

ARMOUR

BULLETIN

DES BLINDES



VOLUME 8

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Toute correspondance doit être adressée au rédacteur, aux soins de la Division des blindés, Centre d'Instruction de Combat, BFC Gagetown, Oromocto, (N.B.).


EDITOR COPY

THE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE WHICH MAY BE OF USE TO AN OFFICER OR NCO ON RECONNAISSANCE HAS NO LIMIT. THE WIDER THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFORMANT, THE MORE USEFUL THE INFORMATION . . . FOR THE FINAL VALUE OF RECONNAISSANCE DEPENDS VERY MUCH ON THE ABILITY OF JUNIOR OFFICERS AND PATROL COMMANDERS TO DISCERN THE FACTS OR DEDUCTIONS WHICH WILL BE OF USE TO THEIR SUPERIORS. . .

. . . THE OFFICER OR NCO WHO HAS ATTAINED ONLY THE STANDARD KNOWN AS THE "GOOD REGIMENTAL OFFICER OR NCO" IS INSUFFICIENTLY EQUIPPED FOR RECONNAISSANCE WORK.

WHAT IS OF VALUE IS A KNOWLEDGE IN SOME DEGREE OF THE ART OF WAR.

HENDERSON - THE ART OF RECONNAISSANCE
(1904)



431 059 617 COLONEL JAMES ARTHUR FOX, OMM, CD

Colonel Fox was born in Halifax, Nova Scotia on 20 December, 1935. He has completed his Senior Matriculation in Nova Scotia and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Dalhousie University. He is married and has two sons.


Colonel Fox enrolled in the Royal Canadian Navy Regular Force on 11 September 1953 as an Officer Cadet and underwent university training at Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, British Columbia. He transferred to the Canadian Army, Regular Force in December 1954, in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and continued his university training at the Royal Military College in Kingston under the Regular Officer Training Plan. In May 1957, he attended a summer training camp with the Royal Canadian Dragoons and was promoted Second Lieutenant in June and to the rank of Lieutenant in August 1957. In September, he underwent his last year of university training at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia where he obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree.

The director was posted to the 8th Canadian Hussars, at Camp Petawawa, Ontario in May 1958 and served as Troop Leader and in November 1959, he moved to Soest, Germany with the Regiment and was employed in the Reconnaissance Squadron. He was promoted to the rank of Captain in August 1961. He returned to Camp Petawawa, Ontario in December 1962 and commanded the reconnaissance squadron for one year and was then appointed Adjutant of the 8th Canadian Hussars. He attended the Canadian Army Staff College in Kingston, Ontario in September 1965.

On successful completion of the Staff Course in August 1966, he was promoted Major and served as Staff Officer Operations and Training at the Mobile Command Headquarters in St. Hubert, Quebec. He served as Staff Officer Operations with the Canadian Contingent of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus from October 1966 until April 1967 when he returned to his former appointment at the Mobile Command Headquarters.

The Colonel served from June 1968 to July 1969 with the 1 British Division in Germany as an Exchange Officer. In August 1969, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant - Colonel and posted as Senior Staff Officer to the Headquarter, Prairie Area in Winnipeg, Manitoba. In June 1971 he was appointed Commanding Officer, Lord Strathcona's Horse, in Calgary, Alberta and in Cyprus for a six month tour. In July 1973, he was selected to attend a year of French Language Training in Ottawa, Ontario.

Colonel Fox was promoted to his present rank in August 1974 and was appointed Director of Land Plans/Director of Armour, in the Chief of Land Doctrine and Operations Branch, at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario. He is posted in July 1977 to a one year tour as a student at the US War College in Pennsylvania.



DIRECTORATE OF ARMOUR

(BY LCOL J.C. GERVAIS)

The Editor has asked me to explain what we do in NDHQ. This is a loaded question and I am still puzzled about the intent of his request. He did mention that most armoured officers were keenly interested in knowing, although after checking with the Career Manager's shop there does not appear to be a great rush for posting to Ottawa - in fact the reverse could be said to be true.

I thought that the best way to explain our Directorate was to start with some background and then to focus on the functions of our present Director, Colonel Fox.

In 1971 the Chief of Armour's "shop" and those of the other two functional chiefs as they were then called, were relocated from HQ FMC to NDHQ. As part of this move there was a re-alignment of functions and a hefty reduction of staff. The functional chiefs were placed in the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Group within the Branch now called Chief of Land Doctrine and Operations. Each of the combat arms representatives was assigned a major role in the business of looking after the affairs of the army. The Chief of Armour became known as the Director of Land Plans (DLP) but retained the previous armour functions. Thus he is also known as the Director of Armour. The word Plans is a misnomer as you will see.

Today the responsibilities of this "double-hatted" position are related to:

- combat development planning and
- Corps or black hat matters.

DLP's interest in combat development has to do with the initial stages in the process of determining the concepts, doctrine, structure, organization and material for the army. As such the orientation is definitely to the future and the broad aspects of matters as opposed to specific matters. A staff of three Lieutenant-Colonels, each assisted by two Majors is committed to work in this area. The major agencies involved outside NDHQ are HQ FMC, HQ 4 CMBG, and The Operational Research organization.

The Directorate of Land Plans is a busy place because as in any organization, on top of the normal day to day work there are a continuing series of tasks which always seem to take precedence. The recent Defence Structure Review is a case in point. Much of the army work related to that review including the structural changes, tank and Cougar organizations and increases to the RCD were handled in our Directorate. At the same time as always we had officers regularly participating in international committees such as NATO and ABCA on combat development matters.

The black hat function is as important to us, if not more so. The Director of Armour's

office provides a focal point of professional identity for the Corps. This is all encompassing but includes: responsibilities that have to do with personnel development, doctrine, material and organization, and general Corps matter including the Militia. The Director's responsibilities in all these areas are related to matters of policy. He is also known as the Corps advisor and as such represents our interests at the more senior levels within the Department.

The Director's interest in personnel is to ensure the long term health of the Corps. He does this by influencing personnel development policy, by consulting with both officer's and men's career managers, as well as the Commanding Officers. He also chairs with the Other Ranks promotion board, which is an important annual event for the Corps.

The Director also plays the part of advisor in a rather key area linked to personnel - professional training standards. Although we all have a part to play in this, the primary responsibility for their development and maintenance rests with the CAS, the units and with the SSO Armour at FMC. The Director's part is mainly to advise at the NDHQ level.

Armoured doctrine, material and organization falls under both combat development and black hat matters. Examples of work in this area which involve us are the introduction of the armoured regiment war establishments and the pamphlets on doctrine, the lead one being the Armoured Regiment in Battle published by HQ FMC recently.

The Director puts on his advisor's hat when it comes to armoured militia and other Corps business as well. He seeks the advise of the Colonel Commandant of the Corps, Major General B.F. Macdonald, and consults with the President of the RCAC Association. He also attends the Annual RCAC Conference where matters affecting the present and future of the armoured militia are discussed. At these working meetings an exchange of ideas occurs on how the Regular and Militia armoured regiments can help one another, how Corps standards can be improved, and other Corps matters which help foster esprit de corps such as the Worthington Trophy competition.

One of the ways in which Corps business is conducted is through the Annual Armoured Branch Conference in Ottawa scheduled to coincide with the Other Ranks Promotion Board. This meeting provides the Director with the opportunity to meet with the Regular Unit COs, the OC of the Armour Department and others, to resolve current problems and to decide on where the Regular Force part of the Corps should be headed. From time to time a special meeting is arranged such as the Tank/AVGP Working Group which met last July in NDHQ. Representatives from the units, the CAS, HQ FMC and NDHQ, under the chairmanship of the Director, worked out the outline plans for the introduction of the Leopard and the Cougar because of the major impact of these equipments on the Corps over the next few years.

To look after the black hat function the Director is assisted in NDHQ by myself, Major Walt Reid and Mr. Clark, who is the only one committed full time to armoured matters. There is another important member of the Director's Staff - his secretary Mrs. Madeline Richards. Without her dedication, organization and plain hard work we often would not cross the line. There are others involved as well and I just want to mention two of them.

Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Conway from the Directorate of Land and Requirements shop in CLDO Branch has a major input on equipment matters. Lieutenant Colonel Ed Exley, SSO Armour HQ FMC as has a key role to play and he consults with us regularly on Corps matters including the Militia.

In effect he is the Director's deputy at HQ FMC and parallels all of his activities at that level.

In this brief overview I did not mention or relate job descriptions and Term of Reference. This is not because they do not exist or are not consulted. However, there is an evolutionary nature to many of our jobs and the function of Director of Armour/Plans, double hatted as it is, is no exception. Suffice to say in summary that his directorate is involved with the future of the army as well as being interested in all matters big and small relating to armour.

ARMOUR DOCTRINE UPDATE

Major Quiller Graham
SO Armoured Doctrine

Since the last edition of the Newsletter we have made a great deal of progress. As you know the basic armoured doctrine package will be:

- CFP 305(1) The Armoured Regiment in Battle
- CFP 305(2) The Reconnaissance Squadron in Battle
- CFP 305(3) The Tank Troop Leader's Manual
- CFP 305(4) The Reconnaissance Troop Leader's Manual

Over the past 18 months CFP 305(1) has gone through two revisions and input was sought (and received in great quantity) from virtually all armoured expertise centres in the forces. It has been published and distributed in interim format and is the fundamental doctrinal reference for tank operations at regimental and squadron level.

CFP 305(4) has also been published and distributed in interim format. Originally the intention was to produce the Recce Squadron in Battle first. However CAS took the initiative and produced Precis 140, (Recce Troop Leader's Manual) which I think all would agree was a solid "Sneek and Peek" reference. Capt Thornton who put the Precis together would most certainly agree! With the arrival of Capt McKenzie to the FMC writing team detachment in September 1976, we established a direct link between SO Armour Doctrine and the talents of those in Armour Department. The result was an acceleration of the production of CFP 305(4). Capt McKenzie, in consultation with CAS and with input from all cells of the doctrine section at FMC, edited the Precis, brought it into line with STANAGS and recently produced CFPs, and made it fit the requirements of a CFP.

CFP 305(3) is going through a similiar process. Armour Department is producing the draft as a Precis, will use it on courses and amend it as necessary. From there it will go through the editing process and should be in your hands in interim format by December 1977.

The somewhat delinquent CFP 305(2) is now receiving attention and should be ready for distribution as a draft this summer. All things being equal, we will have the armoured tactical doctrine package completed this year.

The arrival of Leopard in the scene and scheduled delivery of Cougar has added another dimension to the requirement for manuals. The plan has been co-ordinated between NDHQ, FMC HQ and Armour Department and is now on the rails.

As I will be moving out of the doctrine section this summer, I am taking this last opportunity to make two points. First of all the production of doctrine is obviously not a one-man effort. The requirement for co-operation between Corps expertise, Armour Department, the Writing Team Detachment, the Doctrine Section and the Director is clear, and is now well established. Probably the most important element however, is the combined expertise of all officers and NCOs in the Corps. As any doctrine author will agree, a fresh outlook by a conscientious black beret on a draft manual invariably results in improvements. We are a thick-skinned lot (no pride or authorship here!) and are anxious for comments from all of you. Obviously the best time to comment is when a manual is circulated in draft, because the changes can be made on the spot.

The second point is that doctrine, once produced, must be communicated. There is always a regrettable tendency to leave a new manual on the shelf and continue to use old precis, lesson plans, concepts etc., because a lot of work is involved in changing them. This applies from the Staff Colleges right down to the individual NCO giving his lecture in the Regiment. Inconsistencies in teaching content have always plagued the forces and the result is invariably a confused soldier who fails to realize his full potential. We cannot afford to let this happen to us.



THE TROOP LEADERS SPEAK OUT

By Lt S.B. MacKinnon

The Leopard A2 tank was introduced into the Royal Canadian Dragoons in January 1977. This vehicle will serve in the two year interim period until the Leopard C1, built to Canadian specifications, is delivered.

This new tank has caused a few changes to the normal operation of the Regiment. One of these is due to the fact that it is a leased tank. This means that it cannot be handled or serviced in the same manner as if it were Canadian owned. Its' introduction has also meant that there has been a massive conversion to handle the new piece of equipment. Not only in such areas as switching over from handling gasoline to handling diesel, but converting any person who touches the tank. Everyone, from loaders to the Commanding Officer, including technicians and mechanics, have had to undergo Leopard conversion training. It is just not possible to jump straight from a 30 year old British tank to a 10 year old German, due to their different components and systems.

Conversion started in November, 1976 when selected instructors travelled to various German establishments to learn first hand about the tank. Upon their return, they discussed, argued, wrote, and rewrote the lessons to be taught.

In January 1977, the Leopard crewmen conversion courses started. These were designed to convert the people actually manning the Centurion tanks to the Leopard. In spite of this, the instructors were taxed to the limit to ensure all personnel were properly taught. The odd breakdown did not help matters, either.

However, what did the Centurion - Leopard conversion mean to the individual crewmen? For the driver, it is 200 more horsepower, almost twice the maximum speed of centurion, and a little bit less room in the drivers' compartment. It mean freeing the left foot from the chore of pushing 60 pounds on the clutch and no more pulling tiller bars to steer, for a control column similar to a drag racers' replaces them, with hydraulic assistance. The 2½ foot long shifting column has been replaced by a little six inch stick on the right hand side of the drivers' compartment to control the semiautomatic transmission. This has removed one of the biggest challenges of Centurion tank driving: trying to get back into gear if it goes into neutral (Mexican overdrive). This was especially exciting when driving with the hatches closed. When shifting gears, the periscope would sometimes get in the way of the column, and the driver would find himself in neutral. Now, the driver's biggest worry with hatches down is that he might have his Image Intensification periscope turned up too much.

On the maintenance side, the Leopard is a lot less work for the driver than the Centurion. This is because the crew does not have real access to the engine to check certain things, and anything that needs to be checked is simple to do.

Like the driver, the gunner has a tighter squeeze, but even more so. He sits in his futuristic station surrounded by two panels of lights and switches. Instead of one control for power traverse and one for power elevation, it is all combined in one little controller that looks as if it was pulled straight out of a jet fighter. Thankfully, the weapons fire the same ammunition as the Centurion.

However, the biggest change has been in the rangefinding system. Instead of a ranging gun, there is now a stereoscopic optical rangefinder. Before, you were looking for bullets to hit the target, while now the gunner is attempting to put a post in his rangefinder on top of the target. The thrill that one feels when, after an hour and a half of pleading and frustration by the Instructor Gunner, you finally see the post move, has to be experienced to be appreciated...so what if it moved sideways instead of away from you like it should?

Loader/operators have also had to get used to a more restricted space. Not only is the ceiling lower, but there are eleven 105mm rounds in the ready racks instead of six. Besides this, there are two periscopes to bump heads with instead of one periscope.

The machine guns, while using the same ammunition as on the Centurion, are the German MG3 which fire off rounds at over twice the rate of the old Browning.

The radios are, strangely enough, also German. They have about the same ranges as the ones on the Centurion, but are smaller in size. The radio/intercom harness is simpler than that of the Centurion, but perhaps too simple. Drivers will have to get used to picking out the crew commanders' voice from a jumble of radio voices. The throat microphones are a real change, also.


