# ARMOUR NEWSLETTER





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This Newsletter is published by authority of Colonel D.A. Nicholson, CD, Commandant Combat Arms School. Views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect official opinion or policy unless expressly stated as such.



# ARMOUR Newsletter

## Editor's Comments

The Armour Newsletter is produced by Armour Department of the Combat Arms School. The Newsletter gives the various Wings of the Department the opportunity to report on major course content and policy changes, and it provides a forum for articles of professional and human interest to all members of the Armoured Branch.

Reader response has been excellent. Our distribution list has been revised and notably increased. It is interesting to note that we have received articles and comments from all ranks, from both Regular and Militia Units, including a substantial response from members of other Branches. This edition touches on some rather controversial subjects, and I hope that it will stimulate comparable comment.

L. Crosby Captain Editor

### Introduction

In years to come, I am convinced that 1975 will be looked upon as the "year of decisions" in the Armoured Corps. This year our war establishments will be published, new vehicles will be purchased, the tank question finalized, and revised training packages for our young officers and senior NCOs instituted. The results of these decisions will determine our future for many years to come and present us with new challenges. Although our cups runneth over, the dedication, the solidarity of sense of purpose and the will to succeed in our endeavours has, in my experience, never been stronger in the Combat Arms and especially the Armoured Corps.

Methods and equipments used in our prime role - training for war - have changed with time, but adherence to principles proven by ancient and modern history will ensure a strong and purposeful future.

This publication, designed to inform you of current policy and affairs at your School, is dedicated to the promotion of our Corps and I hope will continue to expand. You will notice some articles by Regiments and by individuals outside the Combat Arms School in this issue. We welcome reports on new procedures, either tactical or technical, that will benefit other Regiments, both Regular and Militia. If you wish to say something others should hear, send it in.

Lieutenant-Colonel Officer Commanding Armour Department

### FOREWORD



I am both pleased and proud to be invited, as the senior resident black beret, to write the foreword to this issue of the Armour Newsletter. As those of you who know me will realize, I was overjoyed at being offered the opportunity to assume what I consider to be the most enjoyable and rewarding Colonel's appointment in the Canadian Forces.

You may all rest assured that Armour's interests are well supported here at the School. Major Gord O'Connor coordinates ranges, resources, etc, for the entire Centre, LCol Ron Brown ramrods Tactics Dept, LCol Chuck Conway and his thoroughly professional crew in Armoured Dept run our courses for us, and Capt Wayne Pickering and SSM Bennett guide the destinies of the old and new "pros" who man Canada's domestic tank force in the CAS Training Squadron. Today the Combat Arms School - tomorrow the world!

I should mention how impressed I am with how well the concept of a combined Combat Arms School has been made to work. It is a testimonial to my predecessors that seldom, if ever, does anyone in any of the departments propose anything without considering its influence on the other departments. It really is a team effort all the way, as it should be.

Let me close by repeating my pledge to Gen Rad on the day he left us that all of us here at Gagetown are determined to "keep the faith". The art of fighting is our raison d'etre, and we must never forget it!


D.A. Nicholson Colonel

Commandant Combat Arms School

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## IN MEMORIAM



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GORDON CARINGTON SMITH, CD

LCol Smith was born in Quebec City in 1906. He received his early education from Bishop's College School in Lennoxville, Quebec and then graduated from the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario in 1927.

In 1929, after graduating from McGill University with a degree in Engineering, LCol Smith, joined the Royal Canadian Artillery. In December of 1937 he served under General Worthington as a founding member of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.

In April 41, LCol Smith proceeded overseas on the SS Nerissa together with 124 all ranks of the Canadian Army. At 2232 hrs 30 April 41 the ship was hit by two torpedoes and in three minutes the ship sunk. The loss to the Canadian Army was 30 officers and 60 other ranks. It is interesting to note that Mrs. Larry Worthington in her book "Worthy" states that "LCol Smith arrived in England and ordered a whole new kit and when he went to pick it up the shop had been bombed out and for the second time in a month LCol Smith had lost all his belongings."

LCol Smith served in the Italian Campaign and was wounded in action while second in command of the British Columbia Dragoons.

After the war LCol Smith graduated from the Canadian Army Staff College in Kingston, Ontario and served as Canadian Liaison Officer at the Pentagon in Washington from 1950-1952. He terminated his military career as staff officer (Manning) in Ottawa in 1958.

After retirement from the Canadian Army, he joined the Halifax architectural firm of Dumaresq and Byrne Ltd. He was a member of the Association of Professional Engineers of Nova Scotia, on the board of the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires and was national vice-president of the Royal Commonwealth Society. He was a past president of the United Services Institute of Canada and an active member of the Cathedral of All Saints, The Halifax Club and the Saraguay Club.

LCol Smith is survived by his wife, the former Jacqueline Marie (Dumaresq), one son Major Arthur Harcourt Carington Smith, CFB Petawawa, Ont and a daughter Eve (Mrs. Stewart McInnes), Halifax.

# TRAINING

WING

REPORTS

# Officer NCO Training Wing

### CAPT JA DALTON CD

The last Bulletin contained a report on courses conducted by ONCOT Wing. Since that report the following courses have been completed:

Phase II - Students - 25
Top Candidate - OCdt SP Johnston

Phase III - Students - 16
Top Candidate - Lt DG Allen

Phase IV - Students - 22 Top Candidate - Lt BG Jackson

ROUTP Phase II - Students - 12

Top Candidate - 2Lt WRF McKee

LOFT II (Armd) - Students - 4

Crew Commander (TL 6A) - Students - 19
Top Candidate - Sgt Fougere JE-12eRBC

Basic Crewman (TL 3) - Students - 30 Top Candidate - Tpr King BS-LdSH(RC)

You will also notice in the Armour Department slate that there have been many changes in the Wing in the past few months. Those who have left deserve special thanks for a job very well done. For those that are new to the wing and to those reading this article who may be posted into ONCOT, you come to what I consider the most challenging Wing in the Department. It is here that the skills and knowledge required to effectively perform and lead in battle are all brought together. As previous instructors will agree this involves long hours and much time in the training area. Yet the knowledge that your students are the future leaders in the Corps does much to make the extra effort worthwhile.

