



Défense nationale  
National Defence



Armour

*Bulletin*



des Blindés

Canada

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**The Armour Bulletin des Blindés**

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Cover Photo  
A 8th Canadian Hussar leopard crosses a pontoon bridge during NATO exercises

Plat Supérieur  
Un léopard du 8th Canadian Hussars qui traverse un pont de bateaux durant un exercice de l'OTAN.  
CF Photo by WO R Sanschagrin ILC87-105-1

Back Cover  
The Royal Canadian Dragoons assisted by the Danes and Austrians meet the ladies of Cyprus during the "Women's Walk Home Demonstration" on 19 Mar.

Plat Inférieur  
Les Royal Canadian Dragoons assistés des Danois et des Autrichiens rencontrent les dames de Chypres durant "Women's Walk Home Demonstration" le 19 mars.  
CF Photo


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## Director of Armour's Foreword



To say that there have been a few changes since the last issue of the Armour Bulletin is something of an understatement. I do not intend to try to bring you up to date; by the time you read this edition, I expect my remarks will once again be OBE. However, I can tell you that the army staffs are working diligently on the post budget army and in due course you will be informed of the changes required to Army 2002. We are expecting change, and in this respect, you won't be disappointed.

I recently attended CAT where extremely high calibre teams from NORTHAG and CENTAG competed for the CAT Trophy first presented by Canada to this NATO competition back in 1963. The outcome is well known, but it would be remiss of me not to mention the excellent performance of the 8 CH (PL). They should be proud and so should we. This year's competition featured smaller targets and longer distances than at CAT 87 and included "hatches closed" firing and tougher target arrays to add challenge and realism to an already demanding competition. Despite the generation gap between the Leo I and the Leo II/MIAI's, our teams shot very well.

On my way to CAT, I had the opportunity to visit the RCD in Cyprus (for 22 hours) and as one would expect they are doing very well. They have initiated many innovative projects that are contributing greatly to the general lessening of tension on the island.

Although I was unable to visit RV 89 and the early MILCONs because of the Cyclical Review 89 (post budget army project), I have had reports from the Corps RSM on the training undertaken. It is obvious that full advantage was taken of the excellent training opportunities offered.

Finally, I'd like to end with a few words on the future of the tank programme. As you are well aware, the Government decision on a replacement tank will not be taken for some time. The project office has closed down but the excellent work of Colonel Nurse and his team has been captured by the army staff and is resident in the capable hands of former members of the project staff now working on the army staff at NDHQ. There are many factors that will impact on the future decision. I remain optimistic that we will see a replacement tank in due course. In the meantime, you have training challenges to face as you integrate new faces and leaders into your respective organizations. The next training year, leading up to the major militia exercise "ON GUARD", will offer its own demands and rewards. As professionals, it should be the focus of our immediate attention as we take another step towards Total Force training.

D.G. Taylor  
Colonel  
Director of Armour

## Préface du Directeur du Corps Blindé

Depuis mes dernières remarques au Bulletin de l'Arme blindée vous avez sans doute constaté que les Forces Armées canadiennes, l'armée de terre, et en particulier nous de l'Arme blindée, n'entreprendrons pas toutes les propositions telles qu'énoncées dans le livre blanc. Je ne peux pour le moment vous décrire toutes les activités et les idées qui sont en train de se formuler par l'état major de l'armée suite aux nouvelles propositions citées pour l'Armée 2002. En temps et lieu vous serez informés par la voix de commandement.

Dernièrement, j'ai assisté à la compétition CAT en Allemagne où les compétiteurs du NORTHAG et CENTAG ont démontré un très haut calibre de tir. Les résultats de cette compétition sont très bien connus et le Canada représenté par les deux équipes du 8 CH(PL) a très bien figuré malgré la compétition sévère contre les MI et les Léopards II techniquement beaucoup plus sophistiqués. Nous sommes fiers de nos équipes qui se sont mesurés contre les 21 meilleurs équipés de l'OTAN. Cette année les épreuves ont inclus du tir avec écouteilles fermées sur des plus petites cibles et sur des plus longues portées. Encore une fois félicitations.

Lors de mon voyage j'ai eu l'occasion de faire une escale à Chypre et de rendre visite à nos confrères du RCD pour une couple d'heures ((22 heures)). Ils se portaient très bien et ont initié plusieurs projets pour amoindrir les tensions entre les Chypriotes grecs et turcs. Bon travail!

De retour au Canada, je n'ai pu rendre visite à l'Ex RV 89 et aux concentrations de milice vu les contraintes du bureau. Cependant le SMR M Duffney m'a donné un compte rendu de l'excellent programme d'entraînement effectué lors de ces exercices. Je félicite tous les participants de leur excellent travail.

J'aimerais terminer cette missive sur une note des plus positives au sujet des chars de combat. Tel qu'annoncé par le gouvernement, la décision sur le remplacement des chars de combat ne sera pas prise dans un avenir rapproché. Les officiers du projet sous la direction du Colonel Nurse ont terminé leur travail et tous les dossiers ont été transférés à l'État Major du quartier général. Beaucoup de facteurs sont à considérer pour le remplacement du char de combat, cependant je suis très confiant que nous en aurons un dans le futur. Entre temps nous avons beaucoup de nouveaux défis à relever ainsi que l'entraînement de nouveau personnel et chefs que nous devons réintégrer dans nos rangs. La prochaine année d'entraînement offrira beaucoup de récompenses et surtout avec l'exercice de milice "ON GUARD". Ceci sera une autre étape vers la force totale des Forces canadiennes.

D.G. Taylor  
Colonel  
Directeur du Corps Blindé

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## LETTRES À L'ÉDITEUR



### Editor's Note

Your comments on any article appearing in the Bulletin (or on any armour subject) are most welcome. Letters should be addressed to the editor and, of course, be to the point.

### Note du rédacteur en chef

Vos commentaires au sujet des articles qui apparaissent dans ce Bulletin (ou concernant n'importe quel sujet blindé) sont les bienvenus. Votre correspondance doit être adressée au rédacteur, et prière d'être bref et concis.

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### Rat Patrol

Being away from home and out of the country always makes it difficult to remain abreast of current affairs within the RCAC. So the arrival of the **Armour Bulletin** was greatly appreciated. The articles and wide range of topics were met with enthusiasm and interest by fellow US Armor Instructors. The bulletin sparked many conversations and even some controversy.

One of the controversies is on Page 19 of the winter issue. The photograph is titled as a T80 with ERA. This photograph is actually a T64, which can be confirmed by the small, stamped road wheels, search light position, stowage boxes on the left side of the turret, and the small snorkel on the rear of the turret. These items are all basic recognition features of a T64.

My only disappointment with the winter 89 issue was the selection of the cover photograph. It is apparent that the ILTIS was the main focus of the photograph. But to others the photograph raised roars of laughter. I immediately defended our reserve force and explained their equipment situation. But notwithstanding those efforts, the photograph did not give a good representation of the RCAC. Their initial reaction to the photograph was of

poorly equipped and unprofessional soldiers conducting "Rat Patrol" type maneuvers.

I am aware of the push towards total force concept, but photographs such as these tarnish the normal professional image of the regular force. Had it not been for the unsecure binoculars placed on the hood of the ILTIS, the makeshift, unauthorized mounting of a GPMG, (which, if fired would be extremely uncomfortable if not dangerous to the crew as the hot casings would be ejected down), and the life threatening position that the gunner has assumed, it might have been a good photograph.

It is my opinion that the cover of the bulletin is its' reader's first impression. When sent nationally, the cover may present the image the RCAC wishes to present, considering our recent budget forecast. But internationally, it is not a RCAC enhancer.

Thank you sir, for your time and your obvious efforts put into the Armour Bulletin.

**WO D.A. Gardner** is an Exchange Instructor with the USA Armor Centre



## Ideas for the Improvement of Realism in Squadron Gunnery Training

The article, *Ideas for the Improvement of Realism in Squadron Gunnery Training*, which appeared in the 1988 Edition The Armour Bulletin was timely but incomplete in that it ignores Canadian Army Doctrine. Tanks do not engage a reinforced motor rifle battalion, or any other AFV, head-on from a firing pad: they engage enfilade from defilade. The target array depicted would be engaged in a squadron killing zone from troop battle positions.

If safety considerations preclude the realistic engagement by a squadron, troops can be rotated through troop battle positions. Troops will have different tasks, and probably different target arrays, from different battle positions. It is unlikely that the entire target array, especially a reinforced motor rifle battalion, in a killing zone will be observable from any troop battle position. It is virtually a certainty that the entire target array will not be observable by every crew commander.

Shown below are the proposed Target Layout Static/Range, which appeared in the original article, and a simple, quick fix which reflects doctrine. In addition, live fire exercises, not battle runs, should be planned and conducted by the squadron commander after he receives orders from the CO. Let's stop emphasizing the "control vehicle". The safety organization overseas: it does not command.

**Maj Ric Latham** is the OC Depot Squadron at the Armour School



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
## Mine Rollers / Ploughs

We recently read with great interest your latest edition of the Armour Bulletin. It is pleasing to note that the mine plough and roller system is receiving good coverage in this edition of your magazine.

We would, however, like to take this opportunity to point out a somewhat significant error in your photograph caption of a "Leopard with mine roller" (inside the front cover). The picture on the rear cover is in fact a "Leopard with mine plough".

To avoid any further confusion enclosed is a 35 mm slide of a "Leopard with mine roller" which you may care to publish in the next edition of the Bulletin. DMER staff are at your service to provide further clarification on the differences between the two!

**LCol Chris Ford** is the Director Military Engineering Requirements at NDHQ



# CORPS UPDATE NOUVELLES DU CORPS



## The Royal Canadian Dragoons in Cyprus

This has been a unique year for the Royal Canadian Dragoons as they will complete their first United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) tour as an entire regiment. Dragoons have served in Cyprus prior to 1989 when Colonel E.A.C. Amy commanded the first Canadian Contingent, made up of Recce Squadron, and 1st Battalion R22eR, in March 1964. As well, on two later occasions A and B Squadrons completed tours in Cyprus.

The Dragoons, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Appleton, are responsible for the busiest of the four sectors in the island's capital city, Nicosia, approximately 45 kilometers to the east of Louroujina.

Regimental Headquarters, commanded by Major Chris Sproule, is quartered at the Wolseley Barracks/Ledra Palace Hotel Complex. This is located in the heart of Nicosia at the checkpoint separating the Turkish Cypriot north and Greek Cypriot south.

Major Geoff Hall and the rest of Headquarters Squadron live and work at the Blue Beret Camp located in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) near the abandoned Nicosia airport. UNFICYP Headquarters is also located in the UNPA.

City Squadron, formerly A Squadron, patrols the Buffer Zone (BZ) within Nicosia. Major Ray Richards and his Squadron are kept very busy because of the short distances separating the two opposing forces. City Squadron Headquarters is also located at the Wolseley Barracks/Ledra Palace, Irish Bridge, Maple House, and Frezenburg House.

Major Bob Black with Rural Squadron, formerly Recce Squadron, observe the wide open spaces stretching from the edge of Nicosia east to the town of Louroujina. Everyone from Rural Squadron

enjoys living in Kebab (Ka-bob) country Squadron headquarters is at Camp Liri while the troops live along the line in numerous troop and section camps such as Ortona House, CS-64 Quebec and Camp Berger.

Highlights of the RCD tour to date are: the demonstration at Stravros Hill where 3500 Greek Women attempted to enter the BZ and were confronted by 2500 Turks; Major-General Clive Milner, a former Regimental Commanding Officer, assuming command of UNFICYP on 10 April; the implementation of "unmanning" (the first time since 1974 that either force has withdrawn) and finally; the naming of four "Dagoon" observation posts: SPRINGBOK, DRAGOON, TURNER and CAMPBELL (to add to OPs RAD and LELIEFONTEIN which already exist).

The Regiment is enjoying its tour but looks forward to returning to Petawawa in September. DRAGOONS!


**Lt Roger Cotton** is Operations Information Officer of Sector Three



*Tpr H. Stadnyk observing the Buffer Zone. (CF Photo)*



*A observation post in Rural Squadron's area (CF Photo)*



## CORPS UPDATE NOUVELLES DU CORPS



### Training in C Squadron

C Squadron has a unique role within the Armour Corps operating as an independent unit directly under the command of the Commander CTC. Equipped as a normal tank squadron with ten additional support trades, squadron tanks support applicable courses at the Armour School as well as CTC tasks such as the Combat Team Commanders' Course. Total tank kilometres in 1986 amounted to 47,000 of which only 10,000 were for C Squadron's own training. A paradox exists therefore, with very well trained drivers but extra training effort required for the remainder of the squadron. C Squadron's soldiers must have a tremendous amount of pride in their equipment and jobs if they're to keep the tanks in serviceable condition. High morale is a critical factor in C Squadron continuing to meet its role.

*Ex WALKABOUT near  
Sussex, NB*



*Armed Forces Day Rappel team*

The C Squadron training plan targeted these two factors specifically, in addition to normal field exercises. Simple guidelines were established which stressed physical and mental challenge and confidence building training for the soldiers and extensive preparation of the crew commanders prior to rolling track.

#### Training the Soldiers

Refresher training is the annual foundation of training but is frequently boring. To inject interest, a Supersoldier competition for Troopers to MCpls was scheduled at the conclusion. This competition was advertised well in advance as was the first prize of an all expenses paid trip for two to Acapulco. Tests included Regimental history, map using, personal kit inspection, obstacle course, NBCD drills, first aid, pistol shooting, weapons handling and AFV recognition. Competition was keen with the soldiers drawing reference books to take home and study, Troop Leaders being requested to give extra instruction and individual PT being done in the evening. The competition was an unqualified success.