When the crew commander jumps into his seat and roars "Action", he is going to notice a few changes. Not only are the responses from the crew different, but his station has changed a bit also. The loader/operator now possesses the anti-aircraft machine gun, and the crew commander has a greater field of view all round, due to less obstructions. His seat is quite versatile, for he can pump it upward with his right hand, lower it with his right foot, and zoom to times 20 magnification through his sight with his right toe. With this sight, it is possible for the crew commander to search out a new target while the gunner is firing, establish the range to it, then bring the gun around and lay it onto the target and fire. This ability to fire from the crew commanders' station is especially important at night, for the crew commander is the only one with an infra-red light sight. The reason that this is important is because the searchlight emits either white or infra-red light, out to 1500 and 1000 metres respectively.

The problem with this sight is that it takes so long to get down to use it. Therefore, an expedient blade vane sight has been developed consisting of a metal square attached by two horseclamps to the gunners' periscope guard. Its tentative title is the Canadian Modification 1, Mark 1. However, the crew commanders' station is not all that rough and ready, for he has his own two control panels of lights and switches, and an elbow rest for his override control.

The culmination of all the conversion training was the Gun Camp in February/March 1977. For the first week the gunners, crew commanders and loader/operators practices their jobs, then the drivers went out that Saturday for their training. Here they learned an

appreciation for the gunners' lot, as several drivers got seasick while travelling in the gunners' seat.

With the summer rotation of personnel, more conversion training will be carried out to replace trained personnel going home. But faith; for two years from now when the Leopard C1 is issued, the Royal Canadian Dragoons should be fairly good at conversion training.



Lt S.E. Moffat

"2 This is 21. My callsign is down. I've blown a clutch, over".

"2 This is 24B. My callsign is down. My transmission is gone, over."

"2 This is 23C. My callsign is down with a coolant leak, over."

"2 Roger.....sob! out."

These are a few of the radio transmissions that cause premature baldness amongst squadron commanders and bring booming business to gasthof owners of West Germany. To the joy of the OCs and the demise of the gasthof owners, these calls will soon cease to be an integral part of the RT procedures for The Royal Canadian Dragoons, as the Regiment has, or soon will be, completely converted to our new tank, the Leopard.

As we are all aware, Canada has contracted to buy 128 Leopard A3 tanks to be built to our specifications, and will be known as the Leopard C1. These tanks will not begin to come off the production line until late 1978, so the German government has agreed to lend Canada's NATO forces 32 Leopard A2 main battle tanks. The first A2 arrived January

7th, and by June 1st the Regiment will be completely outfitted with two squadrons of A2s.

As always happens with the new piece of kit, everyone wants to see a demo, go for a ride or crawl around and touch it. Once a few tidbits of technical data are tossed about, and hands get dirty, everyone walks away feeling completely at home with the new equipment. But what about the soldiers? What has been done to train them on a new tank to an operational level by June 1st?

The regiment conducted seven courses, two D&M, two gunnery, two comms and one crew commanders, to convert the soldiers from Centurion to Leopard. These courses were concentrated packages, designed to give the crewman a thorough knowledge of the basics of the tank, and they were conducted by senior NCOs who underwent training with the Bundeswehr. The training went well as was indicated by the fine results obtained at the gun camp in Hohne 28 Feb - 19 March. But the conversion wasn't as easy as it would seem. No longer is the Mk 1 tool, fine adjusting, 5 lb the most important piece of kit on the tank. Rather than list all the problems that could occur, I've chosen two areas to discuss, one that will present a few problems and one that shouldn't. These are gunnery and D&M.

GUNNERY

The Leopard A2 mounts the British L7A3 105mm gun, identical to that on the Centurion. But that is where the similarity ceases. It is equipped with a stereoscopic rangefinder, backed up by a coincidental rangefinding system. To try and explain in written form how these systems work, is like trying to produce a CFP on the mechanics of tying one's shoe. I don't intend to attempt either, but suffice it to say that it is completely different and more complicated than the familiar ranging gun. The stereoscopic rangefinder is very accurate up to 3500m and the gunner is capable of firing APDS using the rangefinder graticule pattern, thus cutting down the time of engagement. Once a gunner is completely familiar with the equipment and has had a lot of practice, it can be as fast as, if not faster than, the RG. But there lies the major problem with the system, and the one which faces the Regiment presently. A gunner requires weeks of constant ranging practice with the equipment before he is consistently accurate and fast. The brief exposure our gunners had to the A2's rangefinder was not sufficient to allow them to become confident with the equipment. As a result, the first few ranging practices were slow and, in one or two isolated cases, somewhat unaccurate. This, however, rapidly vanished as the gun camp progressed.

The other major stumbling block with the rangefinder is that not everyone can be a gunner. If one has poor or no depth perception, he will not be able to operate the rangefinder. Yet despite this, and the problem of experience, the stereoscopic rangefinder is, in my view, more accurate than the RG and gives you a better chance of getting a first round hit.

Another point of interest in the gunner's seat is the telescopic sight. This sight is used for firing HESH, HEAT and co-ax, and can be used for firing APDS. It is a ballistic sight, not in the sense of the No 30 sight, but rather when a range is applied in the appropriate scale, the graticule pattern moves. The range is applied manually on the sight, which can be slow. So you can see that ranging HESH technique would not be as fast as with an RG, what with ranging, changing to the telescopic sight, applying the range and laying on the target, but with the accuracy of the rangefinder, it is more accurate.

These are the two major problem areas with the gunnery system, and I've touched on them but briefly. It has many good points; it is easier to track movers, the stab system is good and the gunner's controls are simple and easy to operate, to mention a few. The only other area that has caused some problems is the hydraulics which power the turret. The system has a tendency to break down and requires more maintenance than, let's say, an electrically powered turret.

D&M

The IA for a broken Leopard is straight forward and simple: call RCEME. As silly as this may sound, it's true. The Leopard A2 is powered by a Mercedes V10 diesel engine, capable of putting out 830 BHP at 2200 RPM. It is a completely sealed unit, and the back deck can only be removed by the ARV. Many of the maintenance tasks, outside of first and last parades, must be conducted by RCEME, and any work that entails changing anything on the power pack requires the whole thing to be pulled. With a well trained crew, this can take place in less than 3/4 hr, but by the time the ARV reaches you, pulls the back deck, pulls the pack, fixes the problem, replaces the back deck, considerable time has been wasted. Unfortunately, there is precious little that can be done, as the tank is designed in such a manner that crew maintenance is minimal. Don't get me wrong, I'm not complaining. Six hours is better than 36 hours any day.

As far as driving is concerned, it's a dream. It has a semi automatic transmission which is electrical and very simple. There's no tiller bars, but a steering yoke instead. The braking system is nothing short of excellent, and the brakes are capable of bringing the tank to a full, smooth stop no matter how fast one is travelling.

And the ride? Magnifique! Each set of road wheels are joined by a torsion bar, and each wheel is assisted by a shock absorber. The end result is a 45 km/hr trip cross country that is almost as smooth as a baby's bottom.

The beauty of the D&M side of the tank is that its simple to maintain and easy to drive, even hatches down, as the optics are very good. And the feeling one gets when one passes a Chieftain like it's standing still is beyond words!

CONCLUSION

So, the \$64,000 question is, "Will Leopard conversion be difficult?" To quote a squadron commander I knew in another Regiment, Yes and No. Yes, to a certain extent, by virtue of the fact that it's a new piece of kit. Some techniques are different, it has to be treated differently than the Centurion. In some areas it's more complicated than the Centurion (All this, and the labels are in German too!) But I feel that, overall, the conversion will not be difficult for the simple reason that a tank is a tank is a tank. Gunnery techniques are virtually the same, and despite all the lights that flash and buttons to be pushed, the Leopard is not a difficult tank to operate. It is mechanically sound and reliable, and this alone gives the commanders more time to practice the more difficult aspects of fighting the tank, such as the rangefinders.

There are many other areas that I have not touched upon: stowage space, crew comfort, the crew commander's station, and night fighting capability. I have attempted to point out areas that, in my opinion, facilitate and hinder quick conversion to the Leopard. We have the tanks and are capable now of fighting them. The RCD are entering the Canadian Army Trophy competition, and rest assured that we will do well. There will always be those who will feel the Centurion was the answer, but even amongst the die hards is a rapidly growing respect for the first class fighting vehicle.

RCACA RESOLUTIONS 76

The following are the resolutions passed by the RCACA (Cavalry) at the annual conference (Fall 1976) which were submitted with the Canadian Defence Association resolutions to the Canadian Government. Preliminary comments by NDHQ agencies are also included.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO THE ARMED FORCES

The Conference of Defence Associations believes that the Government of Canada is not providing or supporting a level of Armed Forces sufficient to guarantee the security and sovereignty of Canada in time of civil and national emergency.

Preliminary DND Comment by Adm (Pol)

1. DND is in the process of carrying out a comprehensive analysis of the resources, particularly manpower, that are required to enable it to execute effectively the tasks given the Department by Government.

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE POLICY

WHEREAS it is important that there be in existence a current statement of national defence policy which provides an officially approved basis for future defence planning and resource allocation, particularly for the period 1977-1987; and

WHEREAS recent government decisions and statements during 1976 have actually modified the policies as set out in Defence in the Seventies; and

WHEREAS for effective development of the Canadian Armed Forces and public appreciation of their roles there is an urgent need for a revised statement of defence policy.

BE IT RESOLVED that the formulation of a revised and comprehensive policy statement be initiated immediately by the Government and that the Conference Defence Association and other strategic studies and defence policy institutes and bodies be invited to submit briefs and to participate in this vital project.

Preliminary DND Comment by ADM (Pol)

Acknowledging that the 1971 White Paper is a statement of defence policy for the 1970s, DND is in process of carrying out a series of studies to determine what should be the capabilities and force structure required for the 1980s by DND. The outcome of such studies would likely be reflected in a document that would enunciate government policy developed in the light of the above considerations, and modifications already made to existing policy as a result of changed circumstances. Briefs by the CDA and other concerned organizations would be welcome and would be given careful consideration.

MOBILIZATION PLAN

WHEREAS there is no mobilization or force generation plan which sets out the manpower levels, defence equipment and stores required for various contingencies, as well as the tasks and optional roles of units, and

WHEREAS the "Total Force" concept and the policy to develop general purpose combat capabilities have not been described or defined in terms of force level and equipment requirements, and

WHEREAS in the existing force structure the combat, combat support, service support, strategic airlift and sealift elements are inadequate to sustain Canadian field formations in military operations or major civil emergencies, and

WHEREAS stocks of defence equipment and stores are insufficient to meet our national and international commitments and contingency requirements,

BE IT RESOLVED that the Court of Canada be requested to develop and promulgate as an urgent priority matter precise guidelines on which plans can be developed for mobilization.

Preliminary DND Comment by DGMAP

1. This item is being addressed by DCPC because mobilization to such a level is, at this point, still a policy/operational decision. Therefore, any discussion regarding organizational structure, equipment plans or resource mobilization will be premature, if not impractical.

Preliminary DND Comment By DGOM

1. War Establishments for all existing regular force formations, units and headquarters which require them are nearing completion. These war establishments detail the emergency manpower and equipment requirements of the Regular Force as currently constituted.

Preliminary DND Comment by DGOR

1. The ball is in the Government's court, and has been for some time - before WINTEX 75 and probably before WINTEX 73.

Preliminary DND Comment by DGMPO

1. Mobilization planning envisages a Forces requirement for additional resources under conditions of war (general or limited), major internal unrest or following a major natural disaster.
2. Mobilization planning must encompass material as well as manpower and may be total mobilization (ie: the CF as a whole) or selective (ie: individual units or commands).
3. The CF mobilization concept, approved by DMC in Aug 74, embraces three levels:
 - a. Level 1. Augmentation of the Regular Force, or portions of it, to war establishment levels. There are two sub-levels:
 - (1) Level 1A. Voluntary employment of the Reserves.
 - (2) Level 1B. Compulsory employment of the Reserves.
 - b. Level 2. Expansion of the Regular Force either by the creation of new units or by the mobilization or selected formed Reserve Force units. This level is being planned in outline only, as no approved tasks exist which would require this expansion.
 - c. Level 3. General mobilization of the resources of the nation to meet a prolonged emergency. This level is being planned in concept only.
4. Level 1, in regard to manpower, requires augmentation by individuals. No activation of Primary Reserve units is required.
5. A war establishment is that increased manpower and material required to enable a unit to operate at a wartime intensive activity rate.
6. For example, an infantry battalion in Canada has a war establishment of 804 personnel, but the restricted peacetime establishment is 643 personnel.
7. Of some 460 Regular Force war establishments required, 90% have been submitted to NDHQ for approval. Therefore, total Level 1 - Augmentation requirement is not yet firm. Hence planning and Reserve Force tasking cannot be completed.
8. The total Level 1 requirement for additional personnel is estimated to be on the order of 20,000, mostly in the land forces. The response from the Reserves cannot be determined with precision, but is estimated to be not more than 8,000. Therefore, considering the present strength and capabilities of the Reserves, considerable recruiting of civilian volunteers would be required to complete Level 1 of mobilization. Furthermore, should our forces become involved in operations, a reinforcement system would require additional manpower resources.
9. The existing force structure has been tailored to meet those tasks currently identified and considered acceptable as governed by financial restraints. Accordingly, the existing Regular Force units during Level 1, mobilization will be augmented up to war establishment levels in personnel and equipment in order to meet these currently planned defence commitments. In the event of war, priorities and defence commitments will change, therefore the procedures which have been developed to cope with Level 1 requirements are, in the main, considered adequate for Level 2 and Level 3 mobilization.
10. Mobilization of civilian resources (industry, manpower and resources) is the responsibility of other government departments, although DND continues to advise these departments on defence requirements.

PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMME FOR THE RESERVES

WHEREAS the public has little awareness of the Militia; much less their role and contribution.

WHEREAS the lack of public awareness affects both the quality and quantity of recruiting for the Militia and the subsequent retention.

WHEREAS the serving member required reinforcement from the appreciation derived from public awareness of the Militia.

WHEREAS the commanders at all levels do not have the funds or the expertise to conduct adequate public relations campaigns.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that there be developed professional national public relations programmes for the Reserve Force which may be integrated with the present Regular Force programme.

Preliminary DND Comment by DIS

1. Already under way is a national recruiting campaign for Reserve Entry Officers Scheme. A meeting to address a national recruiting campaign, with representatives from all Militia Areas, has been called for Mobile Command Headquarters 19-20 Feb 77, the result of which will be to produce recruiting aids for use in recruiting drives at the unit level.
2. In conjunction with the above, during the spring and summer, a 28-minute colour film called MILITIA: TWICE THE CITIZEN is being produced for use in the traditional September recruiting campaigns.
3. The Militia paid ceiling is 15,500. At the end of September, strength was 101 per cent of paid ceiling, at the end of October it was 99.4 per cent and at the end of November it was 99 per cent. Recruiting, then is for quality, not quantity.
4. More emphasis is to be put on recruiting aids being produced at the national level because it has been found that small-scale local advertising is not as effective as desired. Further, Areas in FY 73-74 spent only 45 per cent of the allocated recruit advertising budget; FY 74-75 it was 50 per cent; FY 75-76 it was 90 per cent. To the end of Nov '76, only 14.1 per cent of the budget has been spent.
5. The foregoing concerns recruit advertising. Concerning retention, it is a matter of training and maintaining individual interest, not a matter of public awareness. Awareness of the individual Militia person already serving is maintained to a large degree by publication of the newspaper The Reservist, which has been judged popular and effective down to the lowest level.
6. Public relations is a separate field entirely and cannot be coupled directly with recruit advertising. Recruitment from public relations is a spin-off; public relations is to inform the public and make them aware of the role and activities of the Militia.

