

# Armour *Bulletin*



**The Regimental System**



# Armour Bulletin

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Part I – General</b>	
Colonel Commandant's Foreword .....	1
Director of Armour's Foreword .....	3
Editor-in-Chief's Foreword .....	5
Keynote Address	
The Regimental System .....	6
<b>Part II – Feature Articles</b>	
The Regimental System – A Double-Edged Weapon .....	8
The Demise of the Regimental System and the Reorganization of the Infantry .....	10
The Regimental System – A Reservist's View .....	15
Reconciling the Regimental System with the Battle Group Concept – A Heretics Point of View .....	17
Reform of the Regimental System .....	21
The Corps or the Regiment – That is the question .....	24
<b>Part III – Topics of Interest</b>	
The Benefits of Simulation to Support Training .....	26
The Requirement for a Brigade Light Recce Troop .....	30
Corps Victoria Cross Winners: Lt Harcus Strachan .....	37
<b>Part IV – Corps Points</b>	
Corps RSM's Comments .....	39
<b>Part V – Turret Talk</b>	
Fiddling while Rome burns .....	40

### Author's Guide

The Armour Bulletin, as a forum for debate and discussion, welcomes the submission of articles of a technical, tactical or historical nature.

The following guidelines apply:

- it would be appreciated if all articles could be typewritten on 8-1/2 x 11 paper, double spaced on one side and be accompanied by a 3.5 inch disk copy; (in WP 5.0/1/2);
- articles should not exceed 2,000 words (much smaller articles are also welcome, ie, a page or two);
- black and white photographs and illustrations should accompany the article. Photographs cut out of magazines are not acceptable as they are an infringement of copyright laws. Photographs and or illustrations add to the possibility of publishing;
- only material of an unclassified nature should be submitted;
- authors should include a very brief description of their current position, location and photo.

The Editor reserves the right to reject and to edit articles or letters submitted for publication. Authors should not submit articles which have either already been submitted for consideration to another publication or have already been published.

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The Guidon Party of the 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Hussars(Prince Louise's)  
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### Next topic and issue submission deadline:

Due to budgetary constraints the next issue of the Armour Bulletin may not be completed. As of 1999 the Armour Bulletin may cease to be published in its current format or altogether. In anticipation of another issue the next topic and issue submission deadline will be

Topic: *Employment of Coyote*

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# Colonel Commandant's Foreword

## The Regimental System in the Canadian Army



All of us understand that our Regimental System is an organization designed for war with a focus of commitment, belonging and pride. These are intended to enhance motivation and morale for success in operations.

We are challenged to define our Regimental System more precisely but it is especially flexible so each one of us can define his environment. The interesting thing about the system is that its most important characteristics are transferable and many of us have worn more than one badge and we generally feel equally at home under any one of them. What are these characteristics?

Cohesion: developed by way of socialization, training and discipline from the crew to the troop and squadron and ultimately the regiment wherein we proudly shelter and display our accomplishments, history and battle honours. The pageantry that we display on our anniversaries and troopings of the guidon serve to meld the comradeship existing at the more personal levels where your fellow troopers, crew commanders, warrants, troop leaders, SSM and OCs and your essential and faithful maintainers and support services are the every day realities. These ceremonies give us all pride in our Regiment, an essential to high morale. Napoleon, one of the greatest generals of all times said: "À la guerre,

les trois quarts sont des affaires morales, la balance des forces réelles ne compte que pour un autre quart." Quick translation: "In war, morale is to all else as 3 is to 1."

Commitment: evolves from our training and realistic missions. Confidence in your well-trained fellow crewmen and leaders are well honed in daily regimental life and gives you the courage to keep in step with your crewmen-in-arms and the ability to keep up with your leaders through to the successful accomplishment of the missions.

Effectiveness: comes from the repetitive training at all levels and well-learned regimental procedures (SOPs) for combat and everyday life in the field – for war and/or peacekeeping. Knowledge that your comrades and leaders are there for you at all times is a morale builder and it is well established that morale is essential to the successful conduct of operations, in war as well as in peace. Good training and good administration are essential ingredients for solid esprit de corps.

The Regimental System provides it all and enables the Regiment to function successfully in its several parts as well as the battle group and formation.

Some of the problems we face these days are the thrusts for economies at all levels and this stresses and often



degrades esprit de corps: crewmen training outside the regiment, imposition of central messing, lack of unit Junior Ranks Clubs/WOs' & Sgts' Messes/Officers' Messes; it is encouraging to note how some have overcome these downturns with home-made alternatives such as "rest areas" off the hangar floor. The problems are always presented as economies to provide equipment but it overlooks the impacts on unit cohesion and undermines the Regimental System.

Additional challenges existing, some are stimulating, are the increasing demands to cope with advanced technology, decentralization of decision making,

the mixed gender environment, and the extraordinarily expanded capability of some equipment like the Coyote. We have to cope with the trends that "everything deployed will be seen, everything seen will be engaged and everything engaged destroyed." This will create ever-increasing demands on cohesion and leadership at all levels of the Regiment.

We old soldiers often worked on gut-feel and frequently solved problems while on our feet; of course this was the result of elementary leadership, good socialization, solid training and concern for our troops. It will be interesting to read all the views presented

in what promises to be another valuable edition of the Armour bulletin; I am sure that solutions will be found to overcome these challenges to the crewmen and leaders at all levels of the Regiment. A major key to what makes the Regimental System is that leaders have the interests and welfare of their troops as first priorities at all times, whether it be for mission accomplishment in combat or professionalism and better living in barracks – troops never follow their leaders out of sheer curiosity!

Worthy!  
Major-General (Ret)  
J.P. Robert LaRose, CD  
**Colonel Commandant**

## Director of Armour's Foreword



It is appropriate that the theme of this volume of the Armour Bulletin be dedicated to the Regimental System. During my tenure as the Director of Armour, we have seen considerable change, very little of which could be viewed as positive from the perspective of the Corps. What has endured, however, is the outstanding performance of Armour soldiers, evidenced by success in operations abroad and at home, and by the collective training skills that have been maintained despite dwindling resources. This, I believe, is directly attributable to the strong Regimental System that we have developed throughout the history of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and the remainder of the Canadian Army.

Some of the Army's fundamental concepts such as organization, leadership and ethos are being questioned from both outside and within the military. The Regimental System is, and has always been, a fundamental building block of the Canadian Army. Much has been written on the subject by wartime participants and others to establish its importance in the development and sustainment of the Army. The Regiment in the past was an important symbol for those who were serving in the Army and for those who had retired. Its significance lay in two areas: first it was an important ingredient in enhancing the fighting spirit of

the unit. By accident, perhaps more than design, the British Army discovered that soldiers do not fight for causes, or even for political objectives. They fight for and with their friends. The Regiment generated a close bond among men. This was enhanced by their coming, for the most part, from the same geographical place or region. It gave them a distinct and unique identity and sense of pride and a source of encouragement and determination in time of danger. The second area of significance was as an important potential source of recruitment. By emphasizing tradition, and promoting a close identity with a town, region or distinctive cultural group, the Regimental System brought military service to the attention of young men for reasons other than knowledge of defence policy. Despite all the change that the Army has gone through, much of this remains true today. The Regular Force Regiments continue to retain a territorial link: the RCD with Ontario, LdSH(RC) with the West and 12<sup>th</sup> RBC with Quebec. The Reserve units maintain a footprint across the complete country.

Regimental associations of retired soldiers assist in the preservation of this spirit of family. Assisted by individuals in honorary positions such as Colonels in Chief, Colonels Commandant, Colonels of the Regiments, Honorary



Colonels and Honorary Lieutenant Colonels, they act as "guardians" of the traditions, reputations and well being of their former Regiments and the Corps. Arguments have been made that the Regimental System has long outlived its usefulness both in war and in peacetime. I do not believe this to be true. We have built a strong Armoured Corps based on the principles associated with the Regimental System. This system continues to promote group cohesion and morale,

thereby increasing the combat effectiveness of Army units. Individuals perform better if they feel like they belong to a definable group, or family. The Regimental System is not the only way to achieve these results, but it is the way we have done it in the past and, for the most part, with success. We must be careful, therefore, to preserve these important principles in order to ensure the relevance of the Corps within the Army.

This will be the last time I address the Armour bulletin as the Director of Armour. I wish to take the opportunity to thank all those who have helped me in carrying out my duties in this regard and wish my successor, Colonel Chris Davis, success when he takes over as Director in June of this year. It has been a distinct pleasure to serve the Corps in this capacity.

Colonel W.J. Fulton  
**Director of Armour**



## Editor-in-Chief's Foreword



This latest issue of the Armour Bulletin is written with the theme of the Regimental System. The Regimental System has been the foundation of our Army since its inception, although it has been modified over the years. With the many changes to the Army, and the recently reduced size of the Corps, it is worth considering and debating the merits of the Regimental System and exploring possible avenues for the future. You will see this done in this issue and I encourage your debate on the issue in subsequent issues in the form of letters to the editor or counter point articles of your own.

We are fortunate to have our keynote article written by the former Colonel of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, MGen Clive Milner. He offers a career perspective on the merits of the Regimental System that is founded in experience and tempered with time. Major John Frappier, Officer Commanding Reconnaissance Squadron, 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment blindé du Canada writes a thought provoking article. Captain Drebot from the Strathcona's presents several views of the Regimental System that will certainly peak your interest and Capt Bradley explores options for

reform. The Reserve perspective is articulated by the 1<sup>st</sup> Hussars, and finally, a British view from WO1 Shaw of the Parachute Regiment.

Again, Larry Zaporzan has written a provocative primer that I hope will stimulate debate for the next issue. The topic is the future direction of the Corps as a consequence of the recent decision to remove the Cougar from the Regular regiments and equip the third sabre squadron with a stripped-down Coyote. Related to this is the issue of how the "cavalry" or "fire support vehicle" squadron ought to be employed. I already have several submissions from the Royal Canadian Dragoons that will form the basis for the next issue but more debate is required.


Enjoy this issue of the Bulletin. More importantly, however, get your thoughts in order and pen a submission on the critical issue of the future of our Corps and the role of the Coyote within the Corps for our next issue. Over to you!

Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Fletcher  
**Editor-In-Chief,**  
**Commandant Armour School**



# Keynote Address

## The Regimental System



*This modern tendency to scorn and ignore tradition and to sacrifice it to administrative convenience is one that wise men will resist in all branches of life, but more especially in our military life.*

**Field Marshall Lord Wavell**

As stated in the last *Bulletin*, this edition is about "The Regimental System," particularly in the context of our Corps. I suggest that some fundamental questions one might consider in this connection are: Does the Regimental System allow us to fulfill effectively our primary mission of training for war while meeting peacetime demands, such as, support for the United Nations and NATO, providing humanitarian aid world-wide and aid to the civil power, as our Corps and the Army head into the next millennium? Are the needs of the Corps and Army now so different that the suitability of the system is in doubt? Can adjustments be made while leaving the system with its traditions and heritage relatively intact, or has the Regimental System failed to the point that it needs to be replaced? I anticipate that such questions will be considered and debated in this *Bulletin* from the armour regiment's point of view. Let me begin the debate with a few random thoughts on the Regimental System based on 35 years experience in the Armour Corps.

While being one who believes that, "if it doesn't need fixing don't try to fix it", I understand that any system needs to be periodically examined to insure that it is still functioning

efficiently and effectively and capable of carrying out its assigned mission. As such, a debate on the Regimental System is timely and should be of value to those who strive to improve the Corps' combat capabilities, while continuing to enhance the well-being and esprit de corps of those who will be required to fight the good fight.

Regiments in one form or another have been around as long as armies and libraries are full of their histories and exploits. In Canada, Militia regiments were formed by recruiting men from a particular town or township in order to provide citizens with basic military skills for local security. These regiments, as their history and traditions evolved, indoctrinated and trained recruits in the belief, proven in other armies, that the pride and friendships developed when linked with the scrutiny provided by their direct tie to the community, would encourage them to fight to the limit of their capabilities. Such soldiers would be less likely to let down their families and friends even in the fiercest of battles.