Exercise WALKABOUT was conducted in the Sussex area. The squadron was organized into twenty, four-man teams (mostly by crews). Each team was led by a Trooper and included his crew commander available for advice. Given a very basic kit list of combat order, webbing and





*C Sqn tanks during Troop Battle Run Competition.*

three days IMPs, team leaders were free to add any kit they wished provided it all could be carried in a rucksack. Each team leader was assigned a different 75 kilometre route for going and stops. To toughen unaccustomed feet, the squadron marched with pack ten kilometres to Firing Point 5 each morning during gun camp. Teams were dropped off by helicopter at their various start points during March weather that included record cold and record snowfalls. Impromptu stops were made to address school classes and to help with farm chores. Tremendous publicity resulted with C Squadron soldiers front page in newspapers, shown on television and interviewed on CBC radio. A smoker on the final night in Sussex spread the war stories and emphasized the value of this cheap, easy to organize training.

A Troop Leader planned and conducted a three-day dismounted patrolling exercise which the Troopers were again tasked to lead and the squadron deployed to support. Working around the clock, with an enemy force, this gave excellent experience in leadership, battle procedure, map using, camouflage and fieldcraft.

A bit surprising perhaps, but on a base with the Infantry School and a battalion, C Squadron provided the helicopter rappel team for Armed Forces Day. Ten days of

*Preparation for a Recce patrol.*



workup and a demonstration in front of 5,000 people resulted in twenty very self-confident, happy soldiers.

### **Training the Leaders**

Crew Commander training included all MCpls to the OC. All trades participated as mechanics and supply techs must understand the basics of unit operations but are normally too busy during FTX with their primary function. To begin the year, one week in garrison with a timetable of lectures and discussion resulted in agreement on SOPs and drills to be followed by the squadron during field operations.

The first TEWT was held on Prince Edward Island covering over four days the advance, hasty attack, withdrawal and bridge demolition guard. Artillery, Air Defence, Infantry and Engineer representatives participated with valuable advice on the all-arms team. Questions ranged from "Where do you do your warm-ups and action drill?" to "You are 3 Tp Ldr - conduct your recce" to "33B to your right was just destroyed by a missile - what do you do?" One interesting discussion took place in a delay position in the fog concerning engagement of a tank appearing a few metres to the front with its gun facing you. The consensus - destroy. Two weeks later, half squadrons were doing a force on force FTX in the manoeuvre area. The exact same situation occurred, the crew commander engaged and destroyed four of his own call signs. All in all, the effort expended to train MCpls as Troop Leaders and Lieutenants as Combat Team Commanders was minimal considering the payoff. Crew commanders had a basic understanding of combat team and battle group operations which allowed them to anticipate what would happen next. Further TEWTs were conducted which covered the assault river crossing and the defence.

Standard senior NCO and officer garrison training was the prerogative of the Sergeant Major and the OC. The Senior NCO programme concentrated on leadership, discipline, administrative lectures at the mess. Officer development stressed communication skills and covered oral and written briefs, book reports and reviews technical reports and service papers.

C Squadron has had a successful year despite mileage restrictions. Critical to the effectiveness of this year's training has been the identification of strengths, weaknesses and goals. Next year the training in C Force will be even better.



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## Winter Training with the 1st Hussars

The 1st Hussars Regiment hit the ground running after a very successful Milcon at CFTA Meaford. After re-establishing and re-organizing the Regiment, the 1st Hussars had a full operational Squadron, a Training Squadron, and a Headquarters Squadron ready to forge in the new training year.

The major exercise in the fall was "Cooks Tour" which took its name from the size of the trace and the number of taskings. The trace stretched from Goderich in the North to Arkona in the South. The exercise proved its worth as the squadron re-established squadron movement and troop control in an operational setting.

Morale was very high in the fall as it appeared the Hussars were going to travel to England to train with its affiliated Regiment, The Royal Hussars. All ranks were eager to train on their main battle tank, the Chieftain. Unfortunately this trip has been post-poned. Despite understandable disappointment, the 1st Hussars eagerly turned their energies to Worthington training and our March Gun Camp. The Worthington Testing showed that the Regiments training program is indeed first rate.

Gun Camp proved to be an adventure. Leaving on Friday March 17, the buses from London and Sarnia drove straight into the teeth of the worst storm of the year. It took over seven hours on a yellow school bus to arrive at Range Road, only to find that the Base was closed due to the storm. As a result, the Squadron spent a most uncomfortable night on the floor of the Owen Sound Armouries.

The 1st Hussars arrived at Meaford the next day, and by 0930 hrs the first round was fired down range. Despite being late, the Squadron fired 16 crews out of a pos-

sible 19. The missing crews were absent because of work and out of country commitments. By 1700 hrs all of the daylight serials had been fired and the night shoot commenced at 2000 hrs.

By 2115 hrs the night shoot had been completed and the Cougars rumbled back to the Anderson Hanger. Early the next morning the Squadron stripped and cleaned all weapons and vehicles and by 1330 hrs the Squadron departed Meaford. Once again the "Meaford Zone" as the troops called it, lived up to its unpredictable best/worst! It certainly was a Gun Camp to remember.

Along with Gun Camp came our much coveted best crew and best troop award. MCpl Phillip Warner and Tpr Kurt Gough proved to be the top crew and 2Lt John Perry and Two Troop gained top spot after a fierce competition.

During the regular training year, the Regiment was also tasked to run Recruit, General Military Training, and ITT courses this year. Recruiting has been going well and it is projected that the 1st Hussars will soon be boasting a total of 34 Officers and 150 NCMS. The Regiment is also entertaining the thought of expanding to two operational squadrons next year, due to the strength of the unit.

Unfortunately for the 1st Hussars, but fortunately for the Regular Force, the 1st Hussars are losing eight men and one officer to their ranks. Lt John Malevich, Tpr Ian R. Fox, Tpr David W. Reid, WO Wendy L. Taylor, Cpl Ricky D. Van Bonn, Tpr Kevin R. Champ, Tpr Miles H. Walton, and Tpr William T.J. Daamen have been accepted into the RCAC. These officers and men join a long list of former 1st Hussars that have left to do very well in the Regular Force.

The Regiment has also sent six members to Cyprus and peacekeeping duties. They are receiving training and memories to last a lifetime.

The next challenge for the 1st Hussars is Milcon 89. The unit is tasked to operate a Regimental Headquarters and field a half Squadron in conjunction with the Windsor Regiment. All ranks are looking forward to a successful summer. See you there! —

**Lt Joseph Murry** is the Senior Lieutenant and a Troop Leader.

## FEATURES NOUVELLES DU CORPS



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### Don't train us - We'll train you

It has been said that change is good for the soul. It has also been said that reorganization is another means for creating confusion in new places.

One is often told that if they have a "bitch" or complaint, to stop crying in their beer and do something about it. Through this text I will try to accomplish just that.

Jane's Defence Magazine has noted that the Canadian concept for an All Arms Combat Training Centre is excellent and should work well except for the Canadian's penchant for changing things. This is especially true of the Armour Corps.

Every few years, the Armour Corps likes to head for the unknown without realizing the true consequences. An example of this is the way our soldiers are being trained, or more precisely, their lack of training as suggested with the courses now being offered to NCOs.

Throughout our history it has been proven that competent NCOs are essential to the overall success of any major undertaking, whether it be during war or peacetime. An excellent example of this is the line NCO in Cyprus who handles most situations that occur preventing them from expanding into full blown incidents.

The commissioned officer is unable to perform all tasks single handedly and it was for this very reason the NCO rank was created. The Sr NCO is the Jr Officer's right hand man, especially at the troop level and on occasion, his replacement, as any unit's war time diary will attest to. One version of how important well trained NCOs are is an excerpt from Max Hasting's "Overlord", which quotes a German report from Italy and reflects similar criticisms made by Rommel's officers in Normandy:

"The conduct of the battle by the Americans and English was, taken all round, once again very methodical. Local successes were seldom exploited . . . British attacking formations were split up

into large numbers of assault squads commanded by officers. NCOs were rarely in the "big picture" so that if the officer became a casualty they were unable to act in accordance with the main plan. The result was that in a quickly changing situation, *the junior commanders showed insufficient flexibility*. For instance, when an objective was reached the enemy would neglect to exploit and dig in for defence. The conclusion is: as far as possible go for the enemy officers. Then seize the initiative yourself."<sup>1</sup>

Sound familiar? We often teach our own soldiers the same tactic when it comes to the Warsaw Pact armies. Now we are guilty of repeating ourselves and making the same mistakes over forty years later. Was it not to overcome these serious shortcomings that led to the introduction of the QL6A and QL6B courses?

The Armour Corps constantly harps about the need for experienced crew commanders and knowledgeable instructors. The latest changes to the training system degrades its ability to provide NCOs with sufficient knowledge and the skills required to perform their duties in an efficient manner. Instead of all potential candidates being brought together in a common environment and providing them with instruction in accordance with set standards and under constant supervision we now leave this responsibility up to the individual units. This will force each unit to conduct some form of training which would have been undertaken by the Armour School. Under these conditions one on one training by experienced instructors which is so important in passing on valuable lessons, experience and correcting otherwise hidden mistakes will cease.

If the only Sr NCOs to train on tanks are those who come from a tank equipped regiment our base of tank experienced NCOs will shrink drastically. What about our commitment to NATO and being able to replace tank crew commanders who become battle casualties? While the American Army (who we've scoffed at due to their lack of training) struggles to implement cross training of its tank crews we are reducing ours. This will lead to only 40% or less of our future Sr NCOs having any training on tanks. Presently the new 6A implies that drill is considered as important as the task of moving a tank in a tactical situations.



This situation will compound itself when these NCOs end up instructing AOOT Phase courses. We'll end up with individuals assessing our future officers on their capabilities of crew commanding a tank without having been properly trained themselves. This will lead to hidden faults being passed on and expanding in magnitude.

The complaint that individuals spend too much time away from the unit is a valid one. However, if the Corps wants to ensure its NCOs are properly trained and have met all qualifications required for that rank, the Corps must make full use of the Combat Training Centre (CTC) which was created for that specific purpose. CTC must not become "officers only" country, but be used to its full extent to ensure that any weakness and shortcomings within the NCO ranks are discovered and corrected so they become competent professionals.

General Radley-Walters often lectured on the value or Sr NCOs and how they must be properly trained. The Corps often reflected this sentiment during NCO training.

With the new 6A and the cancellation of the 6B, the stool has been kicked out from underneath the NCO, leaving the individual to flounder around without the proper guidance and tutoring. Having had the opportunity to become an acting Tp WO in a recce squadron without benefit of the 6B course, I can honestly reflect upon the true value of the 6B course. Working with a new, inexperienced Tp Officer, fresh from Gagetown proved to be an eye-opening experience indeed. The situations which developed would have been greatly

improved if I had the 6B course. My lack of this valuable course caused me to be a liability during the early stages of our troop's development. Without a proper working knowledge to fall back on I made many mistakes which need not have happened. With the cancellation of the 6B course other unfortunate individuals will needlessly suffer the same situation. The result will be young Sr NCOs being thrust into situations for which they have had no training causing a ripple effect and lowering all standards of training. Field Marshall the Viscount Montgomery felt so strongly about the proper training of his soldiers that the fourth point he mentioned to the generals and senior commanders of his British Second Army in preparation for OVERLORD:

"Many other points matter in less degree. These sort themselves out in battle and you get your sense of values. You get a dividend in accordance with your training, ie. ability to teach your officers and NCOs who are the leaders."<sup>2</sup>

In order to ensure we can maintain our sense of values, let those who have made the mistakes and have learned through experience, pass on this vital information to others before serious damage to morale and the efficiency of the Sr NCO rank takes place.

I submit to you that our new Sgts are now nothing more than glorified MCpls who can do drill and limited paperwork. The 6A and 6B courses must be used to identify those unfit for the rank and provide leadership training in a common environment, which is not available under the present system as it relies heavily upon a CO's discretion. This same discretion changes every two years bringing about a new set of standards and values. This is then further compounded by being spread out over four different units. This leaves the Sr NCO vulnerable to uncertain conditions, which are constantly changing and vary from unit to unit, without any means of recourse such as standardized training provided by the Armour School. It is this uncertain atmosphere which leads to the belief that the Sr NCO has no real input at any level regarding the events which takes place within his corps. He feels he is becoming just another training aid.

The combination of the factors that I have briefly touched upon now creates a void in the training required for Sr NCOs which reflects a lowering of standards



expected not only by the commanders but by the Sr NCOs themselves. The German Army felt that:

"Professional standards and soldierly honour were key motivating factors, especially as far as officers and NCOs were concerned, and helped them not only to maintain the Second World War German Army at what was, man for man, and division for division, a remarkably high level of combat effectiveness..."<sup>3</sup>

It is this professional standard and honour which is being eroded in our Sr NCO ranks today. We are being told that we are not required to enhance our leadership training as it is not necessary.

This insult is a slap in the face for all those who have strived to improve their professionalism as a Sr NCO. One must remember that a Sr NCO is a career soldier who spends the majority of his time as a member of a sabre troop (unlike his troop leader who will only hold his position for a maximum two years) enhancing the stability within these organizations.

For many years we have looked down at the lack of professionalism of the Sr NCOs of other countries and took pride in the abilities of our NCOs to react to orders and produce results. Now the shoe is on the other foot as we endeavour to reduce the amount of training for all NCMs and become what we used to scorn.


The point I wish to raise is, can it be possible that our Corps cannot trust and support the NCOs' reaction and that the problems might be worse than one would care to admit?

So once again, the Corps has decided to change the system, never mind the fact that history bears witness that it was all tried before. It would appear that we are damaging ourselves and the improvements we are undertaking are really doing more harm than good. All I've mentioned here is in reference to the 6A and 6B courses. Someone else can tackle the problems of the "new" advanced courses which is another can of worms.