In accordance with the Standards Writing Board Report on Crewman 011 and Armour Officer Standards, Light Armour will no longer be taught at the School. Instead we will be teaching tank and reconnaissance operations at the various levels. This has meant that virtually all of the ONCOT courses have required rewriting and "new" precis and handouts require preparation.

This work is progressing well and beginning with Armour Officer Classification Phase II 7501 starting 7 January 1975 the new program will be put into effect.

Another significant change is the Armour Officer Training reported in the last Newsletter. Now that the new courses and standards are well on their way to completion I am confident that the young officer leaving the School will be better able to carry out his responsibilities at his unit.

The last basic crewman course was conducted to the new standard where the student was trained in communications, gunnery and driving and maintenance both wheeled and tracked. The graduate then is trained to the 5a trade level. Unfortunately this was not possible on the current course, 7404, due to restraints of personnel and equipment. However, where possible the total trade level three package will be given to the recruit thus providing the units with a well trained usable trooper.

The Department has just recently been granted permission to load Trade Level 3 graduates on the Tank Gunnery and Tank Driving and Maintenance courses. This will allow us to send troopers directly from the School to the RCD in Germany. Thus the RCD will no longer receive replacements only from other Regiments but will receive troopers whose first regiment will be the Dragoons. The importance to the Corps of this decision is obvious.

The final item concerns the training of Militia Officers. Effective this summer ROUTP training both Phases I and II will be conducted at the Combat Arms School. The aim of this training is to produce a competent militia troop leader at the end of his two summers capable of instructing at the unit level. The eventual result will be that the militia units will be able to conduct their own training up to and including concentrations with minimal input from the Regular Force.

Throughout the past six months, ONCOT Wing has indeed been fortunate to receive a number of increment instructors. I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to them and their units, without which our courses could not have run so well.


As can be seen from the above report ONCOT Wing has been and will continue to be very busy indeed. To be blunt, our resources in personnel and equipment are stretched almost to the limit. Yet the strength of the Corps depends to a very great degree on the calibre of instruction we give to our future Senior NCOs and Officers. It is therefore imperative that those of us in ONCOT and those of you who may be posted to the School make every effort to ensure that our mission of training officers and NCOs to lead in battle is completed to the highest possible standard.

\*\*\*\*\*\*

The man who follows the crowd will never be followed by a crowd!

# GUUUEBY WIUG

### by CAPT B.L. GRIFFIN



In the last Newsletter, I stated that considerable changes were to be made in the gunnery training of both officer candidates and the other ranks. As a result of these changes, a great deal of the intervening time has been devoted to the writing and rewriting of course training plans and lesson guides.

The twelve day Trade Level 3 Lynx Gunnery course has been conducted twice and has proven to be an excellent package. To date, copies of both the Course Training Plan and complete sets of lesson guides have been sent to both the Strathconas and the Hussars to assist them in training a basic crewman serial.

The Tank Gunner course has finally worked out to be thirty-three days in length. Both the scope and content of the course have remained essentially the same as the tank portion of the former Pay Level 3 Gunnery course. The open range portion has been increased in length and improved. Commencing in February 76, the graduates of this course should prove to be very competent, accurate gunners.

In the area of officer training, the Phase III Gunnery course has jelled into a twenty-seven day package. The aim of the course is to produce a young officer who is capable of both supervising and performing gunnery tasks whether he be employed in a reconnaissance or a tank unit. Once again the open range portion has been increased so that the candidates will gain more knowledge through actual experience. The first of these courses will be conducted in April of this year.

In addition to the numerous rewriting requirements which have now been completed, one each of a Trade Level 3, Trade Level 6A and Advanced Armoured Gunner course has been conducted. This was our second crack at the Advanced course and although several minor difficulties were encountered, it was generally felt that the lessons learned on the previous course resulted in a better package. Considerable thought has been given to the idea that a gunnery instructor should not only know the user aspects of gunnery but also have a knowledge of weapon and ammunition production procedures. The feasibility of conducting tours of both ammunition and armament plants is being investigated. It is hoped that some future courses will be able to make these tours.

One of the major performance objectives of the Advanced course is the individual production of a workable squadron gunnery training program. This year, the students proved to be extremely talented in this area and it is hoped that each unit will derive subsequent benefits.

The Fall period saw two of the more senior members of Gunnery Wing leave. WO Turple, our well-respected "senior instructor", has retired from the Forces while Capt Gowans is attending the Long Armoured course in England. Both of their departures leave considerable gaps to be filled, however, we wish them both great success.

In the foreseeable future, we hope to update all reference material and to produce packages that will be of assistance to units when conducting their own gunnery training.

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If you have to keep on making mistakes, at least make new ones!

\*\*\*\*\*

People who never have time do less than anyone else!

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#### CAPT MA KRYZANOWSKI CD

Communications Wing spent a hectic summer teaching officer cadets of nearly all phases of all Corps (including ROUTP) in the old adage that "you cannot command without the control provided by communications". This task completed, we settled down to a period of reorganization and preparation for our major courses, the Combat Arms Advanced Communicator course, and the Crewman Trade Level 3 course. The reorganization was no mean feat, since, except for two old Strathcona stalwarts, we have had a complete turnover of staff. Regrettably, the reorganization also cost us the CELE Officer and Rad Op 211 Sgt Instructor vacancies. We must now request this badly needed technical expertise on an as-required basis from the CAS Signals Troop. Thanks to the outstanding cooperation of the troop, the system is working.

September was spent on Wing refresher and standardization training. The new instructors had the opportunity to get their feet wet by instructing on several courses run by the Artillery and Infantry Departments, as well the Crew Commanders course (TL 6A). Yes, we too, are an all Arms Wing.

The Advanced Communicator course was run from late-October to mid-December. The only major innovation of this course was that students (in syndicates of three) were required to produce a Course Training Plan for a unit communications course from an On Job Training Standard. On the whole, this exercise was quite well done and should provide units with NCO's who can write and conduct unit up-grading courses, refresher training and militia courses.