7. To this end, a number of meetings at the Area level have been held for Militia Informations Officers who, for the most part, are experts in the media or allied fields, with representation from Mobile Command Headquarters and often from the Department of National Defence Office of Information. One of these seminars, for example, is being held at Central Militia Area on 12 Feb 77.

8. The aim of these meetings, sometimes called by the Area and sometimes by FMC HQ, is to inspire these MLOs to increase their output which, in turn, will serve to substantially increase the public awareness of the Militia in particular and the Canadian Forces in general.

9. To summarize, a Public Information program to promote the aims and activities of the Reserves does exist, and its success is evident in the amount of exposure noted in communications media across the country in the past year, particularly during summer training concentrations, camps and related activities.

10. Public Information being a "command" responsibility (commanders at all levels), the success of any program for any particular formation or unit usually is in direct proportion to the direction and emphasis given by commanders, and the cooperation provided by staffs.

11. Also, Regular Force Information Officers are available in regions to provide counselling, guidance and assistance, to the extent that their resources permit.

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

WHEREAS the administrative systems which the Militia must use are, in certain cases, complex and time-consuming. Particular reference is made to the Reserve Data System and the Stores Control System.

WHEREAS the RDS is a new system which has three critical problems.

- a. For a variety of reasons there has been no reliable output available from the system. The units therefore have not had any of the important personnel profile data necessary to control and manage manpower, training and pay.
- b. The system is so complex that the training of Militia clerks is extremely difficult in the limited time available.
- c. The time and volume of material required even for simple functions such as enrolment, is such, that the most experienced staff must spend an excessive amount of time on data input. The result is a backlog in administration and severe reduction in the time available for advisory and training activities.

WHEREAS the Stores Control System while not suffering from system breakdown prevalent in the RDS has two clear problems.

- a. Each data entry line item requires a separate input form. Such repetitive activity is an inefficient expenditure of time.
- b. The identification of stores is by stock number only, with no alpha description and with no catalogue available for alpha numeric cross reference. Stores not commonly used cannot be traced without the expenditure of an excessive amount of time.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that, a review of these systems should be made to evaluate efficiency and to investigate the simplification of data input.

Preliminary DND Comment By DPIS (in conjunction with FMC COS Adm and COS ADP)

1. RDS user documentation has been rewritten in a much simplified form; in fact, 11 volumes have been reduced to one. The principal aim throughout was the simplification of data input procedures. The new procedures were tested by Reserve units in the Montreal area with very positive results. Simplified instructions are being passed to the printer 17 Dec 76 and should be in the hands of all users by end Jan 77.
2. Further, last October, meetings were held between FMCHQ representatives and all relevant militia organizations to re-define the outputs desired from the RDS. The system has been modified to meet these re-defined aims; Reserve formations should receive the first outputs from the modified system in Jan 77.
3. The Stores Control System is not within the purview of ADM (Per) or his staffs. Consequently no comments are offered. However, it is understood that this system is part of the Canadian Forces Supply System (CFSS) and consequently is the same as that used by the Regular Force. Comments should therefore be solicited from DGSS.

NOTE: It is anticipated that FMC representatives will be present at the conference and, as a consequence, such amplification as may be required could be provided at that time.

Preliminary DND Comment by FMC Compt

Res Data System

1. The complaint of units not having important pers profile data is not understood in that although major difficulties have been encountered with the RDS, manual records continue to exist at the units.
2. The observations that the RDS is complex is well understood and a refinement to simplify both the procedures and the instructions has been taking place over the last few months. The instructions have been reduced from eleven manuals to one and a variety of changes has been made in the procedures all aimed at simplification. Several meetings have been held with all concerned and the consensus now is that the system is in fact well within the capability of the Reserves to use and manage. The new simplified book of instructions will be issued to all prior to the end of Jan. This new manual has been tested with militia clerks who maintain it is well within their capability of understanding and usage.
3. This HQ is in the final throes of testing the new modified, simplistic version of RDS and results are promising. It is suggested that it may be of some value to provide the syndicate members who will be dealing with this particular resolution at the CDA Conference, to be held in Jan, with a briefing about RDS and the Commands intentions to improve, simplify and re-introduce as a working system. The Command Comptroller and his staff are prepared to provide such a briefing of approx 30 minute duration including a question period.

Preliminary DND Comment by DSM

1. Since reserve units are treated as Distribution Accounts for the purposes of the CFSS, the customer need not complete a supply voucher for each line item demanded. Ref B states that such a customer may present his requirements using a variety of methods such as telephone, mail, message, and composite lists.
2. A Distribution Account holder is provided with a Material-In-Use Status Report which shows the stock number and description of all the accountable items to which the unit is entitled. In addition, the account holder should maintain a register of fast moving expendable stores used by his unit. Items for which stock numbers are not readily available can be obtained by submitting a detailed description to the supporting base supply section.
3. The CFSS was designed to provide a high standard of supply support with a minimum of inconveniences to the customer. Close liaison between reserve units and their supporting base supply section should ensure customer satisfaction.

ARMY CADET CORPS SUPPORT

WHEREAS the cadet movement has proven to be an excellent source of recruits for both the Militia and ultimately the Regular Force, and

WHEREAS FMCO 29-7 specifically states that "cadets must not participate in field firing exercises or other dangerous training" while both the Sea and Air Cadet movements provide challenging, adventure-oriented programmes, and

WHEREAS there has been a resultant significant reduction in RCAC numbers in the past few years.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that a revised policy which would allow the Cadet movement to undertake a broader and more realistic scope of training with greater input and support from the sponsoring Militia unit.

Preliminary DND Comment by D Cdts 3

1. FMCO 29-7 (Revised 23 Dec 76) and not yet received by NDHQ amplifies and expends on the policy of affiliated unit support to Royal Canadian Army Cadets.
2. The restriction on cadets participating in "field firing exercises or other dangerous training" will remain. However, it should be noted that this does not preclude outdoor range practices on properly constituted ranges nor participation in field training exercises which does not involve live ammunition. A "field firing exercise" is interpreted as an exercise involving fire and movement using live ammunition. "Other dangerous training" is largely left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer of the affiliated unit.
3. Challenging and adventure type training is being encouraged and expended in several ways: Examples are: Para Course, Leadership and Challenge Course (Banff), Arctic Indoctrination Course and adventure training on other Summer Course and at local units.

ADMINISTRATIVE TROOP

WHEREAS over the past several years all militia units have recognized the serious and continuing problem of a lack of support/adm positions in their establishments; and

WHEREAS most units have in fact created "ad hoc" administrative or "HQ" troops within their present framework; and

WHEREAS it is recognized that there are frequently personnel available who meet support trades requirements, who are unsuitable to combat arms trades, and these personnel could perform valuable support functions; and

WHEREAS the militia soldier's week is "six hours" long and it is not possible for one individual to perform the finance, supply, transport, and other logistical/administrative functions, it is therefore desirable to have militia soldiers committed to each of these several functions; and

WHEREAS it is recognized that at this time it is not desirable to change the overall number of establishment positions pending the outcome of the forces total establishment review.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that a minimum of 13 of the current establishment positions within a unit may be designated at the CO's discretion to be filled by persons in any of the recognized militia support trades to form an administrative troop.

Preliminary DND Comment By D Mil

1. A study will be undertaken to develop establishments for Militia combat arms and combat support arms units which will redress previous deficiencies and which will as closely as possible reflect SBG establishments.

Preliminary DND Comment By DLP 2

1. The question of the need for an administrative element as part of the Armoured Militia Regiment establishment is agreed with. Militia units will eventually be based on the same establishments as the Regular Force, and administrative positions will be annotated as a requirement.

Preliminary DND Comment By DGOM

1. The resolution to designate 13 of the current establishment positions as militia support trades to form an administrative troop is concurred in. New Light Armoured Regiment (M) establishments are not being staffed in NDHQ. The addition of an Adm Tp to RHQ up to 13 positions would have minimal establishment implications. Therefore, it is recommended that the resolution be supported as an interim measure and the requirement for the Adm Tp be included in the new establishments now being staffed at NDHQ.

MILITIA RECRUITING

WHEREAS the Canadian Armed Forces has a national budget allocated for recruiting purposes for Regular Force.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that Militia Recruiting be incorporated in with Regular Force Recruiting Drive at no additional cost.

SUPPORTING POINTS

In all TV advertising currently being utilized by DND there is a 10 second voice-over slide top at the end of each commercial which shows the viewing audience the recruiting centres available.

There would not be much involved by adding the voice-over "If you are interested in the Armed Forces, but don't want to go regular, join the Militia Unit of your choice".

Additionally, with every print ad used, whether newspaper (classified or display) magazine or roto incorporation into these ads of the same line as above can be implemented.

Preliminary DND Comment By Directorate of Recruiting and Selection

1. DND is phasing out its 60 second TV commercials and replacing them with 30 second ones. The voice over of these new commercial is only of five second duration and does not permit any addition.
2. Furthermore the local addresses are being changed for the following:
"For more information contact your nearest recruiting office listed in the yellow pages under Recruiting or contact your local Manpower office".
3. The words: "On a full time or part time basis" could be added but that would be somehow against the rules of good advertising in that we would be introducing a new element in the conclusion.
4. As far as print media is concerned the majority of our ads are very specific i.e. cook - military police - DEO - Engineers etc and unless the Reserves can offer the same our advertising would only be misleading at the time of publication.
5. There are 42 Regular Recruiting centres across the country. Each one has been directed to contact the Reserves unit on their territories and see how they can help. This offer still stands.

SCALE OF ISSUE - ARMoured VEHICLE GENERAL PURPOSE
FOR PRIMARY RESERVE ARMoured UNITS

INTRODUCTION

There is deep concern among members of Canada's Primary Reserve Armoured Regiments that they will be "left out" when issues of the AVGP are made to the Canadian Forces. There has been no issue of armoured vehicles to the Reserve Armoured units since the days of the M4A2E8 Sherman Tank, and even today, no formal scale of equipment exists for these units. Members of the Reserve Armoured community want to make sure that National Defence Headquarters issues the Reservists with an appropriate number of the new AVGPs when they become available, so that the Reservists can train to comparable Regular Force trades specifications and therefore support the Regular Force field units better and more completely.

WHEREAS the announcement will be made soon that the Canadian Forces will be procuring an Armoured Vehicle General Purpose for its Armoured units and;

WHEREAS the Reserve Armoured units are tasked to augment the Regular Armoured units at home and abroad and that close similarity of training standards on identical equipment is the only way to properly carry out an augmentation program that is meaningful and satisfying to a Reservist; and

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that a suitable Table of Equipment based around the AVGP be established for Reserve Armoured Regiments and that this Table of Equipment be one AVGP (4 AVGPs) per Reserve Squadron.

Preliminary DND Comment By DLP 2

1. The AVGPs are being procured to meet the requirements of both the Regular Force and the Militia. The Table of Equipment (TOE) that is in the end decided for Armoured Militia units depends on total numbers of AVGPs being purchased. Because of financial constraints, the figures now used for planning provide for an allocation to the Primary Reserve but not on the scale suggested, eg one troop per squadron per unit establishment. The Armoured Militia will be fully consulted in the allocation of AVGP.

SHORT TERM CALL OUT

WHEREAS the Supplementary List does have people with training, skills and experience who can be a valuable service and resource to the militia, and

WHEREAS a short term attachment for specific requirements to units during a year could help the units overcome deficiencies in key positions for a specific task;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that CFAO 49-8 be amended to grant authority to a unit commanding officer to call out directly to the unit from the supplementary list, any person, for a maximum of 14 days per person per year. The total number of days for such employment to be limited to 140 days per unit per year. These attachments to be funnelled from within the normal unit allotment of man-days.

Preliminary DND Comment By DGMU

1. The resolution is feasible. There is some concern, however, as to control. It is suggested that CHQs, through Area HQ, would have to be advised of the unit's intention and should be afforded veto power.

2. Another minor point that should be considered is the requirement to ensure that the "callout" has the necessary security clearance for the position in which he/she would be employed. This would require either liaison with the CHQ or direct communication with NDHQ.

3. It is recommended that this proposal be staffed through CHQs concerned.

Preliminary DND Comment By DGRC

1. Annex B to CFAO 49-8 now indicates that a member of the Supp L may be attached to the Primary Reserve on authority of the Area Commander. This is an ADM (Per) CFAO and they can be requested to re-examine the level of authorization.

2. The matter of funds could be more difficult. Disregarding HQ, there are in the militia alone:

	<u>Major</u>	<u>Minor</u>
Armd units	17	1
Arty units	14	4
Engr units	3	8
Inf units	51	2
Svc bns	20	-
Med coys	-	6
Total	<u>105</u>	<u>21</u>

The request is for 140 days per unit per year. To this could be added 70 for minor units. Thus, total manday utilization would be:

105 X 140	= 14,700
21 X 70	= <u>1,470</u>
Total	<u>16,170</u>

The cost of 16,170 would be approximately \$397.458 plus travel plus TD costs. There fore, before the plan could be adopted, provision of extra money must be considered. If the management of this money were delegated to district commanders or COs, the authorizing agency could probably be delegated to the same level.

Resolutions du RCACA 76

Résolutions adoptées par le RCACA (Cavalerie) au cours de la conférence annuelle (Automne 1976) et qui ont été présentées avec celles de la Canadian Defence Association au Gouvernement canadien. Sont aussi inclus les commentaires préliminaires des services du QGDN.

APPUI DU GOUVERNEMENT VIS-A-VIS DES FORCES ARMEES

La Conférence des associations de la défense pense que le Gouvernement dur Canada ne fournit ni n'appuie un niveau de Force armée suffisant pour garantir la sécurité et la souveraineté du Canada en cas d'urgence civile et nationale.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par l'Admin (Pol)

1. Le MDN s'occupe actuellement d'une analyse complète des ressources, surtout dans le domaine de la main-d'oeuvre, qui seront nécessaires à l'exécution efficace des tâches que le Gouvernement lui attribuera.

ENONCE DE LA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE

ATTENDU QU'il est important qu'il y ait un énoncé de la politique nationale de défense prévoyant une base officielle en vue d'une planification de défense et d'une répartition des ressources, surtout pour la période allant de 1977 à 1978; et

ATTENDU QUE les déclarations et les décisions récentes du gouvernement en 1976 ont en fait modifié les politiques énoncées dans la Défense au cours des années soixante-dix; et

ATTENDU QUE pour un développement efficace des Forces armées et une prise de conscience du public quant à leur rôle, il faut absolument un énoncé révisé de la politique de défense.