**Sgt Steve Critchley** is a Driving & Maintenance Instructor at the Armour School

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## CTC Trial and Evaluations Section Armour Trials Update

One of the most important stages in the equipment procurement process is the User Trial and Evaluation. In these trials the tasked field units are asked to test new equipment and judge their design and operational value. At the same time the Trial Officer collects hard facts on equipment performance. Faced with a flood of conflicting subjective and objective data, the Trial Officer is forced to draw the line and ask the user: "...yes, but would you fight with it"?


The aim of this update is to describe some of the current and upcoming armour-related trials being carried out by CFB Gagetown's Trial and Evaluations (T&E) Section. These activities involve testing the following:

- upgraded canisters for the personal respirator;
- illuminated callsign panels for AFV's;
- improved AFV crewsuits and a crewman load-carrying vest;
- Canadian-made Leopard track components;
- crewman ventilated respirator system; and
- rationalized Leopard equipment stowage.

### C4 & XC6 Canisters

The C1 and C2 respirator canisters presently used with the C3 gas mask are to be replaced by one which is slightly longer for better protection. Two prototype canisters which have been proposed are designated the XC6 and the C4. They will be tested with the C3 gas mask, the C3 (Universal Canister Mount) gas mask and the C4 gas mask.

These canister and mask combinations will be evaluated for compatibility with a large number of combat arms weapon systems. Trial personnel will also be asked if the weight and size of the new canisters are acceptable from an ergonomic point of view. Although the filter canisters are heavier than the C1 and C2, the users will likely appreciate the longer filter life provided. Also, since the prototype canisters do not need an adapter with the newer masks, this will reduce mask bulkiness and canister oscillation. No serious equipment incompatibilities attributable to the new canisters have been detected thus far.



C4 and XC6 Canister  
Compatibility trials on  
the Leopard C1.  
(CF Photo GNC 89-7033)

### Leopard Turret Identity Light System

Crew commanders generally operate "heads up" for tactical control, navigation and observation, even in the lowest light or thickest fog. In order to more easily identify individual vehicles and troops, they have tried makeshift methods such as glow sticks and filtered flashlights, but with only limited success.

A proposed solution to this long-standing night identification problem is to mount low-intensity callsign panels on the rear of AFV turrets. These should ideally replace the daytime painting callsigns and be equally legible at night. In non-tactical applications, such as gun camps and administrative moves, they could have a stronger light setting for easier recognition.

Two prototype turret-powered identity light systems are now being tested at T&E. The first one uses light strips which glow when a voltage is applied to them. It is a thin and unobtrusive panel but it is also expensive. The second system uses common vehicle light bulbs inside a box. It has the advantages of simplicity of design, ease of maintenance, availability of parts of minimal cost although it is a bit bulky.

Both light systems are presently in the development stage and T&E is simply determining the optimum light settings for their tactical and non-tactical use. This is a controversial subject and is by no means an accomplished fact. Further troop trials will probably be carried out in late 1989 to determine the tactical value of such a system.



*Turret identity light system mounted on the Leopard C1.  
(CF Photo GNC 89-7364)*

### Crewsuit Trial

Armoured soldiers have a love-hate relationship with their crewsuits. While most people would agree that these uniforms are well designed for slipping in and out of tanks they have a number of deficiencies which make them unsuitable for combat. Our crewsuits are not made of a flame proof fabric; they do not have pant leg tuck-in material to keep flames and dirt out; they have no rear door for sanitary purposes; and finally, for many they are

not long enough in the trunk to be comfortable when seated.

T&E is presently evaluating three prototype crewsuit styles which have been designed to determine exactly what the user wants to wear. (When the final pattern is known, another trial will be carried out to choose the best fire-proof material). The first trial suit is one-piece like the one now in use but with buttoned sleeve cuffs and D-ring waist adjusters to replace metal zips and Velcro strips. It also has a slightly




The three trials suits with the vest (on hanger).  
(CF Photo GNC-89-325-3)

longer trunk and a knife pocket at the thigh. The second suit is two-piece with the shirt tucked into the pants. Instead of using a belt, the pants are suspended with straps attached at the underarm. The third suit is also two-piece but the pants are worn inside and the shirt has a beaver-tail which passes between the legs and snaps in front, much like a jump smock.

#### Crewman Load-Carrying Vest

When tank crewmen have to mask up against NBCW agents or exit a burning vehicle they must react without delay. Nevertheless, the crewmen must still retain some basic equipment such as a respirator, weapon and field dressing. Despite this reality, at the present time it is impractical and actually unsafe to wear webbing inside the tank (Cougar, Lynx, etc.) and as a result is generally tucked away until it is needed.

One solution to this problem could be the survival vest which T&E is presently testing. It is comfortable, has lots of



Rear view with vest worn (left)  
(CF Photo GNC 89-325-2)

pockets and can be adjusted to fit snugly over a parka or just a crewsuit. It is made of normal combat clothing material and has a large opening in the back for ventilation. It can hold a field message pad, a compass, a small water flask, KFS, one C8 carbine magazine, a field dressing and even a CF rain suit. It also has two small, metal rings to attach the respirator bag. In fact, it may actually do too much. As with the crewsuits, the vest is being tested by both Regular and Reserve personnel in all three vehicles listed previously during RV89 and autumn training.

#### Canadian-Made Leopard Track Components

The ability to manufacture and rebuild track components in Canada for our present and future vehicles is extremely desirable from an economic and a technology development point of view. In this trial the following New Brunswick-made Leopard track components will be evaluated:


- pads moulded to German specifications;
- shoes rebuilt to German specifications;
- shoes rebuilt with rubber-covered top surfaces; and
- track pins with modified bushings.

Eight C Squadron RCD tanks will be monitored over the course of the year for track wear. The trial is expected to begin in late 1989, once engineering trials have been completed by L.E.T.E., near Ottawa.


#### Ventilated Respirator System

The Ventilated Respirator System (VRS) is a compact, NBC-filtered, vehicle-mounted, individual blower systems which provides crewmen with fresh air directly to their gas masks. The benefits are obvious: uninhibited breathing at TOPP high, sup-

Track components.  
(CF Photo GNC-89-325-1)







plemental filtration and even convention cooling. In order to exit the vehicle, the crewman simply unplugs the VRS hose from the end of his gas mask canister.


The VRS is supplemental to the Leopard's excellent on-board NBC filtration system and will also be useful in reducing the heat stress associated with fighting in a closed-up vehicle. Installation of this system on Leopards, ARVs and AVLBs will begin in late 1989. The VRS will make life easier in the nasty NBCW environment and should be a welcome piece of equipment.

**Leopard Stowage**

The Leopard C1 tank has recently had a fire suppression system installed which takes up a great deal of turret space. The C8 carbine is also presenting a few difficulties in terms of where to mount it. These and other equipment stowage problems are soon to be resolved once and for all. The plan is to take one tank and crew with all the kit that is supposed to be on board and then rationalize where things should be stowed. This trial is expected to take place in late 1989 or early 1990.

Since the equipment tested at this time will likely be in use for more than a decade, it is imperative that it be proven effective and reliable prior to acquisition. T&E depends on the support of "sharp end" equipment users such as the combat arms regiments and CTC schools for the conduct of these trials. User feedback is also significant in that valid observations can lead to equipment modifications or may, in the extreme case, cause the equipment purchase to be cancelled altogether. Many thanks to those units who have provided, and continue to provide, their support.

**Capt Mike Gagné** is the Armour T&E Officer at the Combat Training Centre



*C8 Carbine Stowage trial (CF Photo GN 87-7131-20)*



## Tanks in the RECCE Role

The future looks bright for The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and the Canadian Army. It seems certain that two events will take place. That is, that Canada will acquire new Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and that a divisional reconnaissance regiment (div recce regiment) will be formed. The div recce regiment would be equipped with lightly armoured, highly mobile, command and reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) and MBTs. The grouping of these vehicles implies a type of recce which the Canadian army does not utilize but which most NATO and Warsaw Pact countries do. At present our brigade recce squadrons employ "sneek and peek" tactics as opposed to "fighting for information". The new div recce regiment will have the resources to adopt the "fighting for information" style of recce.


How will we employ MBTs and CRVs together in the reconnaissance role? An examination of tactics with reference to different types of operations is necessary. The tasks considered will be those which are part of present Canadian doctrine for brigade recce squadrons.<sup>1</sup> The tactics are based primarily on the United States doctrine for their regimental armored cavalry troops.<sup>2</sup>

A div recce regiment could be configured in a number of different ways. For example, the Corps 86 regiment has two CRV squadrons, a MBT squadron and a surveillance squadron.<sup>3</sup> The United States armored cavalry troop (Canadian squadron size) groups CRVs and MBTs together with two CRV platoons, two MBT platoons and a mortar platoon in the troop.<sup>4</sup> Regardless of the organization CRVs and MBTs will normally be grouped together in

battle. For the purposes of this article a standard squadron consisting of a squadron headquarters, two 7 car CRV troops, two 4 vehicle MBT troops and a combat service support troop will be used. It is assumed that the regiment has support troop, surveillance and mortar resources available to the recce squadron.

In general the div recce regiment will conduct medium reconnaissance in the divisional commander's area of influence. This area of influence is 15-70 kms (0-24 hrs).<sup>5</sup> The recce squadron's primary tasks will remain reconnaissance and surveillance. With the addition of tanks to the squadron another and perhaps a more important primary task is added. Stripping away the enemy's recce elements. The enemy's ability to learn what is in front is critical to him. This primary task will accent most of the remaining discussion. The regiment's secondary tasks of escorts, traffic control, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) monitoring, rear area security, liaison and anti-airborne/airmobile surveillance will remain. The completion of these tasks with tanks would be a waste of resources. They should, therefore, be done by specialized troops such as Military Police or dedicated NBC sections whenever possible. Delaying operations, advance to contact and hasty attacks are more probable secondary tasks.

The conduct of operations by the respective CRV and MBT troops will remain essentially the same as present doctrine dictates. CRV troops will continue to observe, report, maintain contact and provide warning. Having dedicated tank support should result in a bolder approach being taken with respect to these duties.



MBT troops can now destroy enemy recon elements and provide direct fire support to the CRV troops.

#### Defensive Operations

During the defence the div recon regiment squadrons will be used primarily in the screen or guard role. The regiment may be required to defend within boundaries but this should only be done in emergencies. It has neither the infantry support nor equipment to dig in and hold ground for an extended period of time. If it is deemed necessary, squadron battle positions should be established. A mix of CRV and tanks could be used to cover likely kill zones. Tank and CRV main armaments will destroy enemy tanks and lightly armoured vehicles respectively with their light machine-guns reserved for personnel. Since all crews will be required to man their vehicles it would not normally be possible to dismount soldiers or their weapons. Remaining mounted also enables vehicles to redeploy quickly to counter further threats. The regiment could not normally maintain a defensive battle for any extended period of time. It's therefore, important that a reinforcement, relief in place or break contact operation take place as soon as possible.


The most common task for a div recon regiment in the defence is the provision of a screen for the troops of the division. The mission would be to provide early warning of enemy approach and to prevent enemy recon elements from locating friendly main defensive positions. Within the squadron sectors, CRV troops would be deployed in an Observation Post (OP) line covering likely approach routes. Enemy movements would be reported without compromising OP locations. Meanwhile the MBT troops

would be waiting in troop hides. Their role will be to destroy enemy divisional, regimental and combat reconnaissance patrols once identified by the OPs. These recon patrols would be engaged at prepared ambush points along likely approach routes. Contact with any enemy recon which is not destroyed should be maintained by a CRV patrol. Once Forward Security Elements (FSE) are identified the OPs would withdraw maintaining contact. At this time the tank troops could provide intimate support to the CRVs, set up ambushes or break contact completely depending on the amount of delay required by the situation. They should not become decisively engaged. During this stage of the battle the FSE's advance would be disrupted in indirect fire. Contact will be passed on and a rearward passage of lines will take place with defending troops at the rear of the squadron's sector.

The conduct of a guard operation will be very similar to a screen operation. In addition to identifying axes of advance and stripping away recon patrols, the squadron would be tasked to improve delay for a period to time. Therefore, the first part of the guard operation will be identical to that of the screen. Once the FSE is identified



## Division Reconnaissance Regiment



delay will be imposed through the maximum use of direct and indirect fire in hasty defensive positions as discussed previously. Withdrawal will take place at the last possible moment. While this will be primarily a tank battle, CRVs could be used to assist on the positions or to provide flank security. Normally reinforcements of tanks and anti-tank guided missiles and extensive artillery support would be needed in guard operations.

### Retrograde Operations

During retrograde operations the div recce regiment would be employed in either the rear guard or as flank security elements. A rear guard action would usually be a tank regiment task unless the threat was perceived to be small. In the rear guard, the regiment or part of it would probably be under command of a tank regiment. Regardless of the composition of the rear guard, CRVs and tanks would work together in the same manner. The tanks will primarily be used to engage the enemy from successive delaying positions. The CRVs could work in conjunction with the tanks on the battle positions providing direct fire on the enemy. This, however, would be an inefficient use of the CRVs and should only be done if it were absolutely necessary. A better use of CRVs would be in surveillance tasks.

They could watch enemy secondary approaches provide flank security to the rear guard or conduct recces of guard withdrawal routes.

Flank security of a withdrawing formation is a good task for a div recce regiment squadron. CRV troops would leapfrog through a series of mounted OPs covering the formation's flank as it withdraws. At the same time the tank troops would be moving from hide to hide. Once an enemy force is observed by a CRV patrol, tanks would move to engage. Flank security provides an excellent opportunity for the characteristics of mobility, surveillance and firepower to be exercised.

