding C Squadron of 29th Canadian Armoured Recce Regt, was ordered to cut an escape route in order to close the FALAISE pocket. With just 175 men, Major Currie did just that. The period of August 18-22 1944 saw Major Currie lead numerous attacks against numerically superior forces and personally assist in evacuating crews trapped under enemy fire. The defensive positions were also personally supervised by Major Currie. As a result of these efforts numerous vehicles were destroyed, over 800 enemy ~~men~~ were killed or wounded and over 2000 captured. During this intense three day period Major Currie had only one hour of sleep. The rest of the time he moved among his men providing reassurance and assistance wherever needed. Major Currie was awarded the Victoria Cross for his unfailing efforts but more importantly, his ideals and example serve as a guide for all who follow.

The current name South Alberta Light Horse came into being in 1958 as a result of more amalgamations. In 1960 the unit was transferred

from Calgary to Medicine Hat. Its current role of Militia Armoured and Reconnaissance was assigned in 1968. It is a rather appropriate assignment since the head of a Pronghorn Stag has been the central motif of the Regimental Badge since the formation of the 15th Light Horse. The Pronghorn is known for speed as well as its keen eyesight. The Pronghorn are a common sight in our training areas, seemingly approving of our tasks.

In the years since returning to Medicine Hat the South Alberta Light Horse have been very active and successful. The years 1962, 1963 and 1964 were especially successful as the Worthington Trophy, symbolic of the best Armoured Regiment in Canada, returned to Medicine Hat three successive times.

More recently, fighting through lean years and despite economic recession, the South Alberta Light Horse is once again up to strength. Planning and training are being completed in accordance with our designation as Armoured and Reconnaissance Militia. We continue to live up to our motto: Semper Alacer - - Always Swift.

SOLDIERS OF THE QUEEN-CANADIAN-(Reserve)

Khaki clad with black beret
the 'recce' forces underway,
now the trace is given;

Weapons clean, cam on face,
rookies attempt to hold the pace,
of the 'Reg' force soldier.

Field and gully, copse and green,
rarely is a movement seen
if one reads the ground;

a zzzitttt sounds upon the air,
sunray call signs take great care
to communicate to soldiers.

With hand signals, skyward thumbs
the lead patrol, probing comes
to the first real tasking.

The drill, we know, will be "no sweat"
all objectives being met
- as easy as a P.O. check -
if one knows one's job.

The Warrant of the troop, we've heard
has better eyesight than a bird
with expletives every other word
For his novice driver.

Troop leader with his boots, dust grey,
Is in the middle, if the fray
by design should come his way,
For controlling his command.

The squadron boss has a job to do
controlling movement, fire, too
from start line to objective.

And the excess Admin wogs
So many like obsequious dogs;
they don't lighten the war-gods fogs,
At the commander's O group.

Canadian soldiers train for war,
In a pacific nation never tor
EN in battle.
In a nation more content
to take its Khaki and duly rent
than to gird its loins.

-DBJ Snyder
Captain
OC 'C' Sqn BCD

Le 12^e Régiment Blindé du Canada (Milice)



BGén F. Caron DSO, ED, (LCol Honoraire sortant)
LCol M. Gaulin (LCol Honoraire entrant)
Maj Gén J.P.R. Larose, CD (Colonel du Régiment)

Une imposante cérémonie militaire s'est déroulée le 22 septembre dernier au 12^{ième} Régiment Blindé du Canada (Milice) Trois-Rivières alors que le Lieutenant-Colonel Honoraire Mario Gaulin a succédé au Brigadier-Général Fernand Caron, DSO, ED.


Le Brigadier-Général Caron occupait cette fonction depuis 1979.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Gaulin, nouveau titulaire, s'est fixé quelques objectifs personnels pour les trois prochaines années tels que reconstitution du musée du 12^e RBC (M) Trois-Rivières, accessibilité du public trifluvien et maintien de bonnes relations avec les autres unités du SE (M).

Cette cérémonie s'est tenue sous la présidence d'honneur du Major-Général J.P.R. Larose, CD, Colonel du Régiment. Mentionnons aussi la présence du Général J.V. Allard, CC, CBB, DSO, ED, CD et du Brigadier-Général P. Addy, CD.



Le Maj Gén Larose remet un souvenir à un enfant Grec.



Déchargement des produits et de l'équipement livrés par voie aérienne.



Une patrouille de la Troupe de reconnaissance.



La garde au pas de course.



Visite aux lignes des épouses en vacances à Chypre.

ARMOUR SCHOOL UPDATE

Editor's Note:

Our purpose in presenting this article is to provide an update on the activities here at the School. The last update was published in volume 15 in 1982.

Armour School Headquarters

School Headquarters is the centre of administrative and operational activities within the School. Interesting changes have occurred to this Headquarters over the past year. They have included the Change in Commandants and RSMs, and the onset of new technologies.

The School hosted a very successful Change of Command Parade in July 1984. Lieutenant-Colonel I.D. Barnes, CD, took over command from Lieutenant-Colonel R.N. Lawrence, and CWO A.L. MacAdams, MMM, CD changed the RSM's Cane with CWO E. Cady, CD.

Headquarters has also leaped into the computer age with the installation of two computer systems into two different areas of School Headquarters. The first system has computerized the production of the yearly schedules and of training support requests (these requests aid all training within the School). The second system is the addition of a word processor into the orderly room, which has enhanced the efficiency of our typists, and has made the orderly room look somewhat like the bridge on the U.S.S. Enterprise.

All in all, School Headquarters plays a very important part in the smooth functioning of the entire School.

Tactics Squadron

Tactics Squadron has been very busy conducting the various courses that the School administers. In addition, changes have been made to all of the officer-cadet phases, to the Armoured Squadron Commander's Course and to the Advanced Armour Reconnaissance Course. Also, the start up of the Depot Cadre has begun.

The Armour Officer Candidate Training (AOCT) has been revamped extensively. There still exists three Phases, however the subject matter has been moved, increased or decreased. The following list briefly summarizes the subject matter in each Phase:

- a. AOCT Phase II consists of:
 - (i) General military training;
 - (ii) Communications training;
 - (iii) Tactics training (section level tactics); and
 - (iv) Leopard driving and maintenance training.

- b. AOCT Phase III consists of:
 - (i) Leopard Gunnery training;
 - (ii) Tactics training garrison and field; and
 - (iii) Crew commander battle runs.
- c. AOCT Phase IV consists of:
 - (i) Cougar driving and maintenance training;
 - (ii) Cougar gunnery training;
 - (iii) Tactics training garrison and field; and
 - (iv) Troop battle runs.

AOCT Phase IV has also been increased to two serials per year, one in the summer and one in the fall.

Armoured Squadron Commanders Course (ASC) has been modified to meet the needs of the Corps. The Course covers the following subject matters in 59 training days:

- a. Tank Tactics training garrison and field;
- b. Combat team training garrison and field;
- c. Communications training;
- d. Leopard and Cougar Driving and Maintenance training; and
- e. Leopard and Cougar gunnery training.

Reconnaissance training is going through a major change within the Corps. In March 1985, the publishing date of this bulletin, the Course Training Standard (CTS) writing board was drafting the standards for all reconnaissance training for the Corps. From these CTSS, Course Training Plans will be written, and eventually these courses will be conducted at the School and at units.

The Depot Cadre was formed in 1984 as the first step in bringing the Depot Squadron on line at the School. The first serial graduated from this new organization in December 1984. Plans are proceeding to complete several TQ 3 serials in 1985. The Cadre has been allotted its own top floor of a building, and the Construction Engineers are busily making improvements. All these signs indicate that a full fledged Depot Squadron at the Armour School will be a reality in the near future.

Gunnery Squadron

Gunnery Squadron has been working hard with the newly formed Instructor-In-Gunnery (IG) Team, trials and a new course. The Squadron has been blessed with the IG team, which was formed in January of 1985. The IG team has several tasks, which include:

- a. the investigation of gunnery standards for each weapons system;
- b. conducting unit IG team visits; and
- c. maintaining a centre of gunnery expertise for the Corps.

Trials of various equipment have occurred in Gunnery Squadron over the past year. A list of the major trials is as follows:

- a. the new Indoor Miniature Range (IMR) was successfully built and tested;
- b. a laser range finder simulator was trialed, which is used to fire the IFCS on an IMR; and
- c. various sub-calibre devices were fired during different live firing practices.

A new course has been initiated within the Squadron to convert Cougar gunners into Leopard gunners. The Leopard Conversion Gunner's Course comprises ten days broken into eight days of lecture, practical and IMR periods, and two days of open range firing. This course has been attended by all of the Canadian Armour Regiments, whose aim is to prepare their gunners for RV 85.

CONCLUSION

The Armour School has been very busy with changes in training and equipment to meet the needs and wants of the Corps. As new ideas come forth, this process will be continuing and ongoing as these methods of training change. This process will ensure that the best training occurs on the best equipment available.

THE NECESSITY OF UNARMED COMBAT TRAINING
IN THE ARMED FORCES

by Capt P.P. Pharand

The Canadian soldier must learn to adapt himself to the different environments he could fight in and must acquire the necessary knowledge to operate a great variety of weapons and equipment. He studies the tactics and the fighting equipment of his potential enemies in order to know what to expect and be ready to react to their aggressive actions. He also learns through formal instruction and combined operations the capabilities of the other arms and services within his own organization.

Generally speaking, we are spending our time in keeping vehicles and equipment in an operational state and in teaching our soldiers how to operate them. But what do we do to prepare the soldier himself? How will he react facing an artillery barrage or heavy machine gun fire? Will he stand the battlefield noise and shock effect?

In this essay, I want to discuss more specifically the physical preparation required by the fighting man and its influence on his morale and his capability of supporting stress. You will notice that there is an important relationship between the physiological preparation and the psychological readiness of the combatant.

PHYSICAL CONDITIONING

The Canadian Forces have just put out a new program of physical conditioning called the CF EXPRESS test. The aims of the CF EXPRESS test are as follows:

- a. to condition the body to respond to a lengthy activity or sudden effort without compromising the human motor system; and
- b. to enhance muscular strength.