QU'IL SOIT RESOLU que le gouvernement formule sur le champ un énoncé de défense révisé et détaillé et que la Conférence de la Défense Association et autres études stratégiques ainsi que les instituts et corps de politique de défense soient invités à présenter des mémoires et à participer à ce projet capital.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN l'ADMIN (Pol)

1. Reconnaissant que le Livre Blanc de 1971 est un énoncé de politique de défense pour les années 70, le MDN entreprend actuellement une série d'études afin de déterminer quels devraient être ses capacités et son effectif nécessaires pour les années '80. L'issue de telles études figurera probablement dans un document énonçant la politique du gouvernement élaborée à la lumière des questions susvisées, ainsi que les modifications déjà apportées à la politique actuelle en raison des nouvelles circonstances. Les mémoires que pourraient présenter la CDA et les autres organismes intéressés seront bien accueillies et examinées attentivement.

PLAN DE MOBILISATION

ATTENDU QU'il n'existe ni plan de mobilisation ni d'accroissement des forces indiquant les niveaux de main-d'oeuvre, de matériel de défense et d'approvisionnements nécessaires en cas d'imprévus, ainsi que les tâches et les rôles facultatifs des unités, et

ATTENDU QUE le concept "effectif total des Forces" et la politique de développement de capacités de combat d'ordre général n'ont été ni décrits ni définis en termes de niveau de force et de besoins en matériel, et

ATTENDU QUE dans la structure actuelle des Forces, le combat, le combat tactique, le soutien logistique, le déplacement stratégique par air et les éléments de déplacement par mer sont insuffisants pour supporter les formations canadiennes de campagne dans des situations d'urgence civile, et

ATTENDU QUE les stocks de matériel de défense et les approvisionnements sont insuffisants pour faire face à nos engagements nationaux et internationaux et à nos besoins imprévus.

QU'IL SOIT RESOLU de demander à la Cour du Canada d'élaborer et de promulguer en priorité des lignes directrices précises à partir desquelles des plans de mobilisation peuvent être élaborés.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGMAP

1. La présente question est posée par le DGCM parce que la mobilisation à un tel niveau est, à ce point, toujours une décision opérationnelle et de politique. Par conséquent, toute discussion concernant la structure d'organisation, les plans d'équipement ou la mobilisation des ressources serait prématurée sinon irréalisable.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGOM

1. Les documents relatifs aux effectifs de guerre dont ont besoin les formations, les unités et les quartiers généraux de la Force régulière sont sur le point d'être prêts. Ils donnent le détail des besoins de main-d'oeuvre et de matériel d'urgence de la Force régulière comme elle est constituée actuellement.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGRO

1. La question est devant la Cour du Gouvernement et elle y est depuis quelques temps déjà - avant WINTEX 1975 si ce n'est avant WINTEX 1973.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGPMO

1. Le plan de mobilisation tient compte du besoin des Forces en matière de ressources supplémentaires en temps de guerre (générale ou restreinte), en cas d'une importante crise intérieure ou à la suite d'un important désastre naturel.

2. Le plan de mobilisation doit tenir compte du matériel et de la main-d'oeuvre que ce soit dans le cas d'une mobilisation générale (c'est-à-dire la Force entière) sélective (c'est-à-dire certaines unités ou certains commandements).

3. Le concept de mobilisation des FC approuvé par le DMC en août 1974 comprend trois niveaux:

a. Niveau 1. Accroissement de la Force régulière ou certaines parties aux niveaux des effectifs de guerre. Il y a deux niveaux inférieurs:

(1) Niveau 1A. Emploi volontaire des réserves

(2) Niveau 1B. Emploi obligatoire des réserves

b. Niveau 2. Accroître la Force régulière en créant de nouvelles unités ou en mobilisant des unités choisies dans la Force de réserve. Ce niveau n'est qu'un aperçu, étant donné qu'il n'existe aucune tâche approuvée qui nécessiterait une telle expansion.

c. Niveau 3. Mobilisation générale des ressources nationales pour faire face à une situation critique prolongée. Ce niveau n'en est qu'à l'état de concept.

4. Pour ce qui est de la main-d'oeuvre, le niveau 1 nécessite un accroissement par les particuliers. Aucune mise sur pied d'unités de la première réserve n'est nécessaire.

5. Un effectif de guerre est l'accroissement de la main-d'oeuvre et du matériel nécessaires à l'unité pour fonctionner à une capacité intensive en temps de guerre.

6. Par exemple, un bataillon d'infanterie au Canada compte un effectif de guerre de 804 hommes, mais compte un effectif de 643 hommes en temps de paix.

7. Des quelques 460 hommes de l'effectif de guerre nécessaires de la Force régulière, 90% ont fait l'objet de l'approbation du QGDN. Par conséquent, l'effectif total du niveau 1 - Accroissement - n'est pas encore arrêté. Ce qui fait que la planification et l'attribution à la Force de réserve ne peuvent être terminées.

8. On estime que l'effectif supplémentaire total nécessaire du niveau 1 sera de l'ordre de 20,000 hommes, dont la plus grande partie dans les Forces terrestres. L'apport des Réserves ne peut être déterminé avec précision, mais on estime qu'il ne sera pas de plus de 8,000 hommes. Donc, compte tenu de l'effectif et des possibilités actuelles des Réserves, il faudra procéder à un recrutement intense de volontaires civils pour atteindre le niveau 1 de mobilisation. Par ailleurs, au cas où nos Forces se trouveraient mêlées à des opérations, un système de renfort nécessiterait des ressources en main-d'oeuvre supplémentaires.

9. La structure actuelle des Forces a été élaborée de façon à faire face aux tâches courantes identifiées et jugées acceptables selon les restrictions financières. En conséquence, les unités actuelles de la Force régulière du niveau 1, la mobilisation de personnel et de matériel sera accrue jusqu'aux niveaux d'effectif de guerre pour faire face aux engagements de défense couramment planifiés. En cas de guerre, les priorités et les engagements de défense changeront; par conséquent, les lignes de conduite qui ont été établies pour satisfaire aux besoins du niveau 1 sont, dans l'ensemble, jugées appropriées pour la mobilisation mentionnée aux niveaux 2 et 3.

10. La mobilisation des ressources civiles (industrie, main-d'oeuvre et ressources) incombe aux autres ministères gouvernementaux, bien que le MDN continuera de les conseiller au sujet des besoins en matière de défense.

PROGRAMME DE RELATIONS PUBLIQUES POUR LES RESERVES

ATTENDU QUE le public est peu conscient de la Milice; encore moins de son rôle et de son apport.

ATTENDU QUE le manque de conscience du public nuit au recrutement qualitatif et quantitatif dans les rangs de la Milice et à la retenue des recrues.

ATTENDU QUE l'engagé a besoin d'être encouragé grâce à l'appréciation que le public a de la Milice.

ATTENDU QUE les commandants à tous les niveaux n'ont ni les fonds ni l'expérience nécessaires pour lancer des campagnes de relations publiques.

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLU d'élaborer des programmes de relations publiques nationales professionnelles pour la Force de réserve qui pourraient être intégrés au Programme de la Force régulière.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DSI

1. Une campagne de recrutement à l'échelle nationale est déjà en cours au titre du Programme d'intégration des officiers de réserve. Une réunion groupant les représentants régionaux de la Milice et destinée à discuter d'une campagne de recrutement à l'échelle nationale a été convoquée pour le Quartier général du Commandement de la Force mobile les 19 et 20 février 1977, dont l'issue sera de produire des aides aux campagnes de recrutement au niveau de l'unité.

2. Parallèlement, au cours du printemps et de l'été, un court métrage de 28 minutes en couleur intitulé: MILITIA TWICE THE CITIZEN est en voie de préparation pour être utilisé lors des campagnes de recrutement traditionnelles de septembre.

3. Le nombre maximal de miliciens payés est de 15,500. A la fin de septembre, l'effectif payé était de 101 pour cent, à la fin d'octobre de 99.4 pour cent et à la fin de novembre de 99 pour cent. Comme on peut le constater, le recrutement est qualitatif et non pas quantitatif.
4. Nous devons insister plus sur les aides au recrutement qui sont élaborés à l'échelle nationale, car on a constaté que la publicité locale n'est pas aussi efficace qu'on le voudrait. De plus, au cours de l'année financière 1973-1974, les régions n'ont dépensé que 45 pour cent du budget destiné aux campagnes de recrutement: 50 pour cent pour l'année financière 1974-1975 et 90 pour cent pour l'année financière 1975-1976. A la fin de novembre 1976, seulement 14.1 pour cent du budget avaient été dépensés.
5. Ce qui précède ne porte que sur les campagnes de recrutement. Pour ce qui est de retenir les engagés, c'est une question de les former et d'entretenir leur intérêt et non pas une question de prise de conscience du public. La prise de conscience du milicien déjà en service est entretenue dans une large mesure grâce à la publication du bulletin de nouvelles "Le Réserviste" qui a été jugé populaire et efficace jusqu'à l'échelon le plus bas.
6. Les relations publiques sont un domaine tout à part qui ne peut pas être associé aux campagnes de recrutement. Le recrutement à partir des relations publiques est un fractionnement; les relations publiques sont destinées à informer le public et lui faire prendre conscience du rôle et des activités de la Milice.
7. A cette fin, un certain nombre de réunions au niveau de la région ont eu lieu à l'intention des Officiers de renseignements de la Milice qui, pour la plupart, sont experts dans le domaine du renseignement ou dans des domaines connexes, et de représentants du Quartier général du Commandement de la Force mobile et souvent du Bureau de renseignements du ministère de la Défense nationale. L'un de ces séminaires par exemple se tient dans la région centrale de la Milice le 12 février 1977.
8. Parfois convoquées par la Région et parfois par le Quartier général du Commandement de la Force mobile, les réunions sont destinées à encourager les Officiers de renseignements de la Milice à faire plus de publicité qui permettra au public de mieux comprendre la Milice en particulier et les Forces canadiennes en général.
9. En résumé, il existe un Programme d'information du public destiné à promouvoir les buts et les activités de la Force de réserve et l'on remarque son succès par la publicité qui a été faite par les organes d'information dans tout le pays l'an dernier, surtout pendant les concentrations d'instruction d'été, les camps et les activités connexes.
10. L'information du public étant une responsabilité de "commandement" (les commandants de tous les niveaux), le succès d'un programme pour une formation ou une unité en particulier est directement proportionnel à l'orientation que lui donnent les commandants et à l'accent qu'ils y mettent et à la collaboration du personnel.
11. Les Officiers de renseignements de la Force régulière sont disponibles dans les régions pour conseiller, orienter et aider, dans la mesure où leurs ressources le leur permettent.

SYSTEMES ADMINISTRATIFS

ATTENDU QUE les systèmes administratifs que la Milic doit utiliser sont, dans certains cas, complexes et exigent beaucoup de temps. Il s'agit surtout du système des données de la Force de réserve et du Système de contrôle des approvisionnements.

ATTENDU QUE le système des données de la Force de réserve est un système nouveau qui comprend trois problèmes critiques:

- a. Pour diverses raisons, le système n'a produit aucune donnée de sortie garantie. Les unités n'ont donc pas obtenu les données du profil du personnel importantes nécessaires au contrôle et à la gestion de la main-d'oeuvre à l'instruction et à la paye.
- b. Le système est si complexe que la formation des commis de la Milice est extrêmement difficile par rapport au temps limité disponible.
- c. Le temps et le volume de papiers requis même pour de simples fonctions comme l'engagement, est tel, que le personnel le plus expérimenté doit passer énormément de temps sur les données d'entrée. Il en résulte un retard dans l'administration et une sérieuse réduction du temps libre pour les conseils et l'instruction.

ATTENDU QUE le système de contrôle des approvisionnements, bien que n'étant pas atteint de la perturbation prévalant dans le Système des données de la Force de réserve, présente deux problèmes précis.

- a. Chaque article de la ligne de transmission des données nécessite une formule distincte de données. Une telle répétition est une dépense de temps inefficace.
- b. L'identification des approvisionnements ne se fait que par numéro de stock, sans description alphabétique et sans catalogue pour des renvois alphanumériques. Les approvisionnements dont on ne sert pas couramment ne peuvent être retracés sans dépenser un temps excessif.

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLV de revoir les systèmes afin d'évaluer leur efficacité et d'étudier la simplification des données à l'entrée.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DPIS (de concert avec l'oc d'Administration du FMC et les OC de TAD

1. La documentation de l'utilisateur du Système des données de la Force de réserve a été réécrite beaucoup plus simplement. En effet, les 11 volumes ont été réduits à un volume. Le but principal visait la simplification des procédures des données d'entrée. Les unités de la Force de réserve de la région de Montréal ont essayé les nouvelles procédures avec succès. Les nouvelles instructions seront transmises à l'imprimeur le 17 décembre 1976 et les usagers devraient les avoir en main vers la fin de janvier 1977.

2. En outre, en octobre dernier des réunions ont eu lieu entre les représentants du QG du FMC et tous les organismes intéressés de la Milice afin de redéfinir le rendement du système des données de la Force de réserve. Le système a été modifié pour répondre à ces nouveaux buts. Les formations de la Réserve devraient recevoir les premières données de sortie du système modifié en janvier 1977.

3. Le Système de contrôle des approvisionnements n'est pas du ressort de l'ADM (per) ou de son personnel. Il n'y a donc aucun commentaire. Toutefois, il est bien compris que ce système fait partie du système d'approvisionnement des Forces canadiennes et de ce fait est le même que celui que la Force régulière utilise. Il faut donc demander les commentaires du DGAS.

NOTE: On compte que les représentants du FMC soient présents à la conférence ce qui permettra d'élaborer à ce moment-là, s'il y a lieu.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le Contrôleur du FMC

Système des données de la Force de réserve

1. Nous ne comprenons pas les unités qui se plaignent de ne pas avoir des données importantes sur le profil du personnel en ce sens que, malgré les difficultés éprouvées avec le système des données de la Force de réserve, les registres remplis à la main existent toujours dans les unités.
2. On comprend très bien les observation voulant que le système des données de la Force de réserve soit complexe et depuis quelques mois en travail à la simplification des procédures et des directives. Les directives sont contenues dans un volume au lieu de onze et un certain nombre de modifications ont été apportées aux procédures, visant toutes à la simplification. Plusieurs réunions ont eu lieu avec tous les intéressés et la majorité sont d'accord pour dire que le système rentre bien dans les capacités de la Force de réserve pour être utilisé et géré. Les nouvelles directives seront fournies à tous avant la fin de janvier. Les commis de la Milice ont mis le nouveau manuel à l'épreuve et maintiennent qu'ils sont capables de le comprendre et de l'utiliser bien.
3. Le QG en est rendu aux derniers stades d'essai de la nouvelle version modifiée et simplifiée du système des données de la Force de réserve et les résultats sont prometteurs. On pense qu'il y aurait avantage à fournir aux membres du syndicat qui s'occuperont de cette résolution lors de la Conférence de la CDA en janvier, un exposé sur le Système des données de la Force de réserve et sur les intentions des commandements pour le perfectionner, le simplifier et le réintroduire comme système de travail. Le Contrôleur du Commandement et son personnel sont prêts à produire un tel exposé de 30 minutes suivi d'une période de questions.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DAG

1. Etant donnée que les unités de réserve sont traitées comme comptes de distribution aux fins des ASFC, le client n'est pas tenu de remplir un bordereau d'approvisionnements pour chaque article demandé. La référence B stipule qu'un tel client peut présenter ses demandes par téléphone, par courrier, par message et au moyen de listes.
2. Un responsable de compte de distribution détend un inventaire du matériel en utilisation qui indique le numéro de stock et qui donne la description des articles comptables auxquels l'unité a droit. De plus, le responsable du compte doit tenir un registre des approvisionnements non récupérables utilisés quotidiennement par son unité. Les articles dont les numéros de stock ne sont pas disponibles rapidement peut s'obtenir au moyen d'une description détaillée soumise à la section des approvisionnements de la base de soutien.
3. Les ASFC sont destinés à fournir au client un soutien d'approvisionnement élevé avec un minimum de dérangement. Une liaison étroite entre les unités de réserve et leur section des approvisionnements de la base de soutien devrait satisfaire le client.