On future advanced courses we intend to place more emphasis on student production of training plans. Also, there will be instruction on secure speech equipment. Although the scope of the secure speech package is not yet known, it is advisable that units consider upgrading security clearances of prospective students to SECRET.


One further note on advanced communications courses - the student is expected to be highly proficient in voice procedure and communications equipment on arrival at the course. Units should therefore conduct a refresher programme before sending the students on the course.

We have also completed another Crewman Trade Level 3 course and our thanks go to Training Support Group for providing an increment instructor. (Although he was a Gunner, we almost had him wearing a black beret). Seriously, though, we are looking forward to getting feedback from units on the quality of the product.


In conclusion, our motto continues to be:

- "We aim to please" -

Any suggestions for improvement of our courses will be welcomed. We will also do our best to provide you with any training materials that you may need.



WO TS Rutledge-LdSH(RC)-Combat Arms
Advanced Communicator Course 7402



Sgt D Aucoin-430 ETAH-Combat Arms Advanced Communicator Course 7402

# Driving + Maintenance Wing



B<sub>V</sub> Capt

### PC MERCEREAU


After a short, two week leave period during the first part of August, D&M Wing was again off and running. During the period from mid-August to the end of the year our major courses were two Pay Level 3 courses and an Advanced Driver course.

The return to work also brought about the usual change in personnel within the Wing and during the summer and fall months many new faces and some not so new were added to our instructor slate.

In addition to the losses due to normal postings, we have lost the services of two of our instructors. Sgt Boudreau has left the services and the loss has already been felt in the Wing. The use of field expedients for recovery will not have the Boudreau touch, nor will the OIC have to refill the tea kettle as often. Sgt Ross is also leaving us and although he has not been able to bounce around in vehicles for quite some time he has served invaluably in course administration.



Preparing for amphibious operations-Combat Arms Advanced Driver Course 7402



Exiting from fast-water swimming-Combat Arms Advanced Driver Course 7402

The Combat Arms Advanced Driver course was conducted from 18 Oct to 18 Dec. Unlike the previous courses this one was entirely Armoured students, all but two of whom were senior NCO's. With this high calibre of student the instructors were kept on their toes trying to make their periods of instruction more challenging and more beneficial.

I do not in any way mean to downgrade the other Arms who attended the Advanced Driver course, however, it became evident early in this course that the Armoured crewman is better qualified and more at home around tracked vehicles. This is due to the fact that the crewman is exposed to tracked vehicles from the day he starts his trades training.

In January we will again be running an all Armoured Advanced course. Based on the one run from Oct 74 to Dec 74 we are attempting to make the course more challenging for them and more in line with their capabilities.

# ABMOURED DEPARTMENT

### HEADQUARTERS

OC	ICo1	Conway
2IC	Major	Seeley
AO	Capt	Logan
DCWO	CWO	Geldart
Trg NCO	WO	Engyel
Clk	MCpl	Butler

### OFFICER/NCO TRG

ONCOT WING			GUNNERY V	VING		
OIC	Capt	Dalton	oic	Capt	Grif:	fin
Instr	Capt	Bartels	Instr	Capt	Moye	r
Instr	Capt	Crosby	Instr	Lt	Gros	singer
Instr	Capt	Leentjes	W/MWO	MWO	Down	ey
Instr	Capt	Sproule	WO Instr	WO	Bald	•
Instr	Lt	Kierstead	WO Instr	WO	Cady	
Att	Maj	Doyon (Fr Exchange)	WO Instr	WO	Darr	
		• , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	WO Instr	WO	Hale	٧
WO Instr	WO	Duffney	WO Instr	WO	Mart	
WO Instr	WO	Fletcher	WO Instr	WO	Murr	
WO Instr	WO	Koelbl	WO Instr	WO	Samp	
WO Instr	WO	Munro				
WO Instr	WO	St Hilaire	Sgt Inst	r Sgt	Butl	er
			Sgt Inst		Lynk	
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Barr	•			
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Cuthill	Adm NCO	Cpl	Lamb	
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Morris				
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Oakley CW	ATTACHED			
Adm NCO	Cpl	Clark	7.07	gan	Cpl	Bernard
				orrison	Cpl	Jones
				nute	Cpl	Levasseur
			37.7 <b>-</b> 37.7 -	artin	Cpl	McPherson
			Cpl To	obin		

DRIVING AN	D MAINTE	ENANCE WING	COMMUNICAT	PIONS WI	NG
OIC W/MWO	Capt MWO	Mercereau Clarke	OIC Instr Instr	Major Capt	Thomas (UK Exchange) Kryzanowski
WO Instr	WO	Chesterman	W/WO	Lt WO	Williamson MacDougal
WO Instr	WO	Hutchinson	WO Instr	WO	Sauriol (Inf)
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Bryan (Inf)	Sgt Instr	Sgt	Smith KS
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Delaney	Sgt Instr		Tosh (Arty)
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Parlee (Inf)	Sgt Instr		Vance
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Pridge	Sgt Instr	Sgt	Warnock
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Santer	-8	~6 "	Wallock
Sgt Instr	Sgt	Wallace	Adm NCO	MCpl	MacDonald
Adm NCO	Cpl	Dow			

We have a substantial number of black berets strategically placed throughout the rest of the School.