### Offensive Operations

When conducting an advance the CRVs and MBTs of the squadron must work in close conjunction. How closely they work together is a topic for debate. On one extreme individual tanks could be attached to CRV patrols providing intimate direct fire support. Although the CRVs would receive very good protection, surprise could be lost and more importantly the squadron commander would lose his ability to regroup and move his tanks quickly to a vulnerable area. To other option is to keep the tanks together in troops. Quick deployment and massing of tank fire is possible with this scenario. Intimate sup-



port of the CRV troops would only be possible in open country using an overwatch system. Maintaining the integrity of the tank troops appears to be the better option.

Route and area reconnaissance remain the primary missions in the advance with a secondary task of advance to contact in the absence of other armoured units in open country. CRV troops will take the lead advancing just as current recce troops would. The tank troops would follow one bound behind moving from support position to support position. If a CRV is engaged the tanks would move to provide the best covering fire. In the event that the CRVs have to move into an area which may be covered by heavy enemy fire the tanks may take the lead. Tank "spec fire" could be used on likely enemy positions, especially in built up areas.

In addition to the standard recce missions of locating enemy positions and obstacles the div recce regiment must neutralize the enemy recce. As the CRVs discover enemy recce elements the tanks will be ordered forward to engage. They do not necessarily have to destroy them. The enemy may be fixed in their present position or forced to withdraw, as long as they are not able to complete their mission of reporting friendly movements. The tank troops can achieve this aim by engaging with direct fire from a fire base or by conducting a hasty attack. CRVs should only engage the enemy in self defence.

If the tanks cannot neutralize recce forces from a secure fire base a hasty attack becomes the next course of action. If there is no infantry or support troopers available an attack should only be ordered if it appears that the objective is held by a small mounted force. While the tanks are assaulting, the CRVs could be providing

flank security, securing the line of departure, calling indirect fire, providing a small cut-off force or causing a diversion. Deliberate attacks should only be conducted in conjunction with other armoured and infantry units.

This concept of operations for Div Recce Regt squadrons is based on a unit with an equal number of CRVs and MBTs. The tasks and tactics are basically the same as those used by our present brigade recce squadrons with the additional task of neutralizing enemy recce. With the presence of tanks in the organization the unit is able to accomplish its aims by completing the recce tasks in a more aggressive and secure manner. Another unit which has a significantly higher number of tanks compared to CRVs is the Armoured Cavalry Regiment. This is a highly mobile, hard hitting force designed to engage enemy manoeuvre elements. Its tasks (many do overlap) should not be confused with the div recce regiment's main mission of providing reconnaissance for the division and denying that same capability to the enemy.

The formation of a regiment for the First Canadian Division will provide a unique opportunity for Armoured Corps soldiers to learn and master new skills and tactics. This article has touched the basics of what is to be learned. The challenge will be met in the next few years.

**Capt Jim Atkins** is the Administrative Officer of Recce Sqn, The RCD

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
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## Armée 2002: La perception d'un réserviste

Depuis juin 1987 et la publication officielle du Livre blanc sur la Défense, les réservistes ont été inondés de documents, directives, conférences et présentations de toutes sortes et de toutes origines pour leur expliquer les changements importants qui sont en cours pour eux. Outre l'abus du terme "force totale", qui revient sans cesse, celui d'"Armée 2002" vient renforcer l'idée d'une réorganisation complète de nos forces.

De toutes ces séances d'informations qui se répètent comme pour essayer de nous convaincre à tout prix, et qui deviennent ennuyantes à force de se ressembler, on peut extraire les éléments suivants:

- a. augmentation substantielle du recrutement et des effectifs;
- b. augmentation des facilités d'entraînement; et
- c. augmentation des tâches et responsabilités de la réserve dans une nouvelle structure de commandement.

CF Photo CLC 88-196-12  
by Sgt DB Barton



Au moment d'écrire ces lignes (octobre-novembre 1988), bien peu de détails avaient été fournis pour expliquer le comment de toutes ces augmentations. Ce que je propose dans les paragraphes suivants, c'est d'aborder les nombreuses questions que se posent les réservistes et qui demeurent toujours sans réponses, en relation avec les trois éléments mentionnés plus haut.

### Recrutement

La promesse d'augmenter les effectifs des Forces canadiennes pour leur permettre de rencontrer toutes ses obligations ne surprend pas beaucoup: depuis plusieurs années, nous n'avons pas assez de personnel pour accepter toutes les tâches qui nous sont imposées sans pénaliser tout le système de défense. L'idée d'augmenter la réserve au détriment de la régulière est une décision à la fois logique et politique. Logique, car il est prouvé qu'il est moins coûteux d'entretenir une réserve nombreuse qu'une armée professionnelle, même si elle est réduite et parfois sous employée. Politique, car il faut tout en évitant d'augmenter les dépenses excessivement, retourner l'argent des contribuables le plus possible régionalement, ce que permet justement la réserve.

Nous allons donc quintupler les effectifs nationaux de la réserve au cours des prochaines quinze années, soit jusqu'en 2002. Comment? Personne n'a encore pu répondre à cette question à la satisfaction de tous. Un plan formel de recrutement reste encore à être élaboré pour concrétiser cette volonté d'augmenter les effectifs. À croire qu'on a annoncé quelque chose de bien sans même s'interroger si le projet était réalisable et si on avait les moyens de l'atteindre.

Eh bien, le projet est réalisable, et en moins de quinze ans si on prend les actions nécessaires. Demandez à n'importe quel réserviste quels seront les problèmes causés par l'augmentation des effectifs, et tous vous répondront: la paperasserie inutile, et trop lente, la publicité déficiente ou absente, le système administratif trop lourd ainsi que la faible rétention du personnel.

L'administration actuelle de recrutement dans la réserve a atteint un sommet jugé ridicule et inefficace. À une ère où l'ordinateur est disponible pour accélérer l'accès à l'information. Ceux qui, comme moi, ont une vingtaine d'années de service se souviendront avec nostalgie



CF Photo CLC 88-196-5  
by Sgt DB Barton

comme il était simple de s'enrôler en 1967-68: un baptistère récent, une carte d'assurance sociale, un relevé scolaire. Le commis complétait deux ou trois documents, vous envoyait voir le médecin et, si tout était en ordre, vous faisait signer et prêter serment en présence d'un officier avant de vous envoyer au quartier-maître pour ramasser vos uniformes. Deux heures maximum et vous étiez soldat.

Aujourd'hui, il faut de deux à trois mois pour enrôler un jeune canadien. Rien de surprenant que l'on perde des candidats avant même d'avoir commencé les procédures. On voudrait me faire croire qu'il faut donner cinq fois son N.A.S. et deux ou trois preuves de naissance en plus de passer un test psychométrique pour joindre la réserve? Allons-donc; il faut moins de temps pour s'inscrire à l'université pour un cours de maîtrise... L'armée a beaucoup à apprendre et à modifier sur ce point ou elle ne pourra faire face à une mobilisation générale.

Autre problème courant: comment attirer les candidats dans la réserve. La télévision passe beaucoup de messages pour recrutement de la régulière, une

publicité qui montre surtout les aspects excitants et intéressants de la vie militaire et laisse de côté les parties les plus courantes ou ennuyeuses. De la réserve, on ne parle jamais. Même les réguliers n'ont que des idées vagues sur le sujet.

Une bonne campagne réaliste de publicité nationale est nécessaire pour faire connaître la réserve. Comment vendre un produit qui n'est même pas connu... Cette campagne devrait éviter les clichés habituels du genre: enrôlez-vous et venez voir tout l'équipement que nous avons à la télévision mais pas aux unités... cette publicité se doit d'être simple et réaliste. Ceci implique également la formation des membres des Centres de recrutement qui pourraient s'établir sur les lieux même, dans les unités de milice.

Ensuite, la rétention. La moyenne de service d'un réserviste varie de dix-huit à vingt-quatre mois. Pourquoi? Parce qu'on recrute majoritairement une main-d'œuvre étudiante très volatile au départ, changeant vite de priorité et suffisamment intelligente pour constater les mensonges et lacunes du système. Il faut dès le départ donner une justification aux candidats, leur expliquer la portée de leur engagement: celui qui ne vient que "pour voir" ou "pour le fun" abandonnera bien vite quand il n'y aura plus de "fun" et qu'il aura tout vu.

Pour retenir un candidat, il faut constamment l'intéresser lui fournir un défi et les moyens de s'entraîner localement et à son rythme. Le salaire n'est qu'un facteur initial qui cesse vite de compter: la plupart des officiers et sous-officiers paient un surplus d'impôt à cause de ce petit revenu supplémentaire qui ne couvre même pas le temps réel qu'ils y mettent. A ce chapitre au lieu de penser à un fonds de pension, complexe à gérer pour les réservistes, pourquoi ne pas considérer un crédit d'impôt ou une réduction des contributions au Fonds de Pension du Canada, ce qui serait un remerciement intéressant pour servir son pays...

### Entraînement


Les nouveaux plans de défense prévoient la création de Centres de soutien à l'entraînement de la milice (MTSC) établis dans diverses régions du pays où le matériel et les ressources pour l'entraînement seraient administrés par des équipes permanentes et pour l'usage de toutes les unités. Certaines rumeurs courent déjà sur la localisation de certains de ces centres.

Malgré l'attrait et les nombreux avantages que cette formule présente, personne n'a encore donné une réponse satisfaisante au plus grand problème de ce pays: la distance. Le réserviste qui demeure à 400 km d'un tel centre se sentira certainement désavantagé et sera peu intéressé à voyager une douzaine d'heures par fin de semaine pour faire quelques heures d'entraînement. Sans les facilités de transport rapide (aérien) pour les unités éloignées de ces centres, il sera probablement difficile de les utiliser efficacement, sauf pour la période estivale.

Un compromis efficace impliquerait l'acquisition de simulateurs d'entraînement pour les unités de milice. En plus d'offrir à moindre coût un intérêt pour l'individu, ces appareils peuvent permettre à une unité de programmer la formation individuelle en fonction des disponibilités de chacun. Plus besoin de longs et coûteux déplacements pour s'entraîner sur un bout de terrain qu'on fini par connaître comme sa poche. . .

Malheureusement, personne n'a encore mis sur papier ni diffusé toutes les informations sur ces sujets. Les réservistes devront encore se contenter de ce que les réguliers vont leur laisser ou préparer sans avoir eu la chance de se faire entendre. Et si ça ne marche pas, on pourra toujours blâmer les réservistes pour leur manque de professionnalisme militaire. . .

CF Photo CLC 88-196-9  
by Sgt DB Barton



## Tâches et responsabilités

Dernier domaine enfin qui soulève beaucoup de craintes et de questions chez les réservistes, celui de la nouvelle structure opérationnelle. Dans les nouveaux plans, il est question de brigades formées à 90% de réservistes pour des tâches très précises. Pour l'entraînement collectif, quand de telles brigades pourront-elles se regrouper pour manoeuvrer? Avec une majorité d'étudiants, il est toujours possible de le faire l'été, mais avec une nouvelle génération de recrues provenant du marché du travail, il n'en va pas de même.

A moins que le gouvernement ne vote une politique de protection de l'emploi de réservistes lors de manoeuvres ou de cours de carrière, il est un utopique de penser à des brigades ou des unités de réserve possédant une norme d'entraînement acceptable.

Une campagne de promotion d'un "service national" auprès des employeurs devrait commencer immédiatement en prenant pour exemple le ministère de la Défense nationale (après avoir préalablement corrigé l'application, ou plutôt la non application de cette politique dans le ministère même). Lorsqu'un milicien en Classe B ou C pourra obtenir un congé pour exercice, on pourra exiger la même chose des autres employeurs. . .

## Conclusion

Le Livre blanc de 1987 a donné beaucoup d'espoirs aux réservistes du pays. Les plus jeunes peuvent se permettre de rêver à tous ces projets grandioses et à toutes ces nouvelles formules. Les plus anciens sourient en voyant le tour de roue complet de l'histoire qui nous ramène aux solutions "neuves" d'il y a 25 ans. Les moins crédules d'entre eux demeurent perplexes et sérieux en attendant que se réalisent quelques unes de ces promesses pour commencer à y croire.

Pour assurer le succès de ces programmes, il faut qu'il y ait consultation à tous les niveaux. Il faut aussi qu'il y ait dès maintenant un début de changement dans le système pour prouver qu'on veut vraiment faire quelque chose. En 1988, ce n'est plus avec des mots qu'on peut convaincre, mais avec des gestes. Les réservistes du Canada attendent de tels gestes pour faire les changements qui sont projetés.

**Maj D.R. Gagné** présentement en service avec Le Régiment de Hull





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
## The role of the Padre in the Preparation for Deployment

One of the most unavoidable realities in military life is the separation of soldiers from their families. For those serving in the Army this reality can be one of the most difficult challenges they will have to face. As such it is a primary concern of all those in the support services to aid the soldier in maintaining emotional integrity and family health. Military chaplains are on the front line of those in the support services and must develop and understand the crucial role they can have in helping soldiers manage separation. When these lengthy separations are caused by overseas deployments the need is most intense and the role of the chaplain most significant.

## The Padre and the Commanding Officer

At all levels the role of the military chaplain must be to work within the framework of the unit affected by the overseas deployment. The task of supporting soldiers and their families is a total unit responsibility of which the padre is a part. The integration of padre in the unit must start at the top with the Commanding Officer (CO).

In the most general terms the chaplain's role at this level is to assist the CO in establishing a clear appreciation of the family dimension of military separations. If the CO does not have such an appreciation it cannot be expected that the unit as a whole or the padre in particular will be able to respond with the kind of support that will be needed during the separation. Due to the pre-eminent need of the right attitude on the part of the CO, the chaplain would be wise to open discussions with him well in advance of the deployment. If the family dimension is of paramount importance to the CO, then the padre can offer his services and ideas. If it is a new thought to the CO, then the padre has sufficient time to raise the issue in the early planning phases of the unit's preparations for the deployment. A good working relationship between the padre and his CO is obviously crucial.