When the time came for a regular or standing army in Canada this system in its purest form, desirable though it was, was impossible to replicate. Geography, population dispersion and other factors made recruitment from a broader base necessary. Thus, the regiment itself became the basis on which the bonds of friendship and loyalty were formed between strangers. Although initially men naturally joined regiments from their own regions, over time this became impractical and new recruits from across the country





were integrated into different regiments. Paradoxically, this did not weaken the Regimental System as anticipated but strengthened it thus proving the flexibility of the system and, at the same time, making regiments truly Canadian. New recruits quickly became part of their regiments. They not only accepted new hat badges and the accoutrements that identified them as part of the regiment, but they also learned its traditions and acquired its attitudes, mannerisms and regimental pride.

It was intended that once joined, a soldier would stay with his regiment throughout his career. Some did, but often circumstances necessitated change. In war, the Army introduced new regiments that needed experienced soldiers, and units exchanged troops as they went into or left the front lines. In peacetime, too, the Army expanded and contracted often based only on political expediency as opposed to

a realistic assessment of the threat. As an example, our corps grew from two to four regular regiments in the fifties, added a fifth in the sixties, lost one in the seventies and another recently. It's interesting to note that Canada, as compared to the British, chose not to amalgamate regiments. I well recall the hiatus in 1970 when soldiers in three regiments changed badges at the same time because of the end of unit rotation to Europe. This was a most difficult time for the Regimental System and those in it. All of these moves were costly both in terms of money and morale, but somehow the system survived. A case can be made that our Regimental System became stronger because of these upheavals; strength through adversity.

Our regiments have also seen their roles and organizations changed over the years. They went from horse to vehicle, tank to recce, tracks to wheels and

combinations thereof. As well, organizationally they varied in the size of troops and number of squadrons. These changes were all taken in stride by officers, NCMs and men. It was the Regimental System that provided the strength, flexibility and continuity to accept these changes while maintaining morale and the essential esprit de corps.

I enjoyed all the regiments in which I served (I changed badges four times during my career). In retirement, I belong to their associations and attend reunions where I enjoy the camaraderie and fellowship of our unique profession with those I have soldiered over the years. The feeling of family, of being cared for and caring in return is an experience unique to the profession of arms, and is personified in the Regimental System.

It's ironic that in 1997 the Minister decided to take steps to ensure that all army personnel properly appreciate the balance between loyalty to one's regiment and the necessary broader loyalty to the Canadian Forces as a whole. For me, and I believe thousands of others that I served with in the Corps, the matter of our loyalty was never in question. It was never "balanced" or divided. We were loyal to the regiment in which we served. In turn, the regiment was loyal to the Army and the Canadian forces.

I'm sure that many and varied opinions of the Regimental System will be presented herein, and these will be interesting and worthy of consideration. But in the end, I am convinced that the Regimental System will remain as the very foundation of our Corps, and the Army will continue to adapt the regiment as appropriate in preparation for the next war.

**Major General (Ret) Clive Milner,**  
OMM, MSC, CD



# The Regimental System – A Double-Edged Weapon

by LCol C.M. Fletcher, CD



**Lieutenant Colonel Craig Fletcher is the Commandant of the Armour School. He has had the pleasure of serving in three regiments – 12<sup>th</sup> RBC as a Troop Leader, RCD as Battle Captain and Adjutant and finally the LdSH(RC) as a Squadron Commander.**

The Regimental System has its origins in Britain where noblemen raised regiments at their own expense to fight for the Sovereign. The Colonel was responsible for all aspects of the regiment ranging from recruiting to equipping, pay and training. Practice at the time saw regiments and soldiers recruited from the same geographical area. Over the years in Britain, of course, the practice of recruiting from a geographical area has continued despite the many changes to the regimental and army structure. The British Army has chosen to amalgamate regiments in order to preserve the traditions of several regiments. Canada, on the other hand, has chosen to retire regiments and transfer them from the Regular to the Reserve force order of battle. As a colony of Britain, the Canadian Army inherited the Regimental System. The practice of recruiting regiments from a geographical area continued in Upper Canada until a Permanent Force was established.

In today's Army, we claim to have a Regimental System still in place. Without a doubt, it is much different from the original model. We perpetuate regimental histories that originate in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, whether in Regular or Reserve Force regiments. The Regimental System has evolved differently, however, between Regular and Reserve units. Although at one time the RCD, LdSH (RC), 12 RBC and 8 CH recruited geographically, over time they became national units drawing on all of Canada for their recruit population. The very nature of Militia Regiments, however, necessitates a geographical recruiting base. Consequently, Militia Regiments are far more localized in their manning and, in many ways, closer to their communities.

Like many traditions, there are benefits and drawbacks to the Regimental System as we know it in Canada today. We have chosen to retain it for some specific reasons: the primary benefit is seen to be perpetuating the "Regimental

Family." Through the regimental family we are able to foster esprit-de-corps that has allowed us to be successful in operations over the years. Through the regimental family we are able to control the careers of our officers and NCMs and see that they are employed in concert with their career, personal and service needs. Through the extended family of the regiment (including retired members, Colonels of the Regiment and ERE members) the needs of its soldiers can be cared for. This net of communication can be used to gather information of value to the regiment, or to influence decisions that affect the regiment.

The positive characteristics of the Regimental System can best be described as care of its officers and soldiers, maintenance of regimental traditions, and a source of morale. These benefits exist in spite of the Canadian Regimental System's transition over the years from locally recruited to national units. Over the past 20 years I have been in a position to see various regiments demonstrate and benefit from the best aspects of the Regimental System. It is perhaps surprising to note a similar approach undertaken by all of our Regular Force regiments. They all value regimental traditions nurture the Regimental family and use the system to develop and sustain the necessary traits a regiment needs to be effective in operations.

The very nature of the Regimental System and the focus on its own interests can also be the downfall of the system. Where regimental interests are in conflict with those of the Brigade,



***By and large, the Regimental System, albeit adapted from its 18<sup>th</sup> century origins to suit the needs and times of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, has served Canada extremely well through peace and war.***

Corps, Area or Army, parochialism can then become a force which can consume a great deal of time and effort and can be counter-productive if allowed to fester unchecked. The Regimental System is at the root of our successes in operations but, if not managed wisely, can lead to a closing of ranks in defence of its members when times are difficult. One can argue that it is the worst features of the Regimental System that led the Airborne Regiment, or some of its elements, to close ranks and remain silent following its Somalia tour in 1994. Here we saw a complicated interaction between infantry regimental cultures clashing with the Airborne culture. Actions were taken in the belief that the honour of the regiment was being preserved but was done at the cost of honesty, integrity and justice for offenders. Operational effectiveness was obviously not enhanced. Here,

we saw some of the negative traits of the Regimental System in practice. Parochialism, shirking of responsibility, and self-service before the mission, were all at work. The results of this are well known and this destructive effect is an extreme example of the negative potential of the Regimental System with the wrong motives at work.

The characteristics of the Regimental System can also be seen at Corps level. This is due, in part, to the small size of the Regular Force component of the Corps and the number of crewmen, officers and soldiers, that have served in more than one regiment. This has allowed the Corps to maintain an effective oversight on its members and to ensure they are employed in concert with regimental, Corps and army interests in mind. Some have advocated adapting the Regimental System to employ it at Corps level due to

the small size of the Corps, previous examples of officers and NCOs posted between regiments and wholesale rebadging of regiments on occasion. My answer to this is "how would it improve the operational effectiveness of the army?" After all, this is what we are all about and I see no benefit to a change from the current system. Indeed, I see every reason to retain the status quo, to preserve the system as it is and to make it work for the good of each regiment and the army.

So, what do we make of our current system and where should we steer it in the future? By and large, the Regimental System, albeit adapted from its 18th century origins to suit the needs and times of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, has served Canada extremely well through peace and war. There is no apparent need to make drastic changes to it as long as it continues to contribute to the success of the army and continues to be the source of pride and tradition that regiments draw upon to build and sustain their operational capability. It behooves all RCAC and Regimental leaders to understand the merits of the Regimental System and to use its merits to the best advantage of Regiments, the Corps and the Army. Likewise, we must understand some of the pitfalls that can be encountered and avoid them at all costs. ■



# The Demise of the Regimental System and the Reorganization of the Infantry

**WO1 BM Shaw PARA**

*This article is reprinted by permission from the British Army Review, Number 116, August 1997. While the article deals with the infantry regiments of the British Army, it shows the hidden side of the debate concerning the Regimental System in the country that started that same system centuries ago. – Editor*

**“It is the nature of man as he grows older... to protest against change, particularly change for the better.”  
John Steinbeck**

As a soldier of today I am, as with many others, a product of the Regimental System and I can say that as such I am proud of my Regiment and its short but glorious history. Having said that I have for some time been a keen advocate of a change to a Corps of Infantry. My reasons for this are laid out below, with a possible suggestion for the new structure.

## HISTORY

As a person who takes a great deal of interest in military history, I am well aware of the origins from which the Regimental System has developed. It goes without saying that the system has stood the Army in good stead for the last three hundred years, the question is how relevant is it now and in the future? With digitization and the arrival of new doctrine and tactics, will it be a help or hinder the ability of the Army to reorganize and fight a major war, however remote that may seem?

## TODAY

The Regimental System was devised at a time when the population was less mobile than it is today. It was not uncommon for a person, even up to the 1950s, not to travel more than 30 miles

from his home in his entire life, and joining the local regiment was the obvious thing to do. This was perpetuated by National Service, but since its demise the system has become less relevant. Today the population is more fluid, people move where the work can be found, travel is a norm and not the mystery it once was. The system was devised at a time when to travel abroad was extremely rare whereas now to fly to Spain is considered commonplace – allowing for Spanish air traffic control.

The British Army of today is, as it has usually been in peacetime, a small professional body, composed of long term regular soldiers. The army is however, in my opinion, now too small to support a system of regiments, and the Infantry element should move forward to a Corps structure consisting of a number of Regular and Territorial battalions numbered consecutively. The same applies, to a lesser degree, to the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC), the Royal Artillery (RA) and the Royal Engineers (RE).

Young people today rarely arrive at a recruiting office with any idea of the corps or regiment they would like to join. Many end up in the regiment or corps of the first recruiter they meet in the office. The present Army system is confusing to those that have been in it for years. No wonder we win wars – no enemy intelligence service would ever make sense of the British Army. “*What is the difference between*

*a Engineer Regiment and an Infantry Division or a Division of Infantry?”* The Army has developed into a organization that is rarely understood by those that work within it, let alone those that would wish to join.

Recent “*Options*” reductions to the Army, and the amalgamations of many of the infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments have left many within these units with little or no real love for the regiments into which they have been thrown. The system is an anathema to most of those that serve within it.

With the approaching millennium, the BOWMAN (radio system) and digitization programs, the Army must look forward to the way in which it can best utilize the advances these new technologies can provide. The digitization of the battlefield has been described as “the greatest leap forward since the invention of the breech block”, yet the army is still stuck with a system of regimental dogma that has yet to be dragged kicking and screaming out of the 19th Century, let alone into the 21<sup>st</sup>.