The program is based on an early assessment of each individual soldier's fitness and the prescription of specific training directives in relation to the physical condition of the individual concerned. It requires close medical supervision, a good follow-up program, and a well structured organization to supervise its conduct. However, is it applicable to and desired by combat arms units?

Let us look at the physical condition required by a combatant. Firstly, a high level of general endurance is necessary to enable him to withstand great physical stress during long operations. Soldiers can attain this level of general endurance through an appropriately run unit Physical Training (PT) Program. Secondly, the soldier requires body strength in order to carry out arduous tasks and to undertake aggressive

actions in various tactical situations. Soldiering demands much more than just being fit. Muscular strength must be developed and the soldier should expect to use strength and aggressiveness during hand-to-hand fighting with an enemy. PT should include contact sports, and personnel should be encouraged to participate in combative sports such as judo, karate, etc.

The soldier may react well to combat stress when he is part of a team and when in possession of all his fighting resources, i.e. his weapons. But what happens to him if he loses his weapons; if he becomes stranded; if he suddenly faces an unarmed enemy? Will he stop fighting? Certainly not; his survival depends on his will to fight. Therefore, he must be made aware of that situation and be prepared to face it.

UNARMED COMBAT

"Although proficiency in the use of personal weapons is one of the fundamental objectives of military training, operational readiness for war requires that the soldier be taught how to fight and survive in situations where they may have to face an enemy unarmed" (1). This is unarmed combat training.

The term "unarmed combat" means close hand-to-hand fighting without the use of conventional weapons. It is emphasized however that the soldier, when deprived of his normal weapons, should arm himself with any suitable improvised weapons such as steel helmet, clubs, rock, ... (2). His objective is to kill or render any enemy ineffective. Practice not only provides a means of developing endurance and body strength but will also develop aggressiveness and the will to fight.

Self-defense teaches the soldier about his capabilities and his limits. He will develop his self-confidence and build his own barriers to fear when facing an enemy. The soldier prepared through progressive and continuous training to that encounter will not have only a technical advantage but also a psychological advantage on his opponent. His will to defeat his adversary will permit him to gain and keep the initiative and influence the result of the fight.

TRAINING IN CF

Training programs of all major armies (American, British, French) include unarmed combat training. The level of skills taught depends, however, upon trade and employment. Every recruit is taught the basics.

In the Canadian Forces, all activities related to unarmed combat training, with the exception of the parachutist units, ceased with unification. Prior to 1967, the Canadian Army School of Physical Training included unarmed combat as a major segment of its course. Wrestling was taught for a short period after unification but was abandoned quickly after. The Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security has always taught

certain techniques of restraint and "comealong" holds, as have the military colleges. But in both cases, the training was not aimed at preparing the soldier for war and it is not considered in this essay.

For unarmed combat, categorization would be advisable. Obviously the requirement would not be the same for all trades and personnel would not all have to achieve the same standard. But still the basics should be taught to all recruits and units should be made responsible for the continuation of the program to the required level. There should be no difference made between ranks, age groups or sexes.

IMPLEMENTATION

Two major problems arise when implementing unarmed combat training for the first time: qualified instructors and space. The Canadian Forces School of Physical Education and Sports (FSPES) does not train instructors in this specialty. At present, only PERI staff having experience prior to 1967 and unit personnel having background in the practice of martial arts can be of any help.

The second major problem is space. A large room and a training mat are required. If the importance of this training is understood and if a fairly high priority is given to it, a workable solution can be found. The training mat can be made cheaply with styrofoam, canvas and wood. During the summer, a soft, grassy terrain or a sand pit will do. A progressive program at a rate of 1 or 2 lessons a week depending on the size of the unit would fit into this time-frame.

In summary, the implementation of unarmed combat training within a unit is possible and feasible; but, to ensure a satisfactory standard of instruction and the progression of the candidates, training must be approached seriously at all levels and a workable priority must be given to it.

... AND CONS

Unarmed combat training is not seen from the same point of view by every one. Not having been part of our basic training for almost two decades, people are reluctant to undertake such a program for different reasons. Three factors must be considered by leaders when implementing such training: general physical condition of the soldiers, participation and motivation of unit personnel, and continuity in training.

A soldier in excellent physical condition will achieve a good standard more quickly than an unfit man. But, if the program is well structured and mixed with general conditioning periods, an unfit soldier can undertake such training. He will progress slowly and will require close supervision. But anyone considered medically fit for a combat position should be in condition to follow the training.

Secondly, lackadaisical participation and poor attendance at these periods should not be tolerated. Any soldier, especially the ones belonging to combat arms units, can be trapped in a situation requiring a quick and deadly reaction. The rank or the age of an individual will not protect him from an enemy. He will have to fight to survive. So, it is important that soldiers be motivated through well defined objectives and standards, continual assessment and encouragement. It is also a principle of leadership. To gain the confidence and the respect of his men, the leader must prove his capacity for fighting and leading a group in aggressive actions.

Lastly, cancellation of training should not be considered on such basis as misuse of fighting techniques by soldiers, lack of time or injuries. We are training men for war. It takes time and dedication. Do not expect your men's patriotism and sense of duty to convert them into "Supermen" when the time to fight comes.

In the case of injuries, yes, one may expect some. But through firm control and a proper teaching sequence, they will be kept to a minimum. Consider also the number of people you have lost following morning PT lately or during organized sports afternoon.

CONCLUSION

A fundamental characteristic of the soldier is his training in the rational use of violence. That is what differentiates him from the civilian: his capability of undertaking aggressive actions in a rational manner in order to kill or render an enemy ineffective in the pursuit of an objective.

If we inculcate them with discipline and a sense of urgency through gunnery drills to ensure a quick and accurate reaction in periods of stress while operating their conventional weapons, why do we not provide them with the same capability of surviving when they find themselves without their weapons?

There will always be numerous reasons not to undertake unarmed combat training. Then again, the day you face an enemy, perhaps you will not run fast enough!

References

- (1) CF Manual for Physical Fitness (Draft), Section 12 para 200
- (2) CF Manual for Physical Fitness, Section 12 para 210
- (3) CFP 181 Manual of Unarmed Combat for Military Police.

TOTAL WAR TO UNCONDITIONAL VICTORY:
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OR HISTORICAL ANOMALY

by Lt P.J. McKillip

Wherever one looks today, one reads about 'total war'. Peace workers near hysteria as they contemplate global thermonuclear war; their fears ever heightened by their belief in the universality of the concept of total war. Our politicians discuss the consequences of the final showdown between East and West. Even military leaders around the world are thinking in terms of complete victory, total defeat or mutual annihilation. Why is this so? And is it correct?

For answers, we need to take a look back for the historical perspective. Up until the Napoleonic Wars, most conflicts were fought with limited resources towards correspondingly limited goals. Political aims generally reflected the personal ambitions of the rulers involved and wars were usually fought with small armies. Rarely did countries fight to the death. Usually, once one side gained a significant advantage, peace was restored through negotiation; albeit a lop-side negotiation in favour of the victor. Leaders recognized that there came a point where, short of complete subjugation, it was in their interests to cease hostilities and get on with living. By the same token, victorious powers were often very eager to quit while they were ahead and indeed recognized that by demanding too much, they would drive their adversaries to extremes of effort and infuse them with the energy of desperation. Many wars, already won, were subsequently lost because somebody didn't know when to quit.

With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, the character of wars began to change. Industry made it possible to arm and equip much larger armies than ever before. As well, nationalism, a new quantity in war, began to make its mark; and take its toll. The Great European War, as the Napoleonic Wars were then called, spread nationalism across Europe and urged nations to new extremes of military effort. Ultimately however, the issue was decided in battle, the countries were back at the negotiating table. The remaining wars of the nineteenth century were all quite limited with one very notable exception; the American Civil War. The Civil War combined industrial might with patriotic fervor to produce one of the hardest fought wars on record. The reason for the ferocity of the conflict is relatively simple. The Union was intent on the complete destruction of the Confederacy with no question of compromise. Consequently, the war continued until the South simply had nothing left. The importance of this war on modern thought cannot be over-stated. The English-speaking world, particularly the Americans, began to see winning as an absolute.

World War One was certainly a quantum leap in the annals of combat. All of the combatants put all of the resources, both of material

and of people, at the disposal of the war effort. The indecisiveness of the tactical environment however, precluded any real military decision and it was ultimately political and economic factors which decided the outcome of the war. With war now total, it was still not unlimited. Once Germany saw no chance for a victory they elected to negotiate a peace.

Then came the big one; World War Two. The war which has tended to define to a great extent how war is perceived today. The war, initially a war of political opportunism, eventually degraded into the greatest grudge match of all time. Three diametrically opposed ideologies, backed by the most intensively mobilized industrial effort in history, battled to the siren-song of unconditional surrender. There is no shadow of a doubt that the insistence on this ideal unconditional victory caused the unnecessary deaths of literally millions of people. The war ended only with the destruction of most of central Europe, the atomic bombing of Japan, and the complete emasculation of any remnants of resistance. The ultimate consequences of the war served to underline the terrible irony of it all. The losers of the war were eventually rebuilt out of political necessity and are now prosperous countries. Had the German and Japanese people known that losing the war would mean economic rejuvenation, there is little doubt that their respective governments would have been dumped, possibly as early as 1943.

And so where does this bring us today? In spite of the concept of total war being a generally accepted notion, and in spite of the fact that nuclear weapons have given us the means to conduct a total, unlimited war, what has, in fact, happened? A series of limited wars with limited resources towards limited goals. It seems that, once again, we have come full circle. The totality of nuclear weapons precludes their general use and the existence of them prevents wars from becoming too extreme; too desperate. Wars to the death now would mean just that, death; but for everyone involved (and many others besides). It is definitely time that we began tailoring both our thoughts and our efforts with the new 'limited' realities in mind.

WHO NAMED THEM TANKS?