*Rememberance ceremonies  
in Cyprus*

There are several aspects of the chaplain's role which must be carefully worked out with the CO. The first of these is during the deployment as an advisor on compassionate cases which may require unit action. In order to be an effective or useful advisor the chaplain must ensure he is in contact with the soldier in the field and his family at home. The padre must make arrangements with the CO to ensure he has both. The former is easy to arrange in the field. The latter must involve such possibilities as the padre maintaining regular contact with the Rear Party OC and Base Chaplains at home about any current family related compassionate cases. The chaplain may request the CO arrange weekly phone calls or message links to accommodate that needed contact.

The second area that the chaplain would do well to personally work out with the CO, surrounds the whole issue of marital fidelity during lengthy deployments. If the chaplain is to supply ongoing support to their families, he must be encouraged that the unit stands with him. A strong and clear policy by the CO encouraging marital fidelity would supply this much needed unit support. The chaplain can only encourage such a policy but should realize his position is much improved if a CO can be convinced of its value.

#### **The Padre and the Soldier**

The long standing tool of the military chaplain in dealing with soldiers on any issue is the "Padre's Hour". This often

neglected instrument should be the primary means the chaplain uses to prepare soldiers for military separations. The padre must pay special attention to several issues as he prepares for such opportunities: the specific concepts to be communicated, the most appropriate size of such meetings, the value of having experienced soldiers involved, and the timings for these gatherings.

The greatest challenge facing the soldier during separation is maintaining a significant position in the family system during separation. As a starting point he must help them appreciate that things will have to be different while they're away. By necessity there will be a shift in the balance of power with one spouse having to take over the bulk of the responsibility on home issues. If a male soldier is used to a concept of family power in which the husband is dominant then this change may pose some challenge to his identity. Such soldiers need to be encouraged to view the situation as a necessary sharing of power and not a "coup d'état" in which they are being overthrown or rejected. The choice to share power can be done very smoothly if such issues as bill paying, budget, child discipline, etc are discussed together and a mutually agreed upon pattern adopted in which he can feel a part and at the same time be confident that things will be well managed in his absence.<sup>1</sup> The successful accomplishing of this preparation to share power is crucial. J.E. Finn identifies these sorts of problems with eight of fourteen top causes of stress and tension during separations.<sup>2</sup>



*Padre checks the view from an observation post.*



*Padre checks the view from an observation post.*

A second key issue which should be raised in the Padre's Hour will be communication. Communication should accomplish two ends: keeping the soldiers accurately informed about their dependants and secondly, allowing them to share experiences with the family. The distance during separation can be greatly eased if both these ends are met. The passage of accurate information is crucial. Soldiers have excellent access to a host of communication means when they are overseas. However, some are definitely more helpful than others when it comes to sustaining the best family communications. The telephone is easy and immediate but can present a misleading momentary glimpse into life at home. A better approach is the well thought out letter or cassette tape message. Both spouses can think out what they want to say and do so with clarity and in a fuller way by letter than in a short telephone call. On the

other side of communication is sharing the experience of the field. Soldiers should do all they can to keep family informed of their lives, of the setting in which they find themselves both culturally and as much as possible militarily. They should be encouraged to send plenty of postcards, gifts and info packets to family, and to appreciate how much this passage of information bonds them to their families during the separation. It also goes a long way to resolving three of the primary causes of stress at home: worry over the safety and security of the soldier in the field, loneliness, and social isolation.<sup>3</sup>

In order to address these issues the size, timing and makeup of these Padre's Hours must be considered. The size should not be so large as to inhibit conversation or depersonalize the occasion. The optimal size would be between troop and 30-40 persons. The timing is very important, the best approach being to

have two such Padre's Hours, one as a preparation for departure and one as a preparation for reunion. The latter would cover much the same material but as a review and assessment of the separation experience. It would, however, concentrate more heavily on re-intergration to the family with respect to sharing power, communication and relationship. Thirdly, the makeup of the Padre's Hour should again be geared to encourage discussion and reflection. If NCM's are inhibited by the presence of Sr NCOs and Officers, the two groups should be separated. If on the other hand all ranks can appreciate the commonality of the separation experience the interaction of all ranks may prove very valuable. Each individual case will have to be weighed.

The last broad area that must be examined is the role which the chaplain should have in preparing the family for the separation. The chaplain's role in this regard can be divided up into the indirect and the direct means.

#### **The Padre and the Family**

The indirect means are threefold: through the Padre's Hours with the soldiers, and through an advisory role with those producing a family's handbook, and those tasked with Rear Party responsibilities. The first relates to the matters already discussed in this paper, the other two must be considered at this point. Major J.E. Finn recommends in his paper SEPARATION IN THE MILITARY FAMILY a "Resource Book"<sup>4</sup>, to aid in the educational process of the dependants. Where a unit recognizes this need the padre could offer helpful advice on content, to ensure that the book provides practical help in the areas of budget, medical, car maintenance, socializing, child care, and stress management. With respect to Rear Party the padre can again be a helpful advisor ensuring the Rear Party are educated as to their crucial role in coordinating a support programme during the deployment. The Rear Party should be guided to appreciate that the initiative for programs belongs to them. At the same time they must ensure they receive input from the families and work very closely with their organizations (wives clubs, etc). The sensitivity of the Rear Party to families and a good relationship between the padre and Rear Party will prove invaluable once the deployment is underway.

In the realm of direct relationships between the padre and families there are two channels: the overseas screening process and the families' briefing. J.E. Finn has faulted the screening process as being too cursory on the grounds that there are not enough social workers in the military system.<sup>5</sup> Surely the padres (two per unit — Protestant and R.C.) could fill this void if they were well acquainted with the issues. The screening process now stipulates that spouses should be present at overseas screenings. Often this does not happen because of the rush prior to deployment. If, however, the welfare screenings could be extended over a month long period each couple could be interviewed and given a presentation on the crucial issues of the separation. The dependants briefing, again a suggestion of Major Finn<sup>6</sup>, is another useful means of education and preparation. This approach is best used for presenting information on the political, military and the day-to-day scene in the field. The more personal matters are best handled in the interview process but the dependants briefing is a must for general information.

The role of the unit padre in helping soldiers to prepare for an overseas deployment can be a crucial one. The onus rests upon the individual chaplain to vigorously offer his services for this task. It will inevitably be the case that units will be eager for all the help they can receive in caring for their soldiers.

**Capt Harvey Self** is a Padre with The RCD

#### **Footnotes**

1. Finn, J.E. *Separation and the Military Family*, 1987, p. 20.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 14-16.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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*Separation and the Military Family* John E. Finn, 3 Apr 1 1987

*Falling in Love Again: The Impact of Separation on Marriage* (Highlights of U.S. Navy Ombudsmen Symposium) held 24 January 1981 in Norfolk, Virginia

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## L'entraînement: l'essence de notre existence

Dans un monde où la belligérance ne cesse de se manifester; où les armes deviennent de plus en plus performantes, sophistiquées et meurtrières et; où la technologie se développe plus rapidement que notre capacité d'adaptation; quelle est, aujourd'hui, l'importance de l'entraînement? Qui en est responsable? Comment s'acheminer vers un état de préparation adéquat?

Nul va sans dire que l'entraînement revêt une importance particulière, tout spécialement lorsque le nouveau militaire se voit confronter avec un milieu qui lui est totalement étranger. Dans cette phase dite d'apprentissage initial, le soldat doit faire face à une multitude de situations différentes, devant lesquelles il devra apprendre à réagir selon certains critères qui auront été instaurés dans le but de normaliser, au sein d'une même organisation, les connaissances de base. Ce travail de longue haleine n'est rendu possible que par le biais des différentes infrastructures éducatives et par le travail souvent trop peu reconnu des instructeurs. Lorsque le niveau de connaissance atteint est jugé suffisant, l'individu entre dans sa phase dite de confirmation, période où il sera évalué sur son habileté à restituer, avec certaines contraintes, toute l'information qui lui fût enseignée. S'il devait réussir, le militaire se verra octroyer une qualification qui lui ouvrira les portes d'une unité dans laquelle il devra faire ses preuves par la mise en application systématique des prin-

cipes et de l'instruction reçus. Sa performance globale sera par la suite comparée, une fois par année, avec celle de ses pairs, son rendement sera alors jugé et une note lui sera attribuée. Dorénavant il sera classé et devra se remettre en question chaque année.

Jusqu'ici rien de nouveau mais qu'en arrive-t-il de l'entraînement lorsqu'un individu rejoint son unité d'appartenance, mise à part les cours de carrière? Voilà la faille de notre empire militaire: en effet l'individu qui quitte une École abandonnera aussi derrière lui un système éducatif structuré, progressif et conçu en fonction de nos besoins pour rejoindre un monde où son entraînement sera défini et construit en fonction d'impératifs artificiels imposés par une hiérarchie supérieure; et ce peut importe l'Arme choisie.

Les faits sont tels que nous ne pouvons rien changer à ces obligations car elles font partie intégrante d'une armée en temps de paix. Cependant il ne faut pas pour autant tomber dans l'abîme du désespoir et s'auto-persuader qu'il n'y a pas de temps ou de ressources pour l'entraînement. Pour préciser mes idées prenons le cas d'un Régiment blindé; nous pourrions ainsi nous baser sur certains faits qui ne changent pour ainsi dire jamais:

- a. le régiment reçoit une directive annuelle d'entraînement de la brigade;
- b. par la suite le régiment produit sa propre directive dans laquelle le commandant



expose ses intentions et objectifs et où il attribut des tâches ou missions à ses commandants d'escadron;

c. le régiment doit rencontrer normalement deux objectifs majeurs: les deux exercices de brigade;

d. le régiment reçoit de la brigade sa large part de tâches secondaires tout au long de l'année; et

e. les postes sont généralement fixes pour une période d'une année.

Ayant ces faits en tête et sachant que tout entraînement doit être progressif et tendre vers un point culminant à un moment fixé dans le temps, il est facile de déduire qu'il incombe, par la suite, au commandant d'escadron de s'assurer la préparation de ses troupes pour qu'elles puissent rencontrer les objectifs qu'il s'est vu fixer. Le commandant d'escadron est donc une pierre angulaire de l'entraînement au sein d'un régiment. À ce stade-ci de la hiérarchie est-il possible d'implanter un plan d'entraînement flexible et rigoureux, qui demandera de la part des officiers et sous-officiers de l'escadron un dévouement sans pareil? Je répondrai dans l'affirmative à cette question et m'explique de la façon suivante: il est possible d'appliquer aux troupes un principe intitulé "**les missions globales**".

Ce principe veut que l'entraînement soit progressif et subdivisé en étapes qui, petit à petit, amènent chaque soldat à un niveau opérationnel donné à l'intérieur d'un espace de temps fixé par le commandant d'escadron. Chaque mission globale est suivie d'un contrôle opérationnel qui évalue, sous la forme d'un petit rallye, le niveau atteint par la troupe. Ce processus



se poursuit jusqu'à ce que les objectifs de l'escadron soient atteints. Ce principe impose donc aux chefs de troupe des impératifs à rencontrer (rigueur) et leurs donnent toute la latitude nécessaire pour y arriver (flexibilité et initiative).

Ayant maintenant décrit l'entraînement du soldat, comment perfectionner nos officiers et nos sous-officiers? Tout simplement en réservant trois heures par semaine à une instruction cadre, laquelle serait donnée par les cadres de l'escadron et par les spécialistes que l'on retrouve au sein de la brigade. Cette instruction porterait sur les mêmes thèmes que les missions globales mais à un niveau supérieur. Un système tel que décrit auparavant donne aux officiers et aux sous-officiers la chance de s'affirmer en tant que chef tout en se recyclant et, met du piquant dans la vie routinière d'un soldat qui doit passer quelques contrôles opérationnels en compétition avec ses pairs.

Les missions globales pour être efficaces, doivent avoir comme but principal le développement des connaissances sur des sujets tout aussi variés que: L'I.M.G., la menace, le secourisme, les transmissions, l'entretien, le tir, le conditionnement physique, l'identification des véhicules blindés, la guerre NBC, le renseignement et le développement personnel. Idéalement elles devraient être combinées avec quelques objectifs aux rencontres régimentaires tels qu'un cross régimentaire, un rallye renseignement, un rallye des chefs de troupe, une course d'orientation, ... etc. Il s'agit ensuite de combiner tout ce travail pour qu'il épouse les grands rendez-vous régimentaires et le tour est joué.

Jeunes officiers, sous-officiers et militaires du rang, ne tombez pas dans l'abîme, l'entraînement est à la source même de notre existence: c'est notre raison d'être. Il faut en faire une affaire personnelle.

le **Capitaine Bruno Hamel** est employé comme instructeur tactique à l'École des blindés



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## Training, the Essence of our Existence

In a world where belligerency is everywhere; where weapons become more accurate, sophisticated, and deadly; where technology moves ahead faster than our ability to adjust; how important is training? Who is responsible for it? How can we ensure an adequate state of readiness?

No one will deny that training is of particular importance, especially the training of the new recruit who suddenly finds himself smack in the middle of a completely alien environment. During that initial period of so-called 'basic' training, the soldier is made to face all kinds of situations to which he will have to learn to respond according to certain criteria. Criteria which have been established in an effort to standardize, within a same organization, the storehouse of basic knowledge. This long and exacting task can only be realized through the different training infrastructures and the too often unrecognized efforts of the instructors. When the level of acquired knowledge is deemed sufficient, the individual moves on to the confirmation stage at which point he will be evaluated on his ability to repeat, with some constraints, all the skills he has been taught. If successful, the soldier is awarded a qualification which will open doors for him at a unit. Here he will be given an opportunity to prove himself by the systematic application of the principles and training he received. His overall performance will then be appraised and judged, once a year, with that of his peers.

