



Armour Bulletin



TOTAL FORCE



Armour Bulletin

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About the Cover

"Total Force" is designed to integrate full and part-time military personnel in order to have combat-capable armed forces at various stages of readiness. It professes the concept of loyalty to the corps before the regiment.

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Author's Guide

The Armour Bulletin, as a forum for debate and discussion, welcomes the submission of articles of a technical, tactical or historical nature.

The following guidelines apply:

- it would be appreciated if all articles could be typewritten on 8-1/2 x 11 paper, double spaced on one side and be accompanied by a 3.5 inch disk copy; (in WP 5.0/1/2);
- articles should not exceed 2,000 words (much smaller articles are also welcome, ie, a page or two);
- black and white photographs and illustrations should accompany the article. Photographs cut out of magazines are not acceptable as they are an infringement of copyright laws. Photographs and or illustrations add to the possibility of publishing;
- only material of an unclassified nature should be submitted;
- authors should include a very brief description of their current position, location and photo.

The Editor reserves the right to reject and to edit articles or letters submitted for publication. Authors should not submit articles which have either already been submitted for consideration to another publication or have already been published.

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Doctrine

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Colonel Commandant's Foreword



The Armour Bulletin Editors are congratulated for the DIGITIZATION issue; this is the second issue of timely value for all of us. "Digitization" is of exceptional importance to all combatants and this should be evident to all readers. I have been encouraging all Armoured Corps members to "study" its contents and line-up on the future of fighting vehicles, commanders and crews. We are now about to receive our new radios, TCCCS-IRIS, which will give us the basis to tie-in all those current and future accessories detailed in "Digitization" and articles in the "RCAC Association 1996 Annual Review".

Some authors presented controversial views and they are encouraged to go on and develop their thoughts and proposals because there is no limit to what digitization will do for the combatants of tomorrow. You are all encouraged to participate with your submissions.

TOTAL FORCE is the sleeper that will impact strongly on the future of the Militia and the Regular Army. The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) noted the 1994 White Paper comment on Canada's commitment to Total Force and the emphasis on a four stage mobilization plan. However, the SCRR addressed the absence of a detailed plan for Stage 4 thus the ultimate and true mission for the Militia.

Notwithstanding the Minister of National Defence's subsequent truism that the *raison d'être* of the

Reserves is for mobilization, we are now faced with the need to put true meaning and teeth in our terms of references (TORs) for Total Force in order to achieve defence preparedness.

The Regular Army needs to be clear on its responsibility for the Militia structure and training for all aspects of Stages 3 and 4. Conversely, the Militia must put its oar in on establishing these TORs to achieve the appropriate levels of skills in keeping with the demands of a volunteer force working within the parameters of severely limited strengths, reduced training budgets and scarce equipments. These are continuing daunting challenges.

The Regular Army and the Militia must be fully meshed in our Total Force to achieve Mobilization Plan Stages 1 and 2, and go on to the Stages 3 and 4 mobilization cadres upon which the Canadian Army can grow and go to the field to meet emergencies and ultimately go to war.


Training for War cannot be just a slogan. It must be mutually accepted in the context of achievable training and preparedness and Total Force must be the vehicle to clearly establish: (a) What standards are required for an effective Militia; and (b) What the Regular Army must do to support the Militia in achieving these standards.

Worthy!

Major-General J.P. Robert LaRose
Colonel Commandant



Director of Armour's – Foreword




The timing for an Armour Bulletin dedicated to addressing the Total Force concept could not be more appropriate. With the Regular Force continuing to draw down to its end state of 20,000 and the Reserves about to embark on a three year period of validation and evaluation, it is critical that we look inward and examine the way ahead for our Corps. One needs to look no further than the re-rolling of the Elgin Regiment to know that change is upon us and the Corps of the future is going to look different than it does today. In my opinion, our survival as a vibrant and viable Corps is intimately linked to the Total Force.

Since the 1987 White Paper, Total Force has been a well used phrase, but in the last ten years have we actually fully embraced this concept? I am not sure that we have. I frequently hear grumbling about our Militia brethren from many in the Regular Force. From a Reserve perspective, there is still a basic distrust of the motives of the Regular Force. A feeling exists that the Army wants to use them and their vehicles when it is convenient, but the rest of the time wish they would go away and allow the full time Army to get on with the business of professional soldiering. How do we bridge this gap and create a climate of mutual trust and respect? We have always prided ourselves on our flexibility; now is the time that we must quit paying lip service to this characteristic of armour and be open and innovative in looking to the future.

I do not propose to have all the answers, but I do have some advice on where we can start. For the Regular Force, we must stop questioning the abilities of the Militia. The Armour School is training all students to common standards which are as high as ever. The Reserves have proven themselves over and over again as augmentees on operational commitments. With no indication of a lessening of the tempo of operations, it is time we look at using Reserve sub-units to augment our battle groups. This will give us the double benefit of giving a break to the Regulars and at the same time allowing the Reserve chain of command valuable experience leading their own troops.

The chain of command must be used to solve problems. With the Land Force Area concept, all that happens within an Area is a concern of the Area Commander. Therefore, if you are in some way being treated inequitably, your recourse is to address it through your Brigade and Area chains of command.


The way ahead is uncertain, but for the Corps to get stronger we must build synergy by combining the strengths of both the Regular and Reserve forces into a Total Force. I look forward to reading the articles in this Bulletin and I hope they generate enthusiasm, innovation and creativity for the future. 

Worthy!

Lieutenant-Colonel W.J. Fulton
Director of Armour



Editor-in-Chief's Foreword



Dear Readers:

I hope you enjoyed the last Edition of the Armour Bulletin. You will certainly agree that, although specialized in nature, "digitization issues" are not only applicable to all facets of our profession but will certainly revolutionize the way we do business. On your behalf, I would like to thank all our "techie" for their excellent articles and would certainly be remiss if I did not specifically acknowledge Colonel Howie Marsh's enthusiasm and vision in introducing the theme.

In this Edition, I have invited as our "keynote writer", Lieutenant-General J.C. Gervais, CMM, CD (Retd), Honorary Colonel of 12^e Régiment Blindé du Canada. Having served as Commander Mobile Command, at the time when the decision was made to form our Total Force Regiment, the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's), he is indeed well suited to introduce the topic.

Of the four Editions I have had the privilege of publishing, this Armour Bulletin has, in my opinion, been the most challenging. Soliciting personal opinions on what appears to be an extremely controversial topic is no "cup of tea" (like pulling teeth). Reluctancy and apprehension were certainly abundant in potential authors. This is not a new phenomenon and certainly in my career Total Force has been a subject of countless discussions. Although it would appear that everyone has opinions on the subject, few are willing to express them in a

written forum in fear of perceived reprisals. Nonetheless, my staff have been persistent in their search for articles and you will certainly agree that this Armour Bulletin has met the mark. Again, I invite you all to use the "Turret Talk" column in the Armour Bulletin to voice your thoughts on this issue.

I also invite you to participate in our next edition which will focus on "Doctrine". All articles can be submitted to the editor on the internet at "rcacsc_gagetown@brunswickmicro.com" or "ac_qm_gagetown@brunswickmicro.nb.ca"


As a final note, I would like to announce the annual staff change to the AB effective for the next edition. Maj. Doug Poitras will be handing responsibility as managing editor to Maj Larry Zaporzan who is also occupying the position of CI at the school. Doug, for his part, is off to Tactics School. Capt Andrew Zdunich is returning to his regiment in August and will hand over the duties of Editor to Capt Allan Finney. On your behalf, I would like to thank them both for their guidance of the Bulletin through the changes of the past year.

Lieutenant-Colonel J.W.G. Rousseau
Editor-in-Chief, Commandant
 Armour School



Keynote Address

by Lieutenant-General James C. Gervais



Lieutenant-General (Retired) J.C. Gervais joined the Canadian Army in 1958. He commanded 12th BCC from 1973 to 1975 and retired from the Military as Commandant, Land Force Command in 1981. He is presently the Deputy Secretary, Chancellery at Government House in Ottawa.

“Total Force – to integrate full and part-time military personnel in order to have combat-capable armed forces at various stages of readiness – is, if nothing else, a common-sense idea.”

Since my retirement in January 1993, a lot of change has occurred in the Canadian Forces. One of the fundamental ideas that seems to be withstanding the test of time is Total Force, but its application is another matter.

It is not clear when the concept of ‘Total Force’ was officially launched: some would say that it originated with the 1978 policy document P26, since re-affirmed with the White Papers of 1987 and 1994. But in reality ‘Total Force’ has been with us much longer and is certainly not unique to the Canadian experience.

The rationale for adopting Total Force is somewhat based on resource considerations. How to structure both components of the army in peacetime, i.e., how much integration and at what levels this should take place are questions which planners are addressing in an environment of budgetary constraints.

But these are issues dealing with process. Far more important in my view are the issues concerning

the human dimension which must be addressed up front.

The first of these is communications related. Army leadership must take the initiative in interpreting the concept of Total Force to both the Regular Force and the Militia. This is an ongoing task and not an easy one at that, since there are so many variables and room for misunderstanding. As Total Force is taken more seriously, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of the reservists in meeting their commitment. The reservists have themselves raised doubts about policies introduced to help them, but which have either not done so or have not come to fruition. Such legitimate questions cannot be simply answered, but a common understanding of each component’s strengths, weaknesses and expectations is essential. Mutual trust and confidence is at the very basis of Total Force and army leadership at all levels is responsible to establish the ‘tone’ for Total Force to succeed.

Another important element to Total Force is related to individual training. Common individual training standards are absolutely essential to the concept. A quote from the well-known military historian Desmond Morton says it all: ‘A total force concept cannot exist if the



training of members is separate and unequal. All members should at least begin with common training. Select cadres should continue their professional training together. The Armoured Corps is well positioned to meet the training challenge with its well trained NCOs and highly motivated junior officers.

The application of Total Force must be done with due regard to the principle of flexibility. One has but to look at the demographics of Canada to appreciate that we are a country of regions. Diversity is the watchword. What works in the

Western Area may not work the same way in the East. Within the broad framework of Total Force, there must be room to manoeuvre in order to arrive at the objective. The Armoured Corps which has shown its flexibility on the battlefield is well versed to understand this aspect of Total Force in its application to Regular and Reserve units.

There are other aspects to be dealt with and the readers of this edition will no doubt be entertained by the wide variety of views on Total Force.

Permanent changes to the role, structure and taskings of Armoured Corps units will result from the application of Total Force. The Armoured Corps has been at the forefront of change and has left its mark on the world of force development and doctrine over the years. There is an opportunity to do as much with Total Force.





Total Force – Opportunities and Challenges

by Lieutenant-Colonel M.J. Ward



Lieutenant-Colonel M.J. Ward enrolled in the Governor General's Foot Guards in 1975 and graduated from the Royal Military College in 1980. He is a graduate of the UK All Arms Tactics Course and the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has commanded the 8CH, the Corp's only Total Force Armoured Regiment since 1995.

"Each component has its relative strengths and weaknesses and it will be a mark of our maturity as an army, a profession and a fraternity, if we can begin to judge each other based on the positive rather than the negative."

INTRODUCTION

During the past 10 years Total Force has become the buzzword of choice for our army structure and approach to operations and training. Yet there is still mistrust and misunderstanding surrounding the employment of Reserves and Regulars in close concert. Attitudes range from indifference to petulance to condescension, but rarely support. Command of the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) has set me squarely at the crossroads of Total Force and I've had a unique opportunity to observe its strengths, weaknesses,

opportunities and threats. Total Force has potential but its achilles heel is the attitudes of we who serve in it. Until we solve that we won't be able to exploit the concept. The following paragraphs offer examples of positive initiatives and some additional challenges.

THE AIM

The challenge is to maintain the most effective balance between Regular, integrated Total Force and Reserve Units given fixed resources. From my Mission Analysis these key tasks (specified and implied) fall out:

- a. to maintain a balance of operational readiness and training postures;
- b. to maintain the national mobilization framework;
- c. to train and sustain a military chain of command;

- d. to project national power/influence in coalition and peacekeeping operations;
- e. to reinforce nationalism and citizenship;
- f. to foster regional identities and community ties, and
- g. to protect our military heritage.

Not surprisingly, it's a long list but Total Force must achieve the best mix of all of the above given prevalent constraints and limitations. How well we succeed will be a function of both leadership and professionalism.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Total Force is not new. It has been a constant theme throughout our military history and has always balanced risk against necessity. The Forces arrayed on the Plains of Abraham, Queenston Heights, the Fenian Raids, North West Rebellion, NATO and UN operations have all reflected this balance in terms of Regular and Militia troops. There's no better illustration of how well that has worked recently than in the case of 2 PPCLI which deployed to Croatia in 1993 with more than 50% Reservists in the ranks. The Battalion's commendable actions in the Medac Pocket demonstrated what could be achieved given a successful mobilization, training and deployment cycle.




STRENGTHS

Today, Total Force is working amongst our closest Allies including the United States, Britain, Australia and NATO. It is normal, highly cost effective (socio-politically) and while it accepts risk in providing a range of readiness and capabilities, it nevertheless maintains insurance against future crises. Although we are quick to criticize our own perceived shortcomings, my experience with other armies has been that we aren't necessarily worse off. We should recognize that and accept it. Our kit may not be as new, shiny or combat capable but we do have an advantage over other armies in terms of the high quality of our soldiers, NCOs and officers. Our commitment to maintaining this advantage through proper training in both Regular and Reserve components is what will sustain our ability to operate effectively on the battlefield.

The Total Force concept has generated a big improvement in the quality of Reserve training and the ability of Reservists to augment field force units on deployed operations. In order to operate effectively together it is essential that we maintain a unified approach to training and operational standards between components. The Army couldn't have sustained operations in the former Yugoslavia from 1992-1996 without the ready and continuous availability of a trained Reserve component.

Similarly, combined Regular and Reserve training has improved. For the last few years our Crewman QL7 course has included a mix



ARCON 95 Collective Training.

of Regular and Reserve Warrant Officers. Same course, same standard. There has been tremendous benefit derived by the close association of the two. The Regular has been able to pass on his experience for

the benefit of all while the large critical mass of Reservists has provided a unique insight into the world of the Regular. Better mutual understanding has resulted. This same approach was




Total Force Recognition Quiz: Regular or Reserve?



used on the Reserve Recce Sqn Commander Course serial run last Fall. Due to a shortage of Reserve candidates vacancies were given to the Regular Regiments to fill with officers in Battle Captain appointments. What a golden opportunity!