By CWO K.H. Maybee, MMM, CD

AUTHOR'S NOTE:

During the recent RCAC Association Conference in Petawawa which was hosted by the 8 CH (PL), the Corps RSM and I had the privilege and pleasure of visiting B Sqn 8 CH who were exercising in the local training area. Our visit included an excellent officer/senior NCO dinner followed by the highlight of the evening, a visit with the junior ranks. At the latter, where the topic of tanks was raised. In particular, the question "Why do we call "Tanks", Tanks"? Needless to say, this generated a great deal of discussion. The conversation somehow, reminded me of a bingo game with the participants going all around the free one, without really touching it. I resolved that on my return to FMC, I would research the subject more fully and report my findings in the next edition of the Armour Bulletin. So for the young 8 CH trooper who originated the question, "Here it is".

Where the actual name of "tank" originated in describing armoured fighting vehicles has never been too clearly established. Even close to their time of birth in 1918 the men of the tank battalions weren't certain.

"The Tank Tatler," official publication of the Tank Battalions of the last war, offered three theories in historic November of 1918. Here they are:

Number one has it that a certain Thomas Tank Burrall, the manager of a well-known firm of Engineers in Norfolk, England, in the last century, had his curious second name from the maiden name of his mother, and finally was being called "Tank" for brevity by his friends. Whether it had any connection with capacity in any other direction has never been explained.

Anyway, the story goes that at the Royal Agricultural Show at Derby in 1881, this firm showed what was described as a most novel engine, a ten horse-power traction engine with a Landore steel boiler. It was stated to be the invention of Thomas Tank Burrall.


Realizing the difficulties these traction engines experienced in getting over ploughed fields and uneven ground, Mr. Burrall conceived the idea of patters for the wheels and the famous caterpillar wheels are the outcome of his invention. Mr. Burrall's ingenuity so surprised his fellow-workers in the factory that they called these patterned wheeled

engines "Tanks" in compliment to their manager.

The second version, which is allegedly of Canadian derivation, says that when the tanks were first turned loose by the British in their famous offensive the British war department picked as the most logical drivers for the machines, motorcycle riders of despatch riders. When the M.C. pilots gazed upon the new war machines for the first time they immediately nicknamed them "tanks" because of their striking resemblance to the gasoline tanks on their motorcycles.

Finally, the third and more generally approved edition is the more familiar story that is told by Colonel E.D. Swinton, inventor of the machines. He says that when the tanks were first built it was necessary to keep secret their purpose. Even the riveters and moulders in the steel plant where the outer casing was manufactured did not know what they were making these large tank-like bodies for. For want of a better name they called them "tanks" and the government officials, who knew what they were for, adopted the name, for no other reason than that they were not really tanks, and the name was a perfect form of camouflage. In fact, it was so good that it stuck even after the secret was out.

Friend or Foe



1.



2.

SHOULD THE AVGP CARRY ITS OWN SPARE TIRE

by Capt F. Kushnereit

INTRODUCTION

The AVGP, at this time, has to rely on first line support to change a flat tire. Although this system works reasonably well in peacetime, I suggest that the present system would probably cause undue delays in a real operation.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to resolve whether the AVGP should carry its own spare tire.

PRESENT SYSTEM

An AVGP tire can go flat for any of a number of reasons. The most common is the puncture of the sidewall by sharp rocks or empty casings. When a tire goes flat, the vehicle can still travel on the Hutchinson "run-flat" insert for approximately 50 km at a reduced speed.

When the crew of a vehicle reports a flat tire they also have to report the type of tire as left or right tread. The squadron maintenance vehicles comes to the location after picking up the spare tire from the SPSS Section. The Husky may use a shop jack or its crane to change the flat tire. The actual changing of the tire only requires the removal of 8 bolts. The procedure resembles the way you would change a tire on your family car. In fact, in most cases the Husky is only a delivery vehicle for the wheel and the jack, as the crew does the actual changing of the tire.

The damaged tire then has to be sent back through the Echelon system to the Regt A2 echelon and then back to a second line tire repair facility. Subsequently, a replacement tire must be demanded from second line holdings and brought forward. This procedure must be followed for the repair of each flat tire.

THE PROBLEM

8 CH is allowed to carry only 6 spares at the present time to service 38 AVGPs with a total of 228 tires. In addition, it is not unusual to have a company of infantry and several FOOs attached with a further 17 AVGPs and 102 tires to be maintained.

During RV 83, B Sqn had vehicles out of action for days due to lack of spare tires. The above reference states that "2 Svc Bn scaling of AVGP tires appeared to be inadequate". This was only one Squadron operating on a peacetime exercise. It had an expanded Echelon and the entire Regt's holding of spare tires, and yet this wasn't enough.

If the 8 CH were to engage in actual operations, tires would likely be damaged by small arms fire, shell fragments and mines. Tires could be damaged to such an extent that third-line repair or complete replacement would be required. I suggest that our current scale of spare tires would not support even limited operations.

ADVANTAGES

If each AVGP in the 8 CH carried its own spare tire, there would be a total of 38 spare tires (19 left - 19 right) organic to the Regt. With each tire weighing about 400 lbs, this would mean that there would be 15,200 lbs of tires that would not have to be lifted and handled by the Echelon System. Repairs could be affected immediately instead of waiting for the supply system. Currently one SPSS truck is employed with the hauling of spare tires when it could be employed more gainfully.

With the addition of one or more jacks to each troop, tire repairs would be a part of crew maintenance and the mechanics could be employed with the more demanding repairs. This would give the Squadron Commander an assured supply of spare tires, less vehicles out of action and proper utilization of his mechanics.

If the Husky were not required to change tires it would be less likely to come forward and be exposed to hostile fire. The reduced work load would also take some of the strain off of our over-tasked mechanics.

A further advantage would be in the reduction of the number of Hutchinson "run-flat" inserts that are currently used. Since the vehicle is capable of running up to 50 km on the "run-flat", most crews are tempted to carry on with training instead of waiting for a spare. Consequently, the insert is degraded to a point where it has to be replaced at a cost of \$400 per unit. If each troop had the capability to change tires, they could replace the tire before the insert was ruined.

Annex A illustrates a possible mounting location on a Grizzly and a Cougar for a spare tire. If the tire were mounted on the upper left rear of the Cougar hull, it would not adversely affect the vehicle's center of gravity. In fact, it would make the vehicle more stable. We currently have to use ballast when swimming the vehicle since the engine makes the vehicle heavy on the right front side. The Grizzly has more weight to the rear of the vehicle. The spare tire mounted on the left side would still off set the heavy engine on the right front.

The actual cost of the mounting bracket would be minimal as it could be fabricated locally. I suggest that a mount could be welded on the side and the tire secured with wing nuts. The jack could be a small portable model of at least 8 ton capacity. It could be operated either manually or electrically or using the vehicle's own air compressor system. One per vehicle would be ideal, but one per troop could suffice.

DISADVANTAGES

Some people could argue that the addition of a spare tire per vehicle would cost too much to implement and is not needed. I suggest that RV 81 and RV 83 have proven that tire usage greatly exceeds the original forecast that was made when the vehicles were purchased. With the Cougar now tasked with operational roles, our inventory of tires should be increased to provide realistic operational stocks.

The spare tire is vulnerable to hostile fire when mounted on the exterior side of the vehicle. This is an obvious fault that could be corrected by protecting it with armour or merely carrying it inside the vehicle (in the case of the Cougar which has the extra space).

There are two types of tires (left and right) as the tread is designed to throw mud clear of the vehicle. Within the troop, two vehicles could each carry a left treaded tire and the other two, a right treaded tire. For emergency use, a tire can be fitted on either side.

CONCLUSION

The present system of replacing damaged tires is inefficient in its use of resources, is too slow and has proven not to work very well, even during peacetime exercises.

Trained mechanics and a specialized recovery vehicles are being used to merely deliver the spare tire and a jack to the vehicle site when they could be working on more demanding jobs.

The task of changing a flat tire should be relegated to crew maintenance. Each vehicle should carry a spare tire and at least one jack should be carried within the troop.

With the increase of spare tires within the Regiment, we would reduce down time, allow the SPSS truck to be more gainfully employed, reduce the work load of our mechanics, have an assured stock of spares, and generally increase our operational effectiveness. I firmly believe that each AVGP should carry a spare tire.





FIGURE 1

ARMoured VEHICLE GENERAL PURPOSE WITH
PROPOSED SPARE TIRE MOUNTED

THE NCO AND DRESS AND DEPARTMENT

by CWO J. Rothenburg, MMM, CD

The subject of dress and department has been occupying the time of NCO's, ever since the first rock was thrown. They don't design uniforms, but are the enforcers when it comes to wearing them and are supposed to be the model to follow for young officers and men.

Gone are the days of heavy, cumbersome metal and wooden paraphernalia that used to constitute the protection of the fighting man. Also gone are the days of course and stiff materials, maintenance - demanding trappings of brass, silver cord and sash. The evolution of arms has demanded drastic changes in the style of the uniform, mostly for the better. Even if some of us don't agree with style and colour, integration has brought us into the era of the efficient and maintenance-free uniform; albeit, we have more uniforms to look after. The "looking after", however, is virtually painless. We definitely feel more relaxed wearing the uniform of the day than did the Roman, Norseman, Knight or Hun, or even our counterparts of the wars with PUTTIES. We feel good about the fact that it takes us very little time to get our modern day uniform ready for the occasion at hand. But, as slowly and surely as deserts eat up forest and field, our general attitude toward our uniform seems to be eroding all the positives that come with wearing it. All the little things that used to go together to make up good department through being well-turned-out seems to have been left on the QM counter. What has brought us to this state?

Some say that the design and colour of our uniform is such that one can easily be mistaken for a delivery man. In most cases it is not the design or colour that causes this mistaken identity. It is more often the fact that the individual wears his uniform as if he were a delivery man.

Some say that we don't have enough parades during which we could jack up the individual and force him to improve his dress. Well, we are always parading around in front of each other at our place of work, so what is stopping us from tackling these slack individuals there?

NCOs are expressing concerns about the warned individual with a dress or department shortcoming who does nothing to correct the fault. It's easy to understand why this occurs. As long as the individual knows that he is only going to be warned, and that his NCO is not going to back up his warning with concrete action, he will do nothing to correct the fault. But, if after one good stern warning, the NCO were to impose a punishment, and if we all did that consistently, as it is our duty to do, the ranks of the slackers would quickly dwindle.