Nothing new so far, but what about training after the soldier reaches his unit. Training doesn't mean career courses and this is where the crack is in the foundation of our military enterprise. When a soldier leaves his school, he leaves behind a structured and progressive training system, a system that was designed according to our needs, and enters a world where training will be defined and structured according to artificial imperatives imposed by the hierarchy. This is true, regardless of the combat arm involved.

In fact there is nothing we do to change these obligations because they are an integral element of an army in peacetime. This does not mean that we must fall into an abyss of despair and talk ourselves into believing we have neither the time nor the resources for training. Let us consider, for example, the case of an armoured regiment. We could use as a basis, certain facts that, for all practical purposes, never change:

- a. the Regiment is issued with an annual training directive by the Brigade;
- b. then the Regiment produces its own training directive whereby the Commanding Officer sets out his intentions and objectives and assigns specific tasks or missions to his Squadron Commanders;
- c. as a rule, the Regiment has two major objectives, i.e. two brigade exercises;
- d. the Regiment is assigned by the Brigade its share of secondary taskings throughout the year; and



e. positions are generally established for a period of one year.

Keeping these facts in mind we know that any training must be progressive and must peak at some given point in time. It can be easily deduced that it is the responsibility of the Squadron Commander to ensure that his troops are ready to meet the objectives he has been given. Hence, the Squadron Commander is the keystone of the training edifice of a regiment. Can, at this level, a flexible and rigorous training program be implemented? One that requires from officers and senior non-commissioned officers of the Squadron uncommon dedication? The answer is yes. It is possible to apply a principle called the **global mission**.

This principle implies that training is progressive and sub-divided in stages which, step by step, bring every soldier to a given operational level within a set period of time. Every global mission is followed by an operational check which evaluates, by means of a mini-rallye, the level reached by the troops. This process is repeated until all the objectives of the Squadron are met. As a result of this principle, Troop Leaders are forced to meet imperatives (rigorousness) but have all the latitude they need to achieve them (flexibility and initiative).

Now that we have described the soldier's training, how do we go about developing our officers and NCOs? Simple, by setting aside three hours a week for officer and NCO training, to be

conducted by officers and NCOs of the Squadron and by specialists from the Brigade. Training would proceed along the same lines as those followed in the global mission approach, but at a higher level. The system described provides officers and NCOs with an opportunity to assert themselves as leaders while developing their own skills. It adds some spice to the otherwise routine existence of a soldier now that he has to pass certain operational checks in competition with his peers.

Global mission can only be effective if the general aim is to develop knowledge in fields as varied as general military knowledge, the threat, first aid, signals, maintenance, shooting, physical education, identification of armoured vehicles, NBC warfare, intelligence and personal development. Ideally, these should be combined with some objectives in regimental meetings such as a regimental cross country, an intelligence rallye, a troop leader rallye, a map reading run, etc. It's just a question of bringing all this work together to have it coincide with the large scale regimental concentrations and that's all there is to it!

Young officers and NCOs, don't fall into the abyss, training is at the very core of our existence; it is why we exist. You must make training your personal business.

**Captain Bruno Hamel** is employed as an instructor in Tactics Squadron at the Armour School






# HISTORICAL

## Mailed Fist: British Armour in Normandy 1944

War, von Clausewitz tells us, is the province of uncertainty.<sup>1</sup> Given the ever-changing face of battle, it is not surprising to find all armies striving to impart structure and order to combat — in short to provide a common doctrine. There are however very real dangers with peacetime doctrine. In peace a military force cannot test the validity or relevance of its operational theory. Given the absence of any viable test all peacetime doctrine must be held suspect. Indeed Michael Howard, a distinguished soldier and military thinker, has gone so far as to suggest that peacetime doctrine is almost *inevitably* flawed. This problem is further exacerbated by the response of peacetime military bureaucracy to officially sanctioned doctrine. Only rarely is "conventional wisdom" challenged and, as a result, doctrine tends to assume a life of its own, evolving into a series of immutable laws carved in stone. Howard argues that this, in itself, is of little import, what matters is how quickly in wartime a military force can recognize, and thus correct, the deficiencies of its doctrine.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this article is to

examine one case-study of wartime doctrinal change.

Perhaps the fundamental doctrinal problem facing the British, and by extension, Canadian Armies in early 1944 was the employment of armour and infantry on the European battlefield. British analysis of German operations in France in 1944 were accepted as proof of the primacy of independent tank formations in offensive operations. The result was the British 1944-style armoured division with 340 tanks, 24 field guns and a mere three battalions of infantry (figure one). Subsequent operations in North Africa initially did nothing to change these impressions and combined arms tactics were discounted. Flaws in the 1940-style organization eventually manifested themselves and after El Alamein the armoured divisions were reorganized. The 1942-style armoured division boasted an armoured brigade of three tank regiments plus a motor infantry battalion. In addition it had a regular infantry brigade of three battalions plus a reconnaissance regiment, two field



**VILLERS BOCACHE**


Situation midnight 11th June 1944

Operations 12th June 1944

Operations 13th/14th June 1944

Situation morning 15th June 1944

Roman numerals show Corps; others Divisions



**11th Armd Div. - Operation EPSOM, 26-29 June 1944**





Fig. 3

regiments, an anti-tank regiment and an anti-aircraft regiment. This was a far better balanced and more functional structure but armour and infantry still fought as separate tactical entities. The tactics employed by the British 7th Armoured Division during its break-in of the final German defences in Tunisia (Operation STRIKE, 6-7 May 1943) were a textbook example of the then accepted British doctrine. The 7th Division, exploiting through a breach gained by the 4th Indian Infantry Division,

launched its 22nd Armoured Brigade against a series of objectives selected in depth (figure two). The Division's 131st Infantry Brigade followed behind the armour, consolidating on each objective overrun by the tanks. As the infantry closed up the tanks moved on to their next objective. In short armour seized ground and infantry held it.<sup>3</sup> Throughout both arms operated, for all intents and purposes, independently. This was the doctrine that British and Canadian armoured divisions would take into Normandy.



Unfortunately for British armour, Normandy was to prove nothing like North Africa. Very early in the campaign the 7th Armoured Division discovered that infantry were essential to success.<sup>4</sup> Tanks operating alone or with a limited contingent of infantry fell easy prey to the mixed German *kampfgruppen* frantically attempting to contain the Allied bridgehead. On 13 June, 1944 the 22nd Brigade led the Division's advance in an attempt to penetrate the coalescing German defence. The key crossroad village of Villers-Bocage was overrun and, for a moment, it appeared that the Desert Rats had gained a prize of operational importance.<sup>5</sup> The Brigade was, however, overextended and lacked the infantry to retain Villers-Bocage. A tiny force from the 1st SS Panzer Corps' heavy tank battalion smashed the lead

squadron, blocking the British advance. The Division's infantry failed to get forward and the 22nd Brigade was forced to withdraw. It was a frustrating and painful loss.

The check at Villers-Bocage, coupled with the havoc wrecked on the Allied cross-channel supply lines by summer storms, imposed a delay on British operations. Nevertheless by 26 June the British 2nd Army was strong enough to commit its 8th Corps to an assault west of Caen (Operation EPSOM). The newly arrived 11th Armoured Division spearheaded this attack (figure three). After three days of heavy fighting 11 Division's 29th Armoured Brigade managed to seize Hill 112 (a key feature) but again the infantry were unable to force their way forward. Hill 112, like Villers-Bocage, was abandoned to save an armoured brigade from

isolation and destruction.<sup>6</sup> The tanks were withdrawn into reserve while the infantry (of which there was never enough) remained in the line. Scant wonder that at the end of EPSOM, the commander of the 11th Armoured Division would voice his doubts as to the utility of armoured divisions in Europe.<sup>7</sup>

The next two weeks were a period of stalemate as the infantry divisions carried the battle alone. The only success of note was the Allied occupation of Caen. The city, now a shattered ruin, fell to the 3rd Canadian and 3rd British Infantry Divisions on 9 July 1944. During this period the British 7th and 11th Armoured Divisions, plus the newly arrived Guards Armoured Division, were concentrated, under the command of the 8th British Corps, north of Caen and west of the Orne River. This tremendous mass of armour was being held in readiness for a single massive stroke which, it was hoped, would irreparably break the German line in Normandy.

Operation GOODWOOD was the name given to the 8th Corps' offensive. The plan was simple. The three armoured divisions would smash a hole in the German line east of Caen and then drive hard to the south, capturing Bourguebus Ridge. The 2nd Canadian Corps (in an operation code named ATLANTIC) would strike from west of Caen, also seeking to gain a foothold on the ridge. What the plan lacked in finesse it made up for in sheer brute force. The 8th Corps would deploy over 600 tanks, the Canadians another 150.

On 18 July the 11th Armoured Division broke out of the tiny British bridgehead east of the Orne River. Echeloned behind the 11th Division were the 7th and Guards Armoured Divisions. Concentrated west of the Orne River, these two divisions had to get hundreds of vehicles over six crossing sites. And once clear of the Orne the deployment of these divisions was further complicated by the presence of a poorly charted British minefield sited almost directly on the Corps' line of departure. Frantic efforts by all available engineers succeeded in clearing a few lanes through this obstacle but the Corps' timetable was thrown off almost from the very beginning.

The ground east of Caen was open, rolling farmland. German strong points, each comprising a few anti-tank guns, one or two tanks and some infantry, occupied the villages which dotted these fields. Around these positions the armour flowed, striving to reach Bourguebus Ridge. Infan-


try could easily have dealt with these small pockets of resistance but the 11th Division's 159th Infantry Brigade was already fully committed, clearly two villages close to its line of departure. The Divisional Commander, recognizing the need for infantry to accompany his armour, had pressed the Corps Commander, asking that the 51st Infantry Division be employed to seize the two villages allocated to 159 Brigade. The Corps Commander refused and as a result 11 Division's armour advanced alone. The infantry brigades of the two other armoured divisions also failed to significantly influence the battle, being repeatedly delayed as they fought their way through the appalling congestion around the Orne crossing sites. The German defenders took a heavy toll of the British armour and by noon momentum had been lost.<sup>8</sup> By nightfall the 11th Division had lost 126 tanks, the Guards Division 60. Only a single tank regiment from the 7th Division had managed to push its way through the Orne crossing traffic-jams to enter the fray and it had lost six tanks.<sup>9</sup> Fighting continued for two more days with 8th Corps losing at least 80 more tanks.<sup>10</sup> The 11th Division's 3rd Royal Tank Regiment lost 54 tanks in two days — this from a normal strength of 52 tanks. The 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry lost 51 tanks.<sup>11</sup> The price might have been worth it had Bourguebus Ridge fallen but the quick commitment of German reserves saw the British advance contained well short of its major objectives. Though both the 2nd Canadian and 8th British Corps' had gained toeholds on the northern edge of Bourguebus Ridge the cost had been far too high.

GOODWOOD proved a watershed in the employment of British armour in Europe. The Armoured Divisions now perceived a requirement for a fundamental change in tactics. Each of the three divisions had employed its two brigades as separate tactical entities "in accordance with the then commonly accepted organisation for battle."<sup>12</sup> The experiences of each Division clearly indicated that there was a need for a closer alignment of armour and infantry. Armour alone appeared capable of only transitory successes, as for example the capture of Villars-Bocage or Hill 112. In each case infantry had failed to get forward in time to ensure the retention of the Division's gains. The motor battalions assigned to each brigade were, with only three companies, too small to provide this necessary

# THE EPSOM BATTLE




- British front evening 24th June 1944
  - British front evening 30th June 1944
  - 29th Armoured Bde 29th June 1944
  - German counter-attacks 29th June and 1st July 1944
- Roman numerals show Corps; others Divisions



# THE GOODWOOD BATTLE



British front morning 18th July   
 British front evening 20th July   
 German front evening 20th July   
 Roman numerals show Corps; others Divisions.



support. What was required were much stronger groupings of armour and infantry.

The Guards and 11th Armoured Divisions took immediate steps to integrate their armour and infantry. In the words of the Guard's Divisional history, GOODWOOD was "the last, as well as the first, occasion on which we fought on the lines according to which we had been trained."<sup>13</sup> Within two weeks the Division was quietly (and unofficially) reorganized, as its armoured brigade gained an infantry battalion and lost a tank regiment. The result was a permanent armour brigade organization of two battlegroups (each with a battalion and a regiment). The infantry brigade now consisted of two battalions and a tank regiment. This was a far more flexible arrangement with the two brigade headquarters being, for all intents and purposes, interchangeable and capable of either defensive or offensive operations.<sup>14</sup>

The British 11th Armoured Division took this metamorphosis a step further. The Divisional Commander, MGen "Pip" Roberts, felt that his armoured reconnaissance regiment was of only limited value in the close and bitter fighting that had come to characterize the Normandy campaign. As a result he chose to employ the recce regiment as a *de facto* tank regiment. Following GOODWOOD the 11th Armoured Division was structured around two almost identical brigades. Each brigade now had two infantry battalions and two tank regiments albeit one of the four battalions was a motor battalion and one of the four regiments was a recce cum tank regiment (figure four). And, like the Guards Division, command was to be completely flexible with "the brigadiers themselves ... prepared to operate as armoured brigadiers or infantry brigadiers."<sup>15</sup> Nine days after GOODWOOD the 11th Armoured Division employed these new groupings in Operation BLUECOAT. As far as the Division was concerned BLUECOAT more than justified the changes. A battlegroup based on a tank regiment (the 23rd Hussars) and an infantry battalion (3rd Monmouths) advanced eight kilometers down an unguarded track to seize a bridge over the Soulevre River. This coup was followed by the capture of the important village of Beny-Bocage. The Division exploited these successes until halted by counter-attacks by elements of three German divisions and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps' Tiger Battalion. However, unlike Hill 112, the 11th Division held its ground with the infantry

forming the foundation of a very effective defence. There were some difficult periods with, for example, one battlegroup of a regiment and a battalion cut-off for three days. Nevertheless the performance of the 11th Division in BLUECOAT was very good. The Division drove almost 25 kilometers into the German defences and then held their gains until relieved.<sup>16</sup>

The Guards Armoured Division, grouped in a fashion similar to the 11th Division, entered the battle on 31 July 1944. They too enjoyed good success, inflicting heavy casualties on the 9th SS Panzer Division and seizing the village of Chenedolle, some 27 kilometers beyond their line of departure.<sup>17</sup>

The 7th Armoured Division did not follow the lead of the 11th and Guards Divisions, preferring to retain the established organization. Perhaps the veteran 7th Armoured found it more difficult to accept tactical change than did the eager novices of the 11th and Guards Divisions. In any case the 7th Armoured Division was repeatedly criticized for its failure to group armour and infantry.<sup>18</sup> In Operation BLUECOAT the 7th Division again performed poorly and in early August the Divisional Commander was replaced.