In the 8th Hussars Total Force has worked best at QL2 level where basic training is run by Regular Force, CLC-qualified Cpls. In the past three years, the Regiment has transferred over 90 Reserve soldiers to the Regular Force under the direct entry programme. The quickest and best way to replace this extraordinary attrition and at the same time maintain standards has been through the use of these excellent young soldiers. The combination of first-class training and excellent instructor role models has achieved significant results.

Employment of Reservists within Regular units and formation Headquarters also has benefits. A Sqn, 8CH participates annually in Ex ROYAL HUSSAR and the Combat Team Commander Course. The high training tempo is more sustainable because of Reserve augmentation. The Reservist gets experience of continuous operations while the Sqn benefits by having full crews and troops. This was tried in the RCD in Germany in the early 1980s but did not succeed, we were told, because nobody could agree on who should fund it. A golden opportunity was missed. Yet today, with local arrangements, cooperative staff and a "can-do" attitude it is succeeding. This same approach is used routinely by 1st Cdn Div HQ



Combined Arms Operations: The Atlantic Armoured Regt O Gp at ARCON 96.

to maintain qualified duty officers for its training missions. It works because of will and commitment on all sides.

From these examples my sense is that we are pursuing initiatives at the right levels and working to improve the situation. We are on the right track but there is still room for improvement.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

First and most importantly, we have to overlook the stereotypes that have developed between Reserves and Regulars. Interestingly, we have a lot in common: commitment, dedication, selfless service, loyalty to an ideal, underpaid... We also have to recognize our differences and adjust our expectations accordingly. We can't afford to live in isolation or to perpetuate two

solitudes. Mutual understanding and respect will only be improved, however, through greater contact and shared experience at every level. Maybe every Regular should do a tour in a Reserve support position during his career. Each component has its relative strengths and weaknesses and it will be a mark of our maturity as an army, a profession and a fraternity, if we can begin to judge each other based on the positive rather than the negative. When that happens, the "glass" will always be half-full.

A source of continuing friction is in the area of rank equivalency. It is too easy for the Regular to claim that his Reserve peer has not met the same rigorous standards and therefore doesn't deserve to wear the rank. This is a valid concern which will not easily be overcome but we are well along the road by striving for common standards and



developmental courses. Let's not forget however that it is not a level playing field. You can't demand the same skills from a soldier who serves 40 days per year as you can from one who serves 360. It is an "apples and oranges" argument. Our expectations must match the capability. Where we could compare fairly is on the basis of professional attributes. Why don't we measure patriotism, dedication, loyalty or the commitment to serve? Does either component have the monopoly on these?

At the same time, however, there is a potential cost of too much equivalency. This may have a heavy and unsupportable impact on Reserve units and the ability of the individual to attend longer and more comprehensive courses. There are both pros and cons to this argument and

we must be careful to define, differentiate and manage between the leadership, command and morale aspects of the issue. We can't afford nor do we necessarily want to turn every Reservist into a Regular.

Direct transfer of Reserve soldiers to the Regular Force makes a lot of sense but it also has a hidden threat. In several cases this has stripped Reserve units of its core of young and potential NCOs. Although arguably a renewable resource, going back too often to the same source will eventually destroy some units. Some management is required. We could compensate and improve capability by doing our utmost to encourage skilled transfers in the opposite direction; from the Regular to the Reserve component. We should actively encourage our retirees to soldier-on with the Reserve Regiments. It is

challenging and rewarding service and the skills and experience that it takes us so long to develop should be retained at every opportunity.

CONCLUSION

Total Force is with us to stay. At bottom it is really just a formula by which both Regular and Reserve components contribute to the overall accomplishment of the Army's objectives. We are mistaken if we think that we can exist in isolation or as two solitudes. In these tough times the challenge will be to find a balance between the two which works. There is a positive and proven need for us to work closely together and there are plenty of examples of this wherever you look. It cuts both ways, so think globally, but act locally. The outcome will be a stronger and more capable Army.





The Total Force Concept

by Lieutenant-Colonel L.P. Morin



Lieutenant-Colonel L.P. Morin was commissioned in the Ontario Regiment as a Second-Lieutenant in 1966 and served as Commanding Officer from 1980-1983. He is presently Senior Staff Officer Armour at LFCA HQ. He is a past President of the RCAC Association (Cavalry) and is employed with General Motors of Canada Truck Assembly Plant.

"In order for Total Force to work well there must be an equal partnership. Equal treatment is required when it comes to pay, promotions, training, and most of all equipment in a vehicle intensive Corps."

When Defence Minister Perrin Beatty introduced the concept of "Total Force" as part of the 1987 Defence White Paper it provoked thoughts of great things for the Reserves. The policy statement of 17 September 1991 re-affirmed the validity of the Total Force concept and outlined the plans to increase the current size of both the Primary and Supplementary Reserve components. These plans raised the expectations of equipment buys, modernization programs, and new Militia Training and Support Centres across the country.

My recollection of the plans for the Militia Training Support Centres (MTSC) included provisions

for a Battle Group's worth of equipment: enough APCs for a Mechanized Battalion, a Squadron of Armour, a Battery of Guns, an Engineer Troop and CSS elements. These would be used by the Regular Force units Monday to Friday and the Militia on weekends. Also, full time staff would be responsible for first line maintenance during the week to allow Reserve units the maximum amount of training time. Where would the equipment be obtained? The CF had just purchased 199 Bison APCs (known as Mil LAV for Militia Light Armoured Vehicle when first acquired for the MTSCs). Other sources included the Mech Brigade in Germany and current Militia holdings.

During the last ten years we revised Reserve Terms of Reference in promotion policy and qualifications standards to more closely coincide with those of the Regular Force. Later we embarked on the 10/90 Battalion and finally Total

Army Establishments (TAE). The Total Force Armoured Regiment seemed like the perfect solution for the 8CH (PL) on return from Germany.

In the early 90's, sufficient manpower resources did not exist to meet the operational commitments. We used Militia Cpls/Tprs to meet this need. This idea worked well because of the 70 days pre-deployment period.

Unfortunately the "Appreciation" or the "Estimate" (the term depends on your generation) did not address all the "Factors". We did not know the budget would be cut. We did not spend enough time studying the two different cultures, Regular and Militia. The Regulars viewed their job as a vocation, Militia viewed their job as an avocation.

Total Force courses such as QL 7 are held during the autumn when militia members, especially teachers and students, have difficulty obtaining leave from their school duties, 6A and 6B courses run during the springtime have exacerbated the problem of qualifying sufficient senior NCOs.

TAE which was restricted to establishment is further restricted since it can only be funded at 50%. One wonders if units will be able to maintain sufficient strength to achieve a complete sub-unit.



When the Regular Force received their personnel enhancement credits they quickly cast aside the 10/90 idea. To allow the Regular Armoured Regiments to receive their second Cougar Squadron, the Reserves in Central Area had to surrender seven of their sixteen Cougars. The Mil LAV Bison APCs are being diverted to the Regular Force as logistic vehicles.

The training needs of the Reserve in preparation for mobilization and in peace time are not dramatically different from those of the Regular Force. The differences are limitations in training time and training opportunities rather than differences in training standards. The Reservist must have the availability of the appropriate equipment to meet these training tasks. The

Armoured Corps requires a Squadron of Tanks or Cougars in each Reserve unit. An additional "10% buy" for Reserve equipment is no longer sufficient if they are to be an equal partner.

Misguided training policies such as two year training cycles, cancelled courses, splitting the Armoured Reserve into two officer classifications (R21 Tank & R26 Recce) cannot continue without serious discussion of the effects. The resistance to the recent policy for Regular Support Personnel posted to Reserve units to rebadge to their Reserve cap badge shows serious doubts about "Total Force" on the part of the Regulars. The Regular and Reservist concern for the survival of our units is becoming a wedge between the two cultures.

I foresee succession problems fast approaching in the Reserves, not only at the Commanding Officer level but at the RSM/MWO level. Parachuting a Regular CO or RSM into a Reserve unit is only a bandage approach which can have detrimental effects on the future of a Regiment.


In order for Total Force to work well there must be an equal partnership. Equal treatment is required when it comes to pay, promotions, training, and most of all equipment in a vehicle intensive Corps. By putting Reserve units in the position of having to cope with inadequate budgets to pay soldiers, inadequate training facilities and equipment, the Canadian public will get what they have paid for - an inadequate Reserve Force.





Land Force Atlantic Area Reserve Restructure

by Major G.W. Meisner



Major Gary Meisner, 8CH (PL), joined the military in April 1973 and was commissioned in 1978. He is presently serving at HQ LFAA as Staff Officer Review Services and Senior Staff Officer Armour.

“Every effort will be made to maximize the number of soldiers in the mission elements. The tendency to place more personnel in HQ and support positions than necessary will not be accepted.”

BACKGROUND

The basis of the current restructure of the Land Force Reserve goes back to the 1992 Auditor General’s Report and the 1994 Defence White paper that called for major improvements to the Reserves “operational capability and availability” and the “streamlining of Reserve organizations and rank structures.”

On 5 April 1995, the MND established the Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) with the mandate to “examine

and make recommendations concerning the role, structure and employment of the Canadian Forces Reserve Force to maximize their operational and cost effectiveness”. The Report of the Special Commission was submitted to the Minister on 30 October 1995. The report contains 41 specific recommendations, 35 of which directly impact on the Militia. The recommendations of the SCRR report, as approved by the Minister, are the fundamental building block for the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR).

Within Land Force Command all recommendations and initiatives involving change to and/or restructuring of the Reserve are dealt with through the LFRR which in turn is coordinated with the overriding Land Force Restructure (LFR). Producing such a plan using the SCRR recommendations as

a foundation and incorporating all the factors, directives and guidelines, while still meeting the expectation and requirements of the Reserve community, is a difficult and challenging task. It is one that will involve input of serving Regular and Reserve staff, honoraries and the broader Reserve community.

DISTRICTS TO BRIGADES

The restructuring of the Reserves has resulted in a decision to adopt a National Brigade structure. In the announcement to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) on 21 November 1996, the MND approved the implementation of these Brigade structures. The structure will be implemented in two phases. In the first phase, 1 April 1997 through 1 November 1999, there will be ten Reserve Brigades stood-up across the country. Of these ten, LFAA will stand-up two. However, these two Brigades are an interim structure only, organized to permit effective command and control. By 1 November 1999, Atlantic Area will collapse the two-Brigade structure into a single Brigade, plus additional non-brigade units, as our end-state configuration.

To achieve the interim structure, Atlantic Canada’s current 23 units in 31 locations, from Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and



Prince Edward Island Districts, will form two Brigades with 3 Intelligence Company and 4 Air Defence Regiment remaining under Area control. 36 Canadian Brigade Group will be headquartered in Halifax, Nova Scotia and consist of those units from Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. 37 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters will be located in Moncton, New Brunswick and be comprised of all Newfoundland and New Brunswick units and will commence with the stand-up of Brigade Implementation Teams on 1 April 1997. This will conclude with the concurrent stand-down of the districts and stand-up of the brigades effective 1 October 1997.

TOTAL ARMY ESTABLISHMENTS

Over the past several years, Militia unit establishments and manning levels across the country have adapted to meet unique demands and local conditions without reference to accepted resource controls, resulting in a multitude of diverse unit establishments and an unbalanced rank structure within the Reserve component of the Army. Consequently, Total Army Establishments (TAE) have been developed to ensure that the maximum number of trained soldiers will be commanded and administered by the commensurate number of personnel and rank structure. In addition, TAE will provide a basic framework for Reserve Force expansion if required.

The implementation of TAE is one of the most essential and critical aspects of Reserve restructure.

It is a resource management tool developed for the purpose of maximizing return on invested resources through standardized unit organizations and accepted personnel control procedures. It will provide balanced officer/NCM ratios and prevent rank creep. TAE applies authorized establishments as an organizational template to all units in the regular and reserve components. This will align all Land Force establishments within recognized structures, and clearly define the building blocks upon which the reserve order of battle is built.

The fundamental characteristics of TAE are as follows:

- all Army (Reserve and Regular) unit establishments will have the full slate of personnel positions and trades/qualifications;
- all like units (Reserve and Regular) will have identical establishments;
- all establishment positions may be filled by either Reserve or Regular personnel;
- all unit establishments will have restrictions which recognize the unit's appropriate manning ceiling. This will be primarily a function of the training mission and financial resources assigned. This ceiling will allow the unit a HQ and support element and a mission element; and
- a manning list for other personnel in each unit will provide

visibility and will recognize the requirement to provide depth for training and succession.

Every effort will be made to maximize the number of soldiers in the mission elements. The tendency to place more personnel in HQ and support positions than necessary will not be accepted. Given the fundamental role of the unit – to train up to the platoon level – and the need to focus all efforts on the mission element, large HQ and support elements will not be assigned nor accepted. Flexibility will, however, be allowed for unique and unusual circumstances but clearly the mission element(s) of the units will be the primary focus of unit COs in every respect.

UNIT VIABILITY

Unit viability is critical in determining the end-state structure of the Reserves. To determine unit viability six criteria have been agreed upon and will form the basis of the unit evaluations:

- *Operational Requirement.* While units must be prepared to meet its primary mobilization tasks in Stages 3 and 4, it must also be prepared – and demonstrate its capability – to meet reasonable augmentee requirements in the unit's classification, as placed on Commander LFC by the Government;
- *Capacity to Recruit and Retain Effective Strength.* Over the next three years, from 1 November 1996, the unit



must continue to demonstrate its ability to retain its personnel at or near its TAE levels;

- *Capacity to Train Individually and Collectively.* The unit must demonstrate it can train effectively, and that its personnel can qualify at reasonable percentages on Warrior training. The unit must also perform with reasonable effectiveness in collective training at the platoon level within company setting exercises;
- *Cost Effectiveness.* The unit must have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate the ability to manage its personnel operating and maintenance budgets effectively;
- *Historical Performance and Battle Honours.* The unit record in war and peace should be considered; and
- *Footprint and Link to the Community.* The unit must be geographically located so as to serve as a link between the military and the general population. It must also enjoy the support of the community in which it functions.