Some say that there are so many uniforms with so many variations that it is hard to figure out what to do. Each uniform has a specific purpose and it should be worn only when one is in pursuit of that same purpose. If in doubt, it is our duty to read the standing orders, where the dress regulations are always published.

After thinking back on the so called "Good Old Days", and comparing them with today's way of doing things, one usually comes across the same fundamental change. The different way that we the individual apply the discipline of leadership today is the problem.

To illustrate, mentally describe the kind of person you want to have looking after your interests, the next one up the ladder from you. You will want someone who acts like he is in charge, a professional, one who sets examples and standards and then enforces them. You'll want a leader who will stick up for you, someone who knows the regulations, enforces them fairly and gets on with the job at hand without procrastination. You won't have any respect for indecision, or for someone who always makes excuses, or for one who is afraid to stand up and be counted. By the same token you will have no respect for the leader who does not wear his uniform properly and who can blame you?

Guess what? Your subordinates expect the same from you.

Now ask yourself, "If I know what kind of person I want as a leader, and if I know what my subordinates expect from me, how am I making out, do I fit this role model?" Having said all that, what are we the individuals supposed to do about it? The answer is really very simple; all we need to do is enforce the basics that have been taught us ever since we joined the Forces. These fundamentals have not changed over at least 30 years. It is we and our attitudes toward them that have changed. The old adage of "look after the little things and the big things will look after themselves" still hold true.

First of all we have to bring pride back into our consciousness. We are quite proud about the money we take home every month, considering the work we do, the amount of days off we get in the run of a year, and all the other benefits that come our way. So why can't we display our well-being by showing we are proud of ourselves, the careers we help mould, of the way we are turned out, the way we do our jobs or the way we have just helped someone with a personal problem? In order to be proud we only need do everything to the best of our ability, consistently. That covers personal pride, but it must go further than that, we must bring that pride to our sub-units, our units and the Forces in general. We must do our best to project that pride onto others and discourage all dissenters.

Next we have to practice good leadership. Again using the basics. We must lead by example: "do as I do, not as I say". You

can't expect anyone to always be well turned out or have a positive attitude toward his job and the different challenges it brings if you aren't prepared to do the same and more. It wasn't all too long ago when a LANCE CORPORAL was expected to know virtually everything, be one of the best dressed, look after the needs of his superiors and men and do it all for \$94.00 a month. He didn't have the benefit of lengthy formal courses, he had to learn it all on the job and through burning the midnight oil, and quickly as there were many waiting to take his place. How did he do it? He gave as much as he received. Rather than saying "I haven't been taught that yet" or "it's not my responsibility", he made it a point to know, because one of his men may have turned to him the leader to ask "how" or "why".


You also have to be honest, not only with the people you work with and for but also with yourself. You have to show that you are going to do the damndest to help out or get things done properly, even if it isn't going to mean a 10 on your PER every time. For example, all too often we have young troopers and corporals running around in ill fitting or see-through uniforms. We tell them repeatedly to do something about it, but when the young lad tries, the clerk at the clothing stores gives him no satisfaction and he is caught between a rock and a hard place. What we must do is ensure our people get the required service, at all times, by going with them if necessary and insisting that they get properly fitting or serviceable uniforms even if it means making some waves. Remember, it is our right, not privilege, to demand this service. Don't let other people's education, willingness to upstage you or negative arguments scare you off. If it's your job, do it, fight for things your way. After all, you are doing it for the common good and it's worth it.

Then there is loyalty. All too often we have NCO's openly complaining more about what is going on around them and their superiors, without doing anything constructive about it. Some seem to feel that voicing negative or derogatory opinions about their superiors or the sub-unit they work for, or the Forces in general, makes them stand out positively in the eyes of their subordinates. Were they to look at what they are doing objectively, however, they would see that the subordinate whom they are trying to impress is saying, "If he says that behind his back, what is he saying about me? You also have some types who just don't care. They draw their money every month and take all they can, but when asked to do a little extra or to work on weekends, they fill the room with buckets of verbal abuse.

We must not forget that we are a part of a big family, it supports our every need and in order for all to benefit, we must support it. Not one of us joined as instant expert; we made mistakes getting to where we are and we'll probably make more, but we will always have someone that cares who will support us and show us to the right way. All we are asked is to be prepared to do the same.

So, to recap, where do we stand? We stand at the threshold of the point in time where we the NCO's can put an end to negative opinions, about us, that are beginning to pick up steam in the quarters of the officers and men. We have to prove through positive action that we are entitled to be called the "backbone of the Forces". Paying attention to detail should become our foundation and exemplary dress and deportment the cornerstone.

Fact non Verba



"The Enemy Force is getting carried away again!"

COMBAT SURVIVAL TRAINING

IN AN

ARMOURED REGIMENT

by Capt M. MacLure

Introduction

When training plans are written, an important activity is often neglected. Ample time is normally available to train our soldiers on the basics and advanced aspects of their trade. The training often ignored is what a soldier should and can do to avoid capture and what to do if captured. This training is termed combat survival training and encompasses a wide range of topics including evasion, navigation, wild foods, primitive medicine and resistance to interrogation.

If it is assumed that this training is a necessary skill, and I believe that it is, then it is necessary that it be given some thought when planning regimental training. How then, to best train an armoured crewman to be able to survive after his tank or other vehicle has been destroyed. This paper will limit the choice of options to three. These options are: to ignore the training completely - hoping to achieve the same effect through normal training; have personnel learn the skills through a formal course; or to integrate combat survival training into normal training as well as having dedicated periods of instruction.

Aim

The aim is to determine the most suitable process by which combat survival training can be taught to armoured soldiers on a large scale basis.

Factors

Proficiency. To teach a man only to a level where he is familiar with a subject and then expect him to be able to practise it competently is grossly unfair. To do this when dealing with combat survival could well be fratricidal. History indicates that soldiers unprepared in combat survival skills were easy prey for the enemy and if taken prisoner were often susceptible to enemy interrogation methods. Any training program adopted must teach the armoured crewman to the level where he is capable of skillfully practising the art of combat survival.

Time. Training schedules are often wrecked by interruptions and demands from other taskings and requirements. Any training program that may undermine the basic aim of a regiment's training is not desirable. The program chosen must not interrupt the normal training schedule to any great extent. The program must not deter from training dealing with the basics of armour.

Cost. The era of the unlimited training dollar, if it ever really existed, has made its final debut. If a new training program can be introduced at a lower cost than another and the aim still be achieved then the lower costing program should be considered. This is especially true if the more lavish program would curtail other training activities because of costs.

Interest. If a soldier's interest can be motivated, he is more apt to retain material presented. It would be preferable to introduce a program that sparked the soldier's interest rather than one which is perceived as another monotonous detail.

DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS

Current Program

This option would take very little effort to initiate. It would rely exclusively on material already present in training plans to teach the soldier the necessary skills of combat survival. This would consist of current navigational training, survival training conducted during winter warfare and first aid training.

Proficiency

If this option were chosen it would be unlikely that many personnel would ever reach the proficiency level where they could be expected to have a chance of surviving a situation where they are on their own in a hostile environment. Even though the skills they would learn from normal training are valid, they are meant to be practised in a milieu much different than a combat survival situation. These skills are designed to be practised when with a formed group. When a soldier is cut off behind enemy lines he does not have the opportunity of asking and receiving assistance from those surrounding him. He must be skilled enough to fend for himself. To be skilled he must have been trained from a combat survival point of view. For instance, I doubt that there are many regular first aid courses taught at a regimental level which inform a soldier how to use maggots to clean an infected wound or that he carries around with him one of the most sterile liquids you can find - his own urine.

Other areas not covered by normal training are selection and preparation of wild foods, resistance to interrogation and evasion tactics. In short if this solution were adopted this soldier would not be trained to the necessary level of proficiency. As this solution fails to satisfy this overriding criterion it will not be discussed further.

DESIGNATED COURSE

This option would require the loading of personnel on a specially run course to teach them combat survival skills. This could either be run by, an outside agency or by specially trained personnel within the regiment.

Proficiency. If this option were selected the proficiency of graduates could be expected to be quite high. Those attending would have the benefit of learning and practising their skills with the minimum of outside interference. This solution would definitely meet this criterion.

Time. By sending personnel off on yet another course you would further reduce that individual's collective training opportunities within the regimental framework. If the regiment were to run the course it would definitely disrupt a generally tight training schedule. Although it is unlikely that training in the armour basics would be unaffected, the criterion of minimal disruption to training is not met very satisfactorily.

Cost. The cost of setting up and running a separate facility to conduct combat survival training would be high. The costs incurred by running the course at regimental level would be minimal but would still require shifting of funds from other training. This option would not completely satisfy the criteria set out by this factor but workable solutions could possibly be found.

Interest. As long as the course is presented properly, the soldier's interest should not be a problem. Because of the course content dealing with soldierly and adventurous topics most soldiers would enjoy it. After all, a prime reason most young men join the combat arms is to be a soldier. This option would meet the criterion of interest.

INTEGRATED PROGRAM

This option would break the training into a number of packages which could be taught throughout the year by the squadrons. Confirmation of training could be on a squadron or regimental level involving escape and evasion exercises and the like. Guest lecturers who are subject matter experts could be brought in, on an as available basis, to add flavour to the training.

Proficiency. This would present no problem as long as the instruction at the squadron level was maintained at a high standard. This could be done by the regiment ensuring that one or two of its officers or NCO's were qualified instructors. They in turn, could train and monitor a cadre of regimental instructors. This option would satisfy this factor.

Time. Very little time would be lost from the training schedule if this option was adopted. The instruction could easily be worked into refresher training, and confirmation training would not be difficult to include in squadron and, regimental exercises. Many aspects of combat survival could be included in the normal training of the squadron if a bit of imagination and work is put into it. This option meets the criteria of minimizing interruption of the training schedule and would not pull significant numbers of personnel off collective training.

Cost. This option would cause very little strain on the training budget. The most expensive areas would be the organizing and running of confirmatory exercises and this could be offset somewhat by including it with other armoured training. This option nicely meets this criterion.

Interest. If the level of instruction fell below standard, the interest of the soldiers may be difficult to hold during the instructional periods. However, with effort on the part of the squadrons it would not be difficult to maintain a high standard of interest, especially if the soldiers were aware of the importance of the subject and were able to practise their skills on a regular basis. This option could meet the criterion with little difficulty.