## THE RESTRUCTURED INFANTRY

Given that this article is written by an infantryman it is structured around the Infantry, but the content applies equally to other arms and services. Soldiers being what they are they will still want, as they always have, to serve



HQ Infantry				
Southern Division	Northern Division	Union Division	Armoured Division	Light Division
Regular				
1 Bn	7 Bn	13 Bn (Scottish)	20 Bn (AI)	26 Bn (Para)
2 Bn	8 Bn	14 Bn (Scottish)	21 Bn (AI)	27 Bn (Para)
3 Bn	9 Bn	15 Bn (Scottish)	22 Bn (AI)	28 Bn (Para)
4 Bn	10 Bn	16 Bn (Scottish)	23 Bn (AI)	29 Bn (Light)
5 Bn	11 Bn	17 Bn (Welsh)	24 Bn (AI)	30 Bn (Light)
6 Bn	12 Bn	18 Bn (Welsh)	25 Bn (AI)	31 Bn (Light)
		19 Bn (Irish)		32 Bn (Marine)
				33 Bn (Marine)
				34 Bn (Marine)
Territorial				
35 Bn	44 Bn	54 Bn (Scottish)		61 Bn (Para)
36 Bn	45 Bn	55 Bn (Scottish)		62 Bn (Para)
37 Bn	46 Bn	56 Bn (Scottish)		63 Bn (Light)
38 Bn	47 Bn	57 Bn (Scottish)		64 Bn (Light)
39 Bn	48 Bn	58 Bn (Welsh)		
40 Bn	49 Bn	59 Bn (Welsh)		
41 Bn	50 Bn	60 Bn (Irish)		
42 Bn	51 Bn			
43 Bn	52 Bn			
	53 Bn			

Figure 1

with people of a like mind and character. It would be unreasonable to expect a Scottish soldier to be put into a melting pot along with soldiers from London or the South West, so the Infantry would still to a degree have to be formed on a regional basis. A possible solution to this challenge will be covered later.

My proposal is the Infantry should be organised as a corps, with its thirty

four Regular and thirty Territorial battalions numbered from 1 to 64 consecutively. This represents a reduction in the number of infantry battalions; the reasons for this will be explained later.

The numbering of these battalions is for someone else to determine, but it need not necessarily follow the present regimental order of precedence – however, for die-hards any divergence may be unacceptable.

The Royal Marines should be included in the Corps of Infantry (that should start an argument), as for too long they have lived in isolation, and are in essence just infantry battalions, with a specialised role.

If on balance, after investigation, the best place for the Armoured Infantry (Mechanised Infantry equipped with Warrior) is as part of the RAC, then for the betterment of the Army as a whole, that is where they should go.



Shown in Figure 1 is a possible structure including the Territorial Army.

Headquarters Infantry, with the Director of Infantry, would remain much as it does now, with the Divisional Lieutenant Colonel sitting, sometimes, in HQ Inf as now with his responsibility unchanged. Recruiting, retention and promotion being the responsibility of the division. Officers and soldiers would be posted or promoted from within a specific division and could be posted to any of the battalions within that division, where a vacancy appeared. The Light and Armoured Infantry Divisions would recruit UK wide.

The Light Division would consist of the specialist infantry battalions in the

Airborn Bde (Bn (Para)), Air Mobile Bde (Bn (Light)), and Commando Bde (Bn (Marine)). Officers and soldiers could join straight into these battalions, recruiting from all over the UK or join them from other battalions of the Corps on attachments, having successfully completed the specialist training or selection.

The above applies equally to the Armoured Division, who can promote and post between their battalions where the vacancies occur.

This will present a problem in some battalions, such as the 19 Bn (Irish), as they only have one battalion to play with but their personnel can always apply to serve with the Armoured or Light Inf Divisions.

### INFANTRY TRAINING

The present structure of training in the army with Phase 1 at Army Training Regiments (ATR) and Phase 2 at Infantry Training Centre (ITC) Catterick need not change. The system produces the trainees that the infantry require and is ideally organised to cope with the proposed change. Similarly Phase 3 training at the various ITCs need not change fundamentally. The infantry courses that are at present taught within the Army Individual Training Organization (AITO) will not change.




Figure 2 - Generic Infantry Battalion



## BATTALION ORGANISATION

The reduction in the number of infantry battalions will allow the long standing desire to have four rifle companies per battalion to be realised (Figure 2). Each rifle company will be able to work as an independent group for short periods of time, using the support weapons organic to the company. These companies must be flexible and able to join together to form composite battalions, for this they require SOPs that are standard across the Corps. The problems that the Army has at present during regrouping are manifest and must be addressed. This is because the army as a whole does not direct Commanding Officers as to the organisation of their units, but only suggests, and then leaves it up to them. Standard procedures and drills must be developed – this is not to stifle initiative, but to enable regrouping to take place with the minimum of problems.

Armoured infantry battalions would follow the same generic organisation, taking the fourth companies from the disbanded battalions, and any spare Warrior vehicles would be used to produce Command and Mortar variants so desperately needed, so as to rid these battalions of the FV 432.

The Battalion Commander will still have a Mortar and Anti-tank Platoon, for general support on the battlefield and under his command. These enhancements will allow the Commander to maintain a reserve at all times.

Command Coy will include all those elements that work for the battalion in command and support missions. Admin Coy will contain all those assets that sustain the battalion in the achievement of its mission.

## PROTECTED MOBILITY

All line infantry battalions should be provided with a wheeled APC thereby provided them with a modicum of protected mobility. There are a number of these available from around the world that could be produced under licence in the UK (GKN Defence already produced the Mowag Piranha) but heaven preserve us from the Saxon! An example of the kind of vehicle is shown in Figure 3. To equip the line battalions of the regular army would require approximately 1,600 light armoured vehicles. (15 per rifle coy plus Bn HQ, Mortar and Atk Pl), say 70 per battalion.

These APCs would equip three of the four rifle companies, the fourth being carried in unarmoured vehicles. This

should leave sufficient APCs to equip one of the three specialist battalions in the specialist brigades.

As an aspiration this is probably a pipe dream but must be given thought.

This would provide the framework for the formation of two Mechanised Infantry Divisions, an Armoured Division and a Light Infantry Division (composed of the Specialist Brigades), obviously these are all arms organisations, (organisational Divisions not Divisions of Infantry).

This would enable the line battalions to take over much of the UN/IFOR Peace Support Operations presently performed by the overworked armoured infantry battalions.





## DRESS

The corps would have one set of dress regulation, based on the Combat Soldier 95, thereby achieving standardisation of dress across the corps, and hopefully across the army. There would be certain differences in head dress, the Scottish battalions would wear the TOS as now, Para, Light and Marine, Maroon, Bottle Green and Green respectively, the line infantry and armoured infantry and armoured infantry battalions would wear Khaki. But all would wear the same cap badge, that of the Corps of Infantry. It would be hoped that this could be extended across the whole army, so as to do away with the plethora of different and costly items of clothing that the army has to purchase. Why cannot all the RAC wear the same cap badge and the same uniform?

## REGIMENTAL/ CORPS HISTORY

The history of British infantry has been long and glorious, from the creation of the new Model Army during the Civil War, through Marlborough and the Napoleonic Wars, to the performance

of the Infantry in the Gulf War. Soldiers of the corps should be encouraged to take an interest in the history of the Infantry as a whole and not the specifics of individual regiments. Certain days could be set aside as "Corps Days": Minden, Waterloo, the Somme and D-Day for example, as these stand out in the general history of the Infantry. This could equally be applied to the other corps of the Army.

## UNIT ORGANISATION


As mentioned earlier the bewildering array of organisations that make up the Army must be reorganised.

The main reason for these organisations is historical, with little to do with utility or the war fighting capability of the army. Unit organisation across the army should be standardised, with Platoon, Company, and Battalion replacing the mixture of Platoon - Troop - Section, Company - Battery - Squadron. Battalion - Regiment and its associated confusion. Why call a Signal Regiment a regiment when it is a battalion? The same applies to the RAC and the RE.

## RANKS

The same applies to the rank structure of the army. Let's standardise on Private, Lance Corporal, Corporal, Sergeant, Staff Sergeant and so on. Within the infantry alone for the rank of private you could read Guardsman, Fusilier, Kingsman and Rifleman. If you include the other arms you get Sapper, Trooper, Gunner, and Signaller. Let's standardise and get rid of historical and bizarre ranks which mean nothing in today's society - the adage that the Army protects society and not reflects it, does not apply.

## CONCLUSION

This article was written as a way of stimulating a constructive argument about the future of the Army and the Infantry in particular. The future of the Army and the developments, such as digitization, must not be diluted by sticking doggedly to a system that is no longer valid. There is an adage that says that he who forgets the mistakes of the past is bound to repeat them, but this is not an excuse for living in the past. We must take the time to analyse the best way forward for the Army as a whole, and if this means replacing the present system for the good of the Army, then let's think about it. I am sure that I should have written this under a pseudonym as I am probably letting myself in for plenty of flak, but if it sparks someone into life to think about this then I have achieved my aim. 

From: BRITISH ARMY REVIEW  
NUMBER 116, AUGUST 1997

***There is an adage that says that he who forgets the mistakes of the past is bound to repeat them, but this is not an excuse for living in the past. We must take the time to analyse the best way forward for the Army as a whole, and if this means replacing the present system for the good of the Army, then let's think about it***





## The Regimental System – A Reservist's View

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*Lieutenant Colonel Murray joined the 1<sup>st</sup> Hussars at the age of sixteen. He has been the Commanding Officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> Hussars since 1996. Lieutenant Colonel Murray graduated from the University of Western Ontario with degrees in History and Kinesiology in 1976. Lieutenant Colonel Murray is employed as a high school teacher in London, Ontario.*

The Regimental System has been the saviour of the military in Canada. In the modern, post cold war era, units do not have a proper budget, a good pay system, training opportunities or equipment upon which to train. This is especially true of the Reserve. In the Militia, the soldiers "vote with their feet". The question is why don't they leave? The answer is the Regimental System.

The Regimental System is important to the Regular Force, but it is even more important to the Reserves. The Regimental System has very deep roots in the Reserves. Families have served for generations and it is not uncommon to have members of a single family serving a unit, in their community, over the course of fifty years or more. Sons, and now daughters, are following in the footsteps of their fathers and grandfathers. This will continue as long as the Regimental System is kept intact.

The history of the local regiment is inextricably intertwined with the history of the town, city, or county. Many regiments can link their founding to the settlement of their community and some can even trace their roots to well before Confederation.

Therefore, when a regiment is threatened, the whole community responds. This has been demonstrated time and time again. Because regiments have their roots in the community, local politicians listen. In this respect, Reserve regiments have more support and political influence than their Regular Force counterparts.

In the Regular Force, a recruit joins the Army, chooses a Trade, completes their training and then is assigned to a regiment. In the Reserve, the recruit joins the Regiment first and the Army second. As a result, fierce loyalty to the Regiment is instilled into the recruits and this is the strength

of the Regimental System. When soldiers are not paid, not given training opportunities or not properly equipped, there has to be a reason why these soldiers continue to parade. The leadership often says to the soldiers "the Regiment needs you", or "it is for the good of the Regiment." Invariably the soldiers respond. How else can one explain why soldiers give up holidays, vacations, or make other personal sacrifices to serve? The sacrifices that the soldiers make to the Regiment motivate the leadership to improve training and to ensure the welfare of their subordinates. The soldiers see this and continue to believe in the Regiment so the cycle continues.


Looking at the historical performance of the Reserve Regiments, one has to agree that they predominantly fought the battles that won World Wars One and Two. Furthermore, many of Canada's best Generals emerged from



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
the Reserve Regimental System including Generals Sir Arthur Currie, Matthews and Hoffmeister. In his book *"The Generals"*, Dr. Granatstein (acclaimed Canadian military historian and current director of the National War Museum) points out that in World War Two, 60% of all division commanders, 75% of all brigade commanders and 90% of all commanding officers were produced by the Reserve Regimental System. Even today the Reserve Regiments are still producing top quality soldiers.

The Regimental System is not perfect, but it works. Many Americans have commented how they wished they had a Regimental System. The one organization in the United States that has incorporated many aspects of the Regimental System is the United States Marine Corps. It is no accident that their members exhibit a fierce loyalty, dedication and ownership. They believe that they are unique and the best. Such is the belief of all regiments. Pride, loyalty, ownership and a sense of family all contribute to make the system one that works.