In developing the Unit Performance Criteria, the following guidelines were used for the evaluations:

- *simple* – use readily available data in a forthright manner and be easily understood;
- *fair* – the evaluation had to be applicable to all units, be based on their performance during the evaluation period; and
- *effective* – units evaluated as either “viable” or “non-viable”, and accurately reflect the relative viability of unit by areas in an unequivocal manner.

From the agreed factors, unit performance criteria were developed based on a “statement of performance”, a “performance measurement” and a “performance criteria to be met”. Based on the Unit Performance Criteria, a Unit Evaluation Report will be produced. The report will contain a brief outline of the unit, the unit evaluation by factors, and Area and Army Commander’s assessments.

The three year evaluation period will be completed in 1999. All units will be given an interim evaluation, based on the unit performance criteria, in November 1997. This evaluation will provide all units a “viable” or “non viable” grading reflecting areas for improvement or particular strengths. This interim evaluation will also be used to validate the unit performance

criteria and the unit scoring methodology. All units will receive a full evaluation report in November 1998. This report will grade all units “viable” or “non-viable”. Units will receive their final evaluation and disposition by November 1999.

The majority of existing Militia units will be required for operational roles within the proposed Brigade Group structure. Viable units not required in the Brigade Groups may be assigned, funding permitting, other tasks in keeping with operational requirements.

Units which are judged “not viable” will be considered for, in order of priority, tactical grouping, amalgamation and zero manning. Units zero manned, will be retained on the supplementary Order of Battle and assigned, if practical, roles on Phase 4 mobilization.

At end state, the Land Force Reserves may not require all of its existing units in their present configuration if the number of viable type units exceeds the Army’s requirement, then rerolling, and/or tactical groupings are options to be considered in order to retain as many regiments in the Order of Battle as is affordable.



Total Force: The Need to go Further

by Captain I.S. Mollison



Captain I.S. Mollison, PEIR, joined the Militia in 1982. He is presently on Class B service as the Armour School Army Individual Training Information System (AITIS) Coordinator.

"... Reserve members still have the responsibilities and potential duties that Regular members have ..."

The idea that Regular and Reserve Force personnel can and will work together in an effective and cohesive unit is a noble, if not novel arrangement. However, there are some difficulties and growing pains that will arise from this type of grouping.

For example, in an Armour unit, how does one set up a tank troop that is comprised of Regular and Reserve members? Do you have Reserve personnel mixed in with the Regular Force crews? Do you have strictly Regular personnel crews with no Reserve personnel? Or do you fill in the Regular slots that open if people are out sick or on course with Reserve personnel? Why not just put all the

Reservists in Admin Troop, SHQ or RHQ? This way, support to courses that is provided by Regular personnel is not compromised by Reserve personnel who cannot show up for exercises or unit training. These are basic, yet fundamental questions that should be answered prior to the unit (no matter the size) being formed.

If you ask any group of Reserve members, most of them will say that one of the difficulties with Total Force is that we are not all treated equally. When it comes to benefits, pensions, pay and all other compensation that the Regular members get, the Reserve personnel usually don't. Having compared the 1996 pay rates for Regular and Reserve members at all rank levels, except for 3 basic levels, Reserve members make less than their Regular Force counterparts. A Reserve member who is

working full time will only make, on average, 80% of what a Regular member makes.

Yes, there is talk of a Reserve Force Pension, however, it is not a pension where you receive a check every month. It is, in fact, a one time payout of one week of pay for every year served, with a minimum number of 10 years required. It has been approved in principal by the Treasury Board but has not yet been funded.

It must be said that the normal Reservist works only one night a week and one full weekend a month. The courses that are taken are usually shorter in duration with almost the same amount and type of material being covered as the Regular Force. With this limitation in mind, Reserve members still have the responsibilities and potential duties that Regular members have, with the only exception being Reserve members cannot be operationally tasked; they must volunteer for all operational taskings or call-outs and have the approval of their CO.

In The Infantry Journal (number 30, dated Spring of 1996) WO C.N. Boulter makes some very interesting statements about Total Force. It appears that in the Infantry, when a Regular member is posted to a reserve unit as Regular Support Staff (RSS) or Full Time Pensionable



Staff, the Reserve CO has the power to place the Regular member into any and all positions that need to be filled. Most Regular members who are posted to Reserve units as RSS have had their tickets punched by filling all required jobs for their rank level. Most RSS personnel are placed into line or field positions within the Reserve unit. It is also quite common for RSS to be given many different taskings within the unit; most of the time, it is the RSS who are given the short-fuse problems and are told to deal with it and "make it happen". As well, the position that they hold when deployed in the field occasionally changes throughout the training year, and for almost every weekend exercise or activity that is held.

The difficulty that I see with this system is the Reserve NCOs may not have the opportunity to be employed in all positions that make a well rounded Sr NCO. The latest bad news being discussed is that Regular Force Sr NCOs who are RSS will be employed at the Militia Training Support Centre (MTSC) in both a Course WO position and

as a member of the course instructor cadre. This is being done as a cost-saving measure to the Areas and because there are not enough available Reserve members. Yes, this idea will save a significant amount of money for the Area Headquarters but in the long run it will cost the reserve unit in lack of experience and training for their Sr NCOs.

The biggest obstacle that occurs with most of the senior ranks in Reserve units is not being able to attend courses that are longer than two weeks in duration. Most also find it a challenge to attend ARCON/MILCON exercises due to vacation limitations and family and civilian job obligations because of only having 2-3 weeks of vacation time available to them. The Canadian Forces Liaison Council (CFLC) is doing an outstanding job with regards to Reserve members and their full time civilian jobs but the CFLC usually only deals with individual cases.

It is my suggestion that what we need in this country is similar legislation to what the United States has for their National Guard. The

current legislation utilized for the American National Guard states that you must attend the two week deployment exercises that are held every year, and if the State Governor decides that he needs Guardsman he calls them out and they must go. I firmly believe that Canada does not have to go to the extent that the Americans have, but job protection/security for members of the Reserve Force to allow them to take time to attend UN taskings or other call-outs with operational units, is required.

It is my opinion that a Total Force Unit can and will work if certain criteria are established and followed. It would be foolish to think that Reserve members can operate in any operational unit without additional training but if one looks at traditional recruiting numbers, you will find that a good number of current Regular members have spent some time in a Reserve unit. This is one of the best ways that the Regular Force can and does recruit.



Total Force – Vision or Utopia?

by Colonel J.O.M. Maisonneuve



Colonel J.O.M. Maisonneuve commanded 12th RBC from 1989-1991. He is a former Director of Armour and is presently serving as J3 Operations at NDHQ in Ottawa.

“Utopia: n. Imaginary...Ideally perfect...state of things.”
– The Concise Oxford Dictionary, p. 1183.

Although it may have been used before then, the term “Total Force” (TF) first became part of the Canadian Army’s vocabulary after it was coined in the 1987 White Paper (WP). Thereafter, TF became one of the three pillars of Army 2002 (A2002), which was the blueprint for the Army’s response to that particular WP (the other two pillars being general purpose combat capability and Area structure). The April 1989 budget made the WP obsolete, however, the underpinnings of A2002 were retained including TF. Most members of the Army have an idea of what “Total Force” means, and there does exist an official definition. What is to be asked is: Can we ever achieve

TF or is it merely a mirage meant to keep the Militia hoping in the desert of reduced resources and lack of attention?

This article will argue that the concept of TF is realisable, that low-level measures are easy to implement, and that the first step is to change attitudes. To achieve the aim, I will examine some of those attitudes within the Army and the Corps, provide some examples of the employment of Reserves, and finally offer some simple ideas for the future.

Let me be clear: this article is written without the benefit of any experience as an RSS officer, or within a District HQ. I have done little supporting research, and any errors or omissions are mine alone. What I hope to accomplish is to fan the flames of passion within members of the RCAC on the subject.

The perception (reality?) of a “gulf” between the active and reserve components of the Army (the Militia-Regular Gap [MRG]) has existed probably as long as the two main components of Her Majesty’s CF have existed. Most recently, the report of the Minister’s Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves (SCRR) reiterated the need to reinvigorate efforts to reduce the MRG. Some felt this chance was missed during the early staffing of A2002. Indeed, some of the “outside the box” thinking at that time was that the unit slate should have been wiped clean and true Total Force regiments should have been created, based on need, within a structure. For example, by restructuring a regiment with two or three squadrons of Regular Force, and one of Reserves. The idea that a Regular Force CO may have had to run his own recruiting program was dismissed at that time as heresy; by the way, why should the CO always have been a Regular?

There is definitely a lack of trust between Regulars and Reservists. Each to some extent feels the other is either too well off, not capable enough, too whiney, or motivated by the wrong reasons. The RCAC may be ahead of others, through the efforts of many, in slowly improving the mutual trust between components of the Corps. Nevertheless, there is still room to improve.



As a precept, the Area structure had almost as much of an effect in bridging the MRG as that of Total Force. Indeed, with the emplacement of the Area system, the role of the Commander of the Army seemed to be reinforced as the Commander of the *whole* Army, as opposed to only that of the Regular Force. The same effect took place, in my view, at the Area level. In spite of this, it has been asked in some circles, for example, whether the Director of Armour, is Director of *all* of the Corps, or just the Regular Force!

A prevalent fear has always been that if too much emphasis is placed on supporting the Militia, the Regular Force will lose its edge; that it will have to reduce its standards to ensure the Militia can attain them; and that this will lead to an ineffective Army. The Militia is well aware that it cannot hope to attain the same standards as the Regular Force in all disciplines, but feels that they are constantly being dismissed as incompetents. The bottom line is this: Yes, there is a problem of attitude both on the part of the Militia and the Regular Force, *but* the Regular Force have not put enough emphasis on trying to make TF work. We have also been prisoners of our traditions and uninterested in radical approaches.

While in Cyprus in 1990-91, 12th RBC deployed in operations for the first time, a formed squadron of Militia which included 10 per cent of Regular Force. There is no doubt that the requirements for serving in Cyprus focused on a specific mission with distinct parameters and limited capabilities: There is no comparison with the "new" type

of peace operations. However, the experience marked the first and to my knowledge only validation in operations of the 10% concept which had been used as the "standard." For the first time, Militia members were not just used as "fillers" or individual reinforcements or augmentation, but were commanded by their own officers and senior NCMs. The only caveat placed on the structure of the squadron was that the 10 percent of Regular Force officers and NCMs would be placed in the best positions to support the Militia members. This ensured that the most effective back-up was provided to the Militia structure, and is a lesson learned from the experience. Each of the four Quebec Militia regiment provided one troop, which enhanced small unit cohesion.

Units in Croatia during UNPROFOR routinely contained a proportion of 20 - 30 percent Militia. Some nations use primarily reservists on UN missions, and Canadian Militia officers and NCMs perform outstandingly as members of UN HQs.

The best example of TF within the Corps is, of course, 8CH(PL). What further validation is required? The unit has the advantage of possessing a greater percentage of Regular Force members than the other Armour Militia units in the Corps, so more of the Reservists' time can be spent training. The Regiment as well as many other Militia units have shown excellent capabilities to train and prepare Reservists for transfer to the Regular Force. As a matter of fact, so much so that on occasion, the unit's well-being has suffered from the loss of the experienced personnel. This

is tangible proof that there are successes in cooperation between components.

Finally for some ideas of how to further reduce the MRG. It is my contention that the most important task of the Regular Force after operations is to help train and support the Reserves. The first measures should address the structural issues. Any Militia unit retained in the Corps after the SCRR-driven rationalization and creation of brigades (vs Districts) are complete should be provided 10% of its strength in RSS personnel from the hide of the Regular Force credits. These personnel would be fully integrated into the Regiments, using the approach detailed above of providing effective support for the Militia structure.

The negative effects of transfers from the Militia to the Regular must be dampened. One sure method is to restrict the number of transfers, but then the benefit to the Regular Force is reduced. A better method would be to facilitate and indeed promote Regular Force member transfers to the Militia. To start with, easing the administration of such transfers would help. There are more drastic methods. For example, any member who would be released from the Regular Force could be compelled to serve for a certain amount of time in the closest Militia unit to his selected place of residence. The aim should be to restock the pool of experienced officers and NCMs for the Militia.

The Area HQ structure promotes the reduction of the MRG. Geographic command and staff of the Canadian Army should be based on a rotation of Militia and



Regular Force officers. Why not adjust HQ work hours to coincide with those of the Class A Reservists on staff?

Next, on to training itself. Low-level support is relatively easy for Regular Force units to provide to the Militia and can yield results vastly out of proportion to the amount of resources involved. For example, a Regular Force CO who provides support to a Militia unit using one of his 12 or 16 troops effectively removes 1/12th or 1/16th of his fighting strength for that period. However, from the point of view of the Militia CO, a troop in support provides him with a relatively large, flexible training support resource, often equivalent to 1/4th or 1/8th of his strength. When the benefit provided to the troop from supporting Militia training is factored in, TF training really becomes a win-win situation for both the Militia and the Regular Force.

In general terms, Militia and Regular Force units should never

plan training in isolation of each other. Regular Force COs should always ensure that any training factors in Militia participation. Much of this is currently happening, but the relationships must be formalized and not based on personalities.

Finally, some miscellaneous suggestions. I mentioned tradition earlier. If we really mean TF, why do we not have only one order of battle, with no differentiation between Regular and Reserve regiment? For example, a date on which the regiment was founded or formed could be used to place them in order of precedence. It is time to look upon the TF as a family, for which mess dinner marches are played without differentiation, in a TF order of precedence.

Our vision should be of an Army where it would be impossible to tell whether a member is a part-timer or a full-timer. Rebadging provides one good vehicle. Upon posting to any regiment, the officer

or NCM should rebadge to that unit. They should not rebadge until they are posted to another regiment. Imagine a HQ where it is impossible to tell whether an officer or NCM serving there is Regular Force or Militia: *That's Total Force.*

The Militia is an essential component of the Canadian Forces and the Regular Force should look inwards to ask whether it has really been putting all efforts forward to making TF work. The time to develop trust is here. This can only be accomplished through working together more often, through an adjustment in our culture, through leadership at all echelons, and though unequivocal support. Trust means selflessness and service: putting aside petty arguments and politics and providing each other mutual support. Total Force is a *Vision*, not utopia.