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS

As was noted earlier, the first option, that of relying on current programs to teach this subject, was discarded as it did not meet the criterion of allowing the soldier to reach the required proficiency. It will therefore not be compared with the other two options.

Both of the remaining options contain considerable merit and both would be workable solutions. When discussing proficiency, option B, or sending personnel on course to obtain this training, would be able to produce the more skilled practice. However, by introducing a high quality program into regimental training (option C) a soldier could be trained to a very acceptable standard.

Option C compares more favourably than Option B when we consider time taken from other training. The third option incorporates much of the training in regular regimental training whereas the second option requires the soldier to be excused from all other activities for a period of time. Integrating the training into the normal regimental training meets these criteria far better than sending soldiers off on a course.

Option C fares better than option B when monetary costs are considered. As much of the training in option C is incorporated into other activities the expenditure dedicated strictly to combat survival training is decreased. When dedicated courses are run there is very little concurrent activity possible and as a result the training must bear the full cost of conducting the course.

The interest of the soldier should be maintained quite easily by both options. There is a possibility that option B may be able to generate a bit more enthusiasm during the actual course. Both options satisfy this criterion equally well.

CONCLUSION

Although a dedicated course for the purpose of teaching combat survival is definitely attractive, after careful consideration of the factors it would seem that integrating combat survival training into the normal training schedule of the regiment best meets the aim. This conclusion is based primarily on the factors of time and cost. Although option B would have provided a highly skilled individual, option C will also produce a soldier who can function effectively under the extreme conditions expected during combat survival situations. Therefore based on these considerations an integrated program is the best solution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of this conclusion it is strongly recommended that future regimental training plans contain a directive for the squadrons to produce combat survival training program for their soldiers. In order to assist this directive it is further recommended that the regiment endeavour to have at least one officer or Senior NCO attend Allied courses which produce qualified instructors for combat survival.

Friend or Foe



1.



2.

FIRST IN PHASE THREE

THE MACDONALD SWORD

by Capt M.R. McNorgan

At 1200 hours on Monday, 19 February 1945, The Fort Garry Horse (FGH) were committed to battle. A Squadron was tasked to support the Essex Scottish and B Squadron the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, in an assault on a high feature near the Goch-Calcar Road. This feature lay between the first and second of the Siegfried Lines, three belts of defences along the Dutch-German border. The objective was secured after heavy fighting. As the assault elements prepared their positions for the enemy's reaction and evacuated their casualties the counter-attacks rolled in. Most of A Squadron's tanks were knocked out, the crews taking shelter in the infantry slit trenches. The enemy infantry methodically worked their way through the Canadian positions throwing grenades into the slit trenches while the defenders, now low on ammunition, waited for their reserve companies to mount a counter-attack. The counter-attack did not come and many Canadians were killed or taken prisoner. Among the latter was the wounded, 28 year old Officer Commanding A Squadron FGH, Major Bruce Fraser MacDonald.

Major MacDonald was a native of Edmonton, Alberta and had served in Artillery and Infantry units of the militia from 1935 to 1940. Graduating from the University of Alberta in June 1940 and he obtained a commission in the Infantry in July. In May of 1941, he transferred to the Armoured Corps and was posted to the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) as a troop leader.

Promoted to Captain in May 1942, he continued to serve as a Strathcona until September 1944 holding the rank of Acting Major for five months. In September 1944 he was posted to the Fort Garry Horse which had been fighting in Normandy since June. Again appointed Acting Major in November 1944, he took command of A Squadron of the regiment.

In spite of his wound, Maj MacDonald managed the next day to escape from the prisoner-of-war column as it was being marched to the rear. As he made his way back toward the Canadian lines, he was caught by shell fire from both sides while in no-man's-land, and had to dig a shell scrape with his finger nails to find cover.

Upon his return the exhausted Major was able to give Corps Intelligence a detailed description of the enemy's defences and of the ground conditions in the area of the Corps planned advance. For his cool-headed courage, his accurate observations and his conspicuous devotion to duty, Major MacDonald was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). He was later appointed Brigade Major of 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade.

Released from the Active Service Force in October 1945, he later joined the interim force as a Major RCAC in August 1946. He was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel RCAC in October 1946 taking command of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (School), an appointment he held until

October 1949. Having served a tour at the Canadian Army Staff College, he was appointed Director of Armour for the period September 1955 to December 1957.

His rise in the Army was steady, being promoted Colonel in September 1958, Brigadier in December 1962 and Major-General in July 1966. He was commander of 1 Brigade from August 1962 to April 1965 and served in the headquarters of the new UN Force in Cyprus in 1965-66. He was Commandant of the Canadian Army Staff College before his final posting to NDHQ as head of the Personnel Branch. In July 1969, he retired from the Canadian Forces.

In 1974 MGen MacDonald, then Colonel Commandant of the RCAC, offered his sword for presentation to the Armoured Officer Candidate topping the AOCT Phase III course. His sword replaced the RCAC Association Trophy which had been awarded in previous years. The first winner of the MacDonald Sword was OCdt B.G. Jackson.

The MacDonald Sword is a 1912 pattern cavalry officers sabre. The blade inscribed with the monogram of King George VI and the name of the manufacturer, Solingen, Germany. The scabbard is engraved as follows:

SWORD

OF

MAJOR GENERAL B.F. MACDONALD, DSO, CD

PRESENTED ANNUALLY TO THE OUTSTANDING CANDIDATE

PHASE III ARMOURED TRAINING


Winners of the MacDonald Sword presented to the best overall candidate in AOCT Phase III.

Course Serial:

| | | |
|------|------|---------------------|
| 7401 | OCdt | B.G. Jackson |
| 7402 | Lt | D.G. Allen |
| 7501 | 2Lt | W.W. Watkins |
| 7502 | OCdt | J.O.M. Maisonneuve |
| 7601 | Name | missing from record |
| 7602 | OCdt | P.G. Loggie |
| 7701 | 2Lt | M.G. Macdonald |
| 7702 | OCdt | B.D. Hale |
| 7801 | Lt | M.K. Carswell |
| 7802 | OCdt | W.J. Natynzcyk |
| 7901 | OCdt | J.P.P.J. Lacroix |

Course Serial:

| | | |
|------|------|------------------|
| 7902 | OCdt | S.H. Ellis |
| 8001 | Capt | K.R. Carhart |
| 8002 | OCdt | P.J. Atkinson |
| 8101 | OCdt | A.J. Baldry |
| 8102 | OCdt | G.A. Melville |
| 8201 | 2Lt | P.P.G. MacIntyre |
| 8202 | OCdt | J. Cade |
| 8301 | OCdt | R.E. Kingsbury |
| 8302 | OCdt | D.J. Milner |
| 8401 | 2Lt | R.M. Welke |
| 8402 | 2Lt | R.A. Erland |



SWORD OF
MAJOR GENERAL B.F. MACDONALD, DSO, CD
PRESENTED ANNUALLY TO THE OUTSTANDING CANDIDATE
PHASE III ARMOURED TRAINING

Editor's Note: Major-General B.F. MacDonald, DSO, CD passed away
in February 1985.

Editor's Note:

The following is the second part of an article that was submitted by CWO J.L. Perron, the Corps Chief Warrant Officer. Part One commenced in volume 17 of the Bulletin. It is a formal presentation of 60 CWO's, from all environments, of their collective views concerning "The duties and responsibilities of WO's and Snr NCO's".

Duties of Warrant Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers within the Canadian Forces.

INCENTIVES AND AWARDS

It is the responsibility of Warrant Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers to initiate some form of incentive programs within their units. Incentives are an excellent method to improve morale. In this way junior ranks will be able to develop their full potential and become productive members of the unit.

We recommend programs be instituted by units such as the "Deserving Service-Person Award". Write-ups can be submitted, mini-boards convened, and selection of the best person made by all section heads. A suitable award such as a plaque would be presented at a unit parade so that proper recognition is attained. The prestige and respect gained by one would be an incentive for others. There is no doubt that once instituted, more personnel will strive to be recognized as the best in their field.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CIVILIANIZATION

The effect of civilianization of the Canadian Forces must be examined to determine the full effect upon our ability to train and prepare ourselves to meet military objectives.

LEADERSHIP PREPARATION COURSES

We recommend that the following course of action be considered:

- a. all career courses be conducted on a pass or fail basis;
- b. that leadership courses be conducted much earlier in a member's career;
- c. the backlog of personnel awaiting loading on senior leader courses are conducted at our recruit school, now that the enrolment quotas have been significantly reduced; and

- d. that a staff course for senior warrant officers be introduced into the Canadian Forces to better prepare our personnel for the ever increasing and complex role of the senior other rank.

DRESS

To achieve a standard of dress worthy of the Canadian Forces we recommend the following:

- a. that a new position of chief warrant officer be created in the directorate of ceremonial;
- b. that the Canadian Forces publication 265 be reviewed and re-written at the earliest possible time with emphasis on authoritative direction rather than subjective words;
- c. that a working group be created to assist the directorate of ceremonial in this endeavour, consisting of one chief warrant officer from each command and that prior to the convening of this working group, all units within commands be contacted for their comments, through the normal chain of command;
- d. while it must be accepted that every supervisor is responsible for the dress standards of their immediate subordinates; and
- e. there remains the requirement for all warrant officers and non-commissioned officers to exercise their authority in this area regardless of their affiliation. In the performance of our daily duties we must assist each other by enforcing dress regulations.

LATERAL SKILL PROGRESSION

We recommend that the current study be hastened and that the program be implemented as soon as administratively possible.

RANK STRUCTURE - CORPORAL/MASTER CORPORAL

That the corporal rank be reinstated as the first level of supervision and achieved through merit.

We recommend that the appointment of master corporal be discontinued and that this be achieved through attrition.

FRATERNIZATION - FAMILIARITY - INTER-RANK MARRIAGES

We consider this a serious problem which needs in-depth study followed by firm, high level direction.

UNIT LINE QUARTERING

The present system of allotting quarters at the base level be discontinued. Units must be allotted quarters which they control in order to maintain unit integrity over their living-in-personnel.