On 26 July, 1944 the first elements of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division landed in Normandy. It appears that the Division had already taken steps to group its armour and infantry. On 1 April, 1944 the Division's reconnaissance regiment, the South Alberta Light Horse, was placed permanently under the command of the 10th Infantry Brigade. As a result the 4th Division had two brigades, each capable to some degree of combined-arms operations. Though this organization lacked the balance of the structure adopted by the 11th and Guards Armoured Divisions, it was still better than the War Office establishment.

The 4th Division's first major action, Operation TOTALIZE, gives further evidence of that formation's recognition of the importance of combined operations. The 4th Armoured Brigade, reinforced by the infantry of the Algonquin Regiment, formed two battlegroups each based on a tank regiment and an infantry battalion. Unfortunately for the Brigade its left-hand battlegroup strayed off course and was destroyed by a powerful armoured force from the 12th SS Panzer Division. The right-hand battlegroup was more successful, capturing Bretteville-le-Rabet but even so it covered barely half the distance to its

## 11th Armd Div. - Operation BLUECOAT, 24 July - 6 August 1944




Fig. 4

objective. The 10th Infantry Brigade, supported by the tanks of the South Alberta Light Horse, captured a number of villages but also fell short of its major objectives. The next day the operation was called off. The Division's lack of success in its first major operation appears to have been more the result of its inexperience than a failure to employ its armour and infantry together.

It would seem that the 4th Division had benefitted, to a certain degree, from the experiences of the three British armoured divisions which had preceded it to Normandy. The 4th Division's organization for TOTALIZE reflected a number of the lessons learned by these divisions during the seven weeks they had fought to expand the Normandy bridgehead. The Canadian Division appears to have come to battle already keenly aware of the fundamental tactical imperative of the Normandy campaign — the absolute requirement to closely group and employ all arms in concert.

These lessons were certainly not forgotten when the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, as part of the 1st Canadian Corps,

was transferred to Northwest Europe from Italy in February, 1945. The 5th Division was re-organized immediately on arrival in Northwest Europe. The Division's new establishment was exactly that adopted by the 11th Armoured Division following GOODWOOD. The Divisional reconnaissance regiment, the Governor General's Horse Guards, was organized as a tank regiment so that "the Division could be at any time split into two brigade groups, each of two armoured regiments, and two infantry battalions."<sup>19</sup> This establishment was, in fact, given the force of law when it was adopted by the War Office in May 1945.<sup>20</sup>

In summary it would appear that, in wartime, the doctrinal flow is reversed as tactical innovations and changes are generated by forces in combat. The British and Canadian armoured divisions that fought in Northwest Europe rapidly adapted their tactics and organizations to the nature of the fighting in that theatre. These unofficial changes appear to have influenced some units, such as the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, even before they went into action. Rather than wait for



official sanction (which in the case of the organizational changes adopted by the armoured divisions only came in the last month of the war) these formations independently adopted those structures and tactics which had proven successful in combat. Whether or not these doctrinal amendments would eventually be accepted as established doctrine was irrelevant to the troops at the "sharp end". They quite happily continued to employ that which worked best — whether it has the blessing of the War Office or not.<sup>21</sup> In doing so they demonstrated the doctrinal flexibility which, as Michael Howard suggests, wins wars.

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#### Footnotes

1. "Three-fourths of those things upon which action in War must be calculated, are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty.", von Clausewitz, Karl, **On War**, Kegan Paul edition.
2. Cheney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture, 3 October 1973, given by Michael Howard, MC, FBA. Ironically only three days later the vaunted Israeli Defense Forces would be called upon to demonstrate their doctrinal flexibility as IDF tanks and aircraft suffered heavy losses attempting to breach the anti-tank/anti-aircraft defences established by the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. This they managed to do despite the loss, in the first three days of the Yom Kippour War, of over two hundred (200) tanks and a third of their combat aircraft. See Herzog, Chaim, **The War of Atonement: October, 1973**, p. 196.
3. Verney, Major-General G.L., **The Desert Rats**, p. 157.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
5. The capture of Villers-Bocage opened up access to the Seullles Valley, the best approach to Mont Pincon and the Odon Valley. Villers-Bocage was, in every sense, "vital ground". See D'Este, Carlo, **Decision in Normandy**, p. 177.
6. Roberts, MGen G.P.B., **From the Desert to the Baltic**, pp. 164-167; Ellis, J., **The Sharp End**, p. 139.
7. *Ibid.*
8. One of the most effective German strong points was that of Cagny, which accounted for 16 tanks in a matter of a few minutes. Its garrison consisted of four Luftwaffe 88mm guns (literally press-ganged into a ground role at the last minute), an 88mm anti-tank gun and a Tiger. Later on it was reinforced by all available German reserves-eight infantrymen! This force held Cagny until 1600 hours on 18 July, imposing a critical delay on the deployment of the Guards Armoured Division. See Roberts, p. 175; D'Este, pp. 173-174.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 380-381; Verney, MGen G.L., **The Desert Rats**, p. 205.
10. McKee, Alexander, **Caen: Anvil of Victory**, p. 290.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
12. Hill, E.R. and Rosse, The Earl of, **The Story of the Guards Armoured Division, 1941-1945**, p. 38.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
14. My thanks to Professor Dominick Graham, MC, for this information. Prof. Graham served as a battery commander in the Guards Armoured Division throughout 1944 and early 1945.
15. Roberts, pp. 184-185.
16. D'Este, pp. 423-425; Hastings, Max, **Overlord**, p. 294.
17. Hill and Rosse, pp. 70-77; Lefevre, Eric, **Panzers in Normandy**, p. 144.
18. The New Zealand Army had sent an observer to Normandy to observe, at close hand, the tactical aspects of the campaign. This observer, Brigadier James Hargest, was scathing in his criticism of the 7th Division's failure to properly employ its infantry. See D'Este, p. 295.
19. Locke, R.P., **The Governor General's Horse Guards, 1939-1945**, p. 207.
20. War Office Armoured Division Establishment 20/General/6205; See Joslen, H.F., **Orders of Battle**, p. 10.
21. The British War Office recognized this fact and capitalized upon it, publishing its "Current Reports from Overseas" and "Notes from Theatres of War". These publications served to disseminate lessons learned in battle, often acting to give advance notice of impending changes to doctrine. They clearly show that combat was the dynamic behind doctrinal change.

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## The Cyprus Conflict of 1974

Events in Cyprus have for many years been making front page news, as its long history has been characterized by strife. The presence of a United Nations peace-keeping force on the island for the past twenty-five years indicates that the issues are complex, and there remains no immediate solution in sight.

Cyprus has suffered through many major incidents during its stormy evolution, however no single event has proven more traumatic than the 1974 conflict. Intense fighting during that long summer was to radically alter life on the island and usher in a new chapter in the longstanding conflict. A proper understanding of the Cyprus problem as it exists today can only be garnered through careful study of the contries' history, and therefore the 1974 conflict merits serious discussion.

### Early History

To place the events of 1974 in the appropriate perspective, it is important to examine the early history of the island. Cyprus is situated in the south eastern part of the Mediterranean, lying an equal distance from the Turkish and Syrian coasts. The strategic importance of its location resulted in a steady succession of rulers depending on the dominant force in the area from the earliest times. Nevertheless, the Greek community was to flourish on the island despite almost three hundred years of Ottoman rule ending in 1878. It was during this period that the number of Turkish settlers increased to raise the population distribution to what essentially exists today; roughly eighty percent Greek and twenty percent Turkish.

*Greek students in Athens demonstrating in favour of Enosis.*





*Dr Küçük (L) and President Makarios*

Britain took over administrative control of Cyprus from Turkey and history records that when the first British governor, Lord Wolsely, landed at Larnaca: "he was greeted by the Bishop of Kitium with the words 'We trust, my Lord, that you have come to grant us Enosis'".<sup>1</sup> This concept of Enosis, meaning union with Greece, has served as a passionate rallying cry over the years for the Greek-Cypriots. The obvious conflict of Enosis with the Turk-Cypriot wish for Taxim, or partition of the island, has been the primary reason for tension. Cyprus formally became a crown colony in 1925 and Britain ruled the uneasy divided community with mixed success until 1960.

Demands by Greek-Cypriots for independence from Britain and union with Greece increased in the 1950's as Colonel

Grivas led his guerrilla movement called EOKA, in a violent anti-colonial struggle. The Turk-Cypriot community viewed this conflict with great fear as they perceived the British presence as protecting their interests. The guerrilla war spilled-over into wider intercommunal strife and the ensuing blood-bath has never been forgotten by either side. This period of unrest culminated in the Zurich and London agreements of 1959, which created the Republic of Cyprus with Archbishop Makarios as the President and Dr. Kutchuk, the Turk-Cypriot leader, as Vice-President. The constitution guaranteed Turkish rights and they were allotted roughly thirty percent of the positions in the government, civil service and military. The Vice-President was awarded the right of veto power on all major decisions.



*Turkish troops advancing south (Rex Features)*

Britain, Greece and Turkey all signed as guarantors to this arrangement.

The formation of the Republic did not, however, resolve the basic issue of Enosis versus Taxism. Distrust on both sides crept in, and the Turkish use of their veto power crippled the political and economic life on the island. Intercommunal fighting soon broke out, which led to the creation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 1964, which has contributed substantially towards reducing tension.

The major ingredients for conflict, nevertheless, remained present and the simmering issues came to a boiling point in both 1964 and 1967 with Greece and Turkey threatening to wage war. These crises were only dissipated through timely superpower intervention. Despite these strained times, the Cypriots generally

enjoyed one of the highest standards of living amongst Mediterranean peoples. This was soon to change as once again external political factors were to impinge on Cypriot affairs and violently change life on the island.

### **The Coup**

In November of 1973 BGen Ioannides, a fervent nationalist, became President of Greece. He had previously served in Cyprus where he developed a severe dislike for Makarios whom he believed to be committed to a policy of independence rather than the sacred cause of Enosis. Ioannides moved to place senior Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard who were loyal to him, and quietly plotted to overthrow Makarios.

Meanwhile a new Turkish government headed by Bulent Ecevit was aggressively pursuing the ownership of potential oil fields in the Northern Aegean, and violently opposed the large numbers of Greek officers in Cyprus. Relations rapidly deteriorated between the two countries, causing Ioannides to consider taking over Cyprus which would offer him a strategic advantage in the event of war.

The situation peaked when Makarios sent an open letter to the Greek government in July 1974 complaining that they were unduly interfering in Cypriot affairs and demanding the recall of all Greek officers on the island. This letter was to be the catalyst prompting General Ioannides to order the execution of Makarios.

The total Cypriot military forces at the time included 15,000 men of the National Guard led by Greek officers, a Greek and Turkish regiment numbering roughly 800 men and finally the 4,000 men comprising Makarios' own elite guard, the Epikouriki. BGen Georgitsis as head of the National Guard was ordered to lead the coup and he quickly made plans to kill Makarios at the Presidential Palace, take over the

major communication centres and airports, and to surround the Epikouriki strongholds to force their surrender.

In the early morning of 12 July, a battalion of the National Guard led by a squadron of tanks, advanced on the Presidential Palace. A violent fire-fight ensued, and only a valiant defence by the Palace guard allowed Makarios to escape, whereupon, he managed to make his way to the coastal town of Paphos. Meanwhile, despite fierce opposition by the Epikouriki, all the main objectives were achieved. The UN was informed that a coup had occurred and Makarios was dead, while the Turkish leaders were assured that this was an internal squabble and they had nothing to fear.

Makarios eventually managed to find an intact radio station to broadcast his famous 'I am alive' speech, briefly rallying his troops. Nevertheless, the superior forces of the National Guard eventually triumphed and Makarios was forced to leave the island under UN protection.

International reaction to the coup universally condemned the Athens junta, and refused to recognize the new President,

*Ammunition is rushed forward to Greek National Guardsmen holding out in Nicosia (Camera Press)*




Nikos Sampson. Sampson was an admitted killer during his days as a member of EOKA, and was also a confirmed Turk-hater which prompted Rouf Denktash, the Turk-Cypriot leader, to remark on his appointments: "... it is as unacceptable as Adolf Hitler would be as President of Israel"<sup>2</sup>. The Turkish government demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Greek officers from Cyprus, and the removal of Sampson. Athens chose to ignore these warnings, prompting Ecevit to order a military intervention in Cyprus to safeguard the rights of the Turkish population, based on his country's position as a guarantor nation under the 1960 agreement.