### COMMANDANT - Col DA Nicholson

COORDINATIO	N		STANDARDS				, dell'
S02 Coord S03 Sched Programming Resources	Maj Capt WO WO	O'Connor Eddy Conrad Pierce	S&E SO Armd C	Major Mapt Mapt	Martei Robert Tangua Messer	tson ay	
TRAINING SU	PPORT SO	QUADRON	TRIALS AND EVAL	LUATION	Ī		
OC 2IC SSM	Capt Lt CWO	Pickering Russell Bennett	TSO3 Armd C	apt ENT	McGuir	re	
Tp Ldr Tp Ldr Tp Ldr Tp Ldr	Lt Lt Lt WO	Artibise Doucet Forsyth Baril	OC OIC Cbt Ops Trg Armd Instr		LCol Maj Maj	Brown Latham Cathcart	
			FIELD SUPPORT G	WO	Patte	rson	

<sup>&</sup>quot;There are people who never lose their way because they never set out for anywhere"

# ARTIGLES

# Tank Expedient?

The maintenance of an effective and credible multi-EDITOR'S NOTE: national defence force by NATO has been the main factor in keeping the peace in Western Europe for the last twenty-five years. Canada's well-being, both economic and political, depends on the maintenance of peace in Europe. Canada's Armed Forces should reflect our will to survive and our desire to retain a position of influence in the world. A strategy that is based only on Canada or North America is inadequate. Canada cannot risk political and economic isolation. Only the retention of effective land forces in Western Europe will convince our allies of our resolve to defend the common interest. Present planning indicates that Canadian land forces will not have tanks on inventory after 1976. We may be expected to command attached allied tank forces and to fight tank/infantry combat teams. There will be a requirement to maintain our expertise on the employment of armour, specifically at the combat team level and this requirement must be satisfied by practical application within our training plans. What are we to employ as a useful tank expedient, if any? At what level, to what degree, and to whom should this training be given? Based on the above assumptions and general guidelines, the following articles were written from an individual point of view.

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE?

Mr. Richardson, The Minister of National Defence, has stated that the Centurion Tank will be retired on 1 Jan 1976, with no replacement in the forseeable future. This presents two problems to the Armoured Branch.

The first major problem raised is dealing with the armoured threat against NATO and the second is a stimulating career for the armoured soldier. The obvious question which arises is, what do we use to replace the tank in its direct fire role and in the training of the armoured soldier? In other words, what training expedients are available to us?

We have in our inventory, the tracked M113 family, with the Lynx possibly being the best suited. There are also a few aging Ferrets around which could be pressed into service. As a last resort, any vehicle with a cross-country capability could be used for training.

The advantage of any of the above mentioned vehicles is that they are presently in our system, and with very little expense and effort, can be made to look like a tank.

The disadvantage, of course, is the teaching of false lessons in ability to manoeuvre, maintenance load and re-supply. The basic skills of the crewman, which we have barely kept alive in the last few years would be lost.

Now let's cover some of the skills required of the armoured soldier at all levels and determine if a tank expedient, based upon present equipment, could develop these skills:

- a. Direct fire weapon handling skills impossible;
- Use of ground can be taught with any of the vehicles considered;
- Ability to use complex communications systems yes;
- d. Ability to maintain heavy tracked vehicles no;
- e. Co-operation with infantry to a degree;
- f. Control fast-moving, hard-hitting armoured formations no;
- g. Plan logistical requirements of an armoured battle group no. This is only learned by experience with the tank; and
- h. Plan and mount armoured operations again, to some degree. However, if the planner is not familiar with the tank, his plan will be lacking.

Lastly the manning problem. We will never entice a soldier to become armoured without giving him the armour. How many jet pilots would we have without aircraft?

In conclusion, there is no tank expedient. Some of our present equipment will provide training in some of the skills required. In the quest for new equipment, we must guard against "The Cheap Shot". If we go cheap, it may, some day spell our final destiny on some lonely murky field in Europe.

MWO SL Patterson CD

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Nothing has been invented so far that comes anywhere close to replacing the tank - on the battlefield or in training for war! Having said that, where do we go from here? Everyone knows that our Combat Groups in Canada haven't been able to train for war effectively for several years now. The loss of the tank has affected all the combat arms units, but most of all it has deeply wounded our Corps.

Perhaps it's time we stopped living entirely in hope that by some miracle new tanks are going to appear tomorrow. Indeed we must never lose sight that our only reason for existence is to man tank guns, but we've got to do something now to preserve the essential skills that will enable us, or our sons, to fight effectively in tanks in some future war. But what are we going to do? Without a tank how do we preserve the skills that have been developed over a generation?

The obvious answer is that we must improvise. Maybe it will never be as good as the real thing, but we've got to act now.

While some may quibble, to my mind the essential skills that we must seek to maintain are two - gunnery and tactics. Gunnery because that is what a tank is all about - a mobile gun that provides aimed, accurate, and direct fire on the battlefield; tactics because that gun must be man-oeuvred with skill on the battlefield to provide the intimate fire support essential to the winning of the modern battle. All other Corps skills fall out from these two.

But here is the dilemma: our existing tracked equipment has no gun; the AVGP that is rumoured to be "on the horizon" will likely be wheeled, with little cross-country mobility - making realistic tactical training nearly impossible to achieve with it. How do you teach boldness and violent shock action if you are road-bound?

Compromise is the only obvious answer - but it must be compromise without sacrificing principles. Lets use the AVGP to preserve our gummery skills, and whenever the "going" permits cross country movement use it as a tank trainer on tactical exercises. But let us also be prepared to use our existing tracked vehicles - the Lynx and the APC - as "in lieu" tanks whenever the AVGP can't hack the pace. Let's sacrifice our pride, paint TANK on the sides, maybe even put on a fake canvas turret with a stovepipe. Lets use our ingenuity to get us back into the world of preparing ourselves for war. In the process we'll help the infantry do that too.

Other armies have lived through hard times too. Rommel and Manstein prepared their armoured troops with canvas mock-ups of tanks. General Worthington began our Corps with machine gun carriers and a few Renault tanks rescued from an American scrap heap. Maybe we can learn from them and keep ourselves ready for the day when clearer thinking prevails and we get a new tank, and for that day when we might just have to fight alongside our other comrades-in-arms to preserve our nation's freedom.

Maj J.K. Marteinson CD

### -FULL CIRCLE-

( A FRIENDLY WARNING FROM THE RAC CENTRE)

1.



THERE WAS A TANK



BUTTHEY COULDN'T KEEP UP

3.



BUT THIS COULDN'T

4.



BUT THIS HADN'T ENOUGH PROTECTION SO.....

5.




BUTTHIS HAD NO FIRE POWER SO..... 6.



BUTTHE GUNNER WAS UN PROTECTED SO.....

7.



BUT WHAT ABOUT ENEMY APC'S ETC?

8.



BUTTHEN THERE WAS NO ROOM INSIDE

9.