DRILL

To compliment the drill presently being given on the Junior Leader Course and Senior Leader Course, a drill and duties course should be re-introduced in Canada for selected Warrant Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned officers and the practice of sending our personnel to England should be discontinued. Canadian Forces training system should be tasked to develop a Canadian content course to commence in the fall of 1983.

PERSONNEL RECOGNITION

An individual's accomplishments deserve recognition if performance levels are to be maintained or improved. Warrant Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned officers must be alert to individual achievements and be prepared to reward such personnel both privately and in the presence of their peers.

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS

The subject of drill, discipline and incentives covered in the general presentation can be resolved within current regulations and orders by our full effort in the application of professional development training.

CONCLUDING MATERIAL

CONCLUSION

There is now a requirement to introduce professional training into the daily lives of all service personnel. A greater responsibility for such training must be accepted and put into practice by each and every unit Warrant Officer and Senior Non-Commissioned officer. We recognize the high standard of our Canadian Forces personnel as specialists and technicians. We must now develop their military skills by upgrading their professional training. It cannot be over-emphasized that training is the root of an effective well disciplined military force.

In summary, we have diligently analysed our course project; we reviewed volumes of study material; we defined what duties and responsibilities really means; we reviewed them - past, present and future. We seriously considered how our duties and responsibilities were perceived by our service personnel and finally, how we were perceived by our officers. We believe that the prime duty and responsibility of Warrant

Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned officers is the provision of inspired, instinctive leadership. The major surfacing problem that we foresee for Senior Non-Commissioned officers is the diminishing authority levels of rank versus trade. Fortunately, the problem areas we have identified have viable solutions.

It is quite evident in some areas that junior officers are unaware or are improperly briefed with regard to the responsibilities of Warrant Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned officers. This in turn affects the working relationship between themselves and the senior other ranks. This is particularly evident in the management of junior other ranks where the chain of command is not observed and the experience of the Warrant Officer and Senior Non-Commissioned officer is ignored. We would now like to read a paragraph from the force Mobile Command Commander's letter number twenty-seven written by Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis which addresses this subject:

"I would like that the following guidelines be observed in this formation. The proper responsibilities should be re-established at all levels and especially Non-Commissioned officers be given their full responsibilities. They have been trained for that and we should profit from their knowledge and their abilities to lead. Lately, we have given officers' duties which used to be the domain of Non-Commissioned officers. This trend must stop if we want our Non-Commissioned officers to feel they have an important place in the chain of command. They must be given the opportunity to realize how important their role is within the military framework. It is by giving them this established position of responsibility that we will succeed in making their contribution both self-satisfying and challenging!"

In concluding our presentation, we the Chief Warrant Officers' Course 8201, want to assure you that as in the past, present and in the future, the Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned officers of the Canadian Armed Forces were, are and will remain loyal to the cause and continue to carry out our duties and responsibilities to the best of our abilities no matter what we are called upon to do. The following real-life example of Senior NCO Leadership summarizes our feelings.


The situation is WWI, the exact time and location unknown. The place an overrun MG trench originally held by Australians. The section was dead. But their orders were found on the timbers of the trench on a scrap of paper. They had been written by the platoon sergeant and are a model of what that rank and position mean:

- "1. This position will be held, and the section will remain here until relieved.

2. The enemy cannot be allowed to interfere with this position.
3. If the section cannot remain here alive, it will remain here dead, but in any case it will remain here.
4. Should any man through shell-shock, or any cause attempt to surrender, he will remain here dead.
5. Should all guns be blown up, the section will use Mills' grenades and other novelties.
6. Finally, the position will be held as stated".

These orders are crystal clear. They translated the normal operation order into easily understood standards of job performance and personnel behaviour that were expected. He was obviously a confident and forceful leader who was prepared to set the standard and enforce it. "Never pass a fault, and set the example".

Friend or Foe



1.

LIBERALISM AND THE MILITARY

by Capt M.A. Kelly

Since the mid 1970's there has developed within the military community of liberal society a growing "siege-mentality". Professional servicemen have expressed time and again their frustrations in dealing with the civilian world. Aside from the obvious differences in the two societies, there is an undercurrent of ideological differences that hampers complete understanding and trust between them. These fundamental differences are not often discussed by most professional soldiers and, except in some realms of academe, are rarely discussed by civilians. Issues become battle-cries; accusations are made and countered, but fundamentals are often left unexplained or assumed. Yet the very differences in opinion and viewpoint rise from fundamental differences in ideology and preceptions. This essay is intended to briefly explore some of these differences and hopefully stimulate some interest in this area. Though admittedly written with some bias, the intent here is not to belittle any particular ideology, but rather to point out some glaring problems that should be addressed in the forthcoming years lest apathy render the salvaging of a good premise impossible. There are certainly no simple answers when approaching philosophical problems and this author remains no authority. But it is an area of concern that affects all of us and justly deserves even a layman's consideration.

Liberalism, in its many practical applications, is the ideological cornerstone of numerous western nations. In being so it is the dominant source of both social and political expression.

In his book, "The Soldier and the State", Samuel Huntington describes liberalism as, "... a set of values and attitudes that promotes the concept of individualism over all others. The liberal orientation, emphasizes the reason and moral dignity of the individual and opposes political, economic and social restraints upon individual liberty".¹

The liberal ideology is Canada's dominant ideological construction. As Canadians we grow and mature into citizens verbalizing rightfully or otherwise, its beliefs and values. As a result of this socialization, prejudices as well as attributes are expressed with equal convictions. One of these prejudices is a dark suspicion of all things military. This is most descriptively seen in the downgrading of a soldier's social status during times of peace. During these lulls in popularity, social prejudice towards the military community becomes quite pointed. Popular literature will often depict the professional soldier as a reactionary figure easily alarmed by world events, a social aberration out of step with current social convention or in the worst case a warmonger bent on bloodletting. In the general public, opinions, though certainly wide ranging, seem often more negative than positive. Though many support

fidelity of the military to liberalism, but it also fails to understand and appreciate the necessary differences in orientation.

"Liberalism originated in the assertion of the rights of the individual against the state. Liberal thought focused upon the relation of the individual to the state and the relations among individuals within a society. Liberalism never questioned the existence of the state. Instead it presupposed the state's self-sufficiency and external security."³

Liberalism's preoccupation with the relationships between the citizen and the state leaves little room for direction concerning the relations between states. Liberalism presupposes a consensus of rules on how to play the game. In this assertion of universal principles, it has denied the existence of conflicting and divergent concepts. With black and white values, the possibility of grey has been overlooked or ignored. More likely than not, this insistence on universality only further advances the possibility of conflict.

"Liberalism has many pacifist tendencies, but the liberal will normally support a war waged to further liberal ideals. War as an instrument of national policy is immoral; war on behalf of universally true principles of justice and freedom is not."⁴

In effect the liberal embarks on crusades to further his beliefs. "The military mind on the other hand accepts war in the abstract but opposes its specific manifestations."⁵

Unlike liberal society the military community is a collectivist society, placing the group above the individual and stressing conflict as an ever present factor in life. This is rooted in its basic assumption of the nature of man. The military views man's nature in terms of conflicting human interests and with the belief that mankind will inevitably resort to violence to further his own best interest. It doubts the liberal assertion that conflict can be resolved through dialogue. For the military, peace is simply a lull in the continuing struggle for the security of interests. Because liberalism is primarily designed to defend the individual against the state it is ill-equipped in dealing with concepts outside the concerns of the individual. "The military on the other hand emphasizes the importance of power in international relations and concerns itself primarily with the security of the whole society from those relations."⁵ To the military mind, war is very much an instrument of political policy, if not in liberal society, certainly in others. Recent attempts to instill liberal values and beliefs will only destroy the capability of the military institution to readily identify and address conflict directed at the state from without. Liberalism is an ideology bound to a stable and consensual environment. It has no place in the hostile and violent environment of war. Present day conflicts are far reaching and all encompassing. The institutional devices in place, such as the UN, have become hard pressed to ensure the continuation of dialogue between opposing ideologies. The assumptions that liberals make so easily have less and less meaning in the world forum.

Liberalism is not a dead issue, but is becoming more and more lame as its environment is destabilized by conflict. In effect, liberalism is in danger of becoming dogmatic in its blindness to the threat. Like any system of social and political philosophy it requires intellectual updating if it is to continue in a practical application. The continued navel gazing of liberal thought does not begin to address the real life problems of an imperfect world. Agreedly the military community should not, and does not require absolute autonomy, but to function effectively in its environment it does rely on a set of values that have practical and tested application to its potentially hostile environment.

Liberal society if it is to survive must develop its principles to go beyond internal issues. It must come to terms with conflict and the concept of power in human relations. It must allow a degree of autonomy within the military community if it is to ensure its effectiveness in a hostile world. Because of its recognition to fidelity, because of its well documented history of service to liberalism, the military community in liberal society represents no threat to liberalization, but it does require trust, recognition and open lines of communication and contact with the society it is dedicated to protect.

FOOTNOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, the Backnapp Press of the University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1957, P. 90
2. Ibid., p. 91
3. Ibid., p. 149
4. Ibid., p. 91
5. Ibid., p. 91

LA RECONNAISSANCE DE CORPS D'ARMEE

PRINCIPES APPLIQUES AU NIVEAU DU

PELTON D'AMX 10RC

PAR LE CAPT BBM HOUSSAY, 12e REGIMENT DE CHASSEURS, OFFICIER D'ECHANGE FRANCAIS ET LE CAPT JOM MAISONNEUVE, 12e REGIMENT BLINDE DU CANADA

Note du Rédacteur: Cette article est le premier de deux articles. Le second paraîtra dans le prochain Bulletin.


Les Forces Canadiennes, et plus particulièrement l'armée canadienne ayant une organisation comptant quatre brigades opérationnelles, et ce depuis plusieurs années, a laissé de côté le métier de reconnaissance à longue portée. Notre expertise dans le domaine de l'emploi de forces de reconnaissance de corps d'armée est gardée à date à travers des exercices de PC aux écoles d'état-major. Plusieurs jeunes chefs de troupes se sont sans doute demandé quelles expériences ils vivraient en tant que chef d'une troupe de reconnaissance de corps d'armée. Le 12e Régiment blindé a la chance d'avoir un échange avec une armée qui possède des corps d'armée et qui pratique ce genre de reconnaissance aggressive, l'armée française. Nos Régiment alliés français, allemands, américains, britanniques, etc... sont nos seule sources de connaissances qui peuvent nous aider dans cette mesure.