SOUTIEN DU CORPS D'ARMÉE DE CADETS

ATTENDU QUE le mouvement de cadets s'est révélé être une bonne source de recrutement tant pour la Milice que pour la Force régulière, et

ATTENDUQUE le FMCO 29-7 stipule précisément que "les cadets ne doivent pas participer aux exercices de tir en campagne ni à aucune autre instruction de nature dangereuse" alors que les cadets de l'air et de la marine participent à des programmes chargés de défis et offrant l'aventure, et

ATTENDU QU'il y a eu une forte réduction dans l'effectif du Corps royal des cadets de l'Armée canadienne au cours des dernières années,

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLU d'élaborer une politique révisée qui permettrait au Mouvement de cadets d'envisager une instruction d'une portée plus étendue et plus réaliste avec plus d'apport et plus d'appui de la part de l'unité répondante de la Milice.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le D des Cadets 3

1. Le FMCO 29-7 (révisé le 23 décembre 1976) que le QGDN n'a pas encore reçu développe et s'étend sur la politique de soutien de l'unité affiliée au Corps royal des cadets de l'Armée canadienne.

2. La consigne relative à la non-participation des cadets "aux exercices de tir en campagne ni à aucune autre instruction de nature dangereuse" demeure en vigueur. Il faut toutefois noter que cela n'empêche nullement les exercices aux champs de tir en plein air dans des champs convenablement constitués, ni la participation aux exercices d'instruction en campagne sans munitions réelles. Un "exercice de tir en campagne" s'interprète comme étant un exercice comprenant le tir et le déplacement en utilisant des munitions réelles. "Autre instruction de nature dangereuse" est laissée en grande partie à la discrétion du Commandant de l'unité affiliée.

3. L'instruction portant sur l'aventure et le défi est encouragée et développée de plusieurs façons: Par exemple, cours de parachutisme, cours de commandement et de défis (Bauff), cours d'initiation dans l'Arctique et instruction portant sur l'aventure pendant les cours d'été et aux unités locales.

TROUPE D'ADMINISTRATION

ATTENDU QU'au cours des dernières années, toutes les unités de la Milice ont reconnu le problème continu et sérieux d'un manque de postes d'appui et d'administration dans leur structure; et

ATTENDU QUE la plupart des unités ont en fait créé des troupes administratives ou des "OG" ad hoc au sein de leur présente structure; et

ATTENDU QU'on reconnaît qu'il y a fréquemment du personnel de libre répondant aux conditions des métiers de soutien qui ne convient pas aux armes de combat et qu'il puisse accomplir des tâches de soutien estimables; et

ATTENDU QUE la semaine de travail du milieu est de "six heures" et qu'il est impossible à un seul homme de s'occuper des finances, des approvisionnements, du transport et des autres fonctions de logistique et d'administration, il est donc souhaitable d'entraîner les miliciens à chacune de ces nombreuses fonctions; et

ATTENDU QU'on reconnaît que, en ce moment, il n'est pas souhaitable de modifier le nombre total de postes de l'effectif en attendant la révision de l'effectif total des Forces.

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLU de désigner un nombre minimal de 13 des postes de l'effectif courant dans une unité à la discrétion du Commandant à être remplis par des personnes de métiers de soutien reconnus de la Milice afin de former une troupe administrative.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le D de la Milice

1. Une étude sera entreprise pour élaborer une structure dans le domaine des armes de combat et des armes d'appui tactique de la Milice qui rétablira les faiblesses antérieures et qui réplétera le plus possible l'effectif du groupe-brigade réglementaire.

Commentaire préliminaires du MDN par le DPT 2

1. Il est fait droit à la question du besoin d'un élément administratif comme partie de l'effectif du Régiment blindé de la Milice. Les unités de la Milice seront éventuellement fondées sur les mêmes effectifs que ceux de la Force régulière, et les postes administratifs seront considérés comme besoin.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGOM

1. Il est fait droit à la résolution portant sur la désignation de 13 postes sur le sein de l'effectif actuel comme métiers de soutien de la Milice en vue de former une troupe administrative. Le nouvel effectif du Régiment blindé léger (M) n'est pas doté par le QGDN. L'adjonction d'une troupe administrative au QGR d'un maximum de 13 postes aurait peu de répercussions sur l'effectif. On recommande donc que la résolution soit appuyée comme mesure provisoire et que le besoin d'une troupe administrative soit inclus dans le nouvel effectif doté au QGDN.

BAREME DE DISTRIBUTION - VEHICULE BLINDES TOUS USAGES DESTINES AUX PRINCIPALES UNITES BLINDEES DE LA PREMIERE RESERVE

INTRODUCTION

Les nombres des principaux régiments blindés de la première réserve du Canada sentent qu'ils seront "oubliés" lors de la distribution des VBTU aux Forces armées canadiennes. Il n'y a eu aucune distribution de véhicules blindés aux blindés de la Réserve depuis le char Sherman M4A2E8, et même aujourd'hui aucun barème officiel sur le matériel n'existe pour ces unités. Les membres des blindés de la Réserve veulent s'assurer que le Quartier général de la défense nationale distribue aux réservistes un nombre approprié de VBTU lorsqu'ils seront disponibles de façon à leur permettre de s'entraîner dans des métiers comparables à ceux de la Force régulière et ainsi appuyer mieux et plus entièrement les unités de campagne de la Force régulière.

ATTENDU QU'on annoncera bientôt que les Forces armées canadiennes se procureront un véhicule blindé tous usages pour leurs unités blindées; et

ATTENDU QUE les unités blindées de réserve ont pour tâche d'accroître les unités blindées de la Force régulière au pays et à l'étranger et qu'un rapprochement des normes d'instruction sur du matériel identique est la seule façon d'exécuter correctement un programme de recrutement significatif et satisfaisant pour un réserviste;

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLU d'établir un tableau de matériel fondé sur les VBTU pour les régiments blindés de la Réserve et qu'il accorde un VBTU (4 VBTU) par escadron de la Réserve.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DPT 2

1. Les VBTU sont fournis pour répondre aux besoins de la Force régulière et de la Milice. Le tableau de matériel qui est finalement établi pour les unités blindées de la Milice dépend du nombre total de VBTU achetés. Etant donné les restrictions budgétaires, les chiffres qui sont utilisés pour la planification prévoient une affectation à la première Réserve mais non pas en fonction du tableau proposé, par exemple une troupe par escadron par effectif d'unité. La Milice blindée sera consultée en détail au sujet de l'affectation des VBTU.

RAPPEL A COURT PREAVIS

ATTENDU QUE le Cadre supplémentaire porte les noms de personnes entraînées, aptes et expérimentées pouvant aider considérablement la Milice et être un atout pour cette dernière, et

ATTENDU QUE toute affectation à court terme à des unités au titre d'exigences précises pendant une année pourraient les aider à combler les lacunes dans les postes clés pour une tâche précise;

RECRUTEMENT DE LA MILICE

ATTENDU QUE les Forces armées canadiennes ont un budget national destiné au recrutement de la Force régulière.

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLU d'incorporer la campagne de recrutement de la Milice à celle de la Force régulière sans frais supplémentaires.

ARGUMENTS A LA RESOLUTION NO 8

Toutes les annonces télévisées du MDN sont suivies à la fin de chaque annonce civile commerciale de 10 secondes qui montre aux téléspectateurs les centres de recrutement.

Il n'y aurait rien à perdre à ajouter: "Si les Forces armées vous intéressent mais que vous ne désirez pas faire partie de la Force régulière, engagez-vous dans l'unité de la Milice de votre choix.

De plus, on peut ajouter ce qui précède dans toutes les annonces écrites que ce soit dans les journaux (annonces classées ou affiches), dans les revues ou par rotogravure.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le Directeur de recrutement et de sélection

1. Le MDN supprime ses annonces télévisées de 60 secondes pour des annonces de 30 secondes. La partie verbale ne dure que cinq secondes et ne permet aucune addition.

2. En outre, les adresses actuelles sont changées pour les suivantes:

"Pour de plus amples renseignements, communiquez avec le bureau de recrutement le plus proche indiqué dans les pages jaunes sous la rubrique Recrutement ou communiquez avec le Centre de Main-d'oeuvre de votre localité."

3. On pourrait ajouter les mots "A plein temps ou à temps partiel" mais cela serait à l'encontre des règles d'une bonne publicité en ce sens qu'on introduirait un nouvel élément dans la conclusion.
4. En ce qui concerne les éditions, la plupart de nos annonces sont tout ce qu'il y a de plus précis, c'est-à-dire cuisinier - police militaire - commandant du génie de district - ingénieurs etc., et à moins que la Force de réserve puisse faire de même, notre publicité n'induirait qu'en erreur au de la publication.
5. Il n'existe que 42 centres de recrutement pour la Force régulière dans tout le pays et chacun a été informé de communiquer avec l'unité de la Force de réserve de leur région et de voir de quelle façon il pourrait l'aider. L'offre tient toujours.

QU'IL SOIT DONC RESOLU de modifier l'OAF 49-8 de façon à autoriser le commandant d'une unité de rappeler à l'unité en fonction du Cadre supplémentaire, quiconque, pour une période maximale de 14 jours par personne par année. Le nombre total de jours pour un tel emploi doit être de 140 jours par unité par année. Ces rattachements doivent être acheminés en fonction de l'affectation normale des jourshommes de l'unité.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGUE

1. La résolution 11/77 est réalisable. On se préoccupe tout de même du contrôle. On propose que par l'intermédiaire du QG régional les QGC soient mis au courant de l'intention de l'unité et aient le droit de veto.
2. Il faudrait aussi prendre en considération un point mineur, celui du besoin de s'assurer que le "rappel" porte la code de sécurité approprié du poste qu'il ou qu'elle occupera. Ce qui veut dire qu'il faudrait établir la liaison avec le QGC ou entrer en communication directe avec le QGDN.
3. Il est proposé que cette résolution soit traitée par les QGC intéressés.

Commentaires préliminaires du MDN par le DGRC

1. L'annexe B de l'OAF 49-8 stipule présentement qu'un membre du Cadre supplémentaire peut être rattaché à la première réserve sur autorisation du Commandant de région. Il s'agit d'une OAF d'ADMIN (Per) et on peut demander le réexamen du niveau d'autorisation.

2. La question financière pourrait être plus compliquée. Indépendamment du QG, la Milice seule compte:

	<u>Principales</u>	<u>Secondaires</u>
Unités blindées	17	1
Unités d'artillerie	14	4
Unités de génie	3	8
Unités d'infanterie	51	2
Bataillons des services	20	-
Compagnies médicales	-	6
Total	<u>105</u>	<u>21</u>

La demande est pour 140 jours par unités par année. A ce total il faudrait ajouter 70 aux unités secondaires. Ce qui donne un nombre de jours-hommes de:

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 105 \times 140 & = & 14,700 \\
 21 \times 70 & = & \underline{1,470} \\
 \text{Total} & & 16,170
 \end{array}$$


Le coût de ce total, soit 16,170, serait d'environ \$397,458 en plus des frais de voyage et de service temporaire. Donc, avant que le projet puisse être adopté, il faut envisager plus de fonds. Si la gestion des dits fonds était déléguée aux commandants ou aux chefs d'unités de district, on pourrait déléguer l'organisme d'autorisation au même niveau.



A SQN RCD BERGEN 77

Armour Dept

NEWS



NOUVELLES

Div Blindée

HQ-QG

The purpose of the Armour Bulletin is to inform "black hats" of matters affecting our Branch. I am sure the topics are quite limitless since at each happy hour someone provides me with another solution to our many problems. If you feel you have something to say about technology, training, military philosophy, personnel, etc send in an article. Here are some ideas.

Quick and accurate shooting is the ultimate purpose of all our training. The outstanding win by the RCD of the Canadian Army Trophy demonstrates that our ability has not been lost as we pass through the difficult time before being re-equipped. Hopefully in a few years all the regular regiments will be competing again for the Rams Head Trophy.

The night aid equipment on the Leopard and perhaps the Cougar will affect our tactics. Is "tank first light" a valid concept since the crew can either use their night vision or daylight sights through the entire 24 hr period. Since crew members may be able to see 1000 to 1600m at night should we maintain daylight deployments or adjust for night conditions. These are just a few of the implications of the new technology. We must question our current practices to see what remains valid and make the necessary changes.

TACTICS

- TACTIQUE

REFONTE DU PROGRAMME D'ENTRAINEMENT DES

ELEVES-OFFICIERS DU CORPS BLINDE

Par le Capitaine J.R. Aubry

L'avènement de nouveaux véhicules dans le Corps Blindé n'a pas seulement modifié le contenu des cours techniques de base ou de spécialisation du Département Blindé de l'Ecole des Armes de Combat, mais aussi l'orientation et la philosophie des cours de nos officiers. En effet l'ensemble des phases d'entraînement des élèves-officiers a été restructuré de façon à mieux préparer les jeunes candidats au commandement de troupes de chars (Léopard ou Cougar (AVGP)). Cet article a pour but d'exposer les raisons de la restructuration ainsi que le contenu du nouveau programme d'instruction.

Lors de la conférence du Corps Blindé sur l'entraînement tenue au Quartier Général de la Défense Nationale au mois de novembre 1976, le Directeur du Corps Blindé ainsi que les Officiers Commandants des régiments blindés réguliers et du Département Blindé de l'Ecole des Armes de Combat ont fait le point sur le programme alors existant de l'entraînement des officiers. Certaines lacunes de ce programme comme le pourcentage élevé d'échec en phase finale, le manque d'expérience et de maîtrise du simple commandement d'un char par les candidats et le temps excessif consacré à la reconnaissance ont été établis et le plan révisé d'instruction proposé en août 1976 par l'Ecole des Armes de Combat a été approuvé ainsi donc, fort des recommandations et décisions prises lors de cette conférence et des directives reçues de l'Officier commandant le Département Blindé, un équipe d'officiers expérimentés a révisé les plans d'entraînement (CTP) et en a produit des nouveaux. Les plans d'entraînement de la phase 2 et 3 ont été mis à l'essai dès les mois de janvier et mars 1977 et seront révisés, corrigés au besoin et publiés dans leur formule définitive pour les cours de l'été 1977. Celui de phase 4 sera mis à l'essai dès 1977 et révisé à l'automne pour être publié en novembre 1977.

Bien que le nouveau cycle d'entraînement ne soit pas entièrement nouveau (partiellement en application dans les années 65-66), il diffère considérablement de l'ancien. Pour faciliter son application et éviter de nouveaux changements lorsque le nouveau changements lorsque le nouveau matériel sera physiquement disponible, chaque phase d'entraînement comprend un plan d'application pré et post Léopard ou Cougar.