### FLASHBACK Nos. 2 and 3

Flashback Nos. 2 and 3 were published in Volume 3, July 74. The following letter from a well known armoured soldier is reproduced in part.

"I have been interested in your Flashback series, particularly as I was enlisted into a unit called the CAFVTC 1 Aug 40 commanded by a LCol named "F.F. Worthington". Just about all of the people in Flashback No. 1 were known to me. As a youngster I used to visit Camp Borden with my father who was working with Worthy on camouflage paint for his fleet of AFVs.

The "idents" in Flashback No. 2 are easy when the names from the first picture are supplied. For Flashback No. 3 I noted Worthy's camouflaged Ford staff car. It was painted in a variety of differing colours and then covered with sand to give it a dull non-reflective quality. He used to take great delight in driving it up to Army Headquarters at Ottawa where it made quite an impression. I don't know who the gentlemen are standing in the group but the car at left rear looks like my father's 1935 Nash. He was at Borden for an exercise run by Worthy to test the "armoured force" and, as a side issue, the camouflage in the AFVs. It was on that exercise Worthy extended his intelligence net by giving the local telephone operators boxes of chocolates to solicit their help.

The lower picture is a troop of three Vickers MK 6B light tanks (1 x .50" Vickers MG and 1 x .303" Vickers MG). I believe the shot was taken at Borden near the old south water tower. The MK 6B was the first tank I drove when I joined. It and the Carden-Lloyds were recognized as being underpowered and in 1940 a Ford V8 was put in the Carden-Lloyds and a Dodge engine replaced the Meadows that were originally in the MK 6Bs. (Sounds slightly familiar about current British AFVs!)

Tom Begley and Harky Smith identified the names of the group in Flashback No. 1. For your "younger" readers there are some very familiar people in the group.

#### a. Front Row

Richmond was RSM of the CAFVTC when I joined. He was a big silent man who terrorized us by cruising around the lines whistling through his teeth pausing only long enough to "peg" you for some minor misdemeanor; "Grimy" Gibson retired as BGen; Howie Laroque was A/CO RCD: Johnny Andrews was killed as CO Calgary Tanks in the Dieppe Raid; Jack Wallace was School Chief Clerk and is the father of Jack Wallace (EMO).

#### b. Second Row

Johnny Cave retired as a Colonel. He commanded briefly the Sherbrook Fusiliers (2nd Armd Bde) in Normandy; Gord Pratt (now deceased) was CO C Sqn RCD in 27 Bde.

### c. Third Row

Just about the entire row were WO IIs or WO Is two years after the picture was taken (Philpotts became a LCol in 1941) and the Corps expanded to meet the needs of the early war training Establishments (when A8 and A9 CAC(TC) were formed).

Thanks for the memories!"

Signed P.V.B. Grieve Brigadier-General Commandant CLFCSC



No 2

No 3





# Tube launched Optically tracked Wire guided

CAPT CJN SPROULE

TOW is coming to Canada. With this purchase our forces join those of United States, Iran, Norway, Turkey, Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark and Italy in adopting this US manufactured missile as our primary infantry anti-armour weapon. The standard brigade group will have 8 TOW per infantry battalion, but of more interest to the readers of this magazine is the allottment of 8 per Armoured Regiment in Canada. In Europe, battalions will have 18 and the armoured regiment none.

Tow is a semi-automatic, command to line of sight missile. The controller tracks the target with his sight and the missile is guided automatically on to his line of sight. This is opposed to SS11 or ENTAC where the controller actually flies the missile himself. As a result the accuracy of TOW is of a very high order right out to maximum range which is approximately 3000 meters. It is capable of defeating any known armoured target out to its maximum range. Weighing less than the 106 recoilless rifle and breaking down into smaller parts, TOW is much more flexible in its employment. It can be ground mounted, mounted on any vehicle or on helicopters.

The introduction of TOW is posing some interesting questions for the combat arms. How will it be used? Which weapons, if any, will it replace? What changes will it necessitate in our present anti-tank teachings? These and all other related questions are now being considered by the Tactics Doctrine Board of the Combat Arms School. The subject is being considered in the framework of the infantry battalion in Europe, in all phases of war. While their work is far from over, several key points have emerged:

- a. Tow by itself is insufficent to meet the threat with which a battalion might expect to deal. There is a requirement for a medium anti-tank weapon (MAW) reaching out to 1000m. This MAW must include the capabilities of a gun or a fire and forget missile. This requirement has been recognized in an Operational Equipment Requirement.
- b. The introduction of TOW and a suitable MAW will at last make the infantry battalion capable of conducting its own adequate anti-tank defence. This will free tanks to be used where the threat proves to be greatest and for counter penetration/counter attack tasks. However, does the armour representative at what ever level lose his responsibility of chief anti-tank advisor?

The question of TOW in the reconnaissance arsenal is not at the moment being addressed, which gives readers of this article ample opportunity to make their views known to the writer. Our past experience with ATGM was the troop with the armoured regiment in Germany. A large organization, twice the size of the forecasted allocation, it tended to become the brigade commander's personal resource. It was usually divided up to beef up the battalions' resources or to help out the reconnaissance squadron.

With the battalions self-sufficent, the entire TOW resources of the regiment could go to the reconnaissance squadron. This is a vast increase in fire power from a .50 Calibre. TOW's long range will allow it to engage enemy direct fire targets approximately 1500 meters before they can effectively counter with direct fire. The signature of TOW is also minimal at these ranges. Should we therefore become more aggressive in our reconnaissance, more so than our present sneak and peek attitude?

These are just two of the main questions which the implementation of TOW will present us. TOW poses these problems because of its great capabilities, its range, accuracy and lethality. The reconnaissance squadron need no longer be a semi-passive, reporter of events. It will have the capability to do something to get itself out of tight spots (or into them). These are the options which should make the ATGM troop of the armoured regiment the next best thing to leading tanks.