Le concept du "AIR-LAND BATTLE" américain demande la capacité d'une armée d'engager les forces ennemies de premier échelon avec tous ses moyens, pendant qu'elle voit loin derrière ces forces et possède les moyens du théâtre d'opération de prendre à parti et détruire si possible les deuxièmes et troisièmes échelons ennemis. Une des façons que possède le commandant du corps d'armée d'accomplir cette tâche est d'employer son élément de reconnaissance, qui peut être envoyé en raid, en infiltration, ou être laissé en patrouille statique lors de l'avance ennemie. Il est donc important de savoir quelles sont les tactiques employées par les éléments de reconnaissance à ce niveau.


GENERALITIES: DANS QUEL CONTEXTE SE SITUE LE PELTON DE RECONNAISSANCE

Le régiment de Cavalerie Légère Blindée (CLB) de corps d'armée en France fait parti des Elements Organiques de Corps d'Armée (E.O.C.A.) d'un corps D'Armee d'environ 35,000 hommes comprenant en plus des E.O.C.A. trois à quatre Divisions blindées (DB). Le régiment de CLB dans la nouvelle structure de l'Armée de terre française de 1984 comprend en plus de l'Escadron de Commandement et Services (ECS) trois escadrons de reconnaissance équipés d'AMX 10 RC, de jeeps, et de motocyclettes, un escadron antichar équipé de jeeps et de missiles anti-char Milan, plus tard de VAB HOT, et d'un escadron d'investigation équipé de jeeps,

de radars, et de quelques missiles Milan.



L'escadron de reconnaissance comprend un peloton* de commandement et d'échelon (PCE) et quatre pelotons de reconnaissance.



Chaque peloton de reconnaissance comprend trois AMX 10RC, 2 motos et trois jeeps dont une équip.e d'une mitrailleuse de 7,62 mm. Il y a en plus un véhicule d'allègement qui reste avec le groupe administratif de l'escadron. Le chef de peloton, normalement Lieutenant, est en même temps chef d'un AMX 10RC. Le deuxième AMX 10RC, couramment appelé (engin de tête), est commandé par un Sergent. Le troisième AMX 10RC, souvent appelé (troisième engin), peut être indifférament commandé par le Sergent-Chef** sous-officier adjoint (SO A) ou par le deuxième sergent du peloton; si le SO A est en AMX 10RC le Sergent sera dans la jeep du chef du groupe d'éclairage et inversement. L'équipage d'un AMX 10RC se compose d'un pilote, d'un chargeur et d'un tireur en plus du chef de char. L'AMX 10RC est un char sur roues, amphibie, armé d'un canon de 105mm et d'une 7,62, équip. de télémétrie laser et d'une caméra à bas niveau de lumière pour le tir de nuit. Le groupe d'éclairage se compose de la jeep du chef de groupe et de deux jeeps d'escouade; chaque jeep a un conducteur et un chef à son bord: le chef du groupe d'éclairage, le chef d'escouade ou un simple chef de bord. Quant aux deux motos, elles sont pilotées par un cavalier ou un caporal ayant beaucoup d'initiative et de débrouillardise.

Le Régiment de CLB de CA a pour mission générale d'assurer la sûreté éloignée des éléments du C.A. C'est un moyen de renseignement rapide par ses transmissions, permanent car tout temps, précis et de contact. C'est aussi un moyen de combat en particulier dans les intervalles, sur les flancs et sur les arrières grâce à la puissance de feu de l'AMX 10RC et du Milan. Les missions d'un escadron de reconnaissance peuvent être de reconnaître ou de surveiller une zone, de défendre temporairement un point, de jalonner, de protéger les communications ou d'effectuer un raid sur les arrières ennemis. La CLB de CA doit détruire ou laisser passer la reconnaissance ennemie pour prendre contact avec les éléments de sûreté ennemis - l'avant-garde.

Le décor dans lequel se situe le peloton de reconnaissance étant posé, nous nous proposons de vous le présenter successivement dans la marche à l'ennemi en reconnaissance d'axe, puis dans une mission de jalonnement. Les missions statique de surveillance d'un secteur et de tenir un point, n'ayant rien d'original, ne sont pas étudiées ici. D'autre part, nous ne reviendrons pas sur la façon de combattre de l'AMX 10RC, les positions d'observation tourelle dissimulée, et de tir coque dissimulée étant les mêmes dans tous les pays.

* peloton est la traduction en France du mot troupe
 section " " peloton
 groupe de combat est la " Section

** équivalent au grade canadien d'Adjudant

LE PELOTON DE CLB DE CA EN RECONNAISSANCE D'AXE

Quand il reçoit sa mission, le Chef de peloton doit se souvenir que reconnaître, c'est aller chercher le renseignement tactique ou technique sur l'ennemi et sur le terrain en engageant éventuellement le combat. Il va étudier l'axe qu'il a à reconnaître en fonction du terrain et du rythme qui lui est imposé, Il sait qu'il doit voir l'axe et ce qui le tient.

Il va définir jusqu'à quel point il peut se déplacer rapidement et à partir d'où il risque de rencontrer l'ennemi, ce qui lui impose de progresser en sûreté. Il situera sur sa carte les (bonds d'escadron), ligne caractéristique du terrain (route, rivière, crête majeure) que le commandant d'escadron lui a fixé. Ils servent à réaligner les pelotons qui progressent sur des axes parallèles; les pelotons s'y déploient en observation et ne peuvent le franchir que sur ordre. En fonction du prochain (bond d'escadron), il établira éventuellement ses bonds de peloton sur des points caractéristiques qui permettront au peloton déployé une bonne observation avant de continuer à progresser sur l'axe.

Lorsqu'il peut aller vite sur l'axe parce qu'il y a peu de risques de rencontrer l'ennemi, le chef de peloton prendra la tête. Derrière lui il aura (l'engin de tête), puis l'escouade et les motos, et enfin le SO A en jeep et le troisième engin. (Nous prendrons pour hypothèse que le SO A est en jeep et qu'un sergent est dans le troisième engin, ce qui n'est pas obligatoire mais souvent pratique). Cette formation permet au chef de fixer le rythme de la progression: il marque les bonds qu'il veut en fonction du terrain et redémarre quand il le veut s'il n'observe aucun ennemi. En ambiance vitesse les bonds seront marqués à la sortie d'un bois, avant d'entrer dans un village, à la sortie d'un village, avant de franchir une grosse coupure et sur tout mouvement de terrain élevé offrant de bonnes vues. Avant de passer en ambiance sûreté, c'est à dire avant d'arriver dans la région où il risque de rencontrer les reconnaissances ennemies, le chef de peloton marquera un bond de peloton sur un point particulier offrant de bonnes vues et permettant le déploiement du peloton. Puis le chef de peloton fera adopter une formation de sûreté: l'engin de tête passera en tête et le chef de peloton prendra sa place en deuxième position. La suite de la formation ne changera pas. L'engin de tête progressera alors de point d'observation en point d'observation, le déplacement du peloton se faisant selon la technique de la (boule de billard). Arrivé en position tourelle dissimulée, l'engin de tête s'arrête et observe. Pendant ce temps le chef de peloton est en appui jusqu'à 1500m en arrière. Quand il voit l'engin de tête arrêté, le chef de peloton démarre, suivi à distance de sécurité par l'escouade et les motos. Il s'arrête derrière l'engin de tête et le relance en avant pour prendre sa place en position coque dissimulée afin d'appuyer la progression de l'engin de tête. L'escouade et les motos se portent alors à distance de sécurité et à couvert. Le SO A et le troisième engin soit suivent à distance de sécurité, soit restent en soutien au carrefour ou au mouvement de terrain précédent, prêt à intervenir en effectuant un débordement, s'il y avait un contact difficile en avant. En cas de contact visuel l'engin



de tête se poste et ouvre le feu sur ordre du chef de peloton qui reste maître des feux de son peloton, sauf en cas de combat de rencontre. Si l'ennemi consiste en un ou deux véhicules qui fuient ou qui sont détruits, la progression reprend toujours en sûreté. Si la résistance est plus forte, que l'engin de tête est détruit, touché ou simplement fixé, le chef de peloton fixe l'ennemi et le troisième engin déborde guidé par le SO A afin de détruire l'ennemi par le flanc ou l'arrière. La progression se poursuit ensuite toujours en sûreté. Lorsque la taille de l'ennemi n'est plus à la taille du peloton celui-ci s'installe rapidement en position défensive pour arrêter l'ennemi pendant quelques temps pour effectuer (la bascule), c'est à dire commencer sur ordre du commandant d'escadron le jalonnement que nous étudierons en troisième partie.

L'engin de tête conserve donc la direction et se déplace de point d'observation en point d'observation. Il ne redémarre que quand le chef de peloton est en place et lui en donne l'ordre. Il marque ses bonds en crête, en lisière de village, en sortie de bois ou en vue d'un point caractéristique.

Le deuxième engin appuie celui de tête lorsqu'il se déplace. Les jeeps ont pour rôle l'éclairage du peloton, de contribuer à sa sûreté en élargissant l'observation sur ordre du chef de peloton ou à l'initiative du chef d'escouade (ou du chef du groupe d'éclairage si les trois jeeps sont groupées). Elles cherchent le contact avec la population et trouvent des indices pour renseigner (traces, fouilles de véhicules détruits). Elles reconnaissent aussi les points particuliers telles les maisons, appuyées par les AMX 10RC.


ROLE DE L'ESCOUADE DE JEEPS

- 1 = (CHEF DE PELOTON)
- 2 = engin de tête
- 3 = SO A + 3ième engin
- 4 = escouade





Coup de sonde dans un hameau avec AMX 10RC

Coup d'oeil de l'autre côté d'une crête ou d'un masque



ABORDAGE D'UN POINT PARTICULIER





Le troisième engin à un rôle de soutien: il est toujours prêt à déborder une résistance pour la détruire de flanc ou de dos afin de permettre au peloton de redémarrer sa progression.