# Reconciling the Regimental System with the Battle Group Concept – A Heretics Point of View



*Captain Zenon Drebot is currently serving on Regimental Duty as the Battle Captain for B Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), a Leopard tank Squadron.*

## INTRODUCTION

*"It is therefore to be noted as a principle that, all other things being equal, the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other. Lacking these things, though they may be well-trained soldiers, they are not likely to adhere unless danger has so surrounded them that they must do so in order to survive, and even then, quick surrender is the more probable result."*

In his book *Men Against Fire*, S.L.A. Marshall points out that the one common and critical difference historically between units who fought heroically and those that did not was the level of cohesion and close uniting comradeship

that existed at all levels within the unit. Those units that trained, played and socialized together extensively were far more likely to pass the test of combat, particularly when faced with it for the first time.<sup>2</sup>

In today's Canadian Army, the application of the Regimental System and the way in which we actually conduct operations is inconsistent and establishes the very conditions which Marshall warns will lead to failure on the battlefield. In short, Garrison life finds us organized into our separate Regiments and Battalions, while in the field we recombine into combat teams and battle groups. This constant regrouping establishes a barrier preventing soldiers from gaining the intimate knowledge of their subordinates, peers and superiors which Marshall deems so vital to combat effectiveness.

It is true that we have overcome this problem in the past. Through the judicious application of ample training time each soldier would start with individual skills and work up through crew, troop, squadron, combat team and finally battle group training. Through this time-consuming process, the soldier would develop an intimate understanding of his subordinates, peers and superiors which manifested itself as unit cohesion.

That this is no longer the case is clear. Given budgetary and personnel pressures, current exercises are short, sharp and provide limited scope for building the detailed knowledge of one's Commanding Officer (with the exception of the one wearing the same cap badge as yourself, of course!) before being regrouped under someone else's command.

Given these facts, we are now clearly in danger of realizing the situation put forward in the opening quote to this article. We lack the knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other at anything higher than our own Squadron, Company or Battery. We continue to espouse the doctrine of combined arms operations, yet we are still fundamentally entrenched in our separate arms.



***We continue to espouse the doctrine of combined arms operations, yet we are still fundamentally entrenched in our separate arms.***

## AIM

The aim of this article is to therefore detail the arguments for the rationalization of the Regimental System and the battle group concept.

## THE BATTLE GROUP

"All army training must be designed with the underlying aim of developing force cohesion and providing soldiers with the personal will for victory. To this end, training must emphasize all-arms co-operation..."<sup>3</sup> Within the army, this policy is reflected in the employment of combat forces in a battle group/combat team environment.

In addition to being part of Canadian army doctrine, this concept addresses the requirements of operational readiness and effectiveness as set forth in CFP 300. A battle group is multi-purpose and combat capable, extremely versatile, mobile, self-sufficient (for a limited time) and sustainable as well as providing the framework within which effective planning and staff processes can be carried out.<sup>4</sup> As such, this concept is clearly the way ahead for the army.

## THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

"Institutionally, Canada's army is organized on a corps/branch and regimental basis commonly known as the Regimental System. This is a time-proven method of military organization whose antecedents date back to the Roman legions and even earlier. The Regimental System is of critical importance to the army as it is within the regiment or branch that the military ethos is most visibly embodied and practiced. Its utility and value further lies in the strong sense of comradeship it fosters among members of a regiment and in its tribal/familial nature which bonds soldiers in devotion, loyalty and selflessness to each other, contributing powerfully to unit cohesion."<sup>5</sup>

Having been "raised" in the Regimental System and received what I believe to be full value in the experience, I cannot doubt that this "effective, proven system that balances the hierarchical requirements and human forces in a combination that produces cohesive warfighting units"<sup>6</sup> can and should endure. Indeed, as illustrated in the paragraph above, the Regimental System is firmly entrenched in the keystone document for the Canadian army.<sup>7</sup>

## THE COMMANDING OFFICER

At the heart of the Regimental System is the Commanding Officer. "Commanding Officers occupy, arguably, the most important and influential position of command in the Canadian army. This is because units are where the military ethos is most visibly manifested and applied in the army. The unit is also where the army's moral and physical components demonstrably come together,

the battalion or regiment being the crucible in which combat potential is transformed into combat power."<sup>8</sup>

It is the Commanding Officer who, through personal example and leadership, can inspire the unit under his/her command to succeed in difficult circumstances. History is replete with examples of the achievements (and failures) this one key person can engineer when given the loyalty, trust and confidence of his/her subordinates. "When soldiers are known by their Commanding Officer who at the same time leads and inspires them by personal example, this shapes their fighting spirit, instills cohesion, engenders superior will and, ultimately, can enable them to achieve what might otherwise be considered impossible."<sup>9</sup>

However, as pointed out by Marshall in his book, this degree of leadership is only possible when it is "...based upon intimate understanding between officers and men rather than upon familiarity between them, on self-respect rather than on fear, and above all, on a close uniting comradeship."<sup>10</sup> Marshall goes further to say that this intimate understanding can only be built over time through shared experience; it cannot be simply commanded into existence.

## CURRENT TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

With current budgetary restraints placed upon the military along with real 'quality of life' issues, we no longer have the luxury of deploying into the field for months on end to conduct required training. Exercises today are short, extremely intense and focus on relatively limited training



objectives when compared to exercises of only seven or eight years ago. During EXERCISE RENDEVOUS 1992 we spent in excess of 60 days in the field conducting various levels and degrees of combined arms training, both on the offence and defence.<sup>11</sup>

By comparison, the recent Brigade concentration EXERCISE PRAIRIE RAM 1998 consisted of 24 days (not counting maintenance and deployment days) during which we practiced only combat team and battle group advances (albeit both dry and live).<sup>12</sup> EXERCISE TOTAL RAM 1999, the Brigade spring deployment planned for April and May of this year, has a mere 20 days of combined operations scheduled!<sup>13</sup>

This situation is not likely to get any better. As it is unlikely that additional funding will be provided to the Department of National Defence to cover the attendant costs of implementing all 89 SCONDVA recommendations, it follows that money for actual warfighting training will inevitably become harder to find.

This then is the crux of the problem. In garrison, where we now spend most of our time, we develop an intimate knowledge of our fellow Regimental or Battalion soldiers (subordinates, peers and superiors alike) through a work and social environment which thrusts us together. However, immediately upon deployment on exercise, we regroup along battle group lines. Particularly for the Armoured Regiment of the Brigade, this usually means falling under the command of a virtual stranger whom we do not have the time nor the inclination to get to know to the level which Marshall deems so critical for success in battle.

## SOLUTIONS

How then do we overcome this problem which historically has been shown to be key in a unit's effectiveness under fire? We cannot allocate more field training time, which historically has been our way of dealing with this issue, as cost and quality of life issues prevent it. The common sense necessity of deploying combined arms teams to the battlefield prevents us from suicidally thrusting a single arm into battle.

Essentially, two possible solutions present themselves. First, more training time in garrison can be allocated to combined arms training and a greater degree of socialization between various units can be engineered (particularly in a combined mess as is the case on most bases now). The number of TEWTS, JANUS exercises and the like can be increased and focussed more on the combined arms team. Brigade mess dinners, combined happy hours and other social events emanating from the various messes can be increased to provide for the socialization aspect.

Unfortunately this solution creates as many problems as it solves. It continues to perpetuate both the Regiment and Battalion as parallel but separate from the battle group. It does very little to address the problem of sub-unit commanders and soldiers having to deal with multiple Commanding Officers. Finally, given the already crowded nature of both our training and social calendars (driven as they are by Regimental or Battalion imperatives), it is doubtful that sufficient time can be found for the additional training and socialization required. Reduce the amount of time for Regimental/Battalion activities

in favour of the battle group sufficiently and you will reduce the effectiveness of the Regimental System.

This therefore leads to the second and (admittedly) far more radical solution. Essentially, the Regiment/Battalion and the battle group would become one. Serving permanently under one Commanding Officer would be elements of all arms established as a permanent battle group. Perpetuating Regimental/Battalion identities would be armoured squadrons, infantry companies, engineer squadrons et al, all wearing the same cap badge.

The requirements of both the Regimental System and the battle group would thus be reconciled to the advantage of both. Within the normal work and social environment inherent in a Regiment or Battalion, the problem of gaining intimate knowledge of subordinates, peers and superiors would largely be alleviated. In particular the trust, knowledge and confidence in the Commanding Officer would be much easier to develop, as would the Commanding Officer's own knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of his/her own subordinates. A unit so configured would arrive at the field already having achieved a high degree of cohesiveness which would translate into better use of limited training time.

This concept is not without its own problems. First and foremost is our innate resistance to giving up the 'one arm' organizations which we have been brought up in and are so steeped in history and convention. Replacing my own cap badge under which I have served the bulk of my military life would be difficult to say the least. What would be even more difficult



would be replacing this symbol with one which may not have any history along the lines of my own Corps.

Secondly, it would be difficult to manage the career, work and physical requirements of what would be a very diverse organization. How would the job of an armoured battle captain compare to that of a company second-in-command? Does everyone in the unit have to attain the same physical standards? Where are my tanks going to park?

Finally, the permanent grouping into battle groups would reduce to a certain extent the flexibility which we currently enjoy with 'ad-hoc' units. As it currently stands, the Brigade Commander can tailor a battle group to the mission with great detail, mixing and matching sub-units to arrive at the correct balance.

However, each of these three problems have solutions which, although they may be difficult, are achievable. Knitting more time to allow the first proposed solution to succeed is not. Specifically, the reorganization resistance would be dealt with over time, with those of us currently serving

gradually being replaced with new blood who would know nothing but the battle group and hence would have no problems with allegiance. In terms of management, our units already deal with diverse elements such as maintainers, clerks, supply technicians and signalers (not to mention tanks, light track of several flavours, trucks and wheeled personnel carriers) – it would require no more than a broadening of our horizons. Finally, the loss of flexibility would be insignificant when compared to the greater degree of unit cohesiveness which would eventually follow. In the final analysis, permanent battle groups could still be tailored for a specific mission through attachments/detachments, although the frequency and extent of these changes would be significantly reduced from current practice.

## CONCLUSION

Reduced training time, greater knowledge and trust of subordinates, peers and superiors in the combined arms team, enhanced and inherent cohesiveness and the complete reconciliation of the Regimental System with the battle group concept. Clearly the factors favour the reorganization into


permanent battle groups under one Commanding Officer. The question is whether we have the collective courage to attempt a solution which promises so much short-term pain for very long-term gain.

## Footnotes

1. Marshall, S. *Men Against Fire*, The Benning Herald, p 150.
2. Ibid, pp 148-150.
3. B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee*, April 1998, pp 41-42.
4. Ibid, pp 93-95.
5. Ibid, pp 43-44.
6. Zaporzan, Major LJ, *The Regimental System*, Armour Bulletin Volume 31 Number 1, 1998, p 36.
7. B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee*, April 1998, pp 43-44.
8. Ibid, p 51.
9. Ibid.
10. Marshall, S. *Men Against Fire*, The Benning Herald, p155.
11. LdSH(RC) Regimental Training Plan 1991/1992.
12. LdSH(RC) Regimental Training Plan 1997/1998.
13. LdSH(RC) Regimental Training Plan 1998/1999.

# Reform of the Regimental System

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*Captain Chris Bradley is currently serving on Regimental Duty as the Battle Captain of A Squadron, Armoured Cavalry Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).*

Traditionally British regiments were tied to a location and recruit most of their soldiers from a particular county or area. Often this link is reflected in the name of the regiment (i.e. The Devon and Dorsetshire Regiment). Highland regiments were similar in this in that they were recruited from within the clan itself; an entity that is also tied to a location. During the Napoleonic Wars the Duchess of Gordon recruited men with a kiss and a guinea, while the Countess Elizabeth was slightly more pragmatic: "She imposed a form of conscription that would have won Bonaparte's approval. She called for a census of her tenants and sub-tenants, and when this was done five hundred able-bodied young men among them were told that service in the Sutherland Highlanders would be a test of their loyalty to King George III. Though parents may have grumbled bitterly about the loss of a son and the loss of their tenancy, the young men went willingly enough."<sup>2</sup> When this failed there was always trickery to be used by slipping a shilling into a pint of beer that few self-respecting prospects would refuse.