Some Informal Thoughts on Total Force

by Major J. Howard



“Discontinuity of processes in analysis, design and execution may be our worst enemy, not the policy itself.”

After a few years of living with it, Total Force remains more of a notion to me than a practical vehicle to accomplish whatever it was I thought it was supposed to accomplish. What follows are a few thoughts, predicated on common sense, practicality and a desire to keep things in focus and to bypass the temptation to get entangled in picayune details and Quixotic conspiracies of army life.

Total Force may once have been a concept conceived by policy analysts without too much cross-checking as to its ‘implementability’ and simply passed on to policy makers or to executors. It may be a policy designed to accomplish honorable and legitimate aims but

one that cannot be practically executed due to every day realities or attitudes. It may be a catch phrase or specious sophistry spun to placate those who believe that there are two separate and distinct armies – Regular and Reserve – and this is wrong. For sure it is something being applied in the 8CH and in 10/90 battalions such as 18 Air Defense Regiment, presumably enjoying some success in these forums. I’m not aware of other occurrences in the Armoured Corps. For me, and perhaps for those in the Regular Force and Reserves who are not parading with these units, it remains largely an enigma.

OBJECTIVES – GET REAL

At the moment I have actually forgotten what higher headquarters stated as the intent. I have gone through the past few years believing the intent was to somehow

“bring the Regular Force and Reserves closer together”. At a practical level, I have translated this to mean I am entitled to a bunch of things consistent with my version of Total Force, all the more to (not unreasonably) train to the same standards as the Regular Force. So, I want more access to AFVs and ammo; I get less. I want more kit to train with – where did the kit from 4 Brigade go? I want more money for Class A training, but get less; what consistent logic can explain this? I want a change in the attitude I perceive within some of the Regular Force that the Reserves are rank amateurs, second class soldiers, or some equally disparaging moniker. Many of those Regular Force soldiers were Reservists themselves once – how quickly (or conveniently) they forget.

I don’t know what the Regular Force believes Total Force was intended to mean or to add to their account. The KOCR provides about a dozen trained soldiers each year to the Regular Force and more trained soldiers for peacekeeping augmentation. The Regular Force is the welcomed beneficiary of this, and not at all begrudged.

Total Force doesn’t actually accomplish a lot in my unit on a day to day level. For my account, AFVs for training are increasingly scarce to the point the KOCR’s training plans are constantly being rewritten



on the fly “sans” AFV, and ammo for gun camps is withheld following promises otherwise. One might think this was part of some Machiavellian plot by the Regular Force to slowly emasculate the Reserve over a generation. While this is perhaps just a ‘byzantinely intriguing’ notion, I have yet to enjoy any material and consistent yield from a Total Force policy which really means something to my troops. Despite platitudes of policy, facts always speak for themselves. Draw your own conclusions, dear reader, and act upon them.

WHAT’S WORKING

As policy makers continue to promulgate their work to the public, the public will, over time, likely make less distinction between the Regular Force and the Reserve. This is presumably what policy makers want, and occurs because the policy makers have few filters to pass their message through before it gets to the audience. For the most part, the media appear to have conveyed this message reasonably well – Reservists in a peacekeeping mission has a local interest angle and is good news that sells.

The RSS posting in the unit is no longer the ‘advise and assist role’ it once was. Holding the Operations Officer or Adjutant’s appointment makes a Regular Force soldier become better informed about the Reserves, even if his opinion of the Reserves remains less than euphoric.

Similarly, Reserve soldiers fill appointments at Area and Brigade

headquarters, but interestingly enough, not a Regular Force unit (why is this, by the way?). They return to their units with practical knowledge otherwise unattainable, and can help steer staff work through the higher chain of command faster and more completely than would otherwise be the case.

A Reserve soldier is becoming more accountable for his actions. The opposite was an oft heard criticism of the Reserves by the Regular Force in earlier years, but less so recently. Reserve COs do lose command, Reserve soldiers do go to jail, and other stringent action is taken if circumstances dictate.

Reserves are criticized that they cannot put the time into the job Regular Force soldiers do – true. Nevertheless, if an individual Reservist’s interpretation of Total Force inspires him to dedicate more time to his second career, Regular Force soldiers should acknowledge this and thereby validate the Reserve soldier as “less amateur and more professional” on the criterion of time alone. Considering the opportunity cost that goes with the job, a Reservist’s dedication cannot be legitimately questioned.

It follows, then, that if a Reservist gets the degree of respect he wants from his Regular Force colleague, he may cross a certain threshold of pride in his second career that allows career action to become a far more effective means of enforcing accountability from him.

I admit this does not hold the same impact as a Regular Force soldier’s losing his job (an extreme career

action). However, this is a big time improvement over the situation only several years ago; a certain Regular Force CO was asked in public by a Reserve Corporal if he (the Corporal) could do some particular thing. The CO glibly replied *ver betam* “...you’re in the Reserves – you can do whatever you want” – and he was serious.

POLICY IS NO REPLACEMENT FOR LEADERSHIP

Controlling “end state attitudes” of soldiers, who can either ensure or frustrate the execution of Total Force at the day to day level, is an impossible task for policy alone. Good leadership must carry the ball and effectively persuade subordinates of whatever merits policy does hold. However, listening to soldiers in a Regular Force or Reserve mess opine upon the (de)merits of Total Force easily crystallize one’s skepticism about a hearty all round endorsement of Total Force. Yet, it must be a host for flexible attitudes of Reserves and Regular Force soldiers. This will take a generation to germinate despite the slings and arrows of naysayers on both sides.

THE POLICY PROCESS – CUMBERSOME

Policy analysts, makers and executors rarely see the policy issue in identical light. Generals identifying the problem or designing its solution don’t enjoy the consequential practical difficulties of execution that Captains and Sergeants do. Discontinuity of processes in




analysis, design and execution may be our worst enemy, not the policy itself. Moreover, the process is myopic and overworked. Things worth keeping must be maintained to keep up with new facts of life. To set a policy and not thoroughly follow through repeatedly to refine its execution will frustrate the original intent, raise false expectations, and allow informal policy to rule. I'm not aware of any such maintenance, but I do engage new policies that cloud earlier ones and likely obstruct future ones, all promulgated by the same agency. There may or may not be problems with Total Force per se, but the policy itself creates problems. The

fog of peacetime looks murkier than the fog of war.

SUM UP

Like most things, Total Force will never keep everyone happy. It will be maligned as bad policy when not understood, used as an excuse when things go wrong, proffered as the reason to change the status quo, and forgotten as good policy when things go right. Soldiers and policy makers will come and go as ships passing in the night in the next twenty years or so without understanding it either partly or completely. But if our senior leaders espouse

this as such great policy, let's see them put money, AFVs and ammo where their mouths are and make it happen ... for everyone.

When dealing with the "problem of the day", the best approach to Total Force is to apply one's common sense and understanding of the idea, engage in brief and (naturally) intellectual discourse with an alternate force soldier, and effect the simplest solution that doesn't screw the troops – Regular or Reserve. Being well thought out and simple – the quintessence of every Armoured Corps approach. 





Total Force: Thoughts on Ways of Minimizing the Effect on Morale

by Captain S. Graham



Captain S. Graham, 8 CH(PL) is currently serving as a tactics instructor at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School.

“This is done by acknowledging the differences and reinforcing the similarities in order to reach a common understanding of each group.”

The Regimental System is the source of much pride, loyalty and dedication for those who serve within it. Any changes made to the framework of that system must be done carefully. My aim is to look at the ways the conversion to a Total Force regiment affects the morale of the members within it. This is not an exhaustive look at every possible grievance that a soldier might have, but a list of all the major factors I witnessed. I believe my experience of three years as a troop leader in a newly formed Total Force regiment gives me an insight into some of these factors.

The words “Total Force” usually spark an instant reaction in people. That reaction can vary dramatically

depending on experience and background. Many of our attitudes in life are based on our perceptions, which are often formed on stereotypes and first impressions. These attitudes and perceptions are then promulgated around the unit, increasing the level of ignorance in whoever listens to them. By bringing the two groups together as often as possible and as soon as possible, some of the myths can be dispelled and some of the perceptions can be changed based on fact, not fiction. This is done by acknowledging the differences and reinforcing the similarities in order to reach a common understanding of each group. This is one of the first steps necessary in bringing some amount of cohesion to the Regiment.

The influence of those in direct contact with the soldiers on a routine basis cannot be over stated. Master Corporals, Sergeants, Troop Warrant Officers, and Troop Leaders can

have a great impact on the thoughts and opinions of the men who serve under them. If people in these positions are consistently playing on the changes and problems Total Force brings, it will impact on the way the soldiers see their Regiment during a very important stage of their development. Once new soldiers form opinions and have them reinforced by their superiors, those opinions will likely stay with them forever. As these soldiers progress to supervisory roles, the whole cycle repeats itself. In that this argument can be made all the way up the chain of command, each level must be positive in their outlook and not be seen as lending credence to those who do not agree with the current arrangements.

Simply talking positively is obviously not enough. Each soldier will have valid questions that need answering and possible solutions that need actioning. If the lower levels of the chain of command are knowledgeable and have an understanding about the reserves, then they will be in a position to quickly answer questions and dispel rumours before they spread. Likewise, they must also be receptive to suggestions and ideas from the soldiers, because people who have had an input into the development of an organization will feel more a part of it.

Despite all efforts, there are some individuals who, for their own reasons, will never support Total Force. No matter what is said or



done by the Regiment, it will always be found lacking. These individuals exist in all ranks. Every effort must be made, from the beginning, to post them out of the unit. This is especially necessary when they are in leadership positions in direct contact with the men. As I witnessed on many occasions, these individuals are able to undermine anything positive being done by the Regiment and do much to lower the morale of the unit.

I am not suggesting that the chain of command gloss over problems being experienced in order to deceive the men into believing they are serving in some kind of utopian regiment. There is, however, a difference between acknowledging the problems and trying to come up with solutions, and promulgating half truths with the sole aim of trying to cast the organization in a bad light. If the Regiment is to be successful, then it must have the active support of everyone in the chain of command, from the trooper to the CO.

There are other factors that will affect how soldiers feel about their unit. For one, the Armoured Corps chose, for various reasons, to embody our Total Force regiments in the Reserve Force. Since both the Regular Force and the Reserve Force are subject to different supply regulations, this has a number of repercussions. First, Reserve units cannot have a CFEET, which means they are not entitled to hold certain class C items, like Leopard tanks and night vision goggles for example. Second, Reserve units cannot have a triple-S account, which gives them the authority to hold spare parts. While these are only administrative difficulties (and with the understanding of everyone involved they can be overcome)

to the men on the hanger floor the fact that technically their unit is not entitled to the equipment is a blow to their pride.

My belief is that Regular soldiers, for the most part, have no problem working side by side with Reservists as long as, at the end of the day, they are recognized for the full time, professional soldiers they are. A seemingly small slight on parade, when the Reviewing Officer, a senior general officer, refers only to all the fine Reservists before him, has a lasting negative effect on the morale of the Regular Force soldiers. No one wants to be called something they are not. A Total Force regiment should be addressed as a Total Force regiment.

Equally important to a Regular Force soldier is appearance and conduct. Almost all combat arms units spend a significant percentage of each day on physical fitness and many more hours are spent at home preparing and maintaining uniforms, boots, and equipment. To maintain this standard takes a lot of dedication, but it is part of being a professional soldier. These standards must be the same throughout the Total Force regiment. It is essential that all personnel wearing the same cap badge are subject to the same set of rules and that they are applied equally. When the Regular Force soldier believes they are not – that the Reservist is conducting himself differently, or turned out in manner that would be considered unacceptable for him – then the division between the Regular and Reserve Forces increases.

One of the difficulties a Commanding Officer is likely to have is trying to conduct training with both components at the same time. This is due to the fact that the Regular Force

works during the week and the Reserve Force works at nights and on weekends. For the sake of unit cohesion and operational readiness, time must be found to work together as a single unit. Having the Reserve squadrons deploy on the weekends of a Regular Force exercise would be of benefit. If training is only done within your group, Regular or Reserve, then it only serves to proliferate the differences between the two and a common bond is never found.


A good start towards this goal is professional development training for Senior NCOs and officers. Not only do they gain the benefit of whatever is being taught, but it helps to diminish the impression of different standards and provides a setting for social interaction between the groups. Another possibility is using qualified instructors from both components to work together on in-house courses. This enables both Reservists and Regulars to work side by side developing the next generation of the regiment's soldiers.

It is impossible to completely eliminate the differences that will exist between the two components that make up a Total Force regiment, but it is possible to minimize them so that the regiment can function effectively. By having positive people in the chain of command, being aware of the concerns, and using the experience of the full time soldiers of the regiment, it is possible to have a productive organization. All members of the regiment must realize that the change will happen, whether they like it or not. If each individual tries to be a constructive part of the regiment as opposed to working against it, then everyone's life within the organization, as well as the organization itself, will improve.



The Total Force – The Army of the Future

by Captain M. Boisseau



Capt M. Boisseau, 12^e RBC, joined the Regular Force in 1989 and served on exchange with the 8^e Hussards in France from 1992-1994. He is presently serving as an instructor at the Armour School and is returning to his Regiment this Summer.

“... we must bear in mind that training and cooperation are two inseparable elements, the most important of the two being cooperation, because from cooperation flows mutual respect.”

Two important words that are heard very often these days in military officialese are “Total Force”. For the last ten years at least, the Primary Reserve has deployed a very large number of personnel during international peacekeeping operations. These men and women who volunteer to augment the ranks of Regular Force regiments perform just as professionally as their Regular Force counterparts. Those two important words are justified because without the Reserves, several overseas rotations would have been undermanned.