Editor's Note: Captain Christopher Sproule, RCD, has been with the CAS since March 73. After buying his commission in 1967 he served with the RCD in Canada and Germany as ski instructor and summer recreation officer. Since joining CAS he has held many important assignments including: Chairman of the Armour Dept Entertainment Committee, Assistant Director Peewee Hockey and Assistant Director Mount Douglas Ski Hill. He is, God forbid, the Armour representative on the Tactics Doctrine Board, TOW Committee and as such solicits your opinions (he has got to listen; he is obviously in no position to refute them).

\*\*\*\*\*\*

Good marksmen are only bad marksmen who kept on shooting!

## FLYOVER

### A MILITIAMAN'S VIEW

SGT BG AMIRAULT

8th CANADIAN HUSSARS (PL) (M)

Attachment to the Canadian Forces in West Germany is a most unique and rewarding experience. This past summer, it was my good fortune to be attached to The Royal Canadian Dragoons, stationed in Lahr, for a four month period of combined training and recreation. The possibilities for work and play are endless, depending on how much time, and between what dates, the militiaman gets this attachment.

The first consideration is the work aspect. The equipment that you see and work with is the best that the Armed Forces can provide. There is no fear of incompetence because of a lack of knowledge—there is a job for you, and the unit you are attached to ensures that you receive the training necessary to carry out your tasks. You may feel that you cannot get along with the older and more knowledgeable regular force people with whom you will work, but this is not the case. All you have to do is be calm, act yourself, and keep an open mind. You become a part of the Regiment and find the job stimulating and enjoyable. And remember, with the daily work, training requisites, alerts, and numerous field exercises, there is never a dull moment.

On the recreational side of the coin, you will never be at a loss for something to do. Germany is relatively a small country, and the small portions of it you don't see on the field exercises can be easily visited on weekends. Since all of Europe is small in comparison to Canada, you can visit a separate country every weekend. A five-day leave policy enables you to take advantage of the many week-long excursions planned by the Community Centre.

My "flyover" exercise to Germany gave me a refreshing and honest look into what the Canadian Forces is all about. To my fellow militiamen, I heartily recommend it. You will never regret it!

<del>\*\*\*</del>\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

The battle is not lost until you give up!

### Conditions of Service

CWO Al Minette CD

The following observations, opinions, and remarks are mine, coupled with input from men throughout the Forces. I have over thirty years service in the Canadian Forces and have always tried personally and suggested to others that we operate on the KISS principle. When you adopt the KISS principle, one word comes to the fore - basic. It is my feeling that in this modern machine age and affluent society we have let too much democracy creep into our ranks and have gotten away from the basic approach to soldiering. I should perhaps clarify that statement by saying that I strongly believe in democracy and that it should be defended. However, it is also my belief that democracy in any armed force will destroy that force. My basic approach to soldiering is fair, firm and friendly treatment at all levels coupled with decisive action. In the past few years we have had a strong tendency to listen to and adopt the findings of psychologists, psychiatrists and management study personnel to such a degree that we have forgotten who and with what we are dealing.

To enable us to understand some of the problems or conditions of the service we must deal with the basics and our basic commodity is man or rather manpower.

Why does a lad enlist? According to file FMC 5535-2 (Trg) dated 30 Jul 74, Manning Situation Combat Arms, and I quote "If the youth of today is attracted to serve at all it is because he wants, in order - a trade, travel, adventure, challenge, and excitement" unquote.

Why Al Minette and the youth of his day (1944) enlisted was, and not necessarily in order - to be a soldier, dedication to a cause and country, comradeship, discipline, adventure, and travel. I note with interest in comparing the two lists that the youth of today has missed the desire to soldier and overlooks the aspects of comradeship and discipline. Instead, they ask the Forces to compete with technical schools and travel agencies. Perhaps this is the initial root of our problem. Once the soldier has enlisted we have the responsibility to train him so that he can survive under most conditions. I am of the opinion that our overall aim does not differ from the wartime objective of all weapon training which was to "kill the enemy with the least expenditure of ammunition". Our training of today is adequate to meet the overall aim.

KISS- Keep it simple, stupid.

In conjunction with training our soldier we owe him his welfare or well-being and it is here that we start to err and err badly. The base concept was devised to promote economy of force, effort, manpower and money. The concept is acceptable; however, does it work? Having been on various bases I have yet to see, even when we had a so called surplus of manpower, departments or sections adequately staffed, and if they appeared to be, it was usual to find that the staff had been supplemented by combat trades or personnel dual or triple-roled. Perhaps the most upsetting point to me on the base concept is that, as regiments, we are supposedly self-contained and selfsufficient, with natural limitations. We spend hours instilling in the soldier the virtue and glory of his regiment but when he wants pay, clothing, food, etc, we have to say "sorry lad, you will have to go forth and run the gauntlet against people you have never met." In essence the body who is ultimately responsible for the soldier, the regiment, has little or no control over some of the most important factors of the soldier's well being. Suffice to say "The tail is wagging the dog!" It is also quite noteworthy that when formed troops leave Canada on peacekeeping missions that the base concept departs and we resort to soldiering under the wartime concept of accounting and supply. I also note that messes and institutes come under base control, thus the prices, who will be members, and what the members will pay for are controlled, and the objective, rather than for the morale, amenities, and benefit of the members, suddenly becomes a function of percentage of the profit for the base fund. This may sound a bit emotional or exaggerated, however, remember we are dealing with men and when you deal with men in a regiment you will know that the man must have the feeling of being wanted or belonging to something he can easily identify himself with and that is the regiment. We give the soldier quarters and may say to him "if you want a tape deck, television, bookcase, etc in your room, be our guest. What we expect in return is cleanliness and neatness." A short time later we order the man to move because base has allotted his quarters to militia, cadets and worst of all civilians. These points are the start of a soldier's frustration and beginning of doubt in the integrity of his leaders.