To a lesser degree local recruitment has also been the case with Canadian regiments, and is still the case with reserve regiments. The reserve component of the Canadian Army reflects the traditional mustering of the regiment

## FOREWORD

It is not my intention in this article to deliver a complete history of the Canadian Army's regimental system or its present state. I will touch on all of these topics in so far their relevance will not cloud the issue. The topic of reviewing the Canadian Army's regimental system has been popularised by recent political scrutiny, the Somalia Affair and by questionable military "experts". This is not a popular topic within the army and any changes that are adopted will be both unpopular and difficult to enforce. My hope in this paper is to answer the question on whether or not reform of the regimental system is required or even desirable.

## INTRODUCTION

The word regiment means the: "Permanent recruiting and training unit of an army usually commanded by (Lieutenant) Colonel and divided into several companies, troops or batteries and often into two or more battalions; operational unit of artillery, tanks, armoured cars, etc."<sup>1</sup> It is derived from the Latin *regimentum* to rule. The history of the Canadian Army is closely linked to that of the British Army and some of our regiments were not raised in Canada at all, but by loyalists in the Colonies that were to eventually become the United States of America. It is this link with the British Army that has established the basis of the Canadian Army's regimental system.



in that they are restricted to recruiting from within their own geographic boundaries. Often reserve regiments conduct recruiting drives in schools and through local newspapers. This has kept intact vital links to Canadian communities and gives the Canadian Armed Forces exposure where potentially it would have none. The local or provincial character of regiments has also been reflected at various times in the names of some Canadian regiments such as the Prince Edward Island Regiment or The King's Own Calgary Regiment. Many of these regiments still reflect this strong community association through their location, recruiting and ceremonial activities.

Regular Force soldiers are not recruited locally by their regiment. As we are all aware a potential recruit must approach a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre and apply for enrolment. It is not until the recruit is undergoing his training in the Royal Canadian Armour Corps School that regimental designation is assigned. The tradition of regiments recruiting their own is no longer a factor for the regular army, however, all of the regular regiments to a degree have adopted a certain regional flavour and although no regiment is as closely tied to a city or county as may have formerly been the case, they are certainly associated with their province, region or language.

## ARGUMENT

Anyone reading this will likely be aware of the plethora of recent scandals that have affected the Canadian Army. Because of these scandals some politicians and defence critics have called for a review of the regimental system. In my opinion this a move born of a political agenda which casts its arrows at the wrong target. I would submit

that in the army it has been the regimental structure that has maintained the integrity and morale to the level that it still possesses. Many believe that regimental loyalties have had a detrimental effect upon the RCAC, and that in the larger arena they have adversely affected the army. I do not hold to this opinion. The Regiment is the glue that bonds a group of soldiers together, gives it a tradition and is the foundation of our pride. These loyalties are not easily established, impossible to remove and not transferable to a number. It is only through the soldier's belief in the Regiment and their leadership within it that we have not suffered gross desertion to civilian life.

With the recent withdrawal of troops from Germany, the removal of the 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) from the regular order of battle and the re-distribution of tanks across the Armoured Corps, there is little scope or reason for soldiers and officers to move from one regiment to another in order to be exposed to tanks, foreign armies etc. Thus, once soldiers are posted to a regiment they can now reasonably expect to remain with that regiment for the duration of their careers. This should benefit the system overall in that soldiers will no longer be moved from one regiment to another and will strengthen pride in his Regiment. Soldiers can now reasonably expect protracted postings in one geographic location with all the benefits to themselves, their spouses, children and quality of life.

What would reform of the army's regimental system look like? In order to abolish the regimental system as it now exists and replace it with a system of numbered battalions is as simple as saying that the Royal Canadian Dragoons are now the 1<sup>st</sup> Tk Bn. In order for this change to have any real

impact, and not just be the RCD in all but name, the Regiment would have to be dispersed among the battalions and reformed with no more than one third being former Dragoons. This policy implemented throughout the Armoured Corps and the remainder of the army would render the army incapable of mounting missions during the regrouping of the battalions, destroy unit cohesion that has been built over decades and erode the army's traditions. Any such move would be chaotic and fiscally irresponsible. More to the point, during the First World War many regiments of the Canadian Expeditionary Force were only given numbers and not names. These numbered regiments adopted names and traditions for themselves and are now the regiments that we know today. If this system was ineffective in wartime its chances of success now are not much better than nil.

## CONCLUSION

Whereas it is theoretically possible to abolish the regimental system in the regular army, however unwise it may be, to do so in the Reserves would strike it a mortal blow. Members of the Reserves, certainly at higher ranks, are often professionals in civilian life and do not have the opportunity to be posted away from their present location in order to join the 13<sup>th</sup> Tank Regiment. It is vital that these units remain intact in their locality for the reservist to have the opportunity to advance in rank. Further, were it not for the strong morale and esprit that is fostered by the close community of the reserve regiment, it is unlikely that many would choose to remain with a Reserve Force that is poorly equipped, under-funded and seldom given the opportunity to train beyond the most rudimentary levels.






**SOLUTIONS**

The concept of replacing our regimental system by a system of numbered battalions is at best a quick fix, and like most quick fixes it may do more damage than good. If reform is deemed desirable then it must be in the form of an educational process by which all soldiers and officers are taught to be proud of both their Regiment and the Corps. A suitable analogy that I have found in my own Regiment


is that we as members of a squadron always have a certain amount of rivalry with all the other squadrons in the Regiment, however, we are all Strathconas first and although this may not always entail the best for our squadron it ensures the best for the larger good. It is this attitude that must be taken one step higher. We must all recognise that what is good for the Corps is good for our regiments.

Perseverance. 

**Footnotes**

1. The concise Oxford dictionary of current English – 6<sup>th</sup> Ed. PE 1625 – 1976 pg 942.
2. The Highland Clearances, John Prebble, Penguin Books 1971 pg 58.

*If reform is deemed desirable then it must be in the form of an educational process by which all soldiers and officers are taught to be proud of both their Regiment and the Corps.*





# The Corps or the Regiment – That is the question

Written by Major John Frappier, CD



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No one doubts that the Canadian Forces Regimental System is tried and proven. Major Mike Rostek's essay "The Regimental System: a Timeless Concept"<sup>1</sup> supports this statement very well. However, is our application of this system right for the future? Can our Armour regiments, organised as they are, survive into the next century in this Infantry driven Army? A multitude of factors and the application of the Regimental System have forced the Armoured Corps' regular force regiments to look inward for their survival. This paper proposes to replace the present Regimental System, where three distinct regular force regiments make up the regular component of the Armoured Corps with a system in which each regiment would be but an extension of the Corps. The Corps would be composed of the First, the Second and the Fifth Armour Regiments much like the Artillery and Engineer Corps.

As we have all witnessed, over the past decade the Armoured Corps has undergone a major face-lift. It has witnessed the repatriation of its Regiment that was stationed in Germany. It saw its major competitions, Rams Head and Meritt Cup, cancelled. Its school has undergone a multitude of reorganisations and downsizing. It has seen its postings reduced to the bare minimum. All of these factors have had a direct influence on how the regiments do business. The regiments have had to look inward to maintain their tactical knowledge and skills with little focus provided by the Corps. In fact the Corps' focus is maintained only by the yearly Armoured Corps Association meetings and by informal links between the regiments. Compounding this problem has been the removal of the Corps advisors, G3 Armd and his staff, from the Land Force Staff. The erosion of the Corps influence has caused a certain implosion within its

ranks. Regiments, now more than ever, are insuring their survival with hat badge tactics where the protection of the Regiment is the main focus. Countering the threats posed by downsizing is a natural reflex nurtured by the Regimental System. However, contrary to this reflex the Regiments should look to the Corps for strength in numbers.

The Corps' flagship was traditionally the regiment in Germany. Although this regiment was primarily composed of personnel from a particular hat badge, in its ranks were also many soldiers from different regimental backgrounds. This gave the Corps a certain amount of depth. When the personnel returned to Canada, the experience they gained by working with the "overseas" Regiment was added to the common knowledge of their new Regiment. However, now that the postings within the Corps have been cut to a minimum and that the VIII CH (PL) have been removed from the regular order of battle, this exchange of experience and work ethics has been reduced to a trickle. The Regimental System as applied in this context is conducive to inbreeding where a soldier may never leave his or her Regiment, the only exceptions being a posting to the school, to recruiting or to the reserves. Hat badge politics could be greatly reduced by placing the whole Corps under one badge. This would facilitate the integration of personnel between regiments and would remove, over a period of time, the stigmas fostered



***A Regimental System based on the Corps rather than on three distinct regiments would be better adapted to allow the Corps to survive and flourish in the future.***

by the present system. There would no longer be true "Dragoons, Strathconas or Douxièmes" but rather true Armour soldiers with one focus – The Corps.

Adding to the lack of cross-pollination opportunities posed by the Regimental System is the fact that over the past decade budget restraints have forced the Armoured Corps to cancel its main competitions. I make reference here to Rams Head and Merritt Cup. Both these competitions allowed the regiments to compare their skills and knowledge in the main aspects of their trade. On a yearly basis the Corps could quantify its operational level of experience against a set standard. These competitions gave the members of the Corps the opportunity to compare notes of their methods of training. Now that these competitions have

gone the way of the dinosaur the Corps has no palpable way of comparing its regiments methods of doing business. The exchange of knowledge could come from small unit exchanges between regiments; however, this is a make due solution and a steady flow of individuals between regiments would be even more beneficial.

An argument against the solution of changing the Regimental System is that the Corps could not foster the pride and the will within its regiments for the required allegiance by its members. However, one must only look at the Artillery and the Engineers to see that this pride and allegiance is possible from its members. The Armoured Corps' size and composition closely resemble those of the

Artillery and the Engineers and there is no reason to believe that our Corps could not adopt a similar approach in the application of its Regimental System. It must be understood that the benefits of this new Regimental System would not be immediate and that we would have to wait at least a complete generation to reap its benefits.

The Regimental System has served the Corps and its regiments well. Through the years it has allowed us to overcome many difficult situations and it has been our guiding beacon. However, faced with the recent changes in the Army, we must question its pertinence and its ability in overcoming the challenges of the new millennium. A Regimental System based on the Corps rather than on three distinct regiments would be better adapted to allow the Corps to survive and flourish in the future. The members of the Corps must strive for its well-being if not the welfare of the regiments will be at risk.

#### Footnote

1. M.A. Rostek, *The Regimental System: a Timeless Concept*, (Ex New Horizons, CFCSC 1997-98).





# The Benefits of Simulation to Support Training

by Lt I. Clark, 2Lt R. Miksa, 2Lt D. Childs, 2Lt K. Mead, Tp Ldrs, B Sqn RCD



*Lieutenant Ian Clark and Second Lieutenants Ray Miksa, Dale Childs and Kevin Mead are Troop Leaders with B Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons.*

The first combat actions of most armies are usually fraught with confusion and failure. Peacetime training is rarely up to the task of preparing soldiers for battle, and even professional armies can have difficult first battles due to inexperience. One way to prepare the Armoured Corps and the Army for war is simulation. Simulation can enhance training by providing realistic force on force battle experience, which is not satisfactorily provided by the current field exercises using umpires and blank ammunition. Traditional exercises focus on meeting timings and map reading while incorporating a scripted enemy. These exercises are useful, but they are not an adequate preparation for nor representation of the modern battlefield.

Although not precisely replicating war, training simulators offer a way to fight our first battle and not have our soldiers pay for mistakes with their lives. While many see simulators as simply a low cost alternative to


field training, the aim of this article is to highlight the ways in which simulators can improve on field training, as opposed to replacing it. Field training will always be required, as the movement of tanks in the field and the replenishment required to keep them there cannot be simulated. Simulation does however, offer a means to provide realistic force on force training. This article will discuss several types of simulation systems: garrison tactical computer training and field training simulations.