In my view, this is what the future should hold for the Regular Force and the Reserves. First, the Regular Force should continue to provide instruction and training to the Reserves through such courses as

RESO (the Reserve Entry Scheme Officer) and NC (National Courses) because members of the Regular Force have more experience since they practice their trades every day. The RESO courses are run at the Armour School during the summer whereas the NC are given in the spring. Reserve non-commissioned officers have difficulty attending a NC either because they are still in school or college or because they have a civilian job. Therefore, to remedy this problem, responsibility for the NC should be returned to the **Militia Support and Training Centre** of each Area. Instruction could continue to be provided by Regular Force personnel, the latter selected from within each Area directly. This way courses could be run in the summer. By removing NC from the School’s curriculum, the already rapid pace of training that instructors have to maintain every year could be reduced. RESO courses now run at the School should continue to be given during the summer.

Two, collective training in both the Regular Force and the Reserves must be more intensive. There should be one major annual exercise that would involve a mix of personnel from units of the Regular Force and the Reserves, each having a squadron of two troops. There are exercises now that include such a mix, but not on a large scale. Such manoeuvres would do a lot to promote cooperation between the two components of the Land Force. There are, at this time, exercises planned for each unit which could be combined without too many complications. It is just a matter of adjusting the time tables of both components to arrive at some compromise. The most important point is that there must be greater cooperation between the units.

To conclude, we must bear in mind that training and cooperation are two inseparable elements, the most important of the two being cooperation, because from cooperation flows mutual respect. We must endeavour to foster the growth of combined operations precisely to encourage this reciprocal respect and maintain a high level of training. Today, considering the number of past deployments, it can be said that we have gone on from being a “Total Force” to being an “Integrated Force”¹.


Notes

1. According to MGen Dallaire at a conference on rapid deployment operations at CTC Gagetown on 1 April 1997.



A Reservist's View of Total Force

by Warrant Officer D.B. Korth



Warrant Officer D.B. Korth, 8CH, joined the CF Reserve in 1976 and has occupied numerous positions including Standards WO during a four year call-out with the Armour School. He is presently serving as a Coordinator with the Army Individual Training Instruction System (AITIS) cell at the Armour School.

"The "THEM" and "US" syndrome will never entirely leave the two forces and that is not necessarily a bad thing, for fundamentally they are two separate organizations."

Total Force is a concept that while good in theory has several large obstacles to overcome before it can be implemented fully. One of the concepts of Total Force is the ability of the Reserves to step in and take the place of a Regular Force member of equal rank. This will require a certain amount of change and adaptation for both forces. Some of the most obvious changes are retention, attendance and level of training for the Reserves and comparison with and ability to work within the Regular Force.

There is no way a Reserve NCM or officer can achieve the same level of training and expertise as their Regular Force counterpart, training only one night a week and one

weekend per month. This is not to say the Militia soldier lacks the ability but, due to the limited training time, lacks the experience that prolonged training provides. Also, most course length, content and standards are different for the Reserves than for the Regular Force, due in large part to the two week block format Reserve courses must now be broken into. How can a Reserve soldier be compared to a Regular Force soldier when the latter has more training time and longer, more complete courses?

The rank worn and the job expected from a Reservist may be the same as a Regular Force soldier but due to the large discrepancy in experience it is not possible, on average, to expect the same level of competence. This problem becomes even more pronounced with increases in rank. The Reserve system promotes people faster than is good for the soldier or the system. This is the result of a lack of soldiers at the

higher positions, the idea that someone deserves a promotion just because he has the required time in and courses, and the mistaken theory that reservists will get out if not promoted quickly. The end result of being promoted too fast is poor job knowledge at the higher ranks because everyone is being pushed higher before they become fully competent at their current job.

The average Militia soldier is a member for two to three years only. This is the time it takes for them to graduate from school (either high school or university), become disillusioned with the irregular employment and join the Regular Force, get a full-time job, or get married. When a third of the trained soldiers leave every year, the overall level of training for a unit suffers because the new soldiers must be brought up to the basic level and/or there are not sufficient numbers of trained soldiers left to make further training feasible.

The Regular Force COs, OCs, Troop Officers and Troop WOs, appear unsure how to treat Reserve personnel on call-out with them. They are unsure of the Reservist's experience, capabilities and legal status. As a result, Reservists tend to get the jobs no one else wants; where they do not have to make decisions and exceptions are made for them in regards to their dress and deportment or job performance.

The problems with Total Force are solvable. To start, Reservists



should sign a legally binding two-to-three year contract of employment. He/she would have to attend all scheduled training with exceptions given only for health, sickness in family etc., and disciplinary or dismissal action taken if the soldier doesn't show up. However, training once scheduled cannot be turned off without compensating the soldier.

Three years in the Reserves should be a prerequisite for entrance into the Regular Force. This would increase the number of the Reserves; the soldier's basic training could be done more economically; it would give every Regular member knowledge of how the Reserve works and it would be a selection process where only the best and most suitable would go on to the Regular Force.


All Reserve units should be the same designation, either all recce or all tank; then all Regiments would have standard training. National Certification courses would be run more cost effectively, with a broader selection base for candidates. All Regiments would be able to pool their equipment and vehicles for maximum training and utilization.

The time in rank requirements for promotions for the Reserves should be extended and reflect the amount of training received and not the number of calendar days in rank. A soldier with a UN tour of duty or a year call-out has a lot more experience than one who trains only one night a week, but as it now stands they are both eligible for promotion at the same time provided they have the same qualifications.

All courses should be the same for the Regular Force and for the Reserves. Also, the courses should have a mix of Regular and Reserve whenever possible. The courses could be made up of two week blocks that are run consecutively or preferably, the Reservist would have to find the required time to attend the full course. This would give everyone the same qualifications or the same rank regardless of whether Regular or Reserve. Also shared courses would foster better understanding between the two forces.

One squadron per Regular Force Regiment should be a Reserve squadron, and treated no differently

than the other squadrons in the Regiment. The positions within the squadron should be C-class for two years. This would give the Reservists the continuous training and experience that is so badly needed. One quarter of the soldiers could be rotated every six months to provide continuity for the squadron. Also, the Regular Force personnel that would have been in the squadron could now be used to augment the Reserve Regiments to develop and maintain a high level of training. If the Reserve units were all at full strength, providing personnel for the various squadrons would not be a problem.

The "THEM" and "US" syndrome will never entirely leave the two forces and that is not necessarily a bad thing, for fundamentally they are two separate organizations. That doesn't mean they cannot work together to the benefit of both. The Reserves today contain many good, competent, hard working soldiers but that is not enough to make Total Force work. I believe that if the required changes occur, Total Force, as it was originally conceived, is achievable. 





Point of View of a Former Regular Member concerning Total Force in the Quebec Area

by Lieutenant-Colonel J.J.P. Bruneau



Lieutenant-Colonel J.J.P. Bruneau joined the Militia in 1960 and transferred to the Regular Force (R22 R) in 1963. After retirement from the Regular Force in 1989, he joined 12^e RBC (Trois-Rivières) in 1992 where he is presently serving as Commanding Officer.

"After almost 20 years, the goal is in sight and the Total Force is now something we must contend with for better or for worse."

Today Commanding Officer of 12^e RBC (Trois Rivières), in 1960 I was a soldier reservist at Cap-de-la-Madeleine. My father, by then, was out of his Régiment de Trois-Rivières uniform. Hence, I knew the Militia of yesterday and am well acquainted with today's Reserves.

Sincerely, and although it is not the perception of many Reservists, I feel that progress has been made and that the cadre is much improved. The veterans who made up the High Staff in 1960 were not as dynamic as today's cadres. Later on, the independence won by the Quebec Area Militia in the 1980s

was not necessarily a good thing. This, together with other interests, contributed in the end to the development of the Total Force concept that concerns us now. I remember a presentation I gave as a student at the Indian Staff College where I was praising Canada for developing a Total Force concept that was to coordinate the development of Reserve units as part of a general mobilization context. My, how time flies! After almost 20 years, the goal is in sight and the Total Force is now something we must contend with for better or for worse.

What I have been hearing from the people around me is that the Total Force favours the Regular Force and that it is only effective at the Trooper and Corporal levels. In fact, the discourse has changed. The Reserves have now become the cash

cow. I, myself, see it as a positive development. It is a recognized fact that Regulars and Reservists up to the rank of sergeant are rather well integrated. This was shown to be true on peacekeeping missions. Where officers are concerned, however, we still have a long way to go. For example, I have not had a single officer to date who has served full-time in a unit. Yet, several made it clear they were available to serve. Apparently, not only are there too many generals, there are also too many officers in general. It is acknowledged that in training, Regulars and Reservists are well integrated and work well together in the Armour Corps, the Artillery, Field Engineering and even in Service Battalions. In the Infantry, however, things are still not working out. It is more difficult, I know; I was in the Infantry myself for 27 years. But if we really tackled the problem, like the Commander says, it would work.

Let us take a look at ourselves, at Armour. I keep repeating that in the Quebec Area we get along famously and respect each other as we should. Perhaps we are even a model for the relationship that links 12^e RBC (Valcartier) and 12^e RBC (Trois-Rivières). General Allard would be proud. I dare say this relationship is beneficial to the three Armoured units of the Area, and that together



we operate very well at our level within the concept. We, in the Militia, provide augmentees regularly to 12^e RBC (Valcartier) and our people are appreciated at their true value because the exchanges we have (of all sorts) foster this kind of recognition. 12^e RBC (Valcartier) takes its role as an older brother seriously by developing its militia units, and this partnership concept, which is now official policy, will certainly produce excellent results in future at the troop level ... if the budgets allow it! Hence we now have a very good system for ensuring our development at the troop level. Please don't touch, and let it mature!

It is becoming urgent that we must, as part of the restructuring process, come up with a concept that will ensure the development of the Militia up to the Regimental level. The concept of partnership and the success of troop training also depend on the excellence of command at the Squadron and Regiment levels. Survival of the partnership concept is not assured. It is only one battle won, but if there is no sound operational plan for the campaign after that, we risk losing the war with our improvisations.

Bearing in mind my 28 years with the Regular Force and my 11 years with the Militia, I know how difficult

it is for the Regulars to understand the Reserves. That's how it is. The act of living together can lead us to believe that we know what is good for the other party. You are familiar with this syndrome. Regulars must not attempt to command Militia units. At this juncture, LFQA tends to see its own development as if it were an organization made up of Regulars. In the long term, this could jeopardize the progress made. The primary task of Brigade Staff and LFQA should be the development of a Militia cadre. A Militia commander must have the necessary credibility to operate effectively within the partnership concept. He commands and must develop his majors, his captains and his senior NCOs. He must, therefore, be prepared for his role.

I am not completely happy with the emphasis placed, at this stage, on training limited to the troop level. Training must move ahead to the Squadron level in the Militia. It is a must that future unit Commanding Officers have at least commanded Squadrons. The Regular Force must exercise its unit Commanding Officers, and the Militia, its Squadron Commanders. If the Militia is to train its future commanders at the Squadron level, then staff and future unit Commanding Officers have to be trained. This is, in part, acknowledged under the new


structure within the Brigades and LFQA, but the concept has not been developed yet. There remains to develop models and to assign tasks. Given the distance between units, the shortage of staff positions, and the lack of a cadre training and development concept at the senior level, the Militia risks falling behind in the years ahead. Under this concept, Militia concentrations with the Training Brigade Formation (BESQ) and the formation of the Training Regiment (such as the RBSQ – Quebec Area Armoured Regiment) are excellent tools for developing personnel, as General Baril found out when he visited the RBSQ in the summer of 1995. It is essential that the summer concentrations of the Militia be commanded by Reservists with the support of the Regular Force. We must come up with a concentration plan that allows all Reservists to participate. TEWTs and training positions are needed for those who cannot participate within squadrons.

Finally, I am not very proud of us. There is still much work, after 20 years, to be done to develop our Total Force concept and assure our future ... until the next restructure.



The Total Force

by Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Chapman



Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Chapman has been the Commanding Officer of The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) since October, 1994. He also served as Regimental Sergeant Major of The Ontarios from 1982 to 1987.

"Canada's history shows that our Militia has always been there when they were needed and always met or exceeded the standard set."

What does "Total Force" really mean? Are we talking about an army of full-time and part-time soldiers equal in every way or just an army with one common chain of command? Well, the "total" answer to this question hasn't been given to me yet. I see many areas where commanders are trying to make the "total" mean equal to both full and part-time soldiers, but there are many more areas where the militia soldier is still a "second class citizen" in the overall picture. I have chosen three areas that illustrate this treatment of the reservist and although many commanders are trying to address these, they need to be looked at more seriously if we truly want

a "Total Force". The following comments are written to try to inform personnel of some problem areas that we can all work at to make things better and develop into a Total Force that works together for the good of our country and its military personnel.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

My view is that our full-time soldiers, the Regulars, are required to be at a level of training that, with little to no preparation, will allow them to be developed to wherever and for whatever our government sees fit. Our part-time soldiers, the Militia, with suitable preparation time, are required to augment the Regulars when needed and be the base for mobilization should Canada become involved in any serious conflict. Both

our full and part-time soldiers are prepared to do what is required of them and in fact about 20 to 25% of each operational mission has been filled by volunteers from militia regiments. In most cases when the militia soldier takes part in the work-up training for an operational mission, they fit very well into the regular unit assigned.

When "Total Force" came into existence, qualifications for Militia soldiers changed so that the training for both full and part-time soldiers would be the same. This, although it looks good in principle, placed a burden on the Militia soldiers as they had to take more time from their civilian employment to qualify in the Army. The answer, which sounds fair, was that a sergeant (for example) should have the same training whether employed as full or part-time. Sounds good, except that the part-time soldier doesn't get paid the same as the Regular and even after the proposed pay raises this year, will only be at 85% of the Regular's pay. When a Militia Sergeant deploys on an operational mission, the individual goes as a Corporal because he/she doesn't have the experience a Regular Sergeant has. Well, we can also say that a Regular Sergeant doesn't have the same experience as a Militia Sergeant who must motivate soldiers to come to unit training after completing their shift at a civilian job, attending school, or to give up



a weekend with no extra days off afterwards to even just relax.

This sounds like the training system wants everyone to be equal but the financial and operational areas do not. On one operational mission, a Militia Sergeant who was qualified to Warrant Officer went overseas as a Corporal while a Master Corporal from his militia unit went as a Master Corporal to supervise the Sergeant. Does this sound like a “Total Force”?

VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

We well know that the Armour Corps is vehicle and equipment dependent to do our jobs successfully or even to just train properly. It doesn't matter whether you are full or part-time you need to train on the appropriate vehicles and equipment if you are to be a competent Armour soldier.

We also know that there are many shortages which makes it very difficult to keep what we do have working and with the needs of deployed units, armour vehicles and equipment are certainly at a premium. I must say at this point that in LFCA the Armour units have worked together and with the help of the RCD, have worked around some of the problems, but there still isn't enough equipment for our “Total Force” needs. It is because of these shortfalls that the part-time soldier isn't getting enough time on the proper vehicles and equipment. In fact, because of these shortages, there has been consideration given to militia armour

units only getting use of the equipment during the year their mission element will be evaluated (every other year). In my view this would be like taking the combat boots away from infantry soldiers or locking up all the artillery pieces.

Prior to the “Total Force” the Bison was purchased from the then “Militia Budget” and in fact was called the “MIL LAV – Militia Light Armoured Vehicle”. Operations aside, most of these vehicles are now being used in Regular units and the Militia are begging and borrowing vehicles to train on. Note that we haven't stolen any yet. The Militia, although very eager to train properly, aren't being given the chance due to vehicle and equipment shortages throughout our Army. Is this a “Total Force”?

QUALITY OF LIFE

This is the high profile phrase of the day. It is supposed to show our soldiers that we care about them and their families and that we are working to make their military life better. Well, although there are some elements in this concept that relate directly to militia soldiers and the main thrust is for the full-time or Regular soldier. I agree that we should ensure that our soldiers' “quality of life” is of a suitable standard but is anyone really applying this to the Militia soldier.

The young Militia soldiers; Troopers, Corporals, Officer Cadets and 2nd Lieutenants for the most part are students and are usually available for any length of training during the summer months. The only thing

that really affects the length of their courses is the money to finance them and whether Reserve and/or Regular instructors are available. However, ranks more senior usually have some form of civilian job and are only available for shorter periods especially during the summer months when their civilian co-workers want holidays as well. A lot of these soldiers take what summer holidays they have and even convince their employers to give them leaves of absence so that they may complete military qualification courses. When we lengthen courses especially when we insert non-essential periods of extended breaks between courses we are affecting the “quality of life” of these militia soldiers.

Most militia soldiers want to get the appropriate qualifications not just for rank promotion, but so that they can be employed at their Regiments in other than secondary roles. The new Trooper wants to be able to drive or “gun” the vehicle and the new Officer wants to be able to be a Troop Leader. At present the summer qualification courses for a 2nd Lieutenant to become a troop leader [in the BCT Program] is three two week courses for a total of six weeks away from his civilian job. We have extended that period [in BCT (Armour) at Wainwright] now to eight weeks as there is a break between each two week course. The result is that either the Officer needs eight weeks off work, a difficult task, or he takes two years to qualify as a troop leader after he has already taken six weeks to qualify as a 2nd Lieutenant during the previous year or two.



The answer given is "what's the hurry to qualify"? Well, the extra year means a secondary role at his home unit again and another year's holidays without the family meaning his/her "quality of life" suffers again. In some cases, the individual leaves the militia unit because of this time lag, which is a waste of the resources already spent on this person. Is this "Total Force"?

I think that the concept of "Total Force" is a good one, however, it needs to be better defined so that everyone knows exactly what it

really means. We are presently into a Reserve Restructure period where the viability of each Reserve unit will be assessed. Hopefully, when this is complete, the Reserves will know where they stand, what is expected of them and be given the resources (including funding and equipment) to successfully complete their assigned tasks.

Canada's history shows that our Militia has always been there when they were needed and always met or exceeded the standard set. In World War II the "citizen soldiers" were activated and brought some

civilian thinking and experiences to the battlefield and this enhanced the overall performance of units that remain on the Militia Order of Battle. Today is no different, the men and women of Canada's Reserve Forces are ready and willing to serve our country whenever and wherever needed, but we must ensure that they have what they need to do the job. If we are to have a "Total Force" then no soldier, full or part-time can be treated as a "second class citizen".





A Viable Total Force

by Major J.H. Murray



Major J.H. Murray, 1st Hussars joined as a trooper in 1970, leaving in 1974 to attend the University of Western Ontario where he was awarded degrees in History and Kinesiology, as well as a degree in Education from Laurentian University. He rejoined the Regiment in 1984 and commanded 'B' Squadron for three years before being appointed Commanding Officer on 12 October 1996.

"The concept of Total Force can be implemented if Reservists are given the equipment to train with on a regular basis, and an adequate training budget."

The evolution of the Reserves is almost complete. Downsizing, re-rolling, Warrior training, SHARP training, unit evaluations, TAE, Combat Readiness Evaluation, budget downsizing, Brigade re-organizations, 10/90 battalions and Reserve 2000, have all contributed to preparing the reserves for the 21st Century.

The fiscal realities of today, and the downsizing of the Regular Force, make it only logical that the Army looks to a cost effective, well trained pool of soldiers. In a speech at the RCMI this year, General Baril stated "There is no way that the Army could have been able to sustain its operations

in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Haiti without the Militia ... Their personal sacrifices and excellent performance alongside Regular Force soldiers has given new life to the notion of the Total Force concept". The Militia numbers exceeded 20% of the Canadian contingent in many of the United Nations Battlegroups. When these members returned to their units they added invaluable insight and experience to the Reserves as a whole. Many of these soldiers were invited to join Regular Force units upon and prior to their return to Canada. The quality of the soldier produced by the Reserve system proves that "Total Force" is a viable concept.

Despite the success of the Militia, there were and still are inequalities in benefits and pay. The CF has committed itself to bring the Reserve pay rates to 85% of the Regular Force. This was one of the recommendations

of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves. The Treasury Board Secretariat recommended in a 1989 study that the Reserve pay be brought up to this level. The Reservists received their first pay raise this April. How long it will take to reach the goal of 85% remains to be seen. The Commission on Restructuring also recommended that "Reservists on Class C service within Canada should not serve or be paid less than their Reserve Force Rank when they fill a position appropriate to that rank".

Another recommendation by the SCRR was that legislation be enacted which would protect the jobs of Reservists and enable them to take military leave without fear of retribution, loss of seniority, pension and vacation time. Unfortunately, this was one of the recommendations that was not implemented. The time that a Reserve soldier needs to train and serve the country relies solely on the goodwill and understanding of their employer. The Canadian Forces Liaison Council exists to educate the public and encourage employers to support the Reserves. It does not have any legal power, but relies on moral persuasion. Canada is one of the few members of NATO that does not have legislation to protect its Reservists. As a result many Reservists use their vacation time to train and take courses.



Another area of frustration experienced by the citizen soldier is the allocation of equipment and the opportunity to train with that equipment. The shortage of equipment is a very real concern for the Reserves. A good example is the MilLAV or Bison. At General Motors this AVGP is still known and referred to as the MilLAV. The Bison was designed for and destined to go to the Reserves. The fact is that most of these vehicles went to the Regular Force.

The "old Militia" no longer exists. The training, evaluations, the Warrior testing, the RESO program, augmentations and now CRE, are preparing the Reserves to take the next logical step forward.

There is, however, much more to do from the view of the Militia world. The time has come to send formed sub units to augment the Regular Force in operational settings. Troops and platoons made up of Reservists and led by Reservists would lend a lot of credibility to the concept of Total Force.

The critics of this plan, however, shudder at the concept and point to the American experience in


Desert Storm as why Reserve units should not be given an operational tasking. While some of the criticisms are valid, many are not. Little has been written of a Reserve USMC tank company that fought with distinction and performed very well during Desert Storm. This company of M60's led by Reserve Captain Mike Hussey, was tasked to breach the Saddam line so that the force of Regular USMC Abrams tanks could exploit the breach.

The Reservists not only breached the line but they formed the spearhead of the Marine Division during this operation. It was this tank company that sealed the escape route of the Iraqis and help to make the Kuwait Highway, the highway of death. In this part of the operation the Reservists led and the Regular Force followed.

The success of the Reservists proved that "Total Force" can work. The Marines were successful because they had equipment, work up training beside their Regular Force counterparts and they were highly motivated.

The concept of Total Force can be implemented if Reservists are

given the equipment to train with on a regular basis, and an adequate training budget. The key elements are equipment, money and resources. For the last three years the Armour Units in Ontario had the opportunity to put a squadron in the field for only two weekends a year. If travel, drawing vehicles and turning in kit is factored into the equation, then three days was the total time a squadron trained in the field. It would also not be unusual to see a Militia squadron with Bisons, Grizzlies, a few Cougars and a troop of Ilitis trying to pretend to be AVGPs preparing for phase two of the Warrior Testing. This is not acceptable.

In spite of all the obstacles that the Reserves face, the personnel in the Militia are a great pool of experience available to the Canadian Armed Forces. Regular Force downsizing has added an additional source of expertise, that the Reserves can and have drawn on. The Reservists have performed extremely well in all past conflicts. Given the opportunity and support, the Reserves are ready to go and serve once again. 



We All Wear the Black Beret

by Chief Warrant Officer R.P. Van Iderstine



Chief Warrant Officer R.P. Van Iderstine is presently serving as the Regimental Sergeant-Major of 8CH (PL), the Corps' only Total Force Regiment

In 1990, I was fortunate in having been a member of a battlefield tour, touring over the WW2 Hussar hunting ground in central Italy. The late August sun seemed to have already sucked the life out of the green and gold patchwork of the countryside. Our tour bus rolled to a halt at one of the numerous war cemeteries amid a cloud of dust. I was moved by the rows of white head stones that marked the final resting place of so many Canadian soldiers – quite a few of them were Hussars. I strayed away from the group and eventually stopped my meandering at the grave of a Hussar.

"B144693 Tpr Robinson, G.A." the tombstone read. Who was Tpr Robinson? Doubtless a young soldier; his service number indicated that he joined the Army in

Ontario. A gunner? A driver? Perhaps. I wondered what were the circumstances of his death. A politician might tell me that he died for his country but an old soldier would say that he died for his troop or his Regiment. A lot of thoughts and questions raced through my mind on that hot summer day.

One question that didn't surface was whether Tpr Robinson was a Regular Force or Militia soldier. Who gives a rat's ass? It appears that within our Total Force Regiment, and indeed within today's Army, the issue of a soldier's status as Regular or Reserve is perceived as being important. The Reservists knock the Regulars for not having a real job and the Regular soldiers have a host of complaints relating to the competence of the Reservist.

I've looked at both sides of the issue and always it seems to boil down to the amount of time the Hussar has to spend on training. Regulars spend a lot of time training; Reserves not so much. Regular soldiers cost a lot; Reservists not so much. We get what we pay for and, in both cases, I believe we get much more value for training than what we spend.

There is no doubt that the next time the Hussars cross the start line against a live enemy, the Reservists will man most of our tanks. We'll be glad to have them and surprisingly the walls that we foolishly place between the Regulars and Reservists in our Corps will not exist, just as they didn't exist in Italy when Tpr Robinson crossed over his last start line.

Regular or Reserve, we're all Canadian soldiers and doubtless we'll all bleed red blood when we're hit. Let's put aside our petty intolerance of each other. Our job will be to defeat the enemies of our country and to do that, we have to confront him as a Regimental team.


Tpr Robinson knew that; so must we.





LAV-Recce ... and the "Digital Battlefield"

by Major D.V. David



Major D.V. David, LdSH (RC), is a graduate of CFSC Toronto and is currently serving with PMO LAV as the Deputy Project Director Firepower and Surveillance.

"Crews have also been displaying a disturbing level of trust in the equipment. It is suspected that the result will be a decrease in basic fieldcraft skills."

The phrase "digitization of the battlefield" was not even part of our vocabulary when the LAV-Recce requirements were being written. Yet many have expressed opinions suggesting that the LAV-Recce, with all its gadgets, will be a significant contributor to this newest concept. However, with this potential contribution also comes other, less desirable impacts which will require our attention if we are to benefit from the rapid introduction of emerging technology to the battlefield.

REQUIREMENTS AND COMPROMISES

The LAV-Recce exists to provide the crews with the means to meet a commander's need for timely

and accurate information. The vehicle requirements were therefore written with an emphasis on information gathering capabilities, while providing sufficient protection and survivability features, including effective defensive firepower, to allow the crews to meet their assigned tasks. These tasks were already defined by existing publications, such as the Recce Squadron in Battle.

The LAV-Recce was to be fielded in record time. Only non-developmental, off-the-shelf solutions were considered and research and development was minimized. The traditional project phases were either completed in arrears or reduced to a minimum. Two years of definition work and comprehensive pre-production testing were replaced by trade-offs, "levels of confidence" and commitments by industry to "make it work". The minimum essential requirement remained the rule. Potentially costly and risky solutions were

quickly abandoned. In some cases, part solutions had to be accepted. This approach occasionally made the LAV-Recce appear as the "80 percent solution". However, as the fielding process begins, the Coyote has already established itself as a world class combat reconnaissance vehicle capable of operating anywhere in the world.

CAPABILITIES

The driver has several new features that vary from an impressive selection of climatic controls to a new multi-weather viewing technology. Augmenting the traditional driver controls are new displays for navigation and laser warning, an annunciator panel that manages five warning tones in each crew member's headset, and a Driver's Viewing Aid (DVA). The DVA is a thermal device that can be used day or night, has injected navigation and target referencing information, a magnification capability for surveillance, and can be deployed as another remote sensor for the surveillance operator. The DVA will use the onboard NODLR and radar battery packs when deployed remotely. A vehicle mounted intelligent battery charger will allow NiCd batteries to be quickly recharged. These new capabilities will make the driver a much more versatile member of the crew.

The turret is equipped with a target acquisition system that includes day, thermal and third generation



image intensification sights. The sights use a ballistic reticle and are mechanically linked to a stabilized 25mm cannon. The cannon has two operational rounds (Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot and Frangible Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot, see Vol 27, N° 1, 1994, Armour Bulletin) that can be fed to the cannon through two feed chutes. The ammunition is selected electrically and fired single shot or in bursts. The turret is equipped with electric drives that are capable of traversing at up to 45° per second. In addition to the soft mounted *coaxial* C6 machine gun, there is also a roof mounted C6 flex and a 76mm grenade launcher system. It is intended that the launcher system will be equipped with smoke, HE and anti-thermal grenades. The turret crew also has a through sight eye-safe laser rangefinder, encrypted GPS, and laser warning, navigation and chemical alarm displays. Besides customary navigation information, the system will also provide way point and target location information.