PHASE 2

Cette phase d'entraînement qui était uniquement consacrée à l'entraînement militaire de base et à l'évaluation du leadership des candidats par le biais du commandement d'une section d'infanterie démontée s'est vue greffer une portion supplémentaire de conduite et d'entretien des véhicules jeep et Lynx et une portion d'utilisation de l'armement du Lynx. Dans le plan post-Cougar de cette phase, la partie conduite et armement du Lynx sera remplacée par celle du Cougar. La durée du cours ayant été limitée à 47 jours d'instruction, le temps consacré au commandement d'une section d'infanterie et à certains sujets comme la correspondance militaire a dû être réduit au profit de l'enseignement, de la conduite et de l'armement. Cependant la nouvelle formule permet quand même une évaluation adéquate des futurs officiers et stimule davantage leur intérêt pour la qualification blindée car elle leur offre un contact précoce avec cette dernière.

PHASE 3

La phase 3 qui était uniquement consacrée à l'enseignement des spécialités blindées (transmissions de base, conduite des véhicules roues et chenillés et l'utilisation d'armement du centurion) a vu son contenu changer quelque peu. Dans la nouvelle formule qui a été limitée, elle aussi, à 47 jours d'instruction, la première portion du cours est consacrée uniquement à l'enseignement de la conduite et de l'entretien du centurion ainsi qu'à l'utilisation de son armement. En 1979, la même instruction sera dispensée sur le char Léopard et le centurion sera définitivement relégué aux oubliettes. La deuxième partie du cours met principalement l'accent sur le commandement du char de bataille dans le cadre d'une troupe. Ainsi les candidats ont l'opportunité de se familiariser complètement avec les responsabilités du chef de char, le contrôle et le commandement d'un véhicule unique et les formations employées au niveau d'une troupe. Le centurion qui est utilisé pour cette partie du cours sera remplacé par le Léopard en 1979. La phase 3 permet donc aux candidats d'acquérir une solide formation blindée théorique et tactique de base, les laissant ainsi plus libre de se concentrer entièrement sur le commandement d'une troupe en phase 4.

PHASE 4

Cette phase d'entraînement comme nous l'avons vu précédemment est entièrement vouée à l'instruction de l'art du commandement d'une troupe de chars dans toutes les phases de guerre ainsi qu'à la coopération inter-armes au niveau d'équipe de combat, l'accent étant mis au niveau du groupe troupe/peloton. Les exercices en campagne qui sont faites à partir de TTB acutellement se feront à même les Cougars en 1979. De plus, deux semaines du cours, qui en compte onze, servent à la familiarisation des candidats au commandement d'une troupe de reconnaissance. Cette courte période sur la reconnaissance ne se veut pas un substitut abrégé de l'ancienne Phase 4B (cours de reconnaissance qui a été supprimé au mois de septembre 1976) mais bien simplement une initiation aux tactiques employées par les escadrons de reconnaissance des régiments blindés. Il est prévu d'instaurer, dans un avenir rapproché, un cours spécial de reconnaissance d'une durée encore indéterminée pour les officiers et sous-officiers supérieurs affectés à un escadron de reconnaissance blindé.

Grâce à la redéfinition des priorités et au désir clairement exprimé de former des chefs de troupes le plus apte possible à commander, le nouveau cycle d'instruction des officiers offre une continuité accrue de l'enseignement de l'art du commandement. Les candidats se verront ainsi plongés dans le milieu blindé dès leur première phase d'entraînement à l'Ecole des Armes de Combat et leur instruction se poursuivra à un rythme tel qu'ils maîtriseront progressivement le commandement d'un char, d'une patrouille et finalement d'une troupe. Ce cycle d'instruction devrait assurer la formation d'officiers de troupe compétents et répondant aux exigences des régiments blindés réguliers et du Corps Blindé lui-même. Ainsi donc le mois d'août 1977 verra les premiers officiers, formés selon la nouvelle formule rejoindre leur régiment respectif mais il faudra encore attendre l'été 1979 pour voir ceux formés à même le nouveau matériel blindé.

COMMUNICATIONS

THE RETURN OF THE GREEN HORNET

While the corps has been gripped in the excitement of the acquisition a new tank the dervishes of the communication and supply worlds have introduced a new piece of CANADIAN equipment to the American family of radios. This introduction has arrived virtually unheralded and almost unknown to most members of the Corps. The piece of equipment officially known as the Control Intercom Set C-5261 GRC returns the use of the Handset Telephone No # 1 of RS C42 fame to the corps. Yes the GREEN HORNET has returned!

The 5261 Box, to look at it, appears to be just a normal 2298 box with the headset terminals replaced by line posts. It connects by a short cable to an existing 2298 box in a vehicle, the crew commander's in lynx and ferret and the loader's in leopard. It is now on the check lists for lynx and ferret. Using the GREEN HORNET the following facilities are possible with the 5261 Box using up to $\frac{1}{2}$ mile of WD-ITT cable and $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of combat cable:

- All - receive from all sets, transmit on A
- A - receive/transmit A set only
- Int Only - Hear and Talk intercom only
- B - Transmit A set, low level, reception A set
- C - receive/transmit C set

The following points were also noted using the GREEN HORNET and 5261 Box combination. The call system (handset to radio) becomes very weak over long distances while out and the transmitted signal became poor at the extreme limit of wire. It was also noted that there was a sharp distinctly unpleasant noise when releasing the press-to-talk switch on the green hornet.

To improve the use of the 5261 box Comms Sqn suggests using a TA - 312PT or TA - 43 PT field telephone in place of the green hornet. These phones due to having their own power source produce a strong clear transmitted signal and possess an excellent call system. The TA -312PT may also have a headset H161/GR added to it to free the users hands and one ear and also providing a live mike. It must be remembered that these telephones are heavier and do not have the compactness and portability of the GREEN HORNET and they need batteries.

Comms Squadron also suggests connecting your field switchboard to the box for instant phone patches which will bypass the need for Radio Wire Integration presently taught on Advanced Communications.

For the reader's information the following information might be of value.

CONTROL INTERCOM SET C 5261/GRC

5820-21-862-4127

HANDSET TELEPHONE # 1

5965-99-901-0727

CABLE ASSEMBLY 2FT C x 4723/VRC


5995-00-823-2830

HEADSET MICROPHONE H 182/PT

5965-00-069-8885

In summary the C 5261/GRC box is good and is a piece of equipment that has been requested for a long time. It is up to us to make the best use of it.

GUNNERY



TIR

The past year has seen Gunnery Squadron hard at work training a great many students on a variety of courses. The courses include the 6A, 6B, Sqn Commander, Armd OCT Phases 2, 3, and 4, as well as RESO 2 and 3, and, of course, TL 3 Tank Gunner and the Advanced Gunner. As well, there were the usual demonstrations and assistance to other Armour Dept Squadrons.

The big news, of course, is the Corps' new AFV's - Leopard and Cougar. The effects of the implementation of these vehicles have already been felt in Gunnery Squadron. The last Canadian soldiers to be trained as Centurion tank gunners and advanced gunners were on the TL 3 Tank Gunner Course 7602 and the Advanced Gunner 7601, respectively. Gunnery instructors are being slated for conversion courses in Belgium and England, and preparations are underway for the first Leopard and Cougar courses to be run in 1978.

This is not to say that Centurion gunnery is dead - indeed, Centurion gunnery is alive and well. The Squadron's nine tanks are seeing full service on the 6A, 6B, Sqn Commander and Armd OCT Phases 3 and 4 courses. The cries of "RANGING SABOT..." and "HESH DOT 3 BREAKBACK...", however, will cease to emanate from K-19 in late 1978.

A recent trial carried out by the Squadron was done on a side mounted solenoid for the Lynx mounted .50 cal HMG. The device was originally used on the F 86 Sabre jet and is now being considered for use by our recee troops. It is fairly simple and, like the Centurion maxifort solenoid, pushes against the sear slide, from the left side, thereby firing the action. After a few problems on determining the correct timing, the adjustment procedures were finalized and all .50 cal's fitted with the device functioned very well. An added benefit is that the Lynx mounted HMG can now be fitted with a normal back plate assembly and a more reliable manual trigger - should the solenoid fail (gone will be the days of firing the gun with a nail or screw driver). Recommendations are being drafted for the method of proper adjustment and Gunnery Squadron's approval of the device. This should add one more improvement to the Lynx main armament.

An interesting situation has arisen with 20 pdr ammunition. One would think that as the 20 pdr neared the end of life the ammunition - with the exception of war reserve - would decrease accordingly. Not so! For the first time in years tank courses have their full allotment of ammunition. There should even be enough for the Squadron instructors to "bang off" a few rounds themselves.

With a busy year behind us, Gunnery Squadron now looks forward to an even busier yet exciting year ahead. Trips to Belgium and England will be followed by the fast and furious writing of pams and courses, instructor conversion courses, and finally instruction of Regimental personnel in the Fall of '78.

D&M

CTE & E

The introduction of Leopard has meant that there is a requirement for different training facilities in D&M Sqn. The capabilities of this new tank have necessitated the designing of an area to take a new driver where he will be free from the possibility of meeting another vehicle. With Centurion the speed was such that an instructor had time to react and talk a student out of a potentially dangerous situation or if necessary stop the tank by the use of the magneto buttons in the fighting compartment.

A tank driver training circuit has been designed to meet the needs of safety and putting the tank and driver through their paces. As many situations as possible that will be encountered during field training and in open and close country - including loading and unloading from a tank transporter.


The circuit that will be constructed in the Gagetown training area is 5000 meters in length and will have a hard standing for maintenance and as well as a troop shelter. It will have the following tests and obstacles:

- a. tank transporter;
- b. high speed run - to allow drivers to feel the leopard's handling at high speed cross country;
- c. knife edges;
- d. three-meter trenches;
- e. three-meter walls;
- f. a pond for shallow fording;
- g. a washboard;
- h. maximum slopes and hills that the tank is capable of negotiating;
- j. a bridge - from an AVLB; and
- k. a chicane/course that can be adjusted for various speeds.

A second facility that will be required is the snorkelling pit. Since the Leopard can deep ford or run submerged in depths up to four meters, there is a requirement to train drivers and driver instructors in vehicle preparation, water entry and exit techniques, driving under water and after snorkelling vehicle maintenance.

It is planned to have both facilities completed by the time the first Leopard arrives in Gagetown in August 1978.

Four of the tanks coming to Armour Department will be split between D&M and Gmry Sqns (literally). The turrets will be removed and placed on stands for use by Gmry Sqn and the hulls will be fitted with an instructors' cab. The cab can accommodate two additional student drivers. Two control panels containing the most important display instruments make it possible to constantly monitor vehicle operation and driver activities. If necessary the instructor can use and override system and take over control of the vehicle at any time.



The vehicle has the same riding characteristics as the tank. A ballast ring compensates for the turret weight. The vehicle is capable of fording and can be used to practice the necessary control operations and help students get used to operating in deep water.

The new facilities and training vehicles will allow the Squadron to train drivers and instructors in most conditions and situations that they will encounter during unit field training.

MY FIRST IMPRESSIONS

BY CAPT A. PETIOT FRENCH ARMY/ARMEE FRANCAISE

Living and working with foreign forces is a rich experience for an officer, and it is a pleasure to have been given the opportunity to remember my eight months spent thus far in Canada. The purpose of this article is not to judge the Canadian Forces but to describe the impressions of a French Exchange Officer at CAS. In fact, if my living at CFB Gagetown has created some personal difficulties, the great number of varied activities has taught me considerable lessons.


The problem of language is certainly the greatest among the difficulties. Nevertheless I have to be thankful to the philanthropical francophone officers who, artfully disguised up as anglophones, welcomed me at the Fredericton Airport and initiated me immediately in English. Afterwards I highly appreciated the efforts made by everybody, particularly at Armour Department, to make me maintain a high level of practice. Other problems are not worthy of mention because they have been quickly and definitively solved with the efficient help of the Administrative Officer and NCOs of Armour Department who did everything they could to enable me to live and work confidently.

My arrival in August was very beneficial and opportune because of the number of activities on the Base. I had the good fortune to observe the ending of summer training and during my first weekend in Canada, to become familiar with famous places such as Grozier Hill, Summer Hill and Lawfield where a very interesting breed of mosquitos can be studied. During these days, I also noticed with satisfaction how every office and mess had been brightened up with reservists (W) and how a relaxed atmosphere was created with the announcement of coming holidays. The Armour Mess Dinner and the Graduation Parade impressed me very much and showed me another aspect of the Canadian military way of life. After these busy days the wise members of CAS HQ decided to send me to quieter places, far from the temptations of Oromocto. I visited CFB Valcartier, where the 12e RBC welcomed me, and La Citadelle, the marvelous residence of famous 2eme Bataillon/Royal 22 eme Regiment. My attendance at an English course at CFLS (CFB Saint Jean) was a very good experience because I was able to meet a great number of officers and NCOs from every base in Canada and test, as a student, one aspect of the educational system.

When I returned to CFB Gagetown in January, the aspect of the base had completely changed with snow. "Mon pays c'est l'hiver..." as the words of a French-Canadian singer tell us, is very true. Indeed, if Canada and its forces had to be objectively judged, they would have to be done so in winter when the best qualities appear. I was amazed to see the equipment, the calm and capability for living in the intense cold, of Canadian soldiers. I must also mention the spontaneous help every body gave me to extract my car from the snow. (I could observe the different ways of pushing depending to the rank, the religion or the language of helper. However, a significant statistic cannot be presented here.)

The melting snow announces the arrival of summer training, and I have been very pleased having been committed to conduct the RESO III course. It will be an honour for me to teach the Reserve officers and to work with the senior NCOs of Armour Department.

In short, these months have permitted me to become familiar with the Canadian Forces and to prepare myself to work efficiently. In summary, I would like to mention two facts which highly impressed me. First, is the great efficiency and professionalism of the Senior NCOs which seem to be the strongest points of the Canadian Forces, and second, the constant efforts made in preparation for a commitment in Europe which cannot let an European insensitive.



BOOK CORNER

COIN DES LIVRES

TANK WARFARE by Kenneth Macksey: Panther 1976: 320 pages

Selected and Reviewed by Major R.H. Caldwell CD RCD

There is no question that the romantic, heroic, and almost quixotic aspects of militarism have ascended a level of popularity not seen since the period 1870-1914. War-gaming, military-modelling, military music, prints, book clubs and military "pop history" magazines all flourish and have not yet reached apogee. There is good money to be made in military history. In increasing numbers arm-chair romantics rally and worry about next Tuesday's war-game at KURSK, where they are Manstein, GOC Army Gp South July 1943; or the arrival of this month's modelling journal which will finally resolve the issue of the colour of braid on the dolman of the 1st Regt of Eclaireurs spring 1815. It becomes difficult to sort out 'pop' history, written for profit and to entertain, and history written to show lesson, compare present trends and question the future based on both considerations.

Major Kenneth Macksey MC RTR retired, is a member of the editorial team who brought us the excellent "Ballantine Books" in the late 60's. In his capacity as Deputy Editor of Purnell's History of the Second World War, he had the opportunity of participating with the team of Pitt, Keegan, Dunbar, Jukes and others on specialized aspects of World War Two - while Sir Basil Liddell Hart was still alive.