We now have our soldier trained and at the end of five years we decide he is not destined to be a leader so we release him. We have all been around long enough to know that few regiments have existed for long without the professional trooper, and humans, being what they are, are not all leaders. In fact, many are quite content to do a useful job and have no desire to accept the responsibility of leadership. In 1966 the appointment of MCPL started on the scale of seven per armoured regiment. This became a real challenge to the CO in deciding who and where the MCPL should be employed. The establishment has greatly increased for MCPL over the years but we are still locked to time in rank. If we reverted to the old system of giving the CO the power of promotion for outstanding or deserving personnel, I am quite certain that both the incentive and retention rate would increase. Mysterious happenings are taking place under the present PER promotion system. Personnel who are not highly rated in the unit are being promoted above or ahead of their peers who are considered to be of a higher calibre. This problem is noted at the RHQ level and is also noted by personnel in the squadrons. It becomes increasingly difficult to praise or even support a system where you yourself are contradicted by a mystery. Two of the old incentives for promotion, namely mess life and the privilege of rank have certainly lessened. In fact, regimental messes are practically non-existant and the rank structure has been greatly eroded. These points are vital in a regiment trying to promote "esprit de corps Our biggest posting commitment over the past few years has been to Europe and it is probably the one that caused the greatest problem to the Forces and has caused a relatively high release rate in the Strathconas. At one time it was achieved by unit rotation, but since 1967, it is accomplished by individual rotation. Personally, I am against individual rotation to Europe and my sentiments can be best expressed by the following passage from the "The Execution of Private Slovik." This statement was made by General Cota who commanded the 28th American Infantry Division during WW II and was made after the war with regard to the American wartime replacement system. I quote:

"I regret that Private Slovik had to be a product of our replacement system. This was a cruel system, probably necessitated by the nature of the war, but it was cruel nevertheless, and I never liked it. Men have a right to go into battle as members of a trained unit, flanked by friends and associates, and, if possible, led by leaders who have trained them and whom they have come to trust. To thrust an individual, no matter how well trained as an individual he may be, into battle as a member of a strange unit is in my opinion expecting more than many men are capable of giving." unquote.

Gentlemen the stage setting is the same. The only difference is that no one is shooting at him. There has been great concern in some quarters over the release rate, especially at the senior NCO level. I have given considerable thought to this situation and I find that most senior NCOs have considerable service, are older or at least mature, and they are well aware of the contract they have signed and the possibility of postings they face. Coupled with this many are married, have families and perhaps own homes. Every man, regardless of rank, is looking for his niche in life or where to settle. When a posting appears the time has also arrived to think of many things. We have taught these people to be decisive and if their decision is for release they should not be condemned for it. We all must go sometime and we are all faced with the same circumstances and must also make the decision. Another point is the frequency of postings of some individuals which can effect a man's incentive to produce at his maximum capability. He is continually faced with starting at the bottom in his new unit, making it most difficult at all levels to maintain a workable force. It is also, in my opinion, a strong factor in retention where we consider the "feeling of belonging" or comradeship of the individual concerned. The degree of apprehension caused by the waiting for a posting, then the decision of accepting the posting, and if it is refused the warning time to the replacement, has the chain reaction in "Mexican Overdrive". We have in the Corps personnel who have been in three and some in all of the Regiments - we may ask "where does his loyalty lie?"

I have rambled on over a large spectrum. There are other points that I have not mentioned but I sincerely feel that these are some of the points that cause the frustration, the loss of identity, the apprehensive feeling of our soldiers which contribute to his decision for release. I have approached this subject from my position as RSM of the Strathcona's, but having talked with many personnel of various Corps and various ranks I am convinced that neither the Strathcona's nor the Armoured Corps are the exclusive owners of these problems.

# Le Douzième at CFB Gagetown

The Regiment, composed of some 25 officers and 305 other ranks, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Gervais, left Base Valcartier on the 30th of September 1974 at 0400 hours and arrived with all its call signs at the halfway point, Ste-Rose Dégelis, Quebec, about 187 miles from Valcartier at 2300 hours. This first move was done with exercises in communication by B and C Squadrons, the ferret scout car squadrons. A Squadron, the tracked squadron, had previously made the journey by lowbed and aircraft.

At 0800 hours on the first of October the Regiment continued its move and arrived complete at Petersville at 1830 hours.

As many of you will know, a 1954 or 55 3/4 ton truck "ain't what she used to be". However, with tremendous hard work in wind, rain, sleet and snow by 98 BRAVO and his call signs, the Maint Tp repair team became known as Sgt Lussier's "Surgeons" and not a single solitary vehicle of 115 ferrets,  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , 3/4 and  $\frac{1}{4}$  tons was left behind after a journey of 400 miles. Napoleon once said "an army moves on its stomach", well 12e RBC "moves on its maint tp".

The Regiment was in Gagetown on Exercise "Percée Lointaine" and conducted reconnaissance training at the crew, patrol, troop and squadron level. The reconnaissance squadrons exercised from permanent harbours in the Base training area and Headquarters Squadron remained in Petersville.



The LYNX and the LOH, tools of the trade.



C Sqn vehicle park at the Cenotaph Cvr Robichaud JME and CapC Dumont GR.

About 40% of the training was at night, including mounted and dismounted patrols. Initial training involved much map using. An enemy force was used almost all of the time, especially during recce training.

The Regiment was in Gagetown until the 30th of October and encountered some sun with lots of rain and then turning to snow. Due to the weather the Regiment was forced to bring its sabre squadrons into Petersville but not before the squadrons had ample opportunity adjusting to permanent harbours.


The facilities and help obtained from CFB Gagetown including fire dept service, transport, a photographer and a loan of 9 tanks with drivers and instructors was tremendous. We can only hope that some day we can return the favor.

The Regiment terminated its training at Gagetown with a troop test competition composed of various stands including battle procedure, a trace with helicopters, first aid, distance estimation, an initiative problem, maintenance, an OP and NBCW. There were 8 troops participating. Troop 3 'A' Squadron commanded by Lt R. Smith with WO Blanchet won the tests.

After a Regimental party and departure preparations the Regiment made the two day return trip again without leaving any of its vehicles behind, coming back alas to the demands of garrison duty and a combat group inspection.



Sorry guys, you can't push it!



A Sqn vehicle park - 'weapon maintenance'.

# command tank communications

WO TT MACDOUGAL CD

In the past, squadron commanders effectively commanded and controlled their squadrons from a command tank. Are we about to lose this effectiveness because of the lack of a third radio set?