The surveillance operator's station is the crown of the vehicle. The LAV-Recce fleet will have 152 surveillance suites: 120 tripod mounted and 32 mast mounted systems. The tripod systems can be deployed and remotely operated up to 205m from the vehicle, while the mast system will allow the sensors to be deployed up to 10m above the vehicle. The surveillance sensor suite includes a zoom magnification day camera, a thermal imager (Micro-FLIR for the mast and TOD from the NODLR for the tripods), an eye-safe laser rangefinder and a new radar. The integration of these multi-spectral surveillance sensors



Photo: cpl Carter

WO Williams engages a head-on BMP-2 at 1500m with frangible ammunition during classified lethality trials at Gagetown. He achieved 5 hits with two three-round bursts.

with a control console containing a Hi-8mm VCR and on-screen sensor and software aids will provide the crews with a near all weather combat surveillance capability. The surveillance operator will also have immediate access to an onboard radiation detector and a State of Charge meter that constantly monitors the status of the six silent watch batteries.

The vehicle also includes ballistic seats for the driver and turret crew, laser protected day optics, three pair of third generation night vision goggles (NVGs) and an automatic fire and explosion suppression system. The latest in crew climatic technology allow for convection heat and air conditioning to be effectively channelled throughout the vehicle. Lastly, is the inclusion of a three tiered protection system that is based on the addition of a ballistic liner and almost 1000 kgs of add-on armour to the base metal.

IMPACT

The LAV-Recce will have a significant impact on the units receiving it. Some of the areas that will likely be affected are capability expectations, reliability, doctrine and tactics, training and support. A brief word on each.

Many will have great expectations for the LAV-Recce and its promise of new technology. Most will likely be satisfied. However, the training and crew motivation required to achieve this level of satisfaction will be enormous. Frequent refresher periods will be the norm if expertise levels are to be maintained. Unfortunately, with the increased complexity and capability of the equipment, there is an inherent fragility that, despite its "mil spec design" and robust construction, must be respected by the crews if acceptable serviceability rates are to be maintained. This is particularly



true for the surveillance sensors. The surveillance equipment is also heavy and consists of several components that take time to deploy and stow. Besides the crews, the headquarters staff will also have to learn about the capabilities of the various sensors and when to restrict their use. A radar that has demonstrated that it can detect equipment at 19 kms and personnel at six kms should not be prematurely silenced. You can only put so much armour and protective systems on the vehicle. The LAV-Recce crews will therefore have to realize that the best chance of surviving will be by avoiding contact and by getting out of a fight as quickly as possible. Modern anti-armour weapons are simply too prolific and too effective. Adjustments in thinking will be needed if the LAV-Recce is to be successfully employed to its fullest potential.

Elegance gave way to simplicity. For example, there are several independent, vice integrated displays. The laser warning system (LWS) did not receive hull/turret reference sensors to allow the direction of an incoming laser to be updated as the hull moves. But, the crew still receives an immediate warning that they are being lased. Despite our intent for simplicity, some systems like navigation, will require careful calibration for the dead reckoning mode to work properly.

There has also been early evidence of decreased, instead of the expected increase in situational awareness. Crews have also been displaying a disturbing level of trust in the equipment. It is suspected that the result will be a decrease in basic





Photo: cpl Carter

The LAV-Recce driver's station showing, among other controls, the annunciator panel (lower left), Driver's Viewing Aid (centre) and the navigation and laser warning displays (left centre).

fieldcraft skills, such as map reading and relating tactical information to a map. This is particularly the case for the navigation, for target read-out sensors and the surveillance systems. The equipment on the LAV-Recce should be considered an aid to the crew and should not be totally trusted. Periodic confidence checks, calibrations and verification must be conducted to ensure that the information being provided is accurate. Otherwise, the crews may be misled with catastrophic results.

All this new, complex technology on LAV-Recce makes reliability paramount. The project philosophy is "whatever we field, must work properly and reliably". Retro-fits will be a never ending frustration



Only good luck prevented several hundred thousand dollars of damage when the mast mounted sensors were allowed to strike the antenna base while being retracted. Crew vigilance will be essential when deploying/stowing the surveillance sensors.

and an annoying necessity if acceptable system performance and reliability are to be maintained. A combination of systems coming late in the contract process, some needing to be fixed, and others not meeting expectations will cause disruptions to your early training. Five of the first vehicles produced are being subjected to several months of Initial Production Testing (IPT) to determine the reliability of the vehicle systems. Eight regular force and reserve crews will, among other activities, accumulate about 40,000 kms, 6,500 operating hours on both the turret and surveillance systems, and fire about 10,000 rounds. So far, the IPT crews have generated over 1300 Technical Incident Reports (TIRs). These TIRs have identified potential concerns with performance, ergonomics, design and expectations. Despite this effort, we realize that, like when Windows 95 was first introduced and despite countless hours of testing, our complaint department will be full shortly after you start using the vehicle.

The LAV-Recce is providing a tactical and doctrinal dilemma as we attempt to decide "now what do we do with it?" What will likely change for the Coyote equipped units is how the job gets done, not what gets done. A troop trial to examine the impact of introducing the LAV-Recce is being planned for next spring/summer. It will likely be some time before questions like: how do we tactically use the LWS, do we group the mast and tripod systems together in a patrol for maximum tactical flexibility, should the crew size be three or four, and what do we do with all this sensor imagery/data being collected, are




Photo: cpl Carter

A view of the surveillance operator's station, showing the thermal imager and day camera monitor, radar display, battery state of charge meter (centre above console) and AN/VDR-2 radiac meter (above right).

answered. Considerable interest is currently being expressed about who needs to see what the LAV-Recce has collected, and should other systems be sharing information with the Coyote. For example, imagery collected from Remotely Piloted Vehicles could be viewed by LAV-Recce crews to enhance their situational awareness. Complicating the implementation of this information sharing concept is the mix of old twisted wire pair analogue and modern digital technologies throughout the vehicle's various sensors. For now, the day camera, thermal imagery and radar data collected by the crew is reduced to the operator's ability to talk about it over the radio. The project has already demonstrated that it is possible to send imagery over a combat net radio. This capability should be further enhanced by the TCCCS project. But who do we send it to? Who can receive it? Better yet, who will be able to monitor, vet, collate and

process in a timely and useful manner the output from up to 18 systems deployed by a recce squadron across the brigade's frontage? This is potentially a huge demand that will have to be thought through carefully if a manageable process is to be realized. Unfunded R&D efforts are ongoing to address known limitations with Coyote image processing (eg: electronic zoom, enhancement techniques), image stabilization and transmission capability in anticipation of this evolving "digital battlefield" demand.

Training for the LAV-Recce is very challenging. Just getting the necessary operating instructions is proving difficult, let alone developing the required operator skills. The LAV-Recce systems demand considerably more training effort than anyone realized. We have found that most can be quickly trained to assemble and turn the systems on, but it takes much longer to learn skills such as



target interrogation techniques, thermal target recognition, how to compensate for the weather effects on the surveillance sensors and interpretation of radar doppler audio tones. Early experience suggests the need for semi-annual or quarterly refresher periods and use of checklists like those used by pilots to reduce operator workload and errors. The planned gunnery and surveillance simulation systems will help, but it will still take considerable time and effort to train and maintain basic LAV-Recce operating skills.

Have we provided too much capability, or is the equipment just too complicated or demanding to operate? That you will have to answer. Although the tool box is full, use only what you need to do the job at hand. For example, instead of all those expensive and cumbersome surveillance sensors, a task may only require the NVGs.

LAV-Recce training requirements are only surpassed by our support needs. Modern equipment places heavy and expensive demands on downsizing army. We can no longer afford to train or equip our technicians to fix broken Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). Increasingly, they will have to just replace the LRUs and back-load them, in many cases, to the factory that built them. This will only work if we have sufficient quantities of expensive LRUs available while repairs are being made. Basic Built-in-Test (BIT) was incorporated in the vehicle systems wherever possible, but essential expensive test equipment will still be necessary if faults are to be confirmed to prevent LRUs from being unnecessarily returned to factories. Unfortunately, like most of the episodes on "Star Trek",




Photo: cpl Carter

The commander's station, showing the target acquisition sights, navigation and laser warning displays, GPS receiver and turret hand control assembly.


you will often find yourselves running full diagnostics to determine the source of problems and crawling through your version of the jefferies tubes looking for burnt fuses or damaged end connectors. Also, how long do we believe we can continue to get service on the technology we have bought? The LAV-Recce is full of software. For example, the radar and surveillance systems have already had several revisions and general fielding has not yet begun. How do LRUs in the supply system get their software updates so that they work with the rest of the system when installed. Remember your 8086, 286 and 386 home computers, of which millions were made. Try to get them fixed now. Sooner, than later, the LAV-Recce will need new sensors because it will be too expensive to fix old technology that no one makes. This will require money and priority of effort. The alternative is to return the LAV-Recce to the technology status of the Lynx. Is that acceptable?

CLOSING COMMENTS


The LAV-Recce is a world class reconnaissance vehicle and provides an example of evolving technology being applied to the modern battlefield. While other countries continue to talk about the next generation of reconnaissance vehicles, the Canadian land Force is about to field one. However, it has only been made possible due to a series of difficult trade-offs and compromises. We believe that the Coyote will meet the majority of your operational needs for the next 25 years. But only if we learn to train smarter, how to use the vehicle systems effectively within their limitations, invest in maintaining and exploiting the vehicle's capabilities, and, above all, not allow technology to reduce the value of the crews using the vehicle.



Corps V.C. Winners



Sgt A.H.L. Richardson, LdSH (RC)



Editor's note:

In the last edition of the Armour Bulletin (Digitization) an error was made referring to previous VC winners on the Ethics and Leadership Cover. Sgt A.H.L. Richardson of Lord Strathcona's Horse was falsely identified by his Christian name only as Sgt A.H. Lindsey. The staff of the Armour Bulletin regrets the error and is publishing the following in order to correctly focus attention on the courageous recipient of this award. Furthermore, in order to increase awareness in the Armour community about these heroes of past wars, the Bulletin is inaugurating with this article a Corps V.C. recipients recognition series. In light of the error in the last edition, it is fitting the series commence with Sgt Richardson.

Born on 23 September 1872 in Southport England, Arthur Richardson was the son of an insurance agent. Apprenticed to work for a dental surgeon, Richardson seemed to be in the hunt for something more adventurous and eventually found his way to Stoney Mountain, Manitoba at the age of 19. After a few years time, he found his way to Regina where he joined the North West Mounted Police and after completing his training was posted to Battleford, Saskatchewan.

On the outbreak of war in South Africa, Richardson, then 27 years of age, enlisted in Lord Strathcona's Horse. He was soon after promoted to corporal and then to Acting Sergeant as the Canadian Contingent arrived in South Africa.

On July 5th, 1900, at Wolvespruit he was part of a small Strathcona party of 38 that became engaged by a force of over 80 Boers. The official citation states that upon being led into ambush by the Boers "Cpl McArthur was wounded



and fell from his horse. He would have been taken prisoner but Sgt Richardson, seeing the danger in which the man was placed, rode back and placed him on his horse. The Boers had meanwhile advanced on horseback and, firing at short range [300 yards], called upon Richardson and his wounded companion to surrender."

"Richardson, however, urged his horse to gallop and rode after his comrades. He was followed by a perfect hail of bullets one of which pierced his helmet and another the sleeve of his tunic. When he had covered but a few yards he came to a wire fence and this his horse refused to take until, after wasting some precious moments

during which the enemy rapidly gained upon the fugitives, a friendly bullet hit the animal on the hoof so startling him that he instantly jumped the fence and carried the wounded man and his gallant rescuer safely to camp." For this action, Sgt Richardson became the second Canadian of the war to receive the Victoria Cross and the first Colonial to be Gazetted for the decoration.

Upon his return to Canada, Sgt Richardson rejoined the NWMP and completed over 13 years of service, resigning in 1907. A man of quiet disposition, Richardson returned to England to live in relative obscurity working as a labourer laying track in Liverpool, England.

In 1924 the secret he kept came to light with the death of an impersonator who had claimed he was the V.C. hero of the Strathconas and even had the temerity to present himself as such to the King during a garden party for V.C. winners. Reading of "his" death, and fearing that people may soon find him to be the imposter, Richardson came forward with his story and was soon after reunited with his mother and elder brother who had received word of his passing in Montreal 11 years earlier.

Sgt A.H.L. Richardson died on December 15, 1932 in Liverpool at the age of 59, having received in the final years of his life some of the acclaim that was rightfully his - for valour.





From the Corps Adjutant

by Maj D.M. Poitras



In this address I would like to write on a topic dear to all of us; dress. The Corps RSM and I are in cahoots with this so don't go thinking that I'm treading on someone else's turf.

While at a recent mess dinner, I participated in the typical conversation that occurs in such circumstances on solving all of the world, country, army, and Corps problems. At one point the topic focused on mess kit, questions on the proper wearing of the winged-tip collar and use of braid were raised. Specifically:

- a. Where do the tips of the collar sit in relation to the bow tie; front or behind?; and
- b. Why don't junior officers in the Corps wear a single strand of gold braid on their sleeve cuffs as was the practice in the old scarlet uniforms.

No consensus was reached after all opinions were submitted. All eyes turned to me with the question, "Well, Corps Adjutant?...". First thing the next morning, like any good officer, I consulted my Senior NCO. The Corps RSM was also baffled. Together, like any good staff, we consulted both a reference book and more senior staff. The results were as follows.

CFP 265, The Dress Manual, and the staff at the NDHQ Directorate of Military Heritage and Traditions do not specify where the wing tip sits. The issue does not relate to the wearing of any other previous mess kit and is governed by the traditions of wearing formal attire. Consequently, I consulted the editorial staff of the magazine "Gentleman's Quarterly" and was informed that the proper wearing of the winged-tip is behind the bow tie. Nuff said.