Macksey wrote 'The Shadow of Vimy Ridge', 'Armoured Crusader' (Hobart's biography), and then 'Afrika Korps' and 'Panzer Division' for the Ballantine series. 'Tank Warfare' was partially launched in his two Ballantines, and is really an extension of them encompassing the complete AFV story to 1973. Perhaps the title is incorrect, "AFV Warfare" or "Mechanized Warfare" would be better. Tanks don't fight wars on their own, moreover there is no special brand of war for tanks, they adapt to the war they are in.

'Tank Warfare' is a crewman's eye view of mechanized life in the British, French, USA, Russian and German armies between 1918 and 1945. It portrays the history of the Second World War from a cupola, offering a "black hat" reader an easily digestible account of that war, as well as an outline of the use of tanks in conflict since 1948.

I have only one criticism. It is not laid against the license Macksey uses in demonstrating his "20-20" hindsight, which is perfect, in criticizing Guderian. That can be written off with a quote by David Howarth who criticizes the approach of the universal military historian commenting on Ney at Waterloo, "Ney's judgement,....., may have been less than perfect, but he had five horses shot under him during the afternoon". Neither I, nor Macksey, were in the Wehrmacht and neither of us commanded a Panzer Army on the Eastern front in 1941.

My criticism is in the final chapter, 'The Future', where Macksey predicts the future of the tank. I would have liked to see him comment on the political future as well as the tactical. What concerns us today is the increasing defensive, not offensive, nature of our equipment requirements. If war is to be won, there will come a time for the offensive. The tank must remain the political, as well as the tactical symbol of the offense; and AFV OER's must not be written defensively in order to ease them past National Treasury Boards.

'Tank Warfare' should have been written twenty years ago. As an Armoured Officer I thought it had, but that's probably due to living too close to the subject. The origins of mech tactics and AFV "R&D", and the internal struggle for priority between the two have always been popular service paper and officer training topics, as well as good bar conversation. Those who have been in battle or to Bovington usually have the last word. This book will arm the young officer or NCO to better cope when participating in any AFV discussion.

Recommended further reading:

'Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles' - R.M. Ogorkiewicz

'Panzer Leader' - H. Guderian

'The Tanks' - L. Hart

'Weapons and Tactics' - Wintringham and Blashfor-Snell




AFV Recognition Test

answers on page 63

by Capt DS Madill

Identification des Véhicules Blindés

réponses à la page 63



ZOT

YOU'RE STERILE

LCol G.J. O'Connor

Many of you television affectionatoes may have watched the series STAR-TREK where the heroes use ray guns to persuade various aliens to see things their way. While this is supposed to occur in the 25th Century, the technology they depict is not too remote from what we are working with today. Their ray guns are just very exotic lasers. We now have lasers that help us make our potential enemies see things our way. Since our new tanks will be equipped with a laser range finder, I thought that a simple explanation of how it works and some safety measures related to its use might be of interest to a number of you.

The term LASER is an acronym for light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation. While this appears to be quite a mouthful it is a relatively simple concept.

Light is composed of a large number of energy packets called photons. If you think of these photons as ping pong balls and consider what happens when a moving ball hits a stationary ball directly; of course the stationary ball begins to move in the direction of the moving ball. If the moving ball strikes the stationary ball at an angle, the stationary ball will be deflected to a side and the moving ball will itself be deflected. If you control the direction from which the moving balls enter, very quickly you will notice a stream of balls moving parallel to the axis of the source while other balls will be moving randomly away from the axis. This is what happens in a laser. A stream of photons (light) is introduced into a ruby tube which is silvered at both ends so as to serve as plane mirrors. The photons flash back and forth in the tube knocking out more photons at each pass, until they build up sufficient intensity to burst through the end that is more lightly silvered. Those that go through the end are those that are on an axis parallel to the original light source, and of the same frequency. If light enters the ruby from other than the direction of its axis, it ricochets a few times in the tube then passes out the side. Thus, using this device, we are able to produce a narrow stream of coherent (same amplitude and frequency) light along the axis of the ruby. The narrowness of the beam means that a great deal of energy can be focussed into an exceedingly small area.

On the Leopard, the narrow laser beam is aimed at a target then reflected back to the source. Since the speed of light is a known constant, the tank computer measuring the time required to travel back and forth, easily calculates the distance to the target. This is displayed for the gunner and the sight picture is automatically adjusted the appropriate amount which greatly improves the possibility of a first round hit.

Of course, laser range finders are not perfect devices. They rely upon reflected light to determine the range, the beam could strike an object either farther or closer than the intended target and you would be provided with a false reading. Also, the laser beam is less reliable in haze, smoke, rain or snow. This means that the crew commander's judgement of range is still a big factor in all engagements.

Our range finder can project a beam 10 kms but the computer will only accept information up to 4 kms. The limit of 4 kms was derived as a result of a NATO study of direct fire engagements. It was concluded that it would be extremely rare for tanks to engage beyond this range and therefore the range finder meets the practical needs of tank gunnery. Targets at ranges beyond 4 kms can be engaged by using the sight clinometer and range tables.

As mentioned earlier, the laser beam contains a great deal of energy. The energy of the range finder is extremely dangerous to the unprotected eye up to 7 kms. From a safety point of view, the beam must be treated like a bullet. Either it is fired into a backstop, or range areas of at least 7 kms within the arc markers, must be reserved. The same restriction must be considered in elevation as a beam striking a pilots eye could cause his aircraft to crash. Either elevation limits must be assured by the tank crews or aircraft must fly 7 kms above the range area.

One of the safety features in the Leopard C1 is the crew commander's laser key. During the action sequence he will turn on the laser with his key and when firing ceases he will turn off the laser. This will greatly reduce the possibility of accidental emission.

Another safety device which will be available, is laser goggles. In simple terms these clear lenses form a very effective barrier between the laser energy and the eye. All members of targetting parties and anyone else who must move in front of firing points will be provided with them.

I hope that the foregoing has given you a few more insights into the use and problems of our laser range finder. Oh by the way, the title of this article is untrue. If you are hit by laser it won't affect your sex life but it will affect your ability to oggle the girls.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

NOT

PERFUNCTARILY ESTIMATED RESUME

by CWO W.L. Prouse, CAS

I'm not taking exception to CWO R.J. Slaney's article in Armour Newsletter, Volume 6, June 76, Bob's point on putting the officer back into non-commissioned...Warrant..... is well taken. However, to blame the training system or methods, I believe, is not entirely correct. In the times Bob refers to, the 50s and 60s, we had lengthy summer concentrations and other training periods where we were able to learn a great deal as "on job training" disguised as collective training. Due to restrictions and taskings, in these times, COs are frustrated in their attempts to achieve the standards of yesteryear. The lack of background knowledge and training, before attending courses, directly effects the length of training time required on formal courses. We at the school feel that good sound training is conducted with good results.

The weak link in the chain to becoming good, solid NCOs may be the lack of continuation training and/or the lack of sound direction when performing their daily tasks. I believe the older NCOs will agree that we were never short on sound, firm direction from the likes of Charlie Smith, Smokey Shaw, Doug Eveliegh, Squint Armer, etc. The list (could go on and on) of soldiers who were our trainers a few years ago. Do we have this type of trainer today? I believe we are not lacking in the calibre of trainers, RSMS and SSMS, however we may be suffering for the lack of application of training methods that develop good NCOs. NCOs gain knowledge and are introduced to the qualities of a good leader on courses. This knowledge must be broadened and the leadership qualities tested at every opportunity during the NCOs day to day regimental experience.

The statements made in previous paragraphs are not an excuse for us as NCOs, the performers, to slough off our responsibilities. It may be difficult, in some situations, for us to show our full potential. Invariably there will be times that require a decision and/or action to be taken. If we are not in the habit of making decisions or taking decisive actions the role of being the leader becomes difficult. I'm not speaking of any great high powered, officer-type decisions or decisive actions. I'm thinking of only those little day to day things like discouraging the use of first names from and to our subordinates.

Decisions like, not accepting shoddy maintenance in our patrol or troop, taking action when standards of dress and deportment are not met, no matter what organization an individual belongs to, not allowing your crew, patrol or troop orders to become discussions, i.e., lay out the tasks and ensure correct, timely completion and only one boss. This type of NCO performance should not have to be spelled out, however, I feel that we have lost some of the sense of urgency that is a part of soldiering.

Soldiers require supervision especially the younger soldiers. We, the supervisors, cannot be sure if the work is being done if we are sitting in the troop room trying to impress our troop officers. We will never be sure of the health and welfare of our men if we don't work with them, talk with them, as well as discipline them when necessary. The once a week troop leaders hour may not be enough to discuss things with our soldiers. We must stop believing our work is finished when the "normal working day" has ended and spend extra time developing our crewman, as required. Extra effort is also required practising our own skills and gaining more knowledge.

The following is quoted from the foreword to The RCAC School Information Booklet dated May 1947. This Foreword was written by Maj Gen C. Vokes, CB, CBE, DSO;

"The qualities of leadership may be summed up as follows:

- a. Loyalty to one's superiors;
- b. Self-discipline;
- c. Knowledge; and
- d. Physical fitness.

Loyalty to one's superiors means that you carry out their orders willingly and without bellyaching. As you give this to your superiors, so must you demand it from your subordinates.

Self-discipline is the best form of discipline. If you have no respect for constituted authority, you can never expect it from those you command.

Knowledge. Unless you know more than the men you lead, they will gradually give their allegiance to one who does. They will never follow you.

Physical Fitness. Without this you will never be able to stand the physical and mental strain of modern war. Your powers of endurance must be greater than those you aspire to lead."

Has anything really changed in thirty years?

There seems to be some "rot setting in" with respect to progression in rank. Some NCOs seem to think that progression requires little or no effort. The statement is often heard, "I've entered the promotion zone this year," as if all was required was to put in the time. We often also hear comments along the lines of, "How in hell did he get promoted?" He got promoted because he performed as a NCO and was reported on accordingly while others may have been sitting back waiting for time, the good fairy, good luck, new squadron commander or some such thing.

If we don't perform our supervisors have nothing to evaluate thus nothing to report. This is why some PERs end up as perfunctorily, estimated resumes.

I asked an officer, not long ago, why we find some officers going around "making noises like a lance corporal". His answer was, "The officers have lost faith in the knowledge and ability of some NCOs", or words to that effect. This is an unacceptable situation, if true. We, the NCOs, are expected to help train your officers and if we haven't got our crap straight we don't have a hope in hell of maintaining any credibility. Let's get off our butts, fellows, and perform at nothing less than excellent so that our supervisors can report accurately and easily with no estimations.

----- " ----- "



STANDARDS WRITING BOARD

Capt AR Robertson

The Combat Arms School had the privilege of hosting a Standards Writing Board during the period 12-22 Apr 77. The object of the board was to write Course Training Standards (CTS) for Armour Officer Classification Training/Crewman Trade and Specialty training and the drafting of revised Trade and Classification Specifications as required.

The board was organized in such a way that seven teams of two writers were assigned specific courses on which to write CTS under the Chairmanship of Major J.H. Heymans SO Armd Stds at FMC. The members themselves came from all across Canada with all regiments represented.

The writing teams were composed as follows:

- a. Armour Officer Classification Training; Maj W.A. Reid - NDHQ/DLP and Capt B. Hook - CAS.
- b. Squadron Commander; Maj W.A. Reid - NDHQ/DLP and Maj K.R.T. Seeley - CAS.
- c. Crewman TQ 6A Crew Commander; CWO R.G. Messer - 8CH and WO J.J. Doyle - CAS.
- d. Crewman TQ 6B Troop Warrant Officer; CWO R.B. Clark - NDHQ/DLP and MWO H.C. Sampson - CAS.
- e. Crewman TQ 7 Squadron Sergeant Major; CWO M. Pushkarenko - RSS and CWO W.L. Prouse - CAS.
- f. Advanced Armoured Driver; MWO Lemieux - 12e RBC and Sgt R. Jodoin - CAS.
- g. Combat Arms Advanced Gunner; WO Robichaud - 12e RBC and Capt D. Madill and WO R.J. Lynk - CAS.
- h. Combat Arms Advanced Communicator; Capt R.W. Jackson - LDSH(RC) and Capt N. Nickles and MWO T.T. MacDougal - CAS.
- j. Reconnaissance Instructor; CWO R.G. Messer - 8CH and WO J.J. Doyle - CAS.

After a hectic two weeks, the first draft was completed and the board retired - firmly convinced that it had been a difficult but rewarding task. It then fell to the Armour Department Standards Staff to convert the board's handy work into a second draft and forward to Maj Heymans in FMC. Providing the board's efforts are well received at command the Branch can look forward to receiving advance notice copies of the CTSs some time in the early fall period with their eventual publishing by NDHQ as Canadian Forces Publication.

This will mean that for the first time in a long time we in the Branch will have meaningful Specifications, Standards and Plans which relate one to another for the conduct of our training. WELL DONE!

WITHER WITH THE TANK

Major K. R. Black, RCD

"The problem is not, therefore, to suppress change, which cannot be done, but to manage it. ----- Ultimately to manage change we must anticipate it."

Toffler, Alvin, Future Shock (Bantam Books, 1970).

Now that the RCD has won the Canadian Army Trophy and we have put our money down for the Leopard C1 to be delivered starting in the summer of 1978, we should start to think of tanks in the more distant future. The replacement for the Leopard C1 is important but I would like to confine these remarks to a description of some of the ancillary items which we should see in the tank of the future, and maybe in the Leopard C1.

The Leopard tank first entered service in 1965. Its capabilities have evolved through the years with numerous improvement programs so that in 1978 the Leopard C1 will be the most technologically up-to-date tank in service. But, we are in the era of the microprocessor, charge coupled devices, liquid crystals and megabits and these "things" and many others are going to influence the design of tanks in the near future and the impact on tankers is going to be considerable. The following paragraphs will deal with some of these "things" that we may incorporate into the Leopard C1 and some that will have to wait for the successor to the Leopard C1.

First of all, night vision equipment will be available in the near future which will give better performance at night and in periods of poor visibility (smoke, fog) than we are presently getting in daylight. The tank thermal sight (TTS) will allow the gunner and commander to acquire targets at the maximum combat range and watch the round go down range through obscuration both by day and by night. For the driver, image intensification charge coupled devices combined with a holographic display will produce a three dimensional image right before his eyes. The commander will have a thermal imaging, stabilized sight which then laid on a target will keep the field of view stationary despite the movement of the turret. When ready, the commander will push a button and the gun will traverse and/or elevate on to his target and automatically fire and another button will return it to the gunners control. In the more distant future this stabilized sight will incorporate a miss distance sensor which will automatically measure how much the projectile is off the line of sight and, through the computer, the gun will be re-positioned to give a high probability of a second round hit.

To improve the chances of a first round hit tanks will be equipped with a muzzle reference system (MRS) as it is called in the UK and used on Chieftan. It is also called a "field adjustment device" by the German Army and an "error compensating system" by the US. In any case, the MRS (the UK had it first) generally consists of a light source that is reflected from a mirror on the muzzle end of the gun. That part is easy. The hard part is to detect the reflection and to adjust the sight cross-hairs to compensate for any error (equal time to the US) in the sight linkage, bending of gun tube, droop etc. In the near future this will be a manual field adjustment (I'm playing fair with the Germans too) by the gunner but the next tank will probably have a liquid crystal reticle which will automatically position itself to compensate for the errors.