During combat team operations, squadron commanders required three sets to operate efficiently. With the C42 set family and "A" harness, command tanks had one set for a rear link, one set for the combat team net and a third set for the squadron domestic net. With the insertion of the American family of radios into Centurions, we ended up with an AN/VRC 53 set configuration with no room or harness for a third radio. As a result, the combat team commander must either give up one net, and rely on his battle captain to monitor it, or he must continually change frequency from the rear link to the domestic net. This system is obviously not as efficient as having three radio sets.

However, all is not lost! Outlined below is a simple suggestion for the insertion of a third set into the Centurion:

### ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

- 1. AN/PRC 25
- 2. 5820-00-906-1115 matching unit, MX-6707/VRC
- 3. 5985-00-985-9022 antenna element, AS-1730/VRC
- 4. 5820-00-856-2728 antenna element, AT-1095/VRC
- 5. 5995-00-823-2989 cable, assy, CG-1773A/U (6 ft)
- 6. "cable special purpose C set A harness"

(locally produced - see below)


The "cable, special purpose, C set - A harness" may be "locally manufactured" by converting a C-42 12 point connector cable. The <u>female</u> C42 connector is used at one end and an American <u>male</u> 5-point connector is used at the other end. Connection of pins is as follows:

A HARNESS - 12 PT FEMALE		AMERICAN - 5 PT MALE
A	to	D
G.	to	A
M	to	В
В	to	A
E	to	E
D	to	C

The AN/PRC 25 may then be mounted anywhere in the tank that is convenient to the operator. The frequency must be matched manually on the MX-6707/URC matching unit.

.30

# FLASHBACK Ro4



The setting is in a foreign country. Does anybody know where, when, or what unit?

# 12<sup>e</sup> RBC to the rescue

LT PA DONNELLY

If our memory serves us well, Thursday the 21st of November 1974 is a day this Regiment and the people of Metropolitan Quebec will remember for a long time. During that day and night saw "La Belle Province" hit by a fantastic snow storm with snow levels reaching 15 to 16 inches with winds of 35-40 miles per hour. Many citizens of Quebec City and the suburbs were taken completely by surprise.

That night, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC's) from le 121ème Régiment Blindé du Canada were called out to come to the aid of the civil power in a critical situation. 'A' Squadron took on this task composed of 59 personnel and 9 vehicles (eight APC's sub-divided into 4 patrols of two APC's each and a 3/4T truck). There were 35 people on the vehicles with the rest in an administrative and command role. The operation began at about 1630 on 21 Nov 74 and ended at 0800 the following morning. Once 'A' Squadron was in, orders were given and the deployment began.

Two APC's from 1 Troop 'A' Squadron commanded by Lt John Antaki were sent to the police station in Ste. Foy, a Quebec suburb. The vehicles were in constant communication with RHQ in Base Valcartier. Once there, they received the task of recovering people stranded in their vehicles on the Pierre Laporte and Quebec bridges. Policemen from Ste-Foy accompanied all APC's on their missions. These police officers were in constant contact with the police station. On the bridges they rescued 200-250 people who had been trapped in their cars for at least 10 hours. They transported the rescued in groups of 10 and 20 to a secure area at the police station. They also made emergency runs to the nearby Ste-Foy Hospital (diabetic patients).

Two Troop, commanded by Lt Claude Doucet, with 2 APC's was sent to the downtown Quebec storm coordination centre. This troop assisted people trapped in cars, moved a few cars that were blocking main thorough-fares on the boulevards and at shopping centres. In the same area 2 other APC's commanded by Sergeant-Major "Mike" Lussier proceeded to help in the same tasks.

Three troop, commanded by Lt Bob Smith, went to the Police Station in Charlesbourg. They made an emergency 20 mile run to a hospital with, would you believe, a pregnant woman. They also moved people from houses without electricity and heat to serviced areas such as schools and restaurants.

When the entire operation was over the men returned to the Base exhausted but filled with a tremendous feeling of accomplishment.

## Distribution

Colonels/Comdt		Colleges/Centres	
Armoured Branch Artillery Branch CELE Branch Military Engineering B	- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	CFC CFSS CLFCSC NDC	- 10 - 2 - 10 - 5
Infantry Branch Canadian Forces Dental Canadian Cadet Service	- 1 L Sves- 1	CMR RMC RRMC	- 10 - 10 - 10
Cols of Regts		Groups	
LdSH(RC) RCD 8CH 12e RBC	- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	HQ 4 CMBG HQ 1 Cbt Gp HQ 2 Cbt Gp 5e G de C 10 TAG	- 5 - 5 - 5 - 3
Association Presidents	- 1 -12 12	LOs	
Armoured Branch NDHQ	- 1	CDLS London CDLS Washington	- 5 - 5
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FMC HQ		1 R22eR 2 R22eR	- 1 - 1
Comd DComd COS Ops	- 1 - 1 - 10	3 R22eR Schools	- 1
COS Adm	<b>-</b> 8	CFOCS CFRS	- 10 - 5
Colleges/Centres CABC	7	CFWOS CAS	- 5 - 30
CTC	- 3 - 20	DET EAC 1	<b>-</b> 5

Hel Sqns		Militia Continued
403 (Hel) OTS 408 Sqn 422 Sqn 427 Sqn 430 ETAH 438 ETAC	- 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 - 3	Mildist Victoria - 2 Mildist Saint John - 2 Mildist Halifax - 2 Mildist Windsor - 2 Mildist Winnipeg - 2
444 Sqn	- 3	Militia Units
450 Sqn 450 Sqn Det	- 2 - 2	BCD Kelowna - 5 BCR Vancouver - 5 8CH Sussex - 5
RSS		Elgin R St Thomas - 5
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SP Estb		Sask D Moose Jaw - 5 Sher H Sherbrooke - 5
CANSUPPORT SECKENHEIM	- 2	Sher H Sherbrooke - 5 SALH Medicine Hat - 5 Windsor R Windsor - 5
TCHQ		•
Comd	<b>-</b> 5	Miscellaneous
Militia		CFLO Forth Benning - 2 CFLO Fort Knox - 2 CFLO Fort Bliss - 2
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