***Although not precisely replicating war, training simulators offer a way to fight our first battle and not have our soldiers pay for mistakes with their lives.***

## **PART ONE – GARRISON TACTICAL COMPUTER TRAINING**

Computer technology has made available a variety of systems that enable units to conduct tactical training without actually going to the field. Systems such as JANUS and SIMNET provide low cost training without damage to either equipment or training areas.

The army has recently purchased the JANUS training simulator, currently in use at schools and operational brigades to train the leadership. JANUS



is a network of desktop computers that simulates battle with a computer rendered overhead map and individual vehicles and infantrymen. The JANUS enemy force is controlled by an individual who can be as crafty and unpredictable as any real enemy would be. At the end of the exercise the system can be used to present a detailed After Action Review to help define the key lessons learned.


JANUS is an excellent means to provide battle training to commanders and staffs above squadron level. A single individual can run a squadron in JANUS, so very few extra personnel are required to conduct valuable training for Command Post staffs. A regiment could exercise RHQ in the production and issuing of orders to the Squadron Commanders, who

would then implement the plan on the JANUS battlefield. JANUS then allows the Command Posts to practice the management of information during battle, and forces the Commander to make decisions based on what the enemy is doing.

JANUS is impressive, but it should not be viewed as a trainer for under Battle Group level. It provides only limited training value for the individual looking at the computer screen, as the primary skills required by a Troop Leader or Crew Commander are not used in JANUS. A Troop leader can benefit from JANUS training by being exposed to higher level operations, but will not face the troop level tactical problems required at that level. There is no gunnery training and the control of fire is simple. JANUS therefore

should be seen as an inexpensive way to train command post staffs, rather than a way to train lower level leaders.

Unlike JANUS, SIMNET works with each tank crew as the training audience. The SIMNET systems are linked computers and tank station simulators that allow entire crews to fight in a simulated three dimensional environment. Positions are available for each crewman and a squadron's worth of simulators can be linked together to create an electronic combat team. The chief benefit of SIMNET is its ability to provide realistic force-on-force training with ease and low cost. SIMNET can present large enemy formations with only one person having to control them. Conversely, a single tank squadron requires an entire battalion as enemy force in the field, and given



our force size this will rarely be practical. The semi-automated enemy, or SAFOR, can be set at variable skill levels and will follow enemy doctrine as programmed. A SIMNET exercise is an excellent opportunity to teach and train fire control skills at crew, troop, and squadron levels.

The primary benefit of SIMNET is that it provides a tank crew with the most realistic field experience outside the training area. It permits each crewman to practice individual skills without starting a single vehicle. The crew commanders must manage their ammunition or they can expend their ready rack at a very embarrassing moment. Troops and squadrons must stay within mutual support or become quickly overwhelmed by the enemy. Unfortunately, SIMNET does not focus on gunnery accuracy, so it is of dubious value as a gunnery trainer. More

relevant as a drawback is the overall system cost. The American Army has thus far spent millions developing and improving their SIMNET. Given the geographic diversity of the three existing Regiments, and considering the initial cost of purchasing a SIMNET system, it may be just as well to utilize an American facility on a pay as you go basis until a cheaper alternative is found.

An opportunity to acquire SIMNET style training at each Armored Regiment exists with the new turret program for the Leopard. The Tactical Team Training and Gunnery Simulation System (TTTGSS) has been developed by Wegmann, and it is the simulator for the new Leopard A5 turret. TTTGSS offers realistic gunnery and tactical training for the Leopard tank. TTTGSS attempts to bridge the

gap left by SIMNET by enhancing the graphics and sound capabilities while simultaneously maintaining the fidelity of the system. TTTGSS offer excellent fidelity for gunnery, and can be linked together in the same way as SIMNET. With the plan to purchase four simulators for each Reg Force Regiment it is possible to have a Troop level SIMNET for each tank squadron. If the system is purchased with the optional loader and driver stations, then the force on force tactical training of SIMNET can be achieved while still having a realistic gunnery simulator. Although squadron level SIMNET training would still require travel to a US Army facility, each Leopard troop in the CF would have constant access to a top notch tactical and gunnery simulator.

Computer simulation, whether JANUS or SIMNET, offer units the ability



to conduct realistic training with minimal requirements for support and preparation. Utilising JANUS for RHQ and SIMNET or TTTGSS for lower level training, a Regiment can conduct effective work-ups for field deployments. In addition to providing training prior to field exercises, computer simulations allow units to fight realistic enemies in a way not easily represented in the field.

**PART TWO - FIELD TRAINING SIMULATIONS**

While JANUS can prepare staff and SIMNET can train Troops, it is vital that units still conduct field training. Simulations still offer significant benefits during field exercises. A very high level of realism can be achieved through Weapon Effects Simulators (WES). WES use a combination of lasers and computers to assess the effectiveness of weapons in a field environment. Most readers are familiar with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) that has been in use since that early 1980s. Every weapon system from the rifle to the tank cannon has a laser attached, while each vehicle and soldier has a series of

sensors that register laser hits. Each weapon has a different laser code, so that for example a C7 rifle cannot destroy a tank.


The MILES II is the latest generation system that can be fitted to both vehicle and personnel. From the tanker aspect, MILES II goes a step beyond its predecessor via multi-level kill capability. This involves a processing of input from an enemy weapon system with a corresponding level of damage. For example, a hit tank would not necessarily be dead but immobilized or its main weapon rendered inoperable.

The difficulty in utilizing a MILES style system is in its cost and maintenance. In order for MILES training to be fully effective, every soldier and vehicle would have to be outfitted and maintained with MILES gear. It requires little imagination to realize that to purchase a brigade's worth of MILES gear would require a large initial expenditure.

The advantages however, far outweigh the drawbacks. The level of realism in a field exercise would be substantially increased. Commanders would be able to experiment with tactical

solutions and see accurate results in terms of kills and losses. Squadron or battle group exercises using WES combined with a realistic enemy force could be the capstone event in a training year. JANUS and SIMNET would be used as work-up training prior to the field deployment.


Combined together, the simulation systems detailed above have the potential to raise the training standard of the Armoured Corps to a new level. The initial price tag would seem large, but the price of not buying them could be higher in human terms if we are called to war. The key benefit of these simulations is that they can expose soldiers, commanders and staff to realistic battlefield conditions. Instead of only learning to maneuver our tanks and formations in the field, we will be able to see the consequences of our decisions and actions. Training simulations offer the opportunity to portray these results without loss of life, and are therefore a sound investment for the Canadian Army and the Armoured Corps.





# The Requirement for a Brigade Light Recce Troop

by WO G.D. Olsen, 3 Tp WO, Recce Sqn, RCD



*Warrant Officer Gerry Olsen is currently serving as the Troop Warrant Officer of 3 Troop, Reconnaissance Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons in Petawawa*

## INTRODUCTION

The latest draft of CFP 305(2)-Armoured Reconnaissance (Recce) embraces manoeuvrist warfare theories and lists the three doctrinal roles of Canadian Armoured Recce as stealth, surveillance and counter-reconnaissance. To argue the inability of the Coyote 25mm chain gun to conduct the counter-recce role, and discussing the requirement to supplement recce troops with tanks or anti-armour assets in order to conduct counter-recce operations, goes well beyond the intended scope of this paper. I do intend, however, to demonstrate the critical shortfalls that currently exist and inhibit our ability to conduct stealth and, to a lesser extent, surveillance operations with the Coyote.

Beginning with the loss of the Kiowa Light Observation Helicopter, there has been a gradual degradation of the capabilities of the Canadian Brigade to provide it's own eyes and ears. The loss of this forward, flank and rear security asset has been compounded by the employment of the Coyote without a new doctrine. The results of recent tactical trials and subsequent field deployments of the Coyote LAV Recce-25 vehicle have shown that a serious recce shortcoming exists. This will result in an information gap that will inevitably lead to a situation where the Brigades are fighting without the necessary eyes and ears to succeed. This coupled with downsizing and the resulting loss of capabilities under the Equipment Rationalization Program (ERP) (i.e. the reduction of the Squadron

from 3 x seven car recce troops to 3 x five car troops) will significantly hamper the Brigade's ability to fight and win the recce battle. The primary role of the Recce Squadron – to gather timely tactical information and relay it back to the Brigade Commander – will be affected if something is not done to address these problems. The following article is not meant to be overly critical or dramatic. It is simply a short discussion that will identify tactical problem areas based upon two years of practical employment of the Coyote. It will also provide a suggestion that could rectify this gap in the collection of battlefield intelligence and enhance the capabilities of the Brigade Recce Squadron with a relatively inexpensive alternative using existing CF vehicle stocks.

## COYOTE SYSTEM AND ERP SHORTCOMINGS

The Coyote surveillance system, although technically a quantum leap over what was available before, has some serious shortfalls. Primarily, because the system is a scan system and the operator cannot be looking at everything at once, there exists the possibility that enemy vehicles would be able to filter through a recce screen if they were determined to do so. Furthermore, the system is capable of surveying to a maximum distance of 24 kilometers, however, only if the target area is line of sight (LOS) to





the system. This LOS limitation allows gaps in the screen of coverage, created by dead ground, buildings, foliage, and other objects that the radar and camera cannot penetrate. This limitation of LOS acquisition by the surveillance suite is, ultimately, merely an upgrade to our human capability to over-watch a single observation target (OT), with the enhanced radar capability to detect movement at long distances and be able to scan multiple OTs if desired within a 180-degree arc.

Despite the technological advantages of the surveillance suite, there exists a requirement to employ dismounted troops in an observation post (OP). This is a measure used to reduce the chances of an enemy unit slipping through by supplementing the sensors with eyes and, more importantly, ears with which to cover off the gaps created

by the sensor's LOS limitation. The increased demands of operating the surveillance suite as well as the dismounted OP will mean that prolonged employment of a Coyote patrol could severely downgrade the effectiveness of the equipment as the crew members grow more fatigued. Additionally, the electronic information provided by the surveillance suite does not have the capability to tell us first-hand specifics on the enemy, such as whether or not a certain bridge is prepared for demolitions or if certain ground is obstacle-free and is capable of supporting the Commander's intent.

The equipment that makes up the surveillance suite is heavy and bulky. Although designed to be soldier-portable, it is difficult to carry in rough ground or heavy brush. The average patrol must make three trips from

vehicle to the remote sensor suite location in order to deploy it. All of which could lead to, and has led to, the compromise of the patrol's location due to excessive movement, despite the best efforts of the patrol to reduce that possibility.

The Coyote itself while ideally suited for the surveillance role and tasks such as flank security and rear area security (RAS) is a large vehicle with a distinctive exhaust signature. Its sheer size and profile makes it too large a target to effectively conduct a route or an area recce, without fear of compromise. This would put the Coyote patrol back into the situation the Corps had hoped to avoid, that of advancing until you loose a vehicle to enemy fire, or "recce by death." Inexperienced recce crew commanders risk compounding this problem by



placing too much faith in the 25 mm cannon and failure to use tactical awareness and maximum camouflage to reduce their exposure to hostile eyes. It is for this reason specifically that other nations, such as Germany, France, and notably, the U.S., have either maintained or have converted to light wheeled recce, crewed by dedicated well trained light recce specialists, to conduct the "close" or stealth recce role.

During a recent deployment to National Training Center, Ft Irwin, California, from 1 Aug-11 Sep 98,<sup>2</sup> Troop Recce Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, had the opportunity to trial the Coyote in conditions as close to real combat as is practically possible for our peacetime Army. The Troop deployed as a complete seven-car troop, supported by a small detachment of mechanics in LSVWs. The troop deployed tactically filling

the role of brigade recce, with the occasional tasking to support specific combat teams as required. This tasking was somewhat unusual, as most US Army brigades do not have a dedicated brigade recce unit. The combat power of task forces used in conjunction with divisional armoured cavalry assets usually meets the requirement (we can only dream!). It was, however, interesting to see that they were seriously considering the adoption of a dedicated brigade recce organization.