The Leopard C1 will have an integrated fire control system which will use all the standard sensors but one of these will be almost useless. This is the crosswind sensor which is mounted on the turret. The future wind sensor will probably use laser technology to give an accurate crosswind reading down range where it counts. Other sensors will also be added and hooked up via the ubiquitous microprocessor. One of these may be an audio sensor which could detect a helicopter flying in the vicinity of the tank and warn the crew. Other sensors will detect laser range finders, laser designators, IR and radar. It may also be possible to detect the ignition of anti-tank guided missiles. Once detection has occurred the threat information will be displayed to the commander and the appropriate defence system will be automatically fired - unless overridden by the tank commander. The defence systems will include chaff, smoke, thermal flare and brilliant flash to mask the tank or confuse the attacking missile.

Another sensor which has been in development for a long time is identification friend or foe (IFF). In this system a tank detecting a suspect tank will be able to direct a interrogation signal at it and, if it is a friend, automatically receive the correct coded reply. An incorrect or nil reply could be followed by a fire order.

While we are thinking about signals, new radios will be very small, say, the size of a carton of cigarettes and new developments in antennae will permit directional signal radiation and range selectivity to give a type of radio silence to all but the receiving station. This directional radio could replace land line for the transmission of megabits for the command post computer. Fibre optics may also replace twenty-six pair cable for the same purpose in a static situation.

By now everyone has read about Chobham armour and how the Chieftain tanks being sold to Iran will be manufactured from Chobham armour. All new tanks will be made from this armour, or equivalent, giving significantly improved protection without an increase in weight. Chobham type armour will give the future tanks relative immunity from small chemical energy missiles. In turn, this will have an impact on infantry equipment and tactics.

In ammunition, the long rod penetrator commonly called armour piercing, fin stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSDS) will greatly increase the armour penetration capability of the 105mm tank gun without degrading accuracy or range. The US are expected to be in production this year with the first APFSDS (outside of Russia), designated M735E2.

The mobility of tanks will also be improved in the future. Tanks will have higher cross country speeds, greater acceleration, and improved agility through use of high horsepower (up to 2400 HP) turbine engines and new suspension and track systems.

The daily maintenance of future tanks will be reduced (compared to the Centurion they all look good) and simplified test equipment (STE) will be incorporated so that the first parade will require the driver to punch a series of buttons and the resulting display will tell him if his tank is operational or whether he needs to call a maintainer who will have his own automatic test equipment (ATE). As in the past, if you call the tiffy too often the squadron commander will call you STE/ATE/IC/*/!/!/!/.

There will be some improvement to crew comfort and welfare but not much. Helmets will be mandatory, - unless you like digging the hat badge out of your forehead - but they will be comfortable and they will be equipped with a tiny bone conduction microphone which will be tucked away inside the helmet. Seats will be more comfortable with better back support. The "boiling vessel" will be modernized but the lack of an "aux gen" will require the main engine to be run when it is used. In the future a silent auxiliary power generator will be provided. Tanks will not get any larger so that tankers may have to be selected by size and aptitude instead of good looks. Sanitary conveniences will not be convenient and NBC protection will be adequate - until the crew has to get out of the tank.

On the logistics side, ammunition handling to the tank will be easier and in the future ammunition compartmentalization may improve the problem in the tank. The tank will use diesel fuel but refuelling will be done at 50 gallons per minute through a pressure hose and connector similar to aircraft. Jerry cans will still be required. High usage spare assemblies will plug in quickly without the need for special tools.

Now that we have taken a quick, unclassified look at the future, what about the Leopard C1? In my opinion there are four items that are essential for the Leopard C1 to ensure that it is operationally effective into the late 1980's. These are:

- a. APFSDS. To penetrate potential enemy tanks manufactured with advanced armour plate this round is essential.
- b. TTS. We must be prepared to fight 24 hours a day and the tank thermal sight will give us that capability. The PZB 200 passive low light level TV sight on the Leopard C1 will give an interim capability until TTS is ready in the early 1980's.
- c. PERI R12. In conjunction with the TTS is the stabilized commanders sight which is known as the PERI R12 for the Leopard tanks. This sight, which through the computer incorporates a gun control system for the tank commander, will revolutionize the application of tank fire.
- d. MRS. The muzzle reference system will allow the gunner to boresight before firing each round thus greatly improving the hit probability.

This has been a brief look at a few of the devices which are being considered for the tank of the future. Not all of these will appear in any one tank as the cost would be prohibitive. There will be critics of this technological approach who consider that tanks must be kept simple to be effective. In any conflict we are likely to be opposed by massed troops and tanks which we cannot hope to match in quantity. We must use technology to help us make up in quality what we lack in quantity.

When you consider that a tank will have the sophistication of a fighter aircraft in the very near future, we must be prepared to make innovative changes in our tactics, administration, training, crew selection and above all, thinking. Are you ready?



Well Done R C D

EDITORS NOTE

The Royal Canadian Dragoons won the Canada Cup in April 1977. The Regiment is justly proud and the Corps is proud of them. To measure the confidence of this regiment the readers are invited to re-read the last paragraph of the article by Lt Moffat (P. 14) which was written before the competition. Fortune-telling anyone?

Flashback / Retrospective



Sure it's Worthy

But where
when
who

Bien sur c'est Worthy

Mais où
quand
qui

KNOW YOUR REGIMENTS/ CONNAIS TES REGIMENTS

THE ELGIN REGIMENT (RCAC)

Regimental March: "I'm Ninety-Five"
Trumpet Band March: "Waltzing Matilda"

Motto: Officium Primum

BATTLE HONOURS

First World War: Somme, 1916, Arras, 1917,
Ypres, 1917, Amiens.

Second World War: Sicily, 1943, Italy,
1943-1945, North-West
Europe, 1944-1945.

Perpetuates the 91st Battalion, Canadian
Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919.

Headquarters - St Thomas, Ontario

ORGANIZATION

The Regiment originated on 14 Sep 1866 when the "25th 'Elgin Battalion of Infantry" was authorized to be formed from five independent companies. It was redesignated "25th Elgin Regiment", 8 May 1900. It was disbanded on 1 Aug 1903 but was reorganized as the "25th Regiment" on 17 May 1904. It was redesignated "The Elgin Regiment", 1 Apr 1920, and was converted and redesignated "The Elgin Regiment (27th Armoured Regiment)", 1 Oct 1954, "The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)", 19 May 1958.

HISTORY

Early History. During the South African War, 1899-1902, the Regiment contributed volunteers to several units.

THE ELGIN REGIMENT (RCAC)

Marche du régiment: "I'm Ninety-Five"
Marche pour le corps de trompettes: "Waltzing
Matilda"

Devise: Officium Primum

TITRES DE GUERRE

Première Guerre mondiale: Somme: Arras
(1916),
Ypres
(1917),
Amiens
(1917)

Seconde Guerre mondiale: Sicile (1943),
Italie (1943-
1945), Nord-
ouest de l'Europe
(1944-1945)

Il immortalise le 91st Battalion, Canadian
Expeditionary Force (1914-1919)

Quartier général - St-Thomas en Ontario

FORMATION

Le Régiment est créé le 14 septembre 1866 lorsque le 25th 'Elgin Battalion of Infantry" est autorisé à être formé à partir de cinq compagnies indépendantes. Il est rebaptisé "25th Elgin Regiment" le 8 mai 1900. Il est dissout le 1er août 1903 mais il est reconnu sous le nom de "25th Regiment" le 17 mai 1904. Il est une fois de plus baptisé "L'Elgin Regiment" le 1er avril 1920, converti et reconnu sous le nom de "The Elgin Regiment (27th Armoured Regiment)" le 1er octobre 1954

NO FLOWERS FOR A SOLDIER

Master Corporal
Earl Gordon Briggs C.D.

I will see you all, now and evermore,
My family, my friends, and foes no more -
For reasons of glory we all must unfold:
"The Canadian Nation is the Sword of the Lord."

Let mysteries unknown, become words to be told,
Where Justice is swift, and truth is bold -
We shall stand anew, a family of One,
Given to all nations and divided by none.

Serve Her well, for she is glorious and free,
This Canada of You, and all souls to be -
Betrayed by greed, enslaved through lust,
Her eyes shall ascend to see: 'a deed of trust.'

Blessed you are, the strange and the brave,
For your shield is Peace, while your mind is Love.
Did you weep for someone? Did you pray for anyone?
Stand then, and say to yourself: "the Lord is with me."

Those who take me to my grave, take me to my rest:
Another deed, another will, ending its test -
Tell the children: All flowers are holy,
While my family and friends know:
"All soldiers know glory..."

The Unknown Becomes Known,

John Dale Quigley

MCpl Briggs died after a brief illness on 9 May 77. He served with the RCD, LDSH(RC),
SCH and CAS in Canada, Germany and Cyprus.

AN ARMOUR SONG

(TUNE: MY BOY WILLIE)

THE ARMoured CORPS ROLLS ALONG
WITH BARRELS SPITTING FIRE
THE TANKS THEY TURN UP MUD AND GORE
AND CHASE THE ENEMY TO THE SHORE.

CHORUS:

SO BASH ON LADS, ASSAULT ONCE MORE
IN THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARMoured CORPS
THROUGH THE MUD AND BLOOD
TO THE GREEN FIELD BEYOND.

THE WATCHFUL SPRINGBOK WILL PREVAIL
WHERE OTHERS ATTEMPT AND OFTEN FAIL
THE RCD'S HAVE SHOWN THEIR MIGHT
IN ALWAYS FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT.

THE LORD STRATHCONA'S ARE FROM THE WEST
THE REGIMENT IS ONE OF THE BEST
TO PERSEVERE AND ALWAYS SUCCEED
NO MATTER WHAT MAY BE THE DEED.

THE 8TH HUSSARS DOWN ON THE COAST
ALTHOUGH THEY'RE NEW THIS IS THEIR BOAST
THAT THEY'RE AS GOOD AS THE VERY BEST
OF THE REGIMENTS TO THE WEST.

FROM WINNIPEG THE GARRY'S CAME
TO PETAWAWA'S ROLLING PLAIN
THEIR HONOURED NAME REVIVED ONCE MORE
AS AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE CORPS.

THE ARMoured CORPS ROLLS ALONG
WITH BARRELS SPITTING FIRE
THE TANKS THEY TURN UP MUD AND GORE
AND CHASE THE ENEMY TO THE SHORE.



First World War, 1914-1919. The Regiment contributed to the 1st Battalion, CEF, upon its formation in September 1914 and later recruited for the 18th, 33rd and 91st Battalion, CEF. The 91st Battalion provided reinforcements for the Canadian Corps in the field.

Second World War, 1939-1945. The Regiment mobilized "The Elgin Regiment, C.A.S.F." on 24 May 1940. This unit was converted and redesignated "25th Armoured Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)", 26 Jan 1942. It embarked for the United Kingdom on 29 Sep 1942 as a unit of the 3rd Armoured Brigade, 4th Canadian Armoured Division. The 1st Canadian Tank Delivery Squadron (formed from "B" Squadron 25th Armoured Regiment (The Elgin Regiment) on 6 May 1943) landed in Sicily on 16 Jul 1943, and in Italy on 14 Sep 1943. The unit was converted and redesignated "25th Canadian Tank Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)", 15 Sep 1943, and on 21 Oct 1943 the 1st Canadian Tank Delivery Squadron was reorganized as two squadrons of it. On 15 Mar 1944 it was redesignated "25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)". One squadron landed in Normandy on 8 Jun 1944, followed by Headquarters and other squadrons in July 1944. The squadrons in Italy moved to North-West Europe in March 1945. The active battalion was disbanded on 15 Feb 1946. A 2nd Battalion served in the Reserve Army.

et de "L'Elgin Regiment (Blindés) le 19 mai 1958.

HISTORIQUE

Débuts. Lors de la Guerre du Transvaal (1899-1902), le Régiment détache des volontaires à plusieurs unités.

Première Guerre mondiale (1914-1919). Le Régiment détache des hommes au 1st Battalion, CEF, à sa formation en septembre 1914 et plus tard en recrute pour les 18th, 33rd et 91st Battalion, CEF. Le 91st Battalion fournit des renforts au Canadiennes Corps au front.

Seconde Guerre mondiale (1939-1945). Le Régiment mobilise de "L'Egin Régiment, C.A.S.F." le 24 mai 1940. L'unité est convertie et reconnue sous le nom de "25th Armoured Régiment (L'Elgin Régiment)" le 26 janvier 1942. Il s'embarque pour le Royaume-Uni le 29 septembre 1942 comme unité de la 3rd Armoured Brigade, 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Le 1st Canadian Tank Delivery Squadron (formé à partir de l'Escadron "B" du 25th Armoured Regiment (l'Elgin Régiment) le 6 mai 1943) débarque en Sicile le 16 juillet 1943 et en Italie le 14 septembre 1943. L'unité est convertie et reconnue sous le nom de "25th Canadian Tank Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)" le 15 Septembre 1943, 35 13 21 octobre 1943, le 1st Canadian Tank Delivery Squadron est réorganisé comme deux de ses escadrons. Le 15 mars 1944, il est rebaptisé "25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)". Un escadron débarque en Normandie le 8 juin 1944 suivi du quartier général et des autres escadrons en juillet 1944. Les escadrons basés en Italie se déplacent vers le nord-ouest de l'Europe en mars 1945. Le bataillon d'active est dissout le 15 février 1946. Un second bataillon sert dans la Réserve.

ANSWERS / RESPONSES

Class: Recruit classes #5 & 6 & 7 July 1948 Borden

Names: Left to Right

Front Row: Forbes Small, Unknown, Teacrop, Teacrop, Crome, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Allard, Unknown, MacKay, Morrison, Malone, Jewkes, Matteman, Stewart/Verner?, Thompson, Unknown, Charrand, Unknown, Smith, Unknown, Glendinning, Unknown, Unknown, Blanchard

Middle Row: Levesque, Barr, Ripley, Smith, Unknown, Unknown, McMullin, Panideau, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Jones, Preston, Unknown, Unknown, Ross, McGee, Unknown, Lenson, Simpson, Daigle, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Griffin, Unknown, Nichol, Unknown, Anderson, Unknown, Searle, Cooper

Rear Row: Thornton, Unknown, Unknown, Dent, Unknown, Unknown, Westerguard, Bryans, Dzioba, Unknown, Lesperance, Unknown, MacDonald, Clements, Barr, Smith, Leblanc/Lionel?, Unknown, Gray, Unknown, Scott, Morrison, Unknown, Morgan, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Unknown, Prokopetz, Harris

Answers to ADV Recognition Test

1. BTR 60 - Russian
2. HS 30 - German
3. EBR 75 - French
4. Jagdpanzer Rakette - German
5. BMD - Russian
6. AML 90 - French

Responses a l'Identification des Vehicules Blindes

- BTR 60 - Russe
- HS 30 - Allemand
- EBR 75 - Francais
- Jagdpanzer Rakette - Allemand
- BMD - Russe
- AML 90 - Francais