Les motards ont un rôle d'agents de liaison (avec les pelotons voisins ou avec l'arrière), et de guides pour un déploiement (pour amener les AMX 10RC en position).

Le renseignement, sur l'ennemi comme sur le terrain, est la responsabilité du chef de peloton, qui le transmet lui-même au Cmt d'escadron. Celui-ci le reçoit, le filtre et l'envoie au P.C. du régiment qui en fait la synthèse et l'envoie au C.A. Le renseignement sur l'ennemi est obtenu en engageant éventuellement le combat afin de l'obliger à se déployer et à montrer ses intentions afin de déjouer une éventuelle diversion.

Nous venons de suivre un peloton de CLB de CA dans sa mission la plus fréquente dans la marche à l'ennemi. Voyons maintenant la technique qu'il utilise dans le jalonnement.

THE FALAISE GAP

by Capt L.J. Zaporzan

Introduction

The month of August 1944 was the climax of the Allied campaign in Normandy. On the 30th of July the U.S. First Army under General Hodges broke through the German left flank at Avranches. The next day the Third Army under General S. Patton poured through the Avranches bottleneck and exploded into Brittany to exploit their success. Meanwhile the Second British Army was fighting along the northern coast towards Vire. The First Canadian Army at Caen was preparing for a breakout operation by General Simond's Second Corps directed on Falaise.

On the German side Fieldmarshal Von Kluge, Commander in Chief West, was ordered by Hitler to mount a counter offensive aimed at Avranches. The aim was to separate the forces of Hodges in Normandy from those of Patton, thus cutting off his twelve divisions deep in Brittany. The Germans launched their attack on the 6th of August, but were stopped with the destruction of their armour at Mortain.

The Canadian Second Corps on the 7th descended on the Falaise road. Simultaneously, the Third Army was ordered north to Argentan, the objective being to link up with the Canadians and trap the Germans. By the 19th Montgomery's and Bradley's armies met at Chambois, thus closing the only gap from which the Germans could escape. In the pocket the German Seventh Army and the Fifth Armoured Army were lost, thereby eliminating all resistance to the Seine River. Normandy was lost.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to prove that the German offensive, code named OPERATION LUTTICH, should not have been undertaken.

Overriding and Critical Factors

The aim of this paper will be met by the discussion of one overriding factor and three critical factors.

a. Overriding Factor

The overriding factor affecting OPERATION LUTTICH was that it was ordered by Hitler from Berlin, rather than the commanders on the spot;

b. Critical Factors

The critical factors involve the Allied situation and actions in late July and August 1944. They will be discussed under three headings:

- (1) the American breakthrough;
- (2) the British position near Caen; and
- (3) Allied air superiority.

Discussion

On the 30th of July four divisions of the American First Army unexpectedly broke through the German left flank at Avranches. This opened the way to Pontaubault, a bridge across the Selune River, which led to the main roads to Brest, Nates and Alençon. The Germans still held the bridge, but during the breakthrough the German's Seventh Army's armour, which was to have made up the counter-attack force, was destroyed by fighter-bombers. Von Kluge ordered General Farmbacher, G.O.C. XXV Korps in Brittany, to send Colonel Bacherer's 77th Infantry Division to attack Avranches and stop the Americans. After four hours of fierce fighting a squadron of P47's flew over and destroyed the counter-attack forcing the surrender of 11,000 men. Pontaubault still, however, remained in German hands and an attempt to re-establish the front was still a reasonable undertaking. General Hauser G.O.C. Seventh Army was to prepare for the attack that would allow the Seventh Army to withdraw.

The next day Patton's Third Army took Pontaubault and burst into Brittany at maximum speed. Hitler, upon hearing this, ordered OPERATION LUTTICH. He ordered that Army Group B with all its armoured units prepare a counter-offensive aimed at isolating Patton's forces and destroying them. In order to realize it, Hitler specified that all armour available must be transferred without being replaced. Most of this armour was to come from the British sector where they were preparing to break out from Caen. That decision marked the beginning of the end for the Seventh Army, the Fifth Armoured Army and any further German resistance to the Seine River.

The American Breakthrough at Avranches

The American breakthrough at Avranches was the cause of all German action on and after July 30th. Had Hauser's armour not been lost or had Bacherer been successful in closing the gap quickly, the front would have been re-established. However, once Patton came through, took Pontaubault and was deep into Brittany, it would have been better to withdraw the Seventh Army. The Allies were fully mechanized which gave them overwhelming superiority over the Germans,

who relied mostly on horse-drawn vehicles. If they had retreated instead of attacked they would have been covered by intact armoured divisions and once firmly re-established they could attack Patton's flanks which had been left wide open in their haste to advance. Finally, the German High Command underestimated the Americans. Already the Seventh Army had been badly mauled since the invasion. They lost 160,000 men - killed, wounded or taken prisoner, of 450,000 engaged. Von Kluge stated that there was little chance of reaching the sea given the situation and even if they did, then what? Their forces were too weak to hold against a heavily supported attack. He correctly estimated that any further attacks would worsen the Army group's situation.

The British Position Near Caen

The armour for the attack on Avranches would have to come from the area south of Caen on the Falaise road. Sepp Dietrich, G.O.C. I SS Panzer Korps had been successful against Montgomery from 7 June onwards. On the right the 12th SS Panzer Division had just broken up an advance on Falaise from the Southeast. On the left facing the Canadians were the "Hitlerjugend" of the 1st SS Panzer Division, who had prevented a breakout from Caen. To support the attack at Avranches, Dietrich would have to give up the 1st SS Panzer who were to be replaced by 89th Infantry Division; and untried formation from Norway.

The Germans knew that Montgomery was planning a breakout from Caen to Falaise. The Canadians had staged a number of small probing attacks in the direction of Tilly-a-Camapagne and the British attacked Mount Picon and had advanced to the River Orne. All of the German generals suspected an attack by Montgomery but their advice was ignored and the 1st SS Panzer was taken, weakening the defences on the Falaise road.

Allied Air Superiority


During the months following the invasion the Allies enjoyed almost total freedom of the skies. The Seventh Army's armour was destroyed at La Chapelle-en-Juger and Bacherer's counter-attack was destroyed by a squadron of P47's who happened along. Yet the High Command wanted all the armour that was left concentrated near Mortain for the counter-attack at Avranches. This was a great risk even though all movement was to be conducted at night and air cover was to be provided. This action indeed proved to be fatal for Army Group B. Before Hauser's attack force could move, the fog lifted and his armoured columns were spotted. Ten squadrons of RAF Typhoons and Thunderbolts of the 2nd Tactical Air Force attacked at will destroying the attack force before they hit the start-line. Three hundred fighters had been promised, but they did not exist. They had been destroyed on their airfields. Previous experience should have shown the Germans that they could not concentrate large formations of armour without courting-attack from the air.

Hitler Orders the Counter-Attack


The overriding factor is that the attack was ordered by Hitler unilaterally from Berlin and not by, or with, the advice of his commanders on the spot. None of the Generals actually fighting their formations agreed with the plan, therefore they had no confidence in it. Hitler seemed to have based his orders on a philosophy of "no retreat". He also did not trust his generals to carry out their orders. In fact he sent General Warlimont from the HQ staff to enforce the directives of the High Command and impress upon all commanders his "no retreat" policy. When Hitler made the decision to attack, he must have either underestimated the strength of the Allies or overestimated the powers of his armies. Perhaps he just didn't want to believe that his troops could be beaten. Had Von Kluge been allowed to withdraw, he would have saved his armies for another day, instead of squandering them in an attack that had little chance for success.

Conclusion


OPERATION LUTTICH was a grandiose plan but one that was impossible to realize in practice. The Americans strengthened and expanded the Avranches gap continually as Patton raced into Brittany. The British were poised to breakout from Caen and strike out towards Falaise. As well, the air was full of Allied planes that roamed at will. Finally, the order was given by an "absentee" commander who failed to take into account the Allied movements, except for Patton's, or the strength of his own troops. History has shown that the failure of the Avranches attack cost the Germans two armies as well as the battle for Normandy.



Map of Normandy showing the principle towns involved in the Battle of the Falaise



The 31st of July, von Kluge is two kilometers further from the sea. The temptation is strong to cut the two routes which permit Patton to pass through Brittany.




Formation of the pocket

References

- A. Savill, Mervyn, trans.: The Battle of the Falaise Gap, by E. Florentine. Elek Books, 1965.
- B. Stacey, C.P. The Victory Campaign, Chapters IX and X printed in OPDP 7 study guide.

"HEY!
DOES THE WORD
"FLANK"
MEAN ANYTHING
TO YOU!"



The following is a translation of a recently discovered scroll in a Roman ruin in France:

Cavalry Troops' Training Camp (CTTC)
Villa Gacius
Gaul
5 Sep A.D. 56

Centurion, Training Support Century

CHARIOTEER COURSE 5603

- I. Fellow citizen and senior, several problems have developed while preparing for this course.
- II. Only 8 of the 15 chariots given to the Century for this course are in working order. The other 7 all have rotted leather traces, five have badly worn wheels, and two teams of horses have yet to be shod. The Commissariat lost the requests for new leather traces and the Blacksmith has orders from the Cohort to give priority to swords and shields.
- III. Runners have advised us that the 35 auxiliaries for the course will arrive here in four days. Six of that number are Greek freemen and not one of my Legionnaires or myself speak Greek.
- IV. Lastly, you have ordered me to send to you my Gallic scribe to copy despatches for distribution. But I cannot read or write and, when the course report will be due to you, I will not have the Gaul to write it.

Sejanus Kearnii
II Troop

FRIEND OR FOE SOLUTIONS

| <u>PAGE</u> | <u>PHOTOGRAPH NUMBER</u> | <u>SOLUTION</u> |
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| 34 | 1 | T-72s in the attack |
| | 2 | Challenger MBT |
| 47 | 1 | Mi-24- Hind E firing an AT-6 Spiral anti- tank missile |
| | 2 | Chieftain 900 |
| 55 | 1 | T-72 M-1981/3 |

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