That said, the most significant lesson learned while at NTC was the critical importance of the third patrol. It was this patrol, deployed in depth, that offered the US Brigade Commander the last minute combat intelligence he required to adjust his forces in order to successfully defeat the enemy's advance. The forward two patrols would hand off contacts to the depth patrol that would monitor the enemy's

movement up to friendly battle positions. This system proved invaluable, and made a significant impact to the outcome of the battles fought. With the loss of the third patrol as a result of ERP, the Coyote troop will now lose the ability to deploy a depth patrol within its sector. The squadron in turn will lose its ability to provide sufficient tactical coverage to protect the brigade and gather combat intelligence for the commander.

In field trials and deployments, the Coyote has proven to be a highly capable surveillance platform, although admittedly it does have some areas that do require improvement (i.e. reliable turret power and the availability of sensor spare parts to name a few). However, to further complicate matters, time has become a critical factor in Coyote battle procedure as the time needed to unpack and deploy the suite, and to disassemble and stow the suite



properly has become very tactically significant. A really top-notch crew can set the Remote or Mast up in approximately 30 minutes and tear it down in 20 minutes, under favourable lighting and weather conditions. Not only has this reduced the Squadron's capability to switch rapidly from one role to another, it has seen a definite gap in coverage as the patrols set up and tear down their equipment. This gap is particularly multiplied when you are dealing with only two patrols per troop IAW ERP instead of the normal three patrols.

This loss of flexibility, due to ERP vehicle losses and equipment limitations, has now created a situation whereby the squadron cannot effectively fulfill its close recce role, is the "Recce" Squadron in name only, and is now primarily a surveillance squadron. In short, the Recce Squadron Commander now has to deal with a large vehicle equipped with a surveillance suite that is, by nature of its technical limitations and bulkiness, difficult and slow to employ.

### THE LIGHT RECCE VEHICLE ALTERNATIVE

A suggested method to overcome the information gathering gap and enhance the Recce Squadron's ability to cover ground and react to changing situations is to employ a troop of light recce vehicles (LRV). A logical organization could be a troop of three patrols of two vehicles such as the Iltis, (until a replacement is purchased) outfitted for light recce, and commanded by a Troop Leader in a heavier vehicle (i.e. Bison) for command and support purposes. This configuration would offer a degree of flexibility and stealth currently not present in the Recce Squadron. Unlike the Regimental Recce

Troop, this troop could be deployed well forward and in conjunction with a surveillance screen, concentrating on key terrain features and OTs (i.e. named areas of interest that fall out of the Commander's PIRs). The LRV could be deployable by road or even helicopter-lifted if required, and would be suitable for all close recce tasks, particularly on the brigade advance where first-hand information is required on the enemy obstacles and dispositions. The LRV would also augment the Coyotes in filling the gaps for RAS tasks or flank security tasks. This troop would be flexible enough to react to circumstances that could provide the Brigade with a distinct tactical advantage. The tasks assigned could range from the discovery and destruction of enemy depth command posts or the placement of long range OPs in the enemy's rear area or the ability to deploy into stay behind patrols with minimal fear of being compromised.

### USE OF LIGHT TROOPS AT NTC

During the same NTC rotation, 2 Troop confirmed just how effective light-wheeled recce could be used in costing an opposing commander the advantage of surprise.

During the meeting engagement battle, the first battle of the rotation, the US Brigade Commander tasked a patrol to provide initial surveillance overwatch for the two follow-on patrols. These two patrols were pushed forward to the extreme edge of surveillance coverage, and then deployed their own suites. The US Brigade Commander's intent was for the initial OP to tear down and race forward past the next line of OPs, and set up in the hopes of detecting the enemy's follow-on forces. Due to the time required to tear

down the equipment in rough terrain and in the dark, the first patrol was slow leapfrogging past the next two, and was subsequently caught in the melee of the meeting engagement. The patrol commander was aware of the impending engagement. But felt it was worth the risk of trying to penetrate if the patrol could establish contact with follow-on OPFOR units and destroy or delay them with indirect fire. Sadly, he was compromised.

In this particular scenario, a light patrol could have easily been pushed forward through the second line of OPs in order to gain observation on the enemy follow-on forces. However, the Coyote proved to be too big on the battlefield, and the surveillance suite too difficult to allow for rapid redeployment.

A point proven all too often at NTC was that "he who wins the recce battle wins the engagement". This was perfectly demonstrated during the RCD Rotation. 2 Troop while in surveillance OPs had little difficulty in detecting the OPFOR BMP acting as the CRP, but rarely did they manage to detect the BRDM-2s performing the same roles; that is, unless the BRDM-2s ventured too close to the surveillance suites. The BRDM-2s were able to take advantage of the smaller

***A point proven all too often at NTC was that "he who wins the recce battle wins the engagement".***



**«Celui qui sort gagnant du combat  
de reconnaissance remporte l'engagement.»**

les BRDM-2 chargés du même travail, sauf lorsque ces derniers s'approchaient trop près des suites de surveillance. Ces véhicules ont pu tirer parti de plus petites pistes étroites, en terrain dominant, qui leur offraient une meilleure protection et qui diminuaient les risques de détection et effectuer des percées plus en profondeur dans les zones arrière des troupes amies. Même quand les commandants de patrouille de la 2<sup>e</sup> Troupe réglèrent et installèrent les suites de façon à détecter ces patrouilles de BRDM-2, au moment où elles descendaient le long des parois du canyon, les forces d'opposition réussissaient quand même à faire passer des patrouilles à travers l'écran. La figure ci-jointe illustre de quelle façon les BMP étaient détectés et par la suite détruits. Les BRDM 2, eux, n'étaient découverts que beaucoup plus bas sur le tracé. On a vite réalisé que le commandant des forces d'opposition vouait une grande confiance à ses véhicules légers de reconnaissance, et que ces derniers comptaient pour beaucoup dans le succès de son plan de bataille au cours des combats initiaux.

Le commandement des forces d'opposition a une nouvelle fois démontré la priorité qu'il accordait à l'emploi de véhicules légers de reconnaissance un peu plus tard au cours de la rotation lorsqu'il a détaché des BRDM-2 bien en avant d'une unité de flanc ennemie

afin de capturer ou de préciser des éléments clés tels un terrain dominant ou des brèches. Ces véhicules fonçaient à toute vitesse vers l'avant, se déployaient pour accomplir les tâches et attendaient pour effectuer la jonction avec des forces de deuxième échelon ennemies, démontrant de belle façon que «celui qui s'empare du terrain en devient propriétaire». Simple en termes de concept, cette tactique a été utilisée tout au long de l'histoire lors de guerres mécanisées par des maîtres comme Guderian, Montgomery et Rommel. Elle n'a pas nécessairement toujours été employée au niveau de la brigade, mais le principe mérite d'être mentionné.

**EMPLOI DE TROUPES  
DE VÉHICULES LÉGERS  
AU COURS DE L'HISTOIRE**

Le général Guderian a choisi cette tactique de pousser des troupes de véhicules légers de reconnaissance à l'avant, aussi bien au cours de ses deux guerres-éclair contre les pays du Bénélux et la France que durant sa poussée vers l'est en direction du Caucase en 1941. Dans son livre, il dit croire que des véhicules blindés légers et des motocyclettes filant à toute vitesse vers l'avant pouvaient accélérer le passage des troupes de chars plus lourdes. Une telle manœuvre permettait de réaliser de nombreux

objectifs. D'abord, les unités plus lourdes pouvaient se concentrer sur le combat, réduisant du même coup leurs chances d'être surprises et attaquées par des unités ennemies. Deuxièmement, les troupes voyageant à bord de véhicules légers à roues pouvaient facilement contourner des poches de résistance plus importantes, tenir du terrain clé, fournir des renseignements tactiques, à mesure qu'elles progressaient, et assurer le contrôle de la circulation à des endroits clés au moment où les Panzers fonçaient vers l'avant.

Le field-maréchal Montgomery a lui aussi employé cette tactique lors de son audacieuse poussée vers le Rhin, dans le cadre de l'opération MARKET GARDEN, en septembre 1944. Il a, au départ, poussé les chars du 30 British Corps à l'avant, ce qui s'est avéré coûteux, en temps comme en matériel, puisqu'ils ont été pris dans une embuscade. Le col. Van der Leuer, commandant des Irish Guards a choisi lui aussi, alors que le temps jouait contre lui, de pousser des troupes de reconnaissance à bord de véhicules légers vers l'avant, dans une tentative destinée à repérer et à capturer un site de franchissement convenable sur le Rhin. Malheureusement pour les troupes qui se trouvaient à Arnhem, la jonction s'est faite trop tard, mais l'exemple est tout de même important.

Enfin, le général Rommel a aussi eu recours à cette tactique dans le col de Kasserine. Il décrit dans ses documents personnels le déploiement d'éléments du 33<sup>e</sup> Bataillon de véhicules légers de reconnaissance, filant à toute vitesse vers l'avant, pour s'emparer du col. Même si les Américains y sont arrivés les premiers, les troupes du 33<sup>e</sup> Bataillon ont réussi à les



days without resupply, as crew and vehicle requirements should be less. Furthermore, if required, the vehicles can be easily hidden and the crews can operate on foot when the situation demands. Information would be gathered by stealth and physical verification rather than relying on surveillance provided by the electronic suite.

Employing a vehicle such as the Iltis in an LRV role would offer the Brigade Recce Squadron a significant increase in the information gathering capability and flexibility. Also, the Iltis is a cheaper vehicle to maintain and sustain, and training costs are directly related to the intensity of training in order for the troop to become proficient at light recce. Patrol members in a light recce troop must be "mud recce" specialists, concentrating on foot

patrol skills, camouflage and concealment, field communications, target grid procedure, unarmed combat, light demolitions, AFV recognition and combat first aid.

A suggested Recce Squadron, utilizing current Canadian vehicles and manning levels, therefore might be configured in the following organization:

**SHQ**

- 2x Coyote (OC\LO fire team)
- 2x Bison Command Posts
- Remainder wheeled

**Surveillance Troop**

- 7x Coyote

**Surveillance Troop**

- 7x Coyote

**Light Recce Troop**

- 6x Iltis
- 1x Bison

**Assault Troop**

- 5x Bison, eventually 4x LAV-3 Engineer and 1x LAV-3 CRV

**Administration and Maintenance Troop**

All wheeled.

The Brigade Recce Squadron, configured as shown above, would offer the Squadron Commander a high degree of flexibility. The loss of a patrol per troop would be compensated by the surveillance troops regaining their depth patrol. Assault Troop, in addition to acting as a recce troop, would remain the primary squadron mobility/counter-mobility, ambush and foot



patrolling force. While the light recce troop would give the Squadron the flexibility to fill gaps, gain human intelligence, and react to changing situations without the time delay from disassembling surveillance suites.

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In conclusion, the Coyote is a highly capable vehicle with several advancements in technology that has enhanced the capability of the Recce Squadron to provide electronic coverage. However, technical shortfalls, crew fatigue problems and the sheer size and signature of the vehicle have actually

downgraded the Squadron capability to effectively gather timely tactical close or stealth information for the Commander. Despite valuable lessons that were learned/relearned at NTC, the squadron under ERP will now have a reduced capability, if they must employ five-car troops. A relatively inexpensive method of regaining the Squadron's flexibility and improving it's ability to obtain close recce information is to employ the Iltis in the role of an LRV. Deployed as a separate troop, the LRV patrols can be sent forward of the surveillance screen, supplement the screen, harass the enemy's rear area or conduct other tasks rapidly as required by the higher commander.