The braid situation is not so clear cut. The manual has a diagram which clearly reflects that Army "subbies" and captains wear a single strand of gold braid along the top edge of the sleeve cuff. Also, in the section of the manual that dictates Corps specific differences, there is no statement that Armour Corps subordinate officers do not wear that braid. Finally, the staff at Heritage and Traditions could not find any references or supporting documentation that has requested such a difference. Even my own research of the Archives I have inherited from the old Armour Staffs at NDHQ and LFCHQ has been unsuccessful.

I therefore put it to you: Why don't our subordinate officers wear gold braid on the sleeves of their scarlet mess kit?


This issue goes back to the mid 1980s when the then new mess kit was being staffed. My hope is that the involved officers will enlighten me. I will then ensure that the correct Corps tradition will be properly reflected in the Dress Manual. This should then result in our having one less argument to keep us up late after a mess dinner (not that we need a lot of help in this regard).

Major D.M. Poitras
Corps Adjutant



Corps RSM's Comments

by Chief Warrant Officer J.G. Brown



In this edition of the Armour Bulletin dealing with the topic of Total Force, it is timely that I give you an example of how the Total Force concept has been put to the test. The School has proven that Total Force courses will work and should benefit the Corps in the future.

Over the past few years, the Armour School has been conducting the QL7 course as a Total Force course. Student Warrant Officers from both the Regular Force and the Militia have been integrated, trained and assessed to the same standard in order to qualify them to become Squadron Sergeants Major.

At the School, we realize that most Militia Warrant Officers do not


have the practical experience that most Regular Force Warrant Officers should have. This is due to a lack of equipment and the time for the Militia soldier to practice and improve his skills. For the Militia Warrant Officer, this may be the first time he has seen the number of vehicles it can take to make up a combat team echelon. For the Regular Force Warrant Officer, it may be his first time commanding and controlling a combat team echelon but hopefully not the first time he has seen one.

The course offers both Regular and Militia students the opportunity to train with vehicles and react to situations that they may never get a chance to practice with again.

As with any course, the students often learn from each other, therefore, teamwork and cooperation often lead to success.

Even though the QL7 course is now a Total Force course, the course standard has remained the same and all students are assessed according to the School standard. Since the QL7 became a Total Force course, its statistics are as follows:

- a. 1994 – 6 militia and 6 regular students with 1 failure;
- b. 1995 – 6 militia students with 3 failures; and
- c. 1996 – 7 militia and 6 regular students with 2 failures.

On completion of the QL7 course, all students will know they have trained to the same standard. The respect gained and the teamwork developed should improve the standard within the Corps. 

Chief Warrant Officer J.G. Brown
Regimental Sergeant Major RCAC



South Albertas – A Canadian Regiment at War

by Mr. D.E. Graves

More than half a century after the end of the Second World War, the South Alberta Regiment has finally compiled its wartime history. Scheduled for publication in early 1998, *South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War* tells the story of one of Canada's great Armoured Regiments, the only unit of the Canadian Armoured Corps to win a Victoria Cross during the Second World War. Raised from five Alberta Militia regiments, the SAR (29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment) was one of only two armoured reconnaissance regiments in the Canadian Army. Follow their story from the Rockies to the Rhine as this fine armoured unit experienced some of the heaviest

fighting of the campaign in Northwest Europe: Tilly la Campagne, Ops TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE, Moerbrugge, Bergen op Zoom, the Maas, Kapelsche Veer, the Hochwald and the Rhine crossing. Two chapters of the book are devoted to the battle of the Falaise Pocket where Major David Currie of the SAR won the VC in three days of bloody fighting. Based on three years of archival research and more than 130 personal interviews, *South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War* will make an attractive addition to the library of anyone interested in the Canadian Armoured Corps during the Second World War.

The regimental association is offering this book at a pre-publication price of \$47.00 (taxes included) and we would like to make this offer to as many people as possible in the "armoured community".

If you are interested, please make cheques out to:

**SAR Veterans Association
SAR Book Fund
RR #2, Site 80C
9310 Milne Road
Summerland, BC
V0H 1Z0**





Letters to the Editor

...On the Bulletin

I perceive that the shift to a "theme" based Bulletin may have a detrimental effect on the overall professional nature of the publication. For lack of a professional journal dealing with tactical, strategic and political issues of Canadian defence, the journals of the various corps within the CF are the only outlets for meaningful discussion on those topics. Although less than effective in comparison to, for instance, the defunct *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, these publications allow a free-flow of concepts from all rank levels regardless to, or in spite of, the orthodox thought of the time. In short, it allowed Lieutenants and Captains to tactfully disagree with the word of the Generals.

One might argue the "subbies should be seen and not heard" line in response to mine. I must, however, strongly disagree. Was not Liddell-Hart but a lowly Captain when he developed the concept of the Blitzkrieg? Did not Charles de Gaulle share that same rank when he wrote the outstanding volume *Vers L'Armée de Métier*? Both of these men were derided in their youth for these thoughts, yet they were and still remain the core of our modern military system.

Examples such as these will not occur in a theme-based Bulletin. The subjects addressed will be those chosen by the editor and his staff, who by their very positions represent the orthodox opinion. Although junior officers might be represented in future issues (there were only two in the ethics issue), there is a danger that aspiring contributors will tailor their articles to conform with the official 'school of thought'.

In short, to close the only valve of expression to the thoughts of the army's 'young turks' may be an act of self injury. Can our army afford, in these critical times, to end the expression of new and refreshing thought? By basing each edition of the *Armour Bulletin* only on those themes thought pertinent by the establishment, we are doing just that.

K.C. Gustafson
Second-Lieutenant
LdSH (RC)

Many of your colleagues expressed a similar concern regarding the lack of junior officer/senior NCO input in the Ethics and Leadership issue (Vol 29, No.1, 1996). The Editor-in-Chief, with the overall mission of increasing Corps input in time, invited senior officers with well-developed reputations to provide the foundation of feedback in future editions. Your letter, along with many others, is proof of the soundness of this decision.

The change of direction to a theme-based Armour Bulletin has not stifled the input from junior officers or any other sect in the Corps. To the contrary, it has been enhanced due to the content changes which have been made over the last year and is evidenced by the feedback published in the aforementioned "Digitization" edition. Rest assured that the editorial staff of three, including this "Lowly Captain" who is sometimes known to stray from the "orthodox opinion", considers the inclusion of all well-written and researched articles - no matter their conservatism, or lack thereof.

A.J. Zdunich
Captain
Editor

...On Ethics and Leadership

A profession is a calling and a service to society that regulates its own conduct to ensure standards of competence and social responsibility. As a result, professions hold themselves accountable to police, ethically, the actions of their members. If a profession does not enforce its on ethical conduct the right will be taken from them by the society they serve. This is the message of the Somalia Inquiry.

In a typical Army fashion we try deal with ethics by creating checklists of dos and don'ts. Ethical conduct cannot be achieved with any checklist. It is something that is implicitly imparted to an individual as part of the culture and professional organization. It is an expected attitude and behaviour. If the organization does not follow its own ethical guidelines, training will never impart its ethical values to new members. This is the officer corps' present dilemma. We do

not know our own ethical standard. It differs between individuals and has become muddled. How do we choose between truth and loyalty, honour and duty? They should never be in conflict, but in some instances they are. This is due to our lack of clear ethical direction as a profession.

R. Dundon
Captain
LdSH (RC)



...On Ethics and Leadership (continued)

Becoming a military leader in a society dominated by civilians, and under the glaring eye of the media, is certainly a challenge and it seems to me that he/she, to gain the respect of subordinates, must:

- Demonstrate a continuing mastery of drill, weapons and/or equipment, or task.
- Be firm but fair in matters of discipline.
- Be approachable, through NCMs; keep abreast of morale, anticipate trouble.
- Show continuing interest in the duties performed by subordinates, and compliment good work.
- When clearly in the wrong, say so promptly without apology; it clears the air and the other person will respect you for it.
- Be aware that remarks or actions displaying ignorance will alarm your subordinates.

Wherever possible, staff officers should be returned to their units annually for a short period to regain and foster the regimental spirit, and see at first hand the end result of equipment shortages and ill-considered policies. I understand this was standard practice in the German Army years ago – like taking the family car back to the dealer for a tune-up. Finally, my hat is off to Canada's service people; I don't think I could hack it in today's world.

H.R.S. Ellis, DSO
Honorary LCol
8 CH (PL)

I am glad Major-General Milner shared with us the Officer's Code from 1925. It serves as a powerful reminder to the level of commitment Officers are called to uphold.

Will enforcing all Service Personnel to read such a code change anything? Absolutely not. If these ideals and values become expected and enforced however, substantial change will result. At present, even our officer training system pays little more than lip service to such ideals. The motto of Royal Roads Military College is "Truth, Duty, Valour". Cadets are found guilty of dishonesty, disloyalty and cowardice. Their punishments consist of a slap on the wrist. When I visited a United States academy however, things were much different. "I will not lie, cheat, or steal; nor tolerate those who do",

was strictly enforced. To break this code or to turn a blind eye meant automatic dismissal. If such a code is to be successful, it needs to have teeth. We must not expect that people will live up to a standard, we must demand that they do. As professionals sworn to the protection of this country we can not tolerate any less. The final paragraph of the code in the article allows for honest shortfalls from time to time. This is to be expected, we are all human. What follows however is essential, we must foster an attitude where people will try with all their might to uphold the code.

J.H. Janzen
Lieutenant
LdSH (RC)

The continuous downward spiral of morale in the Army and the perceived notion of a leadership problem cannot be laid solely at the feet of the junior officers and senior NCOs. This was strongly indicated in some of the articles. The problems can also be attributed to a system which sends soldiers on missions with inadequate equipment, has them under-go training away from their families for extended periods, with little direction, only to have the mission(s)

cancelled at the last minute. I feel that some of the senior leadership has lost touch with today's soldiers. The general impression at our level, is of politicians and managers not leaders. This is the environment where the leaders of today must prove their worth.

S.G. Long
Captain
LdSH (RC)

Corruption is defined as a moral deterioration and is an aspect of society that the CF is not immune to. However, by not dealing with these incidents in a timely and harsh manner, those in command responsible for each incident abrogate their moral ability to preach to their juniors about ethics. It is this element of the chain of command

that needs to be quickly addressed. To have individuals not be held accountable for their actions because the investigation has taken so long and subsequently the statute of limitations has been invoked is completely unacceptable. That a General Officer was released with full pension while cheating on expenses is also not sending an appropriate message.

Everyone must be treated equally, until this standard is perceived by the soldiers and the public the CF will not be able to achieve a level of morality we aspire to maintain.

G. Dyck
Captain
LdSH (RC)



...On Ethics and Leadership (continued)

Regarding the photo of the Corps' eight Victoria Cross recipients in the latest Armour Bulletin: you "goofed" again as you have Major Dave V. Currie as being SALH. He was South Alberta Regiment from beginning to end. The SALH never came into being until 1954 and now perpetuate the South Alberta Regiment.

The SAR Veterans' Association had a cairn erected with a bronze plaque dedicated to Major Currie in 1992 at St. Lambert-Sur Dives, and to commemorate the Battle where he won his VC. To rectify an affront to this great Regiment that dates back to 1945, the SAR Veterans' Association paid to have their Colours made and then presented to the SAR Veterans during a Parade on the grounds of the Alberta Legislature by the Honourable Gordon Towers, Lieutenant

Governor of Alberta in September 1995. They then carried out an amalgamation parade with the South Alberta Light Horse under their Guidon (which carries the SAR Battle Honours and was presented to the SALH by HRH Princess Alexandra in 1957).

The SAR Colours were then laid up in the Alberta Legislature Building along with Colours from many Alberta Regiments. The South Alberta Regiment was to have been presented with their Colours before leaving the United Kingdom in 1945, but it never happened.

I like your new format [and] it is very informative to us old tankers.

LCol J.H. Quarton, (Retd)
President
 SAR Veterans' Association

A decision to identify Major Currie as belonging to the SALH was made during the editorial process and was intended to identify this individual with the Regiment perpetuating the Battle Honours and history of the SAR. No insult was intended to the members of the SAR Veterans' Association, and the staff feels the new regular feature on Corps VC Winners will prevent any further misunderstandings or oversights.

Editor

...On Digitization

Congratulations on a very interesting and timely edition of the Armour Bulletin. Digitization of the battlefield has in the past ten years become one of the main thrusts of R&D efforts in most western countries. The effects will be felt at all levels, from Divisional HQ to the "Charlie" Call Sign. It is therefore essential that all of us have a solid understanding not only of the technologies behind the interface, but also of the myriad of implications posed by the introduction of these systems.

Having said this, I feel it is important for me to stand on my soap box out here in the wilderness and sound a call of warning. It is far too easy to be enamored of this technology and become caught up in a feeding frenzy of "bigger, better and faster" without taking the time to ask some fundamental questions. Thomas Landauer in his book "What's Wrong with Computers" points out two areas of concern that are highly applicable

to our current digitization debate. They are, "How usable is the computer?", and secondly, "How useful is the computer?"

The first question to ask yourself is "How useable is the system?" Are the interfaces and operating modes easy to learn and operate? Can they be operated in battlefield conditions by a user suffering from fatigue, stress or even injury? Are the procedures intuitive? How easy is it to fix erroneous input? Experience with such marvels of user frustration as MS-DOS and even Windows lead one to question the abilities of software engineers to develop systems for real people. Good technology is developed in an iterative process that includes users at all stages from concept through development to implementation. What we need is an information system that works for us, not against us.

The second area of concern deals with the usefulness of the system as a whole. The acid test for any technology is whether

it simplifies our workload, or expands it to the point where we are worse off than we were without it. We must ask ourselves, "Does this information system provide me with what I absolutely need or is it filled with useless data, and wasting my time?" This question may not be as easy to answer as it seems. Often data takes on the appearance of importance when it is only on the periphery of the information that we truly need. Some studies in the US now suggest that battlefield data systems so overload the analysis capability of existing headquarters, that vital information often gets lost in the "noise" of useless and duplicated data transmitted by current generation information gathering systems.

The digitized battlefield will only be successful if we approach it with an attitude of "So What?" rather than "Gee Whiz".

S.A. Martin
Captain
 RCD, Tech Adjt Armour School