### Turkish Military Intervention


In the early morning of 20 July, Turkish forces attacked the unsuspecting Greek Cypriot military. In what was a classic example of an amphibious assault, Turkish landing craft disgorged some 6,000 troops on two beaches to the west of Kyrenia under the support of a massive aerial and naval bombardment of the coastal defences. Turkish paratroopers were dropped on the south side of the Kyrenia

mountain range and doubled back to link up with the Turk-Cypriot battalion holding the tactically important fortress of St. Hilarion's castle. From there, they attempted to neutralize the Greek Ranger Battalion supporting the Kyrenia garrison, but encountered stiff opposition. The valiant stand of the Greek Rangers allowed the Kyrenia defenders time to organize and inflict severe losses on the landing force. Concurrently, an airborne insertion occurred in the area of the international airport in Nicosia, however, this attack was met with a staunch defence by the local Greek battalion.

It soon became apparent that the immediate objectives of the Turks included seizing the beachhead at Kyrenia, developing a sixteen mile corridor on to Nicosia, and capturing the international airport. Their first two objectives were accomplished within two days as their superior forces eventually overwhelmed the poorly equipped defenders. The National Guard had desperately attempted to push their armour (sadly comprising just 38 unreliable T-34's) into blocking positions south of Kyrenia, however, severely hampered by aerial attacks, they did not



# The Turkish assault Cyprus 1974



prove effective. The third Turkish objective was not realized as the Greeks managed to maintain a vigorous defence, despite flagging morale, as it became apparent that Greece was not prepared to come to their assistance due to their vacillating new civilian government.

A ceasefire was finally agreed to on 22 July through the efforts of the United States Undersecretary of State who had been actively mediating the dispute in order to avoid all out war between two members of NATO.

As a result of the invasion, the Speaker of the House, Glavkos Klendes, replaced Sampson as President of Cyprus. The Greek government was in turmoil as they had badly miscalculated the Turkish response, and had not been prepared to back up their bluff. Ioannides was forced to step aside and turn over control of Greece to a civilian government.

In contravention of the ceasefire arrangement, Turkey continued to land troops and equipment in Cyprus and gradually extended their control. Intense negotiations conducted in Geneva in late

July resulted in general agreement to establish a security zone around the bridgehead. Nevertheless, Turkey claimed that Turk-Cypriots were still being held prisoners in the enclaves and continued to press forward causing fighting to break out in Famagusta on 5 August. A second Geneva conference failed to resolve the issues, which keyed on the definition of the ceasefire line, and on 13 August the war resumed in full.

Turkish forces now numbered some 30,000 men equipped with upwards of 200 tanks. The new Greek regime refused to wage war on Turkey and consequently within two days the Turks had captured Famagusta and sealed off the greater part of Northern Cyprus.

### Aftermath

At the time of the final ceasefire on 16 August, Turkish forces occupied over forty percent of the island. In addition to the many thousands of casualties on both sides and the massive destruction of cities and villages, Cyprus had been turned into a huge refugee camp. Some 200,000 Greek-Cypriots, roughly a third of the population, were displaced and forced to live in the open until adequate shelter could be provided. Reports of horrible atrocities against civilians on both sides added to the feelings of hatred.

The Turkish reluctance to negotiate a settlement from its new position of strength has resulted in a severe hardening of the situation. The Greek Cypriots now bitterly resent the loss of their land and property, while the Turks feel justified after suffering as a minority for so many years. The drastic partition that now exists has resulted in incalculable economic and human suffering.

It is painfully clear that the tragic events of 1974 shattered the existing framework of Cyprus, and plunged the inhabitants into a chaos from which they still have not recovered. The Greek-Cypriots have paid a heavy price for their cause of Enosis, as it appears increasingly evident that those displaced from the North will not recover their lands and property, due to the Turkish desire to maintain the status quo as demonstrated by their unilateral declaration in 1983 of the formation of the Northern Republic of Cyprus. Greek-Cypriots refuse to accept the present situation on a long term basis, and it appears that unless major concessions are granted future conflict in Cyprus cannot be ruled out.

**Captain Dave Kitchen** is the BC with B Sqn  
The RCD

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### Notes

1. Carver, Michael. **HARDING OF PETHERTON**, p. 23.
2. Theodoracopulus, Taki. **THE GREEK UPHEAVAL**, p. 50.



## Un musée militaire à Trois-Rivières

Qui a entendu parler d'un musée militaire à Trois-Rivières? Bien peu de gens encore. Mais attention! Le vieux projet d'un "Musée du 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada" est en train de devenir une réalité.

Jusqu'au moment de son accréditation par le Comité des musées des Forces armées canadiennes (ministère de la Défense nationale), le 8 mai 1984, le musée officiel du Régiment était situé dans l'édifice administratif du 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé de la Force régulière cantonné à la base de Valcartier, près de Québec. Transféré à la maison-mère de Trois-Rivières, il est depuis lors le seul musée militaire, sur la rive nord du Saint-Laurent, entre Montréal et la Vieille capitale.

Accessible au public depuis les fêtes du 350<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de Trois-Rivières, le Musée militaire du 12<sup>e</sup> RBC sera ouvert officiellement au début de l'été 1989. Plusieurs cérémonies, avec tambours et trompettes, marqueront cet événement. Car (les responsables ne s'en cachent pas) ce musée pourra alors être comparé avantageusement à d'autres musées militaires, dont celui de la citadelle de Québec.

### Vocation

L'unité de milice trifluvienne, telle qu'elle existe aujourd'hui, fut créée le 24 mars 1871. Comme sous plusieurs appellations (86th Three Rivers Regiment, Régiment de Trois-Rivières, etc.) pendant trois-quarts de siècles, elle est devenue le 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada le 8 mai 1968. Ayant participé aux deux guerres mondiales (dans la région d'Amiens (France) en 1917, en Sicile, en Italie et en Hollande de 1943 à 1945), elle s'enorgueillit aujourd'hui d'une longue et glorieuse histoire.

Mais, il faut le souligner, Trois-Rivières est aussi le berceau de la milice canadienne. Dès 1651, avant même de recevoir les instructions du roi, Pierre Boucher avait mobilisé les habitants pour la défense du bourg contre les Amérindiens. Ce système de "milice" avant la lettre devait se perpétuer jusqu'à nos jours.

La vocation du musée militaire du 12<sup>e</sup> RBC est double: d'abord, préserver et mettre en valeur le patrimoine militaire local en mettant l'accent sur l'histoire de la Milice canadienne et la participation du Régiment trifluvien aux deux conflits mondiaux; puis, faire connaître le plus possible les Forces canadiennes au grand public.

### Aménagement et collections

Le Musée militaire du 12<sup>e</sup> RBC est situé dans l'enceinte du manège militaire construit en 1905. Depuis 1984, plusieurs milliers de dollars ont été investis dans les travaux d'aménagement; 31 panneaux d'exposition vitrés sur la galerie-mezzanine "Vallée du Liri", 15 armoires mobiles, achat de mannequins et de matériaux de toutes sortes. Des travaux d'envergure sont présentement en cours dans la salle d'armes et dans les salons "Amiens" et "Cassino II". Les salons "Ortona" et "Termoli" seront aménagés ultérieurement, au fil des ressources financières.

Toutes les pièces proviennent de dons, legs ou prêts permanents faits par des particuliers (surtout des Vétérans) ou par le Régiment et ses instituts. Le musée ne fait aucune acquisition onéreuse. Sa collection compte plus de 2000 pièces dont plusieurs ont une très grande valeur: c'est le cas des médailles et décorations, des uniformes canadiens et des armes blanches (sabres, épées, poignards). Les pièces les plus recherchées par les visiteurs sont les armes à feu: des fusils du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, des pistolets et revolvers de la deuxième guerre mondiale et de la guerre du Vietnam, des mitrailleuses. Les casques, les drapeaux et les centaines d'insignes et écussons suscitent toujours un grand intérêt.

Notons ici qu'une grande place est réservée à certains objets d'époque assez récente, en particulier les cadeaux d'échange entre le Régiment et ses unités affiliées: le 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment de Chasseurs (de Sedan, France), le 8<sup>e</sup> Régiment de Hussards (de Altkirch, France), et le Royal Tank Regiment (de Londres, Angleterre), et, aussi, quelques souvenirs de la carrière du général Jean-V. Allard.

Les pièces exposées ne constituent pas à elles seules l'attrait d'une visite au Musée. Les dizaines de visiteurs venus jusqu'à présent, habituellement en groupes, n'avaient, pour la plupart, jamais mis les pieds dans un bâtiment militaire. Presque tous désiraient voir enfin l'intérieur du manège, "ce qui se passe là-dedans" et "comment c'est bâti": une grande salle d'armes qui sert de salle de rassemblement et d'exercice, autour, une salle de tir intérieur, des bureaux, des locaux pour les instituts. Quelques véhicules tout usage, camions et camionnettes, mais pas de chars d'assaut: la dotation d'équipement des Forces canadiennes n'attribue pas actuellement de chars aux Régiments de

milice blindés et de plus, les gros chars "Léopard" ne pourraient pas circuler dans les rues de Trois-Rivières ou être utilisés sur les terres avoisinantes sans causer de sérieux dommages ...

Par sa nature et par sa spécificité, le Musée militaire vise un public particulier: les Trifluviens et Trifluviennes intéressés à leur unité de milice locale, les vétérans et les anciens militaires qui viennent se remémorer quelques souvenirs, leurs parents et descendants en quête de renseignements, et les nombreuses gens attirés par la vie militaire ou par certains de ses aspects. Tels sont les collectionneurs d'armes ou d'insignes et écussons.

#### **Le centre d'archives**

Depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1988, le Musée comporte deux divisions distinctes: la division muséologique (sous la direction d'un Conservateur chevronné, monsieur Roland Labissonnière) et la division des archives (sous la direction du soussigné). Depuis quelques années, la majeure partie des énergies a été consacrée à la reconstitution des archives régimentaires, pratiquement inexistantes pour la période antérieure à la Deuxième guerre mondiale. On procède actuellement à l'inventaire systématique du fonds régimentaire et des fonds privés, et l'on espère pouvoir diffuser cet inventaire en janvier prochain.

A l'acquisition et la gestion des archives s'ajoutent quelques activités complémentaires: mise à jour périodique du diaporama sur "La milice canadienne et le 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada" et de la brochure sur "L'historique, les coutumes et traditions" de l'unité, projet de publication d'un volume de biographies des anciens commandants du Régiment. Sans parler des recherches qui s'imposent pour répondre de façon satisfaisante aux nombreuses questions et demandes de renseignements qui proviennent fréquemment de partout à travers le Canada et même de pays étrangers aussi lointains que l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande.

#### **Administration et financement**

Les frais occasionnés (administration, salaires) par la gestion d'un musée et d'un dépôt d'archives n'entrent pas dans les dépenses autorisées par le ministère de la Défense nationale.

Le Musée est administré légalement par un organisme privé sans but lucratif, le "Fonds Lieutenant-colonel Raoul Pellerin". Les contributions privées et les campagnes de souscription demeurent encore sa principale source de financement. Jusqu'à ce jour, la campagne de 1988 a rapporté plus de 6000\$. Toutefois, plusieurs activités, dont les profits iront au Musée, sont prévues dans les semaines et les mois à venir.

Pour de plus amples renseignements, composez le 374-8522 poste 43 ou écrivez à: Musée militaire du 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada, 574 rue St-François-Xavier, Trois-Rivières (Québec) G9A 1R6. Vous pouvez également envoyer votre contribution à l'ordre du "Fonds Lcol R. Pellerin", à la même adresse. Merci de votre appui.

**Daniel Robert** Musée militaire 12<sup>e</sup> RBC  
Trois-Rivières



**Armour Bulletin Writer's Guide  
Guide à l'intention des écrivains du Bulletin  
des Blindés**

**Subjects/Sujets**

We are interested in all subjects relating to Armour affairs that would be of interest to Armour personnel. This would include articles on R&D, personnel, equipment, training, tactics, and history.

Nous nous intéressons à tous les sujets relatifs au Blindé qui pourraient être d'un certain intérêt pour le personnel Blindé comme des articles sur la recherche et le développement, sur le personnel, l'équipement, l'instruction, la tactique et l'histoire.

**Style/Style**

In that a readable article is preferred, fit the style to the subject matter. Articles should be double spaced, typed on one side of the paper. Articles should normally not exceed 2,000 words. Only material of an unclassified nature should be submitted. Articles will be published in the official language in which they are received.

Nous préférons les articles qui se lisent facilement, et dont le style soit adapté au contenu. Tous les articles doivent être

tapés à double interligne et d'un seul côté de la feuille. Les articles ne devraient pas compter au plus 2,000 mots. Seuls les sujets de nature non classifiée peuvent être présentés. Les articles seront publiés dans la langue officielle dans laquelle ils nous sont présentés.

**Illustrations/Illustrations**

Art work-sketches, black and white or colour photographs, maps, line drawings, diagrams, etc, enhance the attractiveness and understanding of an article. They must be sharp and of high contrast. Washed out, grey, fuzzy and greatly enlarged photos reproduce poorly. Do not submit photocopies.

Tout travail artistique (croquis, photographies en noir et blanc ou couleur, cartes, dessins au trait, diagrammes, etc) rehausse la présentation et la compréhension d'un article. Le matériel utilisé doit être nettement découpé et faire contraste. Les photos délavées, grises, imprécises et très agrandies ne se reproduisent pas bien. N'envoyez pas de photocopies.

**Next Issue submission deadline  
Prochain numéro date limite de soumission  
31 Oct 1989**



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