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# Corps Victoria Cross Winners: Lt Marcus Strachan



Harcus “Jock” Strachan won his VC at the battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. At the time, he was a Lieutenant serving as the Second in Command of B Squadron, the Fort Garry Horse. The Battle of Cambrai was fought in November 1917 with the aim of creating a breach through the Hindenburg Line using tanks. Once a breach was achieved, large cavalry formations could be unleashed on the enemy.

The FGH was scheduled to breakthrough at the town of Masnieres. The Squadron, commanded by Captain Duncan Campbell, MC, was on a special mission. They were tasked with capturing the German 13<sup>th</sup> Corps Headquarters and returning with the Corps Commander as a prisoner.

The FGH were to be the spearhead of their Division and B Squadron in turn was the first unit committed by the FGH to advance. After crossing the St. Quetin canal, they stopped to regroup. Their Division commander, fearing that there was insufficient daylight left for operations ordered the FGH to return to their start positions and to recall B Squadron. As the CO of the FGH advanced to warn the Squadron, he had his horse shot from underneath him. As a result, B Squadron kept advancing into enemy territory, oblivious to the fact that they were now alone.

When B Squadron reached the foremost friendly infantry position they were forced to stop to clear a path through some barbed wire. Enemy

fire caused several casualties. Strachan noticed that Campbell was riding slowly to the rear, slumped forward in the saddle. Seeing that Campbell was wounded, Strachan shouted, “Okay!” and rode to the head of the column to take command.

B Squadron now galloped north-north-east, stopping to cut their way through a camouflage screen running along the side of the Crevecoeur – Masnieres road. Upon gaining the top of a ridge, the Squadron saw to its front a battery of four 100mm guns. Swords drawn, the horsemen charged down the hill straight at the battery. One gun managed to fire and then the charging troopers were among the guns, slashing at the enemy soldiers. Thinking that they had an entire division behind them to mop up, the Squadron rode on.

After leaving some prisoners for follow-up troops, the Squadron found shelter and rest in a sunken road where Strachan posted pickets, and did a count of his men and animals. Of the four officers and 129 men that had started, there were now three officers, 43 men and 46 horses left. Several men were wounded, as were all of the horses but seven.

Strachan sent patrols out to the north, east and west. A group of German infantry was seen advancing from the east down the same road the Squadron was resting on. The enemy company attacked but was driven off. After ordering all wires and power lines in the area to be cut, during which one



a burst of machine-gun fire swept the ranks, wounding or killing five of the party, including Lieutenant Cowen who was shot through the neck. As well, during the night, enemy work parties were encountered three times and each time beaten off with six more prisoners taken. Eventually, the survivors became separated in the dark. Lieutenant Cowen led one group back to friendly lines arriving at Brigade HQ at 20:15 with Strachan's group following at 03:00.

Strachan's Squadron had destroyed an enemy battery, inflicted well over a hundred casualties, tangled enemy communications over a wide area and captured or caused the surrender of numbers of enemy soldiers far exceeding their strength. On 24 December 1917 the award of the Victoria Cross to Strachan was announced. The citation reads:

For most conspicuous bravery and leadership during operations.

He took command of the squadron of his regiment when the squadron leader, approaching the enemy front line at a gallop, was killed. Lieutenant Strachan led the squadron through

the enemy line of machine gun posts, and then with the surviving men, led the charge on the enemy battery, killing seven of the gunners with his sword. All the gunners having been killed and the battery silenced, he rallied his men and fought his way back at night through the enemy's line, bringing all unwounded men safely in, together with fifteen prisoners.

The operation, which resulted in the silencing of an enemy battery, the killing of the whole battery personnel and many infantry, and the cutting of three main lines of telephone communication two miles in rear of the enemy's front line, was only rendered possible by the outstanding gallantry and fearless leading of this officer. (Cambrai. 20 November 1917.) (London Gazette 30234 18 Dec 1917)

In honour of Strachan and the soldiers of B Squadron, The Fort Garry Horse celebrate Cambrai Day every year on the weekend closest to November 20<sup>th</sup>, with a social gathering and Church Parade.

man was electrocuted, Strachan paused to consider his options and formed a plan to return to friendly lines.

The first part of the plan involved stampeding the horses in the direction of the enemy and then the Squadron moved out on foot, retracing their route in. After going a short distance,







## Corps RSM's Comments

*Chief Warrant Officer J.G. Brown*



Some time ago I was asked, 'Who was the first School RSM?' That I could not answer. However, a letter sent to the National Archives of Canada confirmed that the first Regimental Sergeant Major of the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre effective 1 January 1940 was Warrant Officer First Class (WO I) Frank Richmond.

Frank Richmond entered the Canadian Army as a private in Winnipeg, October 1922. On completion of his training in Edmonton, he was affiliated with the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians). In 1936, Quartermaster Sergeant Instructor (QMSI) WO II Frank Richmond was posted to the Canadian Tank School in London, Ontario. At this time, all officers and soldiers of the School were listed as 'On Command From' as each was still carried supernumerary by their home units.

In the organization of the Canadian Tank School, the School Sergeant Major's position was to be filled from

a member of the instructional cadre. Beginning on the 15<sup>th</sup> of December 1936, WO II Richmond filled this position as the acting School Sergeant Major. He was highly recommended for promotion through the years but, due to circumstances, was not promoted until 1 January 1940.

WO I Richmond remained as the RSM of the Canadian Tank School until he was Transferred on Strength (T.O.S.) of the Ontario Regiment (Tank) as a Lieutenant effective 8 July 1940 where he subsequently rose to the rank of Major. The picture of WO I Richmond, attached to this article, was reproduced from a 1938 staff photo of the School.

In the time of WO I Richmond, the Canadian Tank School required the support of the regimental system to provide instructors. The first object of the School was to train their own personnel since up to the point when the School was formed most of the Corps' units were still on horses! The second, and consequently main, object

was to train and qualify for rank the personnel of the six newly formed tank battalions.

One thing hasn't changed since WO I Richmond's time and this is that the present day Armour School's instructional staff is drawn from the regimental system! Within the Corps, the School is the central force for the development of armoured leaders and soldiers. Therefore, it is imperative that the quality of instructor employed at the School be of the highest calibre that the regimental system can provide.

As a final thought, the focus of the regimental system should be in support of the Corps and the Corps must be in support of the Army.





# Fiddling while Rome burns

*L.J. Zaporzan, Major, Chief Instructor, Armour School*

The decision was taken last year to remove the Cougars from service with regular armoured regiments and to put them exclusively with the reserve regiments. This itself is disturbing in terms of our "One Army" philosophy, but that is not the most serious consequence of this decision. The substitution of the Coyote for the Cougar is one of many short-sighted steps in the continued marginalisation of the Armoured Corps within our Army, and it has been accomplished with the only dissent coming from reserve armoured units. Before my Infantry brethren smile smugly and say, "I'm OK, Jack," take note that the marginalisation of one of the two "contact arms" means the reduction of the Army to a position where peace-keeping and constabulary duties will be the most we can expect in terms of operational capability. Conspiracy theory is the realm of the weak argument, so I do not think that the government is consciously pushing the Army, and ultimately the Armed Forces into a constabulary role, however, that is exactly what will soon be the limit of our capability. And it will take place without forethought or professional debate.

The Coyote is a capable vehicle that is well suited to Recce and other armoured car duties. It is new, reliable and is better armed in terms of an armoured car than the Cougar. The problem with the Coyote's employment in other than reconnaissance tasks, is a matter of perception that will lead to the relegation of the Armoured

***The substitution of the Coyote for the Cougar is one of many short-sighted steps in the continued marginalisation of the Armoured Corps within our Army***

Corps to tertiary tasks and ultimately an Army capable of support operations only. This state of affairs is disturbing since only a short time ago the Canadian Army was capable of the full spectrum of combat operations.

Within the regular armoured regiments there is one recce squadron equipped with Coyote, and two "sabre" squadrons. One is equipped with Coyote and the other is a tank squadron, which will soon have the Leopard C2. The tanks and recce squadron will continue to perform their tasks within the framework of current doctrine. The two "sabre" squadrons are organised and crewed to train and fight in combat teams with the infantry, artillery and engineers. This organisation provides a general purpose combat capability that is the basis for either warfighting or OOTW. The tank is the main DFSV within this grouping and in former times the Cougar was primarily

employed as a tank trainer capable of combat team training and low intensity operations in cooperation with the other combat arms. It is this cooperation which provides the flexibility to perform any number of tasks across a large spectrum of conflict scenarios.

The use of Coyote as the primary vehicle for one of the sabre squadrons will prove to be disastrous for two reasons. First, there will be some regiments who will use the Coyote squadrons as cavalry squadrons only. This makes sense in terms of making the best use of the equipment, but the problem is that combined arms training in combat team operations will suffer since there will not be enough "tanks" to partner all infantry companies with armour in training. The tank squadrons can be split, but doctrinally they really should not be divided. Furthermore, when it comes time to replace the tank, it can be easily argued that squadrons of 10 tanks each are workable, therefore the acquisition of only enough Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACVs) to replace the tanks will meet the Army's needs. In almost 21 years service I have yet to see the Canadian Forces buy more replacement equipment than what was in place at the time of purchase. The trend is always toward less.

The second reason will be one of perception for those Coyote squadrons that might remain as the armoured component of the combat team. The infantry will soon receive the LAV III. It is bigger, better armoured, equally



armed and more mobile than the Coyote. In operations, the big question from the infantry will then be, "Well, what can you contribute to the combat team? A gun that can destroy tanks? No, it's the same as ours. Cross country mobility that can get fire to where it can be decisive? No, ours is better. Armoured protection that will take some of the heat off of us as we assault the objective? No, same as ours. So what can you contribute then? Hmm...I think I have a job for you out on the flank somewhere. We'll handle the rest ourselves." In training, Coyote will have difficulty keeping up with the LAV III. As well, LAV III being bigger and mounting the same 25mm gun will make it difficult for the Coyote crews to be taken seriously. The result will be, at the very least, a portion of a generation of soldiers who may be taught about combat teams, but will not truly believe in combined arms groupings because they will not have seen a viable combat team or trained within a combat team context. In our infantry based army, this is a dangerous precedent that could lead to the questioning of having an Armoured Corps at all! The same could be said of the Cougar in comparison to LAV III, but hopefully the result would have been the will to replace it with an ACV sooner rather than later.

This leads me to my last point. As long as we were using the Cougar in the regular force we stood a fairly good chance of convincing those in the department and Treasury Board that an ACV is required as a priority capital equipment acquisition. I believe that such a proposition would have been with the support of the infantry, who would have seen the need to bolster a part of the combat team that was lacking. We would also have gained support from the Reserves, who are equipped with Cougar. The urgency and arguments for an expeditious replacement are now moot until Leopard is scheduled for replacement in 2010-2015. The Coyote squadrons will be forced into armoured car roles and fewer combat teams will be trained with a concomitant lack of support for an ACV, except perhaps from the Reserves.

As the Armoured Corps diminishes in importance, the most frightening aspect of this whole issue is the evolution of our once proud first rate Army into a constabulary force only capable of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and aid to the Civil Authority. And it is all happening quietly, with the support of those of us in uniform because we have not sat back and

thought about the longer-term consequences of what seemed like a good idea at the time. As a generation of officers becomes comfortable with the idea the Canadian Army is designed for OOTW and that the "Queen of Battle" can do it all on their own, it will become more and more difficult to persuade anyone that we need tanks or a proper DFSV at all. For certain, that is what specific factions within and outside of our Government want, but I believe that Canada deserves better. Our reputation of being the world's best peacekeepers and reliable players in the international community is based upon our ability to conduct general-purpose operations. If the vision for the future is one of a "niche army," then so be it, but let's do it consciously after having considered all the factors and debating the consequences of our actions. Those of us in the Armoured Corps had also better start thinking of where we want to go and how we should be equipped before we find ourselves only capable of support operations, separated from the infantry who will soon be doing the "business of our business" without